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WHEN DO STATES ADOPT REALIST OR  
LIBERAL FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD ONGOING WARS?  
AN ANALYSIS USING WORLDVIEWS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate  
School of The Ohio State University

By

Thomas S. Mowle, M.A.

\*\*\*\*\*

The Ohio State University  
1996

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Approved by



Adviser

Political Science Graduate Program

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## ABSTRACT

One of the leading debates in international relations concerns whether realism or liberalism better models state behavior. This dissertation contributes to this debate by reformulating these leading theories of international politics into a theory of foreign policy behavior. This "competing worldview theory" argues that liberalism and realism are distinct and coherent worldviews potentially held by the leadership of independent states. It deduces characteristics of those ontologies from the leading theories of international politics. When decision makers receive information, such as from observation of a war in the "external environment," the national leaders will develop a single definition of the situation. This initial problem representation will strongly predispose the national leadership toward certain types of reactive behavior. The dissertation then sets forth several hypotheses as to the circumstances under which foreign policy is based on liberalism or realism. Using official statements issued by the governments of the United States, Canada, and India, the dissertation tests those hypotheses to determine the conditions under which states tend to adopt a liberal foreign policy.

The results of this analysis generally support the hypotheses set forth by realists: states tend to adopt a liberal foreign policy when addressing a war that does not involve an ally, a rival, or a fellow democracy. They also tend to adopt liberal foreign policies when their economy is growing relative to economic competitors and when their security has been guaranteed by a great power. These results do not seem to apply to India; the final analysis included only the United States and Canada. The worldviews identified in the text seem to correspond to state

action: states whose leaders are issuing liberal policy statements tend to participated in multilateral action; those whose leaders are issuing realist policy statements tend to act unilaterally. It appears that states may be somewhat more likely to intervene into wars when the decision makers' perspective is closer to the liberal ideal than to the realist ideal.

**Dedicated to my wife, Janice**

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I would like to thank Colonel Douglas Murray and the United States Air Force for sponsoring me to this Ph.D. program. The contents of this dissertation are my own, and do not represent the official views of the United States Air Force Academy, the Department of Defense, or any of its subordinate subdivisions.

Finally, but most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Janice, and my daughters Elyse and Adrien, for keeping me sane through this process by supporting me and reminding me that there are more important things in life than academic research.

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3. Thomas S. Mowle, "Non-State Actors." In Christopher Carr and Donald Jordan, eds., *International Relations and U.S. Security Policy*. U.S. Air Force Academy Textbook, (1993).
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## FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

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## INTRODUCTION

Do the foreign policies of nation-states better correspond to liberal or realist theories of international relations? Under what conditions are nation-states' policies more realist or more liberal? These questions are at the core of the current debate between realism and liberalism. It is difficult to answer these questions if we only look at state "actions:"<sup>1</sup> realism allows for some cooperation between states, and no liberal asserts that cooperation is universal. Nonsystematic archival archeology can also be inconclusive. For example, was Neville Chamberlain acting as a realist or a liberal at Munich? Some citations make him sound rather realist;<sup>2</sup> other statements sound more liberal.<sup>3</sup> Scholars even differ over how to interpret U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Layne and Schwarz (1993: 5) assert that U.S. foreign policy has been "liberal internationalist" since 1950's NSC 68, which said U.S. strategy was "designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish." Yet Mearsheimer (1995: 5) sees Clinton's "neo-Wilsonism" as a change from Cold War "balance of power politics." Each of these scholars seems to believe he can recognize a liberal or realist policy when they see it, but mere illustration does not prove their arguments. A systematic attempt to distinguish between them will help resolve this long-standing debate between realism and liberalism.

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<sup>1</sup>By "actions," we refer to behavior such as going to war, signing a treaty, or leasing destroyers to a combatant state. This project emphasizes the statements of foreign policy issued by states, which are another form of state behavior (Hermann, 1978).

<sup>2</sup>He described the issues as "a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing," and added "However much we may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbour, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in a war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that." (Jervis, 1976: 105)

<sup>3</sup>"I sincerely believe that we have at last opened the way to that general appeasement which alone can save the world from chaos." (Herz, 1964: 301).

I deduce a theory of foreign policy, which I call "competing worldview theory," from these competing theories of international politics. The domain of this study is reactions to "foreign wars," defined as a paraphrase of the definition used by SIPRI (Sollenberg, 1995: 20): *a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where armed force is used between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, and neither initial party is the government or citizenry of the state observing the war.*<sup>4</sup> The focus on warfare is intentional. Reactions to war lie near the core of realist thought. A finding that liberal worldviews seem to influence decision makers in this issue area would be more significant than finding them in economic relations. This subject area is also a good choice because wars are more discrete and observable events than economic issues. Selection of cases need not be biased by only examining events in which states took a strong position, as might be the case in other issue areas.<sup>5</sup>

But why limit this study to "foreign wars?" There are strong methodological and substantive reasons for doing so. Methodologically, we should try to keep the question under study as constant as possible. In a system of 180 states, whenever a war occurs, the question facing the leaders of 178 of them (179 in the case of internal wars) is "How does this conflict affect my state? How should I react to it, if at all?" One state faces the question "Can I defend myself, and how?" If an international war, a second state faces the question "How can I coerce this state into acceding to my demands as quickly as possible?" These latter two questions are very interesting, but this study will not confound them into the first, and more frequent, question. This approach moves closer to Riker's (1977: 28-9) advice: science progresses better when examining patterns in small, repeated events than when trying to "generalize about huge events which turn out to belong to classes with very few members."

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<sup>4</sup>See chapter 2 for further discussion of this definition.

<sup>5</sup>See Meernick (1994) on the problems of selection bias in evaluating foreign policy decisions.

The substantive basis for this choice is also compelling. Our discipline has paid too little attention to the issue of interventions into wars, even though all major wars begin as a conflict between only two states.<sup>6</sup> The decisions of "bystanders" were very important to the outcome of the Austro-Serbian war of 1914, the German-Polish war of 1939, the internal war in Korea in 1950, and the Iraq-Kuwait war of 1990, not to mention the ongoing wars in former Yugoslavia.<sup>7</sup> Some "realists" are fond of citing Wolfers (1962: 13) that everyone is a realist when "the house is on fire." Perhaps, and it is also said that "there are no atheists in foxholes:" but what study of religious beliefs would limit itself to the trenches of Verdun and the siege of Khe Sanh? To understand behavior, we should look at reactions when others' "houses are on fire." Do others try to assist in extinguishing the fire and save the residents? Do they only do so if the fire is in an upwind neighbor? Do they organize a volunteer fire department for future contingencies, or stock buckets and hope the well doesn't run dry? If an arsonist is afoot, do they form a posse, or at least a neighborhood watch, or sit at home with Smith & Wesson?

State leaders may choose to intervene or not intervene in a war from either a liberal or realist perspective. One cannot infer their worldview from the observation of intervention or inaction -- many behaviors may reflect either realist or liberal concerns. If we examine the rationales for the behavior, however, we can begin to build a more general theory of interventions into wars; perhaps even the framework for a more general theory of international behavior. Before we reach that point, however, we must establish that the "policy rationales"

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<sup>6</sup>Levy (1989: 216) notes that the issue of how states react to external wars -- and in particular, when they intervene in them -- is a neglected area of research. This question, however, was a major focus of Blainey (1988) and has also been examined by Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Alteld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1982), Butterworth (1978), Eberwein (1982), Eckhardt and Azar (1978), Gochman and Long (1983), Haas (1983), Kim (1991), Pearson (1974a, 1974b), Raymond and Kegley (1987), Siverson and King (1980), Cusack and Eberwein (1982), Gochman and Maoz (1984), Kegley and Raymond (1986), and Kaw (1990). Alker and Greenberg (1976) and Alker and Christenson (1972) examine circumstances under which the United Nations intervenes in wars.

<sup>7</sup>This study will continue to observe the behavior of initial bystanders, even after they choose to become involved in a foreign war.

observed in this analysis reflect more than mere rhetoric. If the policy statements from which we have inferred a worldview do not bear any relevance to state actions, then we have only a theory of propaganda. But if the actions taken are consistent with the expressed perspectives, then this "competing worldview theory" will have helped advance the study of international politics, and of foreign policy behavior in particular.

That discussion, however, must await the final chapters of the dissertation. While we should not accept these premises on faith, let us conditionally accept them and prepare a systematic evaluation of them. The first chapter elaborates on the gaps in the current debate, arguing that realism and liberalism can be translated into distinct perspectives or worldviews that could be held by a state's decision makers. This perspective is the dependent variable in this theory.<sup>8</sup> The chapter also discusses why these perspectives can be expected to guide nation-states' policy, and why they can be observed in official statements about foreign wars. Finally, it sets forth a basis for identifying these worldviews in such statements. The second chapter describes a methodology for systematically distinguishing realist from liberal policy statements, and proposes several hypotheses (drawn from the existing literature) regarding the circumstances under which states' policies will tend to be more realist or more liberal. The third chapter describes the selection of nation-states, wars, and texts to use in this analysis. The fourth chapter describes the results of the analysis. The fifth chapter addresses questions of validity, in particular that of relating actions to perspectives. What were the actions of the selected states with respect to conflicts toward which they displayed a liberal perspective, as compared to those toward which they displayed realism? The sixth and final chapter discusses the implications of these findings for future studies of international behavior.

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<sup>8</sup>This deductive approach appears to be a more plausible basis for constructing theory than an inductive approach. For an attempt to construct an "operational code" at the individual level, see George (1979) and section 2.1.2 below. For an attempt to induce ideological "paradigms," see Taber (1992) and section 2.1.5 below.



## CHAPTER 1

### A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY

#### 1.1 The Current Debate: Neorealism and Neoliberalism

The ongoing debate between "neorealists" and "neoliberal institutionalists" has three weaknesses; this study addresses each of them. These theories may have become entangled in debate for the same reasons as those Geddes (1991: 54-58) describes in the field of political development: selective use of data in their development, ideological predisposition reduces the degree of scrutiny by their advocates, reluctance to sully pure deduction with facts, and avoiding hypothesis-testing as long as possible. This dissertation would answer all four of these obstacles to theory building.

The first weakness is that some research assumes that one theory is universally applicable. Both Grieco (1993b) and Keohane (1993) tend to argue that their preferred model better explains international politics during and after the Cold War. They do not consider whether each might only be applicable during part of that time period, or if each might apply to different groups of states in different situations. Keohane (1993: 273) advises moving beyond this assumption: instead of emphasizing "if realists are right..., if institutionalists are right..." we should study *how* institutions make a difference. Baldwin (1993: 22) likewise advises us to study the "conditions that promote or inhibit international cooperation."

Another weakness seems to be a reluctance to systematically investigate state behavior, as opposed to constructing models (Powell, 1991; Snidal, 1991; Stein, 1993) or relying on illustrative evidence (Keohane, 1993; Grieco, 1993b). This reluctance may follow from Waltz's

1979 warning not to confuse his neorealist theory of international relations with a theory of foreign policy.<sup>9</sup> It is reasonable to distinguish theories of international politics from theories of foreign policy (1986: 121),<sup>10</sup> but many interesting questions lie in the area of foreign policy. The purely structural theory can demonstrate only that balances tend to form among states and that changes in the number of great powers strongly affect unit behavior. An extension of these propositions into foreign policy would help explain *which* balances form and *how* changes in the number of great powers affect unit behavior. Waltz's comment that one would not expect a "theory of universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf" (1986: 121) is provocative, but inapt. States -- especially strong states -- shape unit behavior in a manner more comparable to planets and moons than to falling leaves.<sup>11</sup>

While one can overcome both of these problems simply by changing the research focus, a third problem is less tractable. Typically, scholars collect evidence of macro behavior, such as agreements reached or not reached and alliances honored or ignored. Grieco (1990: 177-80) searches for cases and deduces the state motivation from observed behavior, based on the "logical consequences" of alternative behaviors. Keohane (1993: 283) uses similar methods of inference: "To make a plausible case for [relative gains] motivations, the analysts must show that the state or states resisting cooperation could have reasonably expected to be disadvantaged, in a future period, by the gains made in this current period by its potential partners." But neither theory is determinate: many foreign policy behaviors are consistent with

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<sup>9</sup>The realist tradition is, of course, much richer than Waltz's structural version (Wolforth, 1995: 102).

<sup>10</sup>Although, as Ripley (1993) sets forth, realism and theories of foreign policy are not so much contradictory as incompatible: they operate at different levels of analysis.

<sup>11</sup>In any case, scholars regularly ignore this warning. Mearsheimer (1990) explores the policies of European states after the end of the Cold War. Krasner (1993) examines differences in policies in different issue areas of telecommunications. Hellmann and Wolf (1993), in one of the most rigorous (but still rather inconclusive) tests of neorealism and neoliberalism, try to predict whether NATO will survive the end of the Cold War. Mastanduno (1991) tries to understand U.S. trade policy with Japan.

both theories, and neither predicts specific responses to given situations.<sup>12</sup> Keohane and Grieco use the same macro behavior -- Australian, Canadian, and Argentine opposition to a steel antidumping agreement with the US and EC -- to support their position. Grieco (1993b: 327) sees this as evidence of a concern for relative gains by the smaller powers, who might lose ground relative to the larger economies. Keohane (1993: 280) suggests that the smaller powers did not expect to "catch up" to the larger ones; instead they were holding out for larger absolute gains. Grieco and Keohane cannot resolve their disagreement because they consider only the terms of the agreement, how the terms change over time, and the fact of opposition. Keohane (1993: 279) describes this as the central ambiguity of bargaining: "two parties that are indifferent to one another's welfare will behave, at the margin, *as if* they care about relative gains." One cannot infer interests and motivations from examining macro behavior: this is a naive use of revealed preferences (see Sen, 1986; Jervis, 1988: 322-3), where tactical behavior may mask the underlying strategy. Instead, one must try to ascertain how the problem and the interests at stake were subjectively perceived. Keohane states that both sides need a theory of interests (1993: 285); what is truly required is a comparison of the perspective of the actual decision makers with the interests assumed by realist and liberal theory.

This study infers liberal and realist policy from the public statements of state leaders. While this source of data, like all data, may not be perfect, there are several reasons for choosing it. The most basic is simply that no other behavior allows for clear inference of liberalism or realism. Grieco's search for "logical consequences" assumes that his rationality aligns with the rationality of the leaders in question. Perhaps recognizing this problem, some of the best examinations of the realist-liberal distinction themselves fall back on statements. Mastanduno (1991) bases most of his argument on statements made by officials of federal agencies. Hellman and Wolf (1993) use a variety of statements to investigate the future of

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<sup>12</sup>"The fundamental ambiguity [is] that bargaining for a larger share of overall benefits, and for relative gains, may be indistinguishable" (Keohane, 1993: 280).

NATO. Even Grieco (1990: 182-3) says "One sort of evidence suggesting defensive positionalism on the part of the EC concerns the arguments it presented in explaining its approach to the TBT and GPR accords. ...one would expect to observe EC expressions of dissatisfaction with its share of joint gains." In a footnote, he adds that "most arguments made by code signatories at committee meetings are based on prepared statements developed after inter-departmental deliberation at home capitals" which they can later review and amplify. These scholars, however, do not make systematic use of these statements.

Studies of foreign policy decision making suggest additional reasons to accept public statements as indicators of policy. Hermann (1978) argues that we must define foreign policy in terms of observable behavior, not unobservable "goals." If foreign policy behavior is "the discrete purposeful action that results from the political level decision of an individual or group of individuals," (34) then foreign policy is the political level decision itself. Statements -- a form of behavior -- made about that decision will be more likely to conform to the decision than macro behavior that has passed through the state apparatus. Public statements, he says, can be aggregated to discover trends in policy stances (43). Statements may also be valid reflections of policy because leaders may be reluctant to issue statements that do not conform with policy because they can become "entrapped" in their rhetoric (Snyder, 1991: 42).<sup>13</sup> Brecher (1972) also asserts that leaders can come to believe in their rhetoric. The most important reason to use public statements as an indicator of foreign policy, however, is that they contain a description of the situation that reflects the underlying perspective of the decision-makers. The next section describes a theory of foreign policy based on these perspectives.

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<sup>13</sup>Much of the uproar when President Reagan's arms transfers to Iran in the mid-1980s came to light surrounded the inconsistency of this policy with his public refusal to "negotiate with terrorists."

## 1.2 Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making

### 1.2.1 A Brief Review of the Field

While the question of perspectives has deep roots in theories of foreign policy decision making, it has recently been "rediscovered." This section offers an overview of this subfield; Gerner (1995) provides a fuller history. Previous theories in this area have tended to emphasize the process by which individuals and groups select a course of action from among possible alternatives. This was the main approach of Snyder and Paige's work on Korea (1958), one of the first extensive case studies in the decision-making subfield. As Allison (1971) has illustrated, policy makers could base their decisions on a "rational" evaluation of means and ends, on the interplay of bureaucratic politics, or on more personal factors. His work begins after the decision-makers perceive a problem: "Why did the Soviet Union place strategic offensive missiles in Cuba?" (1971:1) By so structuring the situation, Allison specifies that the problem facing U.S. decision makers was "how should we respond to the *strategic offensive missiles in Cuba?*"

This approach to decision making directs one to focus on either the quality of the decision making process or on factors that influence that process. Janis (1982), and subsequent works such as Herek, Janis and Huth (1987), and C. Hermann (1993) epitomize the first tradition by examining the phenomenon of groupthink, wherein a group focuses on a single solution to a problem without adequately considering alternatives. Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan (1987) examine decision making in different decision units. They argue that the nature of the "ultimate decision unit" influences the process and outcome of foreign policy. If a single predominant leader makes the decision, then M. Hermann (1993) guides one to examine whether or not that leader is sensitive to the situation or guided by an ideology. If the leader is sensitive, then relations with other advisors will be important in understanding his or her decisions; if not, one need look primarily at the leader's own beliefs and motivations. If a single group makes the

decision, C. Hermann (1993) examines the group's procedures for managing conflict. If they try to avoid conflict, groupthink is likely to result; if they try to resolve all conflict, a bureaucratic deadlock is likely to result. The process is only likely to be efficient when group conflict is accepted, such as by using a majority vote instead of unanimity or consensus to reach a final decision. He emphasizes, however, that an "effective" group can still make decisions that have "poor" outcomes, while groupthinkers can lock onto an "effective" decision. Finally, if decisions are to be made by multiple autonomous actors, the decision unit is likely to deadlock unless the actors employ some form of bargaining or one actor can successfully transform the decision unit into one of the other forms (Hagan, 1988).

The other major emphasis in foreign policy decision making has been to study how various factors influence decisions. Rosenau (1971) emphasized the importance of including many dimensions, from the individual's characteristics to governmental structure, societal values, the domestic economy, and external inputs. While this dissertation remains less comprehensive than his vision, it does incorporate a broader range of factors than many other approaches do.

Some emphasize the external inputs. Hudson, Hermann, and Singer (1989) constructed a model based on the type of situation facing the state. The relevant variables in their research are prior affect between one's state and the others involved, the salience of the issue, and the relative distribution of capabilities among the states. The variables interact with the specific situation: a confrontation between two states, an intervention between others, a request for assistance, a response to such a request, or an attempt at collaboration. These rules (developed into a computational model in Hudson (1991)) predict the instrument used and the recipient of state action rather well. One difficulty is that the nature of the situation is rather subjective -- it depends on the perspective of the state. Moon (1985) rebuts claims that weak states form their policies in compliance with the wishes of stronger states. Such bargaining models assume that the strong state has the tools to reward or punish the weak state, and that the strong state can

skillfully calibrate those tools. The bargaining also assumes that the decision makers in the weak state face no constraints on their behavior and are free to meet the whims of the strong state. Neither of these conditions holds, but Moon does argue that elites in developing countries are socialized into a "dependent consensus," wherein they support the core states' positions on most issues without bargaining.

Others emphasize domestic factors. Moon (1987) suggests that capitalist states use appeals to "national interest" to conceal their real goals: foster capital accumulation and maintain their legitimacy. Lake (1992) looks to the nature of the domestic regime. Non-democratic states exhibit hostility toward democratic states because they want to force them to extract more "rent" from society, lest the more efficient democratic states become dominant over them. When wars start, however, the democracies tend to win because they have more popular support, stronger economies, and more room to switch to a war economy -- all because they extract lower rents in peacetime. Yergin and Gustafson (1993) also rely primarily on domestic factors in constructing hypothetical paths for the future of Russia.

Finally, some examine the structure of the government in more detail. Hagan (1993) emphasizes the nature of opposition -- which can be present in all regimes. Opposition can affect the government's willingness to commit resource, its degree of accommodation, and its foreign assertiveness. A fragmented regime can preclude a strong commitment. The impact of opposition is modified by how it is channeled in the political system and how vulnerable the regime is to the opposition. Maoz and Russett (1993) suggest that democracies can only mobilize support for war when they can convince people that there is a real threat; only non-democracies make plausible enemies. These constraints would be stronger on a coalition government than in a majority parliamentary or presidential system. They conclude, however, that an even stronger determinant of the democratic peace is that states externalize domestic political norms unless dealing with a different regime type. The more established a democracy is, the less likely it is to treat another democracy with suspicion.

### 1.2.2 Worldviews and Problem Representations

Those emphasizing psychological factors argue that Allison (1971) and works like it beg an important question: Why did American decision makers interpret the evidence on hand as *Soviet strategic offensive missiles*? Outcomes are important, but it is equally important to discover how the decision-makers understand the situation. As Taber (forthcoming: 1) puts it, "The initial definition of the situation strongly constrains future behavior;" so we must investigate "how...individual decision makers within the larger organizational structure interpret the information they receive as inputs." This "generational change," as described by Neack, Hey, and Haney (1995), is more of a re-emphasis than a new argument. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin asserted

The situation is defined by the actor...in terms of the way the actor...relates himself to other actors, to possible goals, and to possible means, and in terms of the way means and ends are formed into strategies of action... These ways of relating himself to the situation (and thus of defining it) will depend on the nature of the actor—or his orientations... The actions of other actors, the actor's goals and means, and the other components of the situation are related meaningfully by the actor. His action flows from his definition of the situation (1962: 64-5).

Brecher (1972) also argued that an "attitudinal prism" separates the "objective" operational environment from the perceived psychological environment. Decision making occurs within the psychological, not the objective, environment. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin's orientations and Brecher's attitudes are equivalent to the perspectives of this theory. In current research, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin's definition of the situation is redefined as a problem representation, created as individuals use heuristics<sup>14</sup> and analogies to develop an understanding of a new foreign policy problem. This "situation description" includes a label for the situation, a description of its features, the current and preferred goals of policy, and a description of the consequences if the policy is left unchanged (Sylvan, Majeski, Millikin, 1991: 328).

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<sup>14</sup>For a full explanation of heuristics, see Sherman and Corty (1984).



Keohane argues that we must understand theory because theory implicitly guides policy making:

No one can cope with the complexities of world politics without the aid either of a theory or of implicit assumptions and propositions that substitute, however poorly, for theory. Reality has to be ordered into categories, and relationships drawn between events (1986: 4)

Theory always informs the set of assumptions and biases through which decision makers view the world. Goldstein and Keohane (1993) call these assumptions and biases "worldviews;" these limit the range of alternatives that can be considered by a policy maker.<sup>15</sup> Realism and liberalism can each be translated into such a perspective. This "competing perspective theory" of foreign policy proceeds from the fact that realism and liberalism each constitute a coherent worldview, defined as the ontology through which decision makers interpret events in world politics.<sup>16</sup> This ontology filters inputs from the external environment to create a problem representation or a definition of the situation. These problem representations, revealed in statements made about the conflict, can be classified as liberal or realist -- allowing us to infer which perspective was held by the state leadership at different times.<sup>17</sup> These findings then can

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<sup>15</sup>With this insight, Goldstein and Keohane are moving toward the arguments that have been developed over the past fifteen years by Sylvan and Biddle (1979), Herrmann (1988), Thorson (1984), Sylvan and Thorson (1992), Taber (forthcoming), Voss (forthcoming), Beasley (1994) and many others. Indeed, Keohane's statement bears a striking resemblance to Voss' (forthcoming: 1-2) position that "individuals construct models or representations of their environment," based on perceptions, motivations, learning, knowledge, beliefs, and experiences, which "provide some sense of stability" for an individual, allow the decision-maker to "be better able to satisfy his or her own needs or goals...[and]...mediate...actions and policy choices."

<sup>16</sup>Vasquez (1987) describes "realpolitik hardliners" and "accommodationist softliners" as competing perspectives; these are similar to realism and liberalism. Kegley (1995) discusses a third potential worldview, the Marxist/structuralist perspective. This worldview will not be addressed here because it seems unlikely to obtain in the official policy of industrial democracies. If this research programme eventually expands to include the Soviet Union or other states where this perspective might be more likely to be found, this third option will be included.

<sup>17</sup>We must be quite clear on this point. This project does not attempt to measure motivations. It observes a specific behavior, namely certain statements of representatives of the national government. It then infers, based on observable characteristics of those statements, that those issuing the statement appears to be operating within a particular worldview.

be used to evaluate hypotheses taken "off-the-shelf" about the conditions under which realism or liberalism should operate.

This study does not claim that states, or even a particular government in one, can be classified as "realist" or "liberal."<sup>18</sup> As with their mercantilist and liberal counterparts in trade policy, the two models would not have survived as long as they have if they did not both contain some elements of plausibility. Rather, contextual elements will shape which lens the decision-makers adopt. For example, it may turn out that increasing the proximity of a war increases the tendency to view it from a realist perspective. For some governments, the "proximity" threshold may be much lower than others. The members of some governments may tend to take a liberal view more often than those of other governments, holding context constant. Nevertheless, we expect that any government may at times display a liberal perspective and at other times a realist perspective. The goal is to learn what those conditions are.

Simon (1969: 68-72) argues that the key step in solving a complex problem is to break it down into smaller, more manageable ones. Decision-makers use an iterative process to structure an ill-structured problem. An ill-structured problem is one in which the initial state, desired state, or the needed transformations between the two are unknown to the problem-solver (Taylor, 1974: 632). This is in contrast to a well-structured problem, such as an algebraic equation or a crossword puzzle, in which all of those elements are familiar to the solver. The incidence of a foreign war is likely to present an ill-structured problem: the initial state may be uncertain, the desired outcome may need to be developed, or the steps one would take to bring about the desired outcome must be determined.<sup>19</sup> Depending on how decision makers assess these aspects, the foreign war may not even be a "problem" at all, either as Taylor defines it -- a situation where there is a conflict between current state and desired state (1974: 632) -- or as

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<sup>18</sup>Thus it is different that Hagan's (1993) roles and orientations, which seem more permanent.

<sup>19</sup>This view is shared by Bonham and Shapiro (1994).

Thorson does -- a situation in which an agent is uncertain or ignorant of how to resolve the discrepancy between the current state and the goal state (forthcoming: 3).

To solve an ill-structured problem, the problem solver must try to convert it into a well-structured problem: he or she can seek more information about the initial conditions (or hypothesize what they are); try to establish an acceptable goal, perhaps by looking at possible incremental results; or try to discover new operations to reach the solution based on heuristics, analogies, or combinations of known operations (Taylor, 1974: 634-640). Through this process, the individual develops goals and constraints under which he or she will resolve the problem (Voss, forthcoming: 6); these become the (transformed) representation of the problem.

Well-structured problems also have representations, of course. But well-structured problems, by definition, imply that the problem representation is widely shared among individuals. Using the crossword puzzle example, a wide range of individuals understands the same initial conditions (a blank numbered grid and a set of (English) "clues"), the desired state (a grid with each square occupied by a single Roman letter such that each set of consecutive squares makes a word related to the corresponding numbered clue), and the operations that can be used to reach that goal. To be sure, there are individuals for whom this is not a well-structured problem (those not literate in English and those who have never seen such a puzzle). But not only do most understand the problem, most have a similar concept of it.

When a problem representation is developed for an ill-structured problem, one cannot assume that the problem representation is shared. Each individual will create constraints based on his or her attempt to understand the situation. These constraints will help reformulate the problem, but different individuals will create different constraints. Beasley (1994: 19-21) illustrates this process by tying different problem solving elements to different parts of an individual's belief structure. The problem conditions are shaped by one's categorical beliefs about the state of the world. Constraints in the operating environment develop from one's causative beliefs: what effects various actions would have. Alternatives will be limited also by

one's resource beliefs. Finally, goals stem from one's desired outcome beliefs. Thus not all decision makers faced with the same situation will be working on the same problem (Beasley, 1994: 13).

Thorson (1994) emphasizes that just as representations are individual, the very notion of problem is individual. He uses Newell and Simon's definition of problem as a situation in which an agent is uncertain or ignorant of how to resolve the discrepancy between the current state and the goal state. In a sense, then, well-structured problems are barely problems at all. Beyond that, in some situations some individuals may find no discrepancy between current and desired conditions, while others do. Going back to the crossword puzzle example, there are those who might be enthralled by the symmetry and stark contrast of the blank grid. They might not see any problem in it. Just as representations cannot be judged "incorrect" according to this school of thought, neither can the perception of a problem. This adds another level of potential conflict between individuals.

Through this entire process, the decision-makers' ontologies or worldviews play an important role in defining the situation or developing a problem representation. Worldviews influence what interpretations they find plausible, as some international politics theorists agree:

The payoff structure that determines mutuality of interests is not based simply upon objective factors, but is grounded upon the actors' perceptions of their own interests. Perceptions define interests. Therefore, to understand the degree of mutuality of interests (or to enhance this mutuality), we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 88)

The worldview is largely developed in an iterative process through socialization and experiences.

Jervis notes

More generally, issues arise in particular historical contexts that shape preferences and behavior. The operating incentives are given not only by the present circumstances, but also by how these circumstances came about. Where the players are is strongly influenced by where they have been... Actors do not react merely to the *immediate* stimulus they face (1988: 320-1).

Jervis goes on to say

Preferences also stem from the ideologies and beliefs of individual decision makers. Some are "hard-line," others "soft-line" in dealing with an adversary.... The effect is that under circumstances in which some statesmen will believe that mutual cooperation is beneficial, others will see it as a trap. Thus, because of their beliefs about the nature of the adversary, Ronald Reagan and his supporters believe that many kinds of cooperation with the Soviet Union are likely to produce greater Soviet pressures on the West rather than further cooperation (1988: 326).

In "competing worldview theory," the worldviews promote interest in different aspects of the possible outcome of foreign events, such as what impact a war could have on relative capabilities in the international system or its consequences for the norms of international institutions. The perspectives also provide different heuristics for responding to a war: a realist worldview might be more prone to consider a unilateral response than the liberal would, or place less faith in the efficacy of an appeal to an international organization. These different routes for defining the situation can influence the future courses of action. Returning yet again to Allison's question, once ExComm represented the raw intelligence information as "Soviet strategic offensive missiles" (as opposed to, perhaps, "deterrent enhancements to the Cuban right to defend itself"), its members became less likely to choose the less-forceful "options." Thorson (1984) explores how that particular representation developed in the Cuban case, while Sylvan and Thorson (1992) demonstrate how different actors in ExComm, each proceeding from different ontologies, would have handled the events in a different way. More generally, Wendt describes the importance of worldviews in shaping representation:

States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar "structural" positions, just as British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles. The distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the "distribution of knowledge,:" that constitute their conceptions of self and other [I]f the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, "the cold war is over." It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions. (1992: 397)

In adding structure to a problem, the decision makers create a representation that is widely shared among individuals. Voss (forthcoming: 14) suggests that during this problem representation phase, in which the actor tries to convert the problem into a well-structured one, the objective is not so much to find an optimal solution as to find a problem that the decision maker "knows" how to solve. For example, if decision makers "know" the solution to a "Munich" is to stand up to opponents and reject their demands, forcefully if necessary, then they may tend, perhaps unconsciously, to convert a crisis into a Munich rather than develop a new representation.<sup>20</sup> Once this representation has been fixed, debate over courses of action is perfunctory. The "solution phase" consists of the decision makers justifying why a given set of constraints was the appropriate ones to place on the problem. In a group setting, representations may still compete, but the discussion will center on the nature of the constraints, not the course to take given those constraints (Voss, forthcoming: 15-6).

"Problem representations" or "definitions of the situation" are relevant across a wide range of international relations theory. Sylvan and Thorson (1992) note that just as individuals try to shape the problem representations of others within their "group," national actors will try to shape their target's problem representation. This idea finds echoes as far afield from post-modern cognitive science as Schelling (1960): one can gain an advantage in strategic interaction by reframing the problem in a way that is to one's own advantage. Snyder and Diesing's coercive bargaining revolves around convincing your adversary that your critical risk exceeds his (1977: 199-203). Framing information is also at the heart of deception, as discussed by Heuer (1981). All states engage in attempts to influence others' problem representations.

This theory assumes that official statements of policy reflect a single representation of the problem. It does not address the process by which that single definition is developed from each decision maker's individual representation. Voss (1994: 19-20) indicates that individuals

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<sup>20</sup>The use of precedents in evaluating a new foreign policy problem has been modeled for the United Nations by Alker and Christenson (1972) and Alker and Greenberg (1976). A similar method was used for China by Tanaka (1984).

only change their problem representations, once formed, with reluctance: they tend to tinker with the solution or search for scapegoats before redeveloping a representation. He believes change is more likely in a group context. Beasley (1994: 23) wants to begin investigating "how do individuals combine their various attributes within the group setting?" His question is central to the formation of public policy in all but the most autocratic regimes. Different individuals will have more or less differing representations of the problem at hand (or even disagree over whether it is a problem). He finds approaches that emphasize "competing preferences" inadequate. Sylvan and Haddad (forthcoming) suggest that groups select from among competing problem representations based on which creates the more compelling narrative. This is similar to Pennington and Hastie's (1987) story model of jury deliberation. Shapiro and Bonham (1982) argue that the power and interests of the individuals in the group strongly influence the final problem representation.

This dissertation does not try to resolve that issue. We only can observe that the state exhibits certain behavior. This behavior may reflect the domination of one representation over others, or the creation of a shared consensus on a representation, either through persuasion or synthesis. This view is perhaps most similar to that of Rubino (1994): a group problem representation does not imply that there is a "group mind." Axelrod (1977: 727-8) argues that interests in complex situations are discovered through the decision process, not separately from it. While such research at the discursive level may eventually prove important in explaining variation in outcomes, this project will limit its independent variables to those at higher levels of analysis, which are more reliably available. A description of a problem in a speech to the national public, in testimony to a legislative committee, in an appeal before an international organization or other authoritative contexts implies that some representation has become "official." The means by which that has come to pass is not immediately relevant.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Although it is *possible* that, where different perspectives are present within a group of decision makers, the style by which an official "group representation" is created may favor one or another type of perspective. This would dovetail with the work of Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan (1987

Each individual has a unique worldview. Beasley (1994: 19-21) illustrates that different individuals create different constraints on a problem by tying different problem solving elements to different parts of an individual's belief structure, such as categorical beliefs, causative beliefs, resource beliefs, and desired outcome beliefs. Taber (1996: 9-12) understands individual perceptions using Shank and Abelson's (1977) conceptual dependency and the script-schema framework. Rather than storing templates of stimuli, individuals create prototypes abstracted from stimuli that have previously been either experienced (scripts) or conceived of (schemata). He accepts the possibility, derived from Kolodner (1991), that some important cases are stored, with strong links to prototypes.

If we left perspectives at this unique, individual level of analysis, however, we would not be able to develop links between perspectives and behavior, nor useful links between the environment and perspectives in general. Taber (forthcoming) argues that one can aggregate similar worldviews into what he calls "paradigms." "Competing worldview theory" asserts that liberalism and realism form distinct and coherent paradigms. We do not assume that decision makers actually think in terms of these paradigms, but will test whether these academic paradigms correspond well to the actual perspectives. The next section describes these worldviews, first in their theoretical basis, and then in terms of the characteristics of the problem representations each would produce when a decision maker observes a foreign war.

The unique (and only indirectly observable) worldviews actually held by individuals may vary along a continuum between liberalism and realism. Realism and liberalism, under different guises, have been the dominant perspectives on international politics for hundreds of years. We suggest, therefore, that decision-makers, at least within the "Western" tradition, may have been socialized into some combination of these paradigms. Even if these individual worldviews remain relatively constant over time, an individual might exhibit realist or liberal behavior at

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and subsequent work). Nevertheless, for this possibility to be considered, one would need to first determine what perspective is held by each individual in each decision unit -- data that I shall allow others to gather.



different times. A recent profile of Senator Robert Dole illustrates this point (Lane, 1995).<sup>22</sup> While Dole generally appears to be a realist on foreign policy, he is a liberal on genocide: he irritated Turkey and Israel by pushing for a commemoration of the Armenian genocide and has been one of the few to consistently argue that the West has a moral duty to help the Bosnian Muslims avoid that fate.

How do these individual perspectives aggregate into a single, varying, official worldview? It is difficult to hypothesize until research, including this study, identifies some patterns of variation. The hypotheses described in the next chapter suggest that systemic, situational, or state-level factors influence the official perspective. While dramatic events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, could alter individual worldviews, this is not the only mechanism by which the official worldview could change. Systemic changes could lead to the election or appointment of different decision-makers, with worldviews better suited for the changed world. State-level factors, such as elections or economics, could lead the national leader to change the advisors' whose views are most highly valued.<sup>23</sup> It also may be the case, for example, that a perfectly coherent set of individual worldviews could take situational factors into account: "I will support multilateral peace efforts in accordance with international principles unless the war occurs in a nearby state or threatens my state's access to oil. In the latter case, I will do whatever is necessary to safeguard my national interests." In this final example, variation will occur in the official perspective without changes occurring in the makeup of the decision-making unit or in the individual worldview of any of the advisors. Follow-up research will investigate this aspect of the theory more thoroughly.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>And an article in the semi-popular press can certainly do no more than illustrate an aspect of an individual's worldview.

<sup>23</sup>Thorson (1984) illustrates how decisions made by intelligence analysts framed the issues before ExComm in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

<sup>24</sup>For one approach to aggregation of problem representations, see Beasley (1994: 22-39) and section 2.1.4 below.

### 1.3 Realism and Liberalism: A Brief Genealogy

The current debate between neorealism and neoliberalism is only the latest round of an intellectual fight that dates back to Hobbes and Machiavelli versus Kant and Grotius (Bull, 1985). This rich history provides sufficient detail to deduce the characteristics of worldviews that correspond to realism and liberalism. These worldviews are broader than the terms of the current debate, which Baldwin (1993: 9) describes as being over a very narrow ground.<sup>25</sup> The following brief sketch of each of these schools only lays the foundation for defining those worldviews. For a fuller description of them, see Mearsheimer (1995), Hellman and Wolf (1993), Grieco (1990), or Claude (1960).

#### 1.3.1 Classical Realism and Neorealism

Morgenthau (1986: 4-17) sets out five fundamental principles of classical realism. It assumes that state behavior will be rational. It asserts that state interests are "defined in terms of power." Power involves any tool that a state can use to control or influence others. Prudence, not morality, governs state decisions, especially where survival is in question. Knowing that all state actions are based on interests, one should not morally judge other states' behavior. From these principles, and the logic of autonomous states, Morgenthau concludes

The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it (1985: 187).<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Grieco (1993a: 123) and Keohane (1993: 271) agree that their main difference is over the efficacy of institutions in overcoming anarchy and its obstacles to cooperation. Mearsheimer (1995: 24) places liberal institutionalism "subordinate" to realism.

<sup>26</sup>Claude (1962: 35-7) observes that Morgenthau's "of necessity" indicates his own belief that any other policy would be stupid. Balance of power is here a synonym for prudent realist policy. He is also sharply critical of the many meanings Morgenthau assigns to the concept (1962: 13-25).

The balance of power is a concept central to realism. Morgenthau (1985: 187-201) argues that the balance maintains an equilibrium that is stable and in which component states are preserved. Since the relative power of states changes, the balance requires constant adjustment. Balancing involves trying to weaken other states or alliances or adding to one's own strength, internally or through alliances. If one state were to attack another, possible responses by the "bystander" state with which this study is concerned range from intervening directly in the war to building up its own strength internally. In his conception, efficient balancing requires the intervention of skilled diplomats.

Morgenthau (1985: 209-212) asserts that the "Classic Period" of the balance of power lasted from the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 to the Polish Partition of 1772, and again from 1815 to 1914. In his view, the balance of power continued to operate in the Cold War world, but it operated poorly: "the system of the balance of power has undergone three structural changes that considerably *impair* its operations." (1985: 360, emphasis added) One of these changes involves the reduction in the number of great powers, which leads to a lack of flexibility and caution. Another is that in a bipolar distribution of power, there is no "holder of the balance" who can intervene to support the weaker side as the power distribution fluctuates. Finally, the balance of power made use of the vast "empty" frontiers as a release valve for competition in the classic periods: states could always receive compensations of territory or property in some distant part of Africa or Asia (1985: 360-7).

Kaplan (1957: 23-9) describes a balance of power as one of six patterns of international relations behavior. He sets forth six rules that states must generally follow in order for balance of power to continue.<sup>27</sup> Several of these set up preference ordering for states trying to increase their capabilities: negotiation is preferred, followed by fighting, followed by refraining from the attempt, followed by eliminating an "essential national actor." After a situation is resolved, the "loser" must be either rehabilitated as a legitimate alliance partner for all states, or a new state

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<sup>27</sup>Gulick (1955) also suggests that states must follow specific rules in a balance of power system.

must be promoted to the status of essential actor. Finally, states in the system must oppose any actor or coalition of actors that tries to become dominant or establish a multinational empire. He dates the beginning of the downfall of the system to the loss of any potential French-German partnership after 1880, but the system limped along until the rise of states in search of world domination, like Germany and the Soviet Union. In addition to needing five or more states, Kaplan believes a free-acting "balancer" is essential to the system; this state can intervene on the weaker side and restore the balance as it changes.

While both Morgenthau and Kaplan seem reluctant to attribute state behavior of the recent past to the balance of power, this may stem from a prior belief that a "classic" balance of power system operated in a more distant past. Morgenthau is not clear how the balance of power system failed under the bipolar distribution of power. The politics of that period met his objectives of preventing a world empire from coming to power and of preserving the existing state actors. As for Kaplan, the "rules" of his loose bipolar system (which best corresponds to the Cold War era, as well as to Morgenthau's bipolar system (1985: 377)), do not appear entirely incongruous with the balance of power, as it would operate with only two major powers (1957: 38). The only glaring inconsistency is that he asserts that any bloc that is fully or partly hierarchical (which is where he places the Warsaw Treaty Organization) will be seeking to eliminate the other. Whether this was true during that period or not, this ascribing of motivations to a type of bloc seems unwarranted and a thin basis for distinguishing between international systems of behavior.

Claude (1962: 41), in his evaluation of balance of power, also defines it as a "system for the conduct of relationships among states." He is uncertain if this system operates automatically (Waltz's (1986) view), semi-automatically with the intervention of a balancer (Kaplan's (1957) apparent position), or only with the interaction of skilled diplomats (Morgenthau's, when he refers to its efficient operation), but that in any case it tends to produce some sort of equilibrium (43-51). Claude agrees with Morgenthau and Kaplan that the environment of the twentieth century is

not the most conducive to an effective balance of power system (1962: 90-92). Nevertheless, he also agrees with Morgenthau and Waltz that the balance of power is the default system, the one that will pattern behavior unless explicitly replaced by another mechanism for managing military power (1962: 93, 280).

Waltz (1986: 101-3), the founder of neorealism, deduces balance of power from the logic of states interacting in an anarchic system. In an anarchy or self-help "system," states must be concerned about the asymmetric distribution of gains. This concern tends to attenuate any impulses they might have for cooperation over the long term. Balance of power operates as long there are at least two units in the system (1986: 117), because states are motivated to survive but can "never be certain about the intentions of other states" (Mearsheimer, 1995: 10). Waltz (1986: 120-1) emphasizes that it is a grave mistake to try to infer rules of a "balance of power system" from the results of its operation: foreign policy will vary depending on the specific instance of action and the power distribution at that time; the system as a whole will tend to produce balances of power under any configuration. Mearsheimer (1995: 11-2) concludes that three basic patterns of behavior result from realism: mutual fear and suspicion, emphasis on short-term interests, and the pursuit of relative advantage over other states.<sup>28</sup>

Balance of power is a specific pattern of behavior in international politics, where states use force for their "own protection and advantage." (Waltz, 1986: 110). States are most concerned with the relative distribution of power within the anarchy, and will react to any adverse change in that distribution. In the context of this dissertation, state leaders observing an external war through the filter of a realist worldview will base their problem representation on how the outcome of that war could affect the distribution of power. The leaders would then consider which of these possible distributions are the least advantageous. Finally, they would select a course of action that would aim to prevent or respond to that outcome. As with any situation,

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<sup>28</sup>Walt (1987) argues that states balance against threats, not raw capabilities. Grieco (1993a) argues that states seek to minimize relative losses, not maximize relative gains. These positions remain well within the realist perspective.

States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one). (Waltz, 1986: 117)

Balance of power is a pervasive principle in large part because it is so flexible. This tends to make it non-falsifiable, but this is not a problem *if* it follows deductively from a falsifiable condition of anarchy. Realism's concerns with relative power distribution, possible security threats, and the effects on one's own state's interests form a distinct perspective on international relations.

### 1.3.2 Wilsonian Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism

Liberalism holds that war and insecurity do not inevitably result from anarchy. Historical patterns need not repeat themselves if some "mechanism" intervenes to motivate states toward cooperation rather than conflict. Nye (1988:246) distinguishes among four types of liberalism, each based on its own "mechanism." Commercial liberalism suggests that trade links promote cooperation. Early proponents of this view include Cobden and Bright. Continued research in this area includes Polachek (1980); and examination of the decreasing control states have over transborder flows of capital (Pollins, 1993). Democratic liberalism argues that democratic states will be able to cooperate with each other. This idea goes back to Kant, and was a foundation of Wilson's plan for the League of Nations. The observation that democratic states have not fought wars against each other continues to motivate research (Russett, 1993; Lake, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1993).<sup>29</sup> Sociological liberalism posits that increasing contact between individuals and leaders will promote their ability to understand and be at peace with each other. Early arguments in this "functional" school include Deutch, et al (1957) and Mitrany (1966). The role of

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<sup>29</sup>For a realist response to this observation, see Layne (1994).

ideas and subnational challenges to the nation-state also remains an active area of research (Rosenau, 1990; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993).

"Neoliberalism" refers to the fourth mechanism, that of international institutions.<sup>30</sup> Collaborative institutions can act to resolve both the proximate causes of wars and to reduce the anarchy that allows those individuals or states with malevolent intentions to threaten the majority. This liberalism draws on the new institutionalism literature, which argues that interests are not simply endogenous to the units.<sup>31</sup> Structures, concrete or conceptual, can alter the preferences held by actors in a system. The liberal use of this concept goes beyond the realist position generally held in Krasner (1983), which holds that states may form regimes out of mutual self-interest to regulate their interactions. When such a regime has outlived its usefulness, or when it conflicts with endogenous state interests, states will violate or discard the regime. Liberals claim, on the other hand, that institutions can modify state interests from what they would have been without the mediation of the institution. Keohane (1984) argues that the gains states achieve under a hegemonic order leads them to value its continuation even as the hegemon declines. Further examples of these arguments include Keohane and Nye (1977) and Martin (1992).

Collective security is the liberal counterpart to realist balance of power. With the failure of the League of Nations as Europe slouched toward the second phase of this century's great power war, Carr (1939) set out the distinction that realism was a theory of how states behaved in reality, while liberalism was a theory of how we might wish states behaved. The current renewed interest in liberalism stems from the observation that many aspects of world politics have begun to better correspond to a liberal reality than the realist construct (Kegley, 1995: 10-14). The principles of collective security -- that peace is generally served by taking action against those

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<sup>30</sup>In Nye's framework (1988:246), this would be "regulatory liberalism."

<sup>31</sup>For a full description of new institutionalism, see Thelen and Steinmo (1992).

who break the peace -- continue to survive in international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO.

In a collective security system, security becomes the common concern of all. Each state responds to any war as if its own security were at stake. The advance commitment of states to support each other if they are attacked gives collective security a deterrent power -- it asserts that an overwhelming defensive coalition will be automatically assembled against any offensive action (Claude, 1962: 97-110). This collective activity is distinct from a standing alliance system, which is the hallmark of a balance of power system (Claude, 1962: 111; Morgenthau, 1985: 201). This strength, both for the system and for states in it, has been confirmed in simulations (Cusack, 1989; Cusack and Stoll, 1992; Niou and Ordeshook, 1991; Cusack and Stoll, 1994).

Those who advocate collective security, such as Bennett (1988: 135), Cusack and Stoll (1992: 5), and Riggs and Plano (1994: 100-1) concur with each other that before collective security can operate, all members would need to place peace above all other policy objectives, be able to reach a consensus on whether or not the peace is threatened, be able to agree on the identity of the aggressor(s), and be able to agree on sanctions. They agree that there has never been an effective collective security system operative in the world. The League of Nations was the only attempt, but as Morgenthau observes (1985: 320), the only time the League applied sanctions on an aggressor (Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935), it did not apply them well. Its failures then were perhaps due to a lack of adherence to the necessary values, and the absence of major powers like the United States, Soviet Union, Germany and Japan during large portions of its operation. Even the Korean War turned out to be only an "aberration." Claude says the initial stages of the Korean conflict were conducted as if a collective security system operated, except for the potential deterrent value that should have prevented the war (Claude: 1962: 166-8). In the end, however, repetition was precluded by the unsatisfying end to the war and the joint Soviet-American resolve not to let such a resolution through the Security Council again (Morgenthau, 1986: 170-1). Riggs and Plano (1994: 104) point also to the lack of true



collectiveness in the response: while the UN approved the effort, 90% of the forces were South Korean and American. Morgenthau goes so far to assert that Korea, both the war and the continued division of the peninsula, are simply examples of the balance of power system in action -- no major power wanted that buffer region in Northeast Asia to fall entirely into the hands of a rival (1985: 459-60). The distribution of power during that period also did not help collective security. Bennett argues that collective security will operate "best if power is widely dispersed" in order to avoid having any power be immune to sanctions, and near-universal adherence if it is to be strong enough to deter or even punish aggressors (1988: 136). Neither of these were present during the Cold War.

Those who find such ideal collective security unworkable, including Morgenthau (1986: 452), Claude (1962: 97-110), Mearsheimer (1995), Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), and Betts (1992), agree with these points. They base their dissent on collective security's high cost (any war not deterred becomes a major war), its status quo bias, and its past failure. Overwhelming force will be difficult to apply against very strong states, it may be logistically difficult to bring sufficient force to bear before the aggressor has achieved its goals, and assembling a coalition that agrees on how to best punish the aggressor (ranging from diplomatic isolation to military intervention) will also be difficult.

As a prospective deterrent system, collective security must promise a response to aggression. But there are many arguments for inaction by those who so wish. One may choose not to punish some states out of long-time friendship or from fear that doing so might prompt an attack on one's own country. One may also find certain regimes unworthy of defense, again either from long-time enmity or because of the nature of the regime (Idi Amin's Uganda, invaded by Tanzania, comes to mind). Collective security implicitly defends the status quo, which may not be "just." In some cases it will be difficult to agree on an aggressor, especially if one state has launched a pre-emptive strike after great provocation. Kupchan and Kupchan (1991: 177-9) suggest that a looser concert system, based on an informal oligarchy of major powers, could

keep the peace in Europe. As Betts notes (1992: 221-3), it is unclear how this diluted version of collective security could overcome self-help concerns for very long.

Despite the lack of clear historical evidence to support it, the perspective of liberalism and collective security survives. Lyons (1994) and Claude (1962) note that opposition to aggression as a matter of justice has become part of at least the rhetoric of foreign policy in many states. Behavior consistent with the principles of liberalism -- concern for community interests and protection, and advocacy of multilateral resolution of conflict -- may therefore be present in some cases, such as Korea, Kuwait, and Somalia.<sup>32</sup> The next section sets forth how to distinguish liberal policy statements from realist ones.

#### 1.4 From Theory to Problem Representation: Distinguishing the Perspectives

We can only classify policy statements as realist or liberal if we can clearly distinguish between the two perspectives. Baldwin (1993: 4-8) suggests six differences between them. First, liberalism and realism differ on "the nature and consequences of anarchy," and the degree to which it constrains the range of state behavior. Second, they have different views of the difficulty in achieving international cooperation. Third, they disagree over the extent to which states are concerned with relative, as opposed to absolute, gains. Fourth, they have different assumptions over whether states are more concerned with security or economic interests. Fifth, liberals emphasize intentions where realists emphasize capabilities. Sixth, they disagree over the efficiency of international institutions and regimes. This list, and others like it,<sup>33</sup> does not meet the needs of this project. It seems extremely unlikely that official policy statements will

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<sup>32</sup>Mearsheimer (1995: 47) is mystified by continued appeal of liberalism, attributing its adherence in the face of failure to peculiarities of American values. The previously noted results of computer simulations, contrary to realist expectations, should be examined by realists.

<sup>33</sup>For other descriptions of the differences and commonalities between liberalism and realism, see Mearsheimer (1995), Niou and Ordeshook (1991: 484), Powell (1994: 340-3), Wendt (1992: 391-3), and Kegley (1995).

take an explicit position on the nature and consequences of anarchy, or whether international regimes are efficient. Only distinctions that might manifest themselves in representations of foreign wars will be useful. These distinctions, deduced from realist and liberal theory, form a Weberian "ideal" realist or liberal worldview with respect to that decision domain. This section describes five indicators of liberal or realist perspectives: concern over relative or absolute gains, emphasis on state or collective interests, goals of national protection or protection of an international community, whether the ultimate concern is with the conflict itself or with the precedent it might set, and the role of multilateral coalitions. These five indicators are the basis for classifying the dependent variable, the worldview expressed in each statement.<sup>34</sup>

The first indicator is a *concern for relative versus absolute gains being accrued to different actors as a result of the conflict*. Waltz says

When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure<sup>35</sup> must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" ...Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities. Notice that the impediments to collaboration may not lie in the character and the immediate intention of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity -- at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions -- works against their cooperation (1986:101-2).

Grieco concurs:

[Neoliberalism] argues that states seek to maximize their individual *absolute* gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others... Realists find that states are *positional*, not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that...states also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation than they do. For realists, a state will focus on both its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains (1993a:117-8, emphasis in original).

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<sup>34</sup>The appendix describes the coding procedures for the thematic content analysis.

<sup>35</sup>A hollow modifying statement. Immediately after this quotation, Waltz says "In any self-help system, units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior." (102) He then draws the logical, sweeping conclusion "A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more than itself [because of] the structure of international politics (102-3).

He adds, in italics, "the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities." (1993a: 127) Keohane disagrees (1993:275), saying that "relative gains may be important motivating forces for states..., but only when gains in one period alter power relations in another, and when there is some likelihood that subsequent advantages in power may be used against oneself." Earlier in the debate, he took a stronger liberal position: preferences are "based on their assessments of their own welfare, not that of others." (Keohane, 1985: 66)

Niou and Ordeshook capture the distinction as follows:

Realists perceive a single compelling equilibria -- a balance of power -- in which state must be vigilant about relative position. Neoliberals see the complex interdependencies of contemporary affairs as occasioning a different kind of equilibrium in which states can pursue pure welfare maximization because threats to sovereignty are somehow not part of the character of the strategies that sustain the equilibrium (1991:484).

Thus, one question realist policy makers would consider in interpreting a foreign war is "Can my state suffer a relative loss based on the outcome of this conflict?" If some other state can achieve a relative gain, the realist would take some action (external or internal) to counter it. Likewise, the realist might be interested in exploiting any potential gains his or her own state could accrue from the conflict. If a coalition exists, realists would expect to see dissension among the partners over distributing the spoils of war (see Krasner, 1993) -- such as, for example, in the Allied conferences of World War II. Under liberalism, these concerns would not arise. Only one's own gains and losses would be considered.

The second indicator is a *primary concern with state or collective interests*. This indicator is a more precise statement of the dichotomy between interests and norms, which is not captured strictly by asking whether interests are endogenous or exogenous. Neither side of the debate, when being careful, excludes the relevance of either norms or interests, but the emphasis differs. Obviously adherence to international norms can itself be an interest, and the right of self-defense is a norm based on interests, but we can make a distinction between the two concepts. Realism has an element of exogeneity in its assumptions of interests, as Powell

(1994: 317-8) notes: structural realists assert that interests, beyond the basic interest of survival, are assigned by the relative distribution of national capabilities. The more precise interests, however -- those likely to be found in policy statements -- would be endogenous and unique to the state. Institutionalists, on the other hand, believe institutions can change states' conceptions of interests (Keohane, 1993: 271). In reordering state preferences, these effects could be seen as endogenous, but their locus is exogenous. Keohane does not conclude that collective interests such as free trade, common democracy, or transnational contacts are the driving institutions, but neither does he exclude their potential effects. These variants of liberalism may not be at the top of the agenda in the "current debate," (Baldwin, 1993: 4) but this study considers them.

This distinction between state and collective interests is at the heart of the debate between the economic versions of these theories, mercantilism and liberalism (Gilpin, 1987: 28-33). In economics, some decisions are made primarily out of state-centered self-interest, while others aim at promoting the general good (with the national interest assumed to be promoted along with that general good). A realist might promote a trade agreement based on how it increases access to foreign markets or ensures the availability of a strategic mineral, while a liberal might promote the same agreement based on its promotion of free trade in general. We can make the same distinction for other foreign policy decisions. A neorealist representation would consider the effects of a conflict on material, often short-term and security-related, interests of the state. A neoliberal representation would derive longer-term "interests" from the norms of an international community, often enshrined in a formal institution. One example of the liberal view is U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's 1993 remark that "to the extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential."<sup>36</sup> A collective security system would be the ultimate

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<sup>36</sup>"Remarks of Anthony Lake," Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 21 Sep 93, cited by Layne (1994: 46).

expression of a liberalism in which interests are defined in terms of a community norm of peaceful resolution of disputes. In Betts' words (1992: 203), "community of power replaces balance of power."

The third indicator is whether *concern is expressed over protection of one's own state or of others in an international community*.<sup>37</sup> Claude illustrates this distinction in this way:

In the balance system, A joins in the defense of B and C against D, lest D gain a position in the power configuration which might enable it to later conquer A. The collective security principle dictates the same response, rationalized in the rather different terms that peace is indivisible and that the safety of the entire community demands the treatment of an attack upon one member as an attack upon all members (1962: 127).

Waltz supports this argument, saying that in the anarchic self-help system he assumes to exist, states are motivated by fear:

those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power (1986: 117).

In contrast, the liberal response is motivated more by outrage than by fear. Kenneth Thompson (1953: 753) cites Secretary of State Henry Stimson in 1932 as providing the rationale most succinctly: treat aggressors as "lawbreakers" who must be brought to justice and punished. The reason for this need not be an overriding concern with morality or human life on the part of the policy makers. Rather, the illegitimate use of force constitutes "cheating" against an institution of stability. Reciprocity may be an appropriate strategy (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 94-105). If cheating is not penalized, others will cheat as well, bringing down the institution -- making everyone less secure.

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<sup>37</sup>The second and third indicators are similar, but not identical. The third is more narrowly military than the second. These distinguishing elements are not meant to be mutually exclusive. They are all indicators that will be used to classify a problem representation as either liberal or realist. Since no direct measure can be used, it is better to use several complementary indices (see King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). Part of the results of this research will be to assess which distinctions seem to most consistently separate the two worldviews.

Thus institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behavior of others on future issues. The principles and rules of international regimes make governments concerned about precedents, increasing the likelihood that they will attempt to punish defectors. In this way, international regimes help to link the future with the present.... By sanctioning retaliation for those who violate rules, regimes create expectations that a given violation will be treated not as an isolated case but as one in a series of interrelated actions (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 94)

Powell (1991: 1308) agrees that "threats to punish defection can be used to sustain cooperation in [his] model" As a result

Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection and thereby make it more costly. Insofar as they specify precisely what reciprocity means in the relevant issue area, they make it easier to establish a reputation for practicing reciprocity consistently. Such reputations may become important assets... (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 110)

This view can be traced back to both Kant and especially Grotius. In a Kantian worldview, one shares a common interest with many others against an opposing set of "oppressors," against whom any action is justified, even obligated. The Grotian worldview emphasizes that states must follow rules so as to maintain a World International Society (Bull, 1985: 30-33). Realism is concerned neither with "justice" nor with identifying the "aggressor."

The fourth indicator is *whether the conflict is viewed in terms of the combatants only, or the precedent it might set for other states*. Both realists and liberals concern themselves with the ramifications of a conflict, but realism casts these concerns more narrowly. In Claude's statement (quoted in the previous section), the state operating in the balance system remains most concerned with D, the original aggressor. The more liberal perspective, however, considers a broader precedent: D's attack against B or C must be opposed, not because of the future actions of a possibly-stronger D, but because D's success could encourage some other country G to attack E or F. Here is a more concrete example. A realist might argue that if Serbia were not prevented from conquering Bosnia, it would next try to attack Macedonia or recover Croatia.<sup>38</sup> There would be no reason to presume, however, that any broader precedent

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<sup>38</sup>An American realist might go on to point out that this would hardly affect U.S. interests in any way, but perhaps it is a Croatian realist I am citing.

is set. A liberal would be concerned that Serbian victory might undermine international norms against overrunning sovereign members of the United Nations, committing genocide against religious minorities, and using armed force to settle disputes.<sup>39</sup> This might lead other countries (Russia, for example) to follow the same strategy.<sup>40</sup>

A fifth and final indicator is *the role of alliances and multilateral institutions*. For realists, coalitions are useful tools for improving one's chances of favorably influencing the future distribution of national capabilities. States that share a common, specific perception of threat would assist each other. Any coalition-building effort, however, would be independent of any initial actions taken, since the threat must be balanced with or without assistance. The states would also tend not to allow the alliance to constrain their actions, if self-interest dictated a break with alliance partners. The interests states have in retaining independence are very strong (Grieco, 1993b: 315). Thus, of course, a state acting under neorealism would decline to join a coalition if it perceived no threat that could not be answered by internal strengthening. This corresponds to the view taken by Hellmann and Wolf (1993: 9-10), which they draw from Walt (1987), but even Morgenthau (1987: 201-2) limited the formation of alliances to issues of "expediency." If the state does not need an alliance, it will not join nor form one.

The liberal position differs on every dimension. Multilateralism would precede individual action, since the international community has defined the norms being violated. In the purest

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<sup>39</sup>Layne and Schwarz (1993) cite President Clinton as saying "[the Balkans will set] the standard for addressing other ethnic conflicts and the effectiveness of vital international institutions" with the possibility that the Serb example will be duplicated if unpunished. They do not cite the occasion for these statements.

<sup>40</sup>In principle, of course, it is possible that the state could be concerned with both the immediate combatant and the precedent set by the war. Likewise, both national and community interests could be affected by a war. At such times the relevance of problem representation becomes most apparent. Does the Bush Administration state that it opposes Iraq because of fears of its future aggression and/or its potential to dominate Middle Eastern oil (realist concerns) or because of the violation of international norms of sovereignty and the example it might set for other revisionist states (liberal concerns)? Both are "reasonable," but this theory argues that only one perspective will tend to be evident in any statement that is made.



case, individual states defer to the group decision on actions to be taken, even if that decision is not the state's ideal policy choice.

...the legitimacy of international institutions does not emerge from any waiving of the national interest, but from an interest developed in the institutions themselves. Any shift in interest does not automatically lead to changes in the regime or to its destruction, because there may well be uncertainty about the permanence of the observed changes. The institutions may be required again in the future, and their destruction for short-term changes may be very costly in the long run.... The costs of reconstruction are likely to be much higher once regimes are consciously destroyed. Their very existence changes actors' incentives and opportunities (Stein, 1993: 51).

This fits Stein's (1993: 31) description of a regime as a situation "when patterned state behavior results from joint rather than independent decision making." This is not to say that regimes do not serve self-interest -- they allow states to reach a common-interest goal that they could not be assured of reaching independently (Stein, 1993: 41). Institutions<sup>41</sup> might encourage states to work multilaterally even where interests do not converge.

...there is a possibility that the creation of international regimes leads not to the abandonment of national calculation but to a shift in the criteria by which decisions are made.... Once nations begin to coordinate their behavior and, even more so, once they have collaborated, they may become joint-maximizers rather than self maximizers (Stein, 1993: 52).

Even where a state remains a "self-maximizer," it may still support the regime's decision making. Stein (1993: 52) notes that "an actor that no longer prefers the regime to independent decision making may nevertheless choose not to defect from it because it values an undiminished reputation more than whatever it believes it would gain by departing from the established order." Martin (1992) has pointed out that institutional arrangements can make side payments more credible. Finally, the regime reduces the cost of decision making:

...nations do not continually calculate their interactions and transactions. Once in place, the institutions serve to guide patterned behavior, and the costs of continual recalculation are avoided. Decision costs are high, and once paid in the context of creating institutions, they are not continually borne (Stein, 1993: 51).

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<sup>41</sup>"Institutions" need not be "organizations." (Stein, 1993: 46)

These five indicators distinguish "ideal" liberal and realist perspectives. Before going on, however, we must emphasize two areas this study will *not* use to distinguish between neorealist and neoliberal problem representations. First, the words "balance of power" or "collective security" will not be sufficient for classifying texts. The phrase "balance of power" is itself an almost meaningless piece of diplomatic boilerplate. We can only interpret it in context with the rest of the statement in which it appears. "Collective security" is equally problematic. Claude (1962: 121) notes that early in the Cold War, Americans such as Senator Arthur Vandenburg referred to NATO as a "collective security arrangement," which he considers inaccurate.<sup>42</sup> The United States Department of Defense still uses this terminology, listing all alliances, even the one-sided commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan, as examples of "collective security." (Cheney, 1992) Claude (1962: 121) finds the "embedding" of the language of collective security, and the trend to oppose aggression on principle, as important contributions to foreign policy. Such anecdotal evidence supports the idea that liberalism has influenced diplomatic discourse. But the use of key words will not be enough to classify official statements.

The same is true of the words "national interest." Just as "collective security" adds a sense of highmindedness to the operation, realism influences public discourse to the extent that interests will most likely be invoked, whether or not they are actually present. One must look beyond the words to see the concepts they invoke. If the "national interest" is a concrete threat to national autonomy (a direct potential military threat, a threat to important resources, or a direct challenge to stated national defense policy, etc.), then we may infer realism. "National interest" may also be a disguise for norms, or the "community interest" of liberalism. It may well be in the Western powers' "national interest" to maintain free trade, support democratic regimes, or encourage respect for international institutions. In these cases, however, it seems likely that the community interest in liberalism has influenced the national preferences.

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<sup>42</sup>And Bennett (1988: 136) calls it a "perversion." Terms such as "selective security" or "collective defense" (Wolfers, 1962) better capture an alliance like NATO.

## 1.5 Summary

This review has reformulated the leading theories of international politics into a theory of foreign policy behavior. Competing worldview theory argues that liberalism and realism are distinct elements of worldviews held by the leadership of independent states. It deduces characteristics of those ontologies from the theories of international politics. When decision makers receive information, such as from observation of a war in the "external environment," the national leaders will develop a single definition of the situation. This dissertation tests various hypotheses as to the circumstances under which foreign policy is based on liberalism or realism, informing both a major debate among international relations scholars and foreign policy interests in interventions into ongoing wars. The next chapter describes the method for classifying foreign policy and the hypotheses that will be tested.

## CHAPTER 2

### METHODOLOGY

The deductions of the first chapter yielded five indicators of whether a foreign policy reflects a realist or liberal worldview. The first section of this chapter discusses some methods one could use to locate those indicators in observable foreign policy behavior. After presenting some general models, this section describes in detail the POLI and EVIN models of Taber (1992, forthcoming) and Young's (1994) WorldView. As neither of these fully met the requirements of this dissertation, content analysis has been chosen for its methodology. The second section of this chapter describes in detail how that content analysis will be performed. The third section identifies the hypotheses that will be tested in this dissertation. The final sections of this chapter explore some other methodological issues, including analysis, reliability, and validity.

#### 2.1 Models of Problem Representation and Intervention Decisions

Snyder and Paige's (1958) initial study began much of the work in foreign policy decision making. It is especially relevant here because it looks at the Korean case, where either the collective security or balance of power approach may have obtained. Specifically, they ask "Why was there a decision at all in this situation?" and "Why was this decision made in response to the North Korean attack instead of some other?" (1958: 343). They assume that "nation-state action is determined by the way in which a situation is defined subjectively by those charged with...making choices." (1958: 346) Important factors include the organization/individual, the

internal (society and culture) setting, the external setting, and the situational properties of the problem itself. They anticipate many of the issues that are relevant today.

Nevertheless, Snyder and Paige seem satisfied with dividing the situation into sequential stages. These are

- 1) Categorization of an event in terms of past experience and existing "givens."
- 2) Specification and clarification of generalized values and the bearing of the objective situation on them.
- 3) Perceived relevancies--factual aspects "added to" the objective situation.
- 4) Establishment of a set of goals--a desired state of affairs to be attained.
- 5) Assessment and selection of one combination of available means and desired goals. (1958: 358)

These "steps" may be merged into a seamless problem representation process to a greater extent than they acknowledge. Snyder and Paige do, however, make several interesting observations about Korea (1958: 371-2). One is that the "police action" label was a form of framing. They include as "pre-existing knowledge" World War II and the Soviet role in the invasion. They conclude that the status quo ante was "commensurate with the basic values threatened" by the invasion, only a limited intervention was needed, the means were available -- so the U.S. acted.

#### 2.1.1 Precedent Models

One method of looking at reasons for intervention into a war is to use precedent-based reasoning. Alker and Christenson (1972) and Alker and Greenberg (1976) created computational models of United Nations intervention based on precedents. Alker and Christenson (1972) suggest that a means of involvement (here including many tools of intervention) would be selected based on the success or failure of its past use. Finding this to be an inadequate explanation, they proposed that the UN leadership would search for an appropriate precedent. Upon finding one, the method used there would be repeated, if successful. In Alker and

Greenberg (1976) write these precedents into an "Operational Charter" that sets up standard operating procedures to deal with new events.

There are many problems with identifying and using precedents. One is the assumption that the decision-maker acts as an individual in selecting a specific case and reasons from it. Even though the United Nations was a collective, the Alker models make no provision for different individuals to reason from different cases. Whereas Sylvan, Ostrom, and Gannon (1994) have shown that not all of these individuals will reason from cases, Alker (and Tanaka (1984)) assumes not only that all use case-based reasoning, but also that they all use the same case. Furthermore, and this is the second fundamental problem with the precedent selection model, all the members of the leadership apparently interpret this case in the same way. Indeed, since they select the same case, they must all interpret *all* cases in the same way.

Nevertheless, this research has some value. Alker and Greenberg show how the meaning of terminology changes over time: "domestic jurisdiction" presented a much deeper barrier to intervention in 1945 than it did in the era of decolonization, and even more so than today; we might find the same to be true of "aggression." In addition, the concept "precedent" still seems important. Despite the difficulty in measuring it and using it with confidence, the success or failure of previous interventions surely has an effect on current decisions. If nothing else, precedent relates to the schemata present as conceptual nodes, whether "Munich," "Vietnam," or now, "Somalia." Bosnia may be any of these three, but curiously enough, apparently not "Kuwait." Precedent will not be important to the task of classifying the basis of intervention, but it cannot be evaded in explaining why.

#### 2.1.2 Operational Codes

Alexander George (1979) suggests that policy preferences will be related to an individual's "operational code." An operational code can be seen as a specialized schema, one

related specifically (for George's purposes) to political life. An operational code does not include attitudes, for those are merely predispositions to specific objects. Rather, the operational code consists of beliefs which "influence...behavior across situations." (1979: 99). An operational code can indirectly influence the diagnosis of a situation by shaping the means of information gathering, processing, and interpretation. As such, it thus helps to form a problem representation -- rather than addressing "what is the problem representation," it addresses "why was this the problem representation this actor was predisposed to?" The operational code can also influence the choice of options, although it does not determine behavior by itself.

One can assess the impact of operational code beliefs on decisions in two ways. In the process-tracing procedure, one must get into the decision making process to see directly how elements of an operational code influenced decisions. The data needed for this task may be difficult to get, especially for any recent case, but it would be a powerful use of the concept. One could take two leaders, similar in responsibility and confronted with the same situation, but with (as would surely be common) different operational codes, and look for how these codes affect their decisions. One example could be leaders in a range of countries confronted with an intervention decision. Another would be leaders within a single country.

The easier use of operational codes is the congruence procedure. First, one establishes the subject's beliefs, based on relevant historical behavior. One deduces what behavior would be produced by those beliefs, and compares those predictions with the observed behavior. One problem with this method is that belief systems may have enough ambiguity and qualifying statements to prevent clear predictions of behavior. Another problem is determining whether or not the beliefs were a necessary condition. One would need to ask whether other behaviors would have been consistent with that same operational code, and whether the behavior would also be consistent with a different operational code. Clearly, the concept requires more precision before it can be used. Nevertheless, George, citing Holsti, says beliefs should be important in ambiguous situations, non-routine situations like war, situations dominated by a (relatively)

unconstrained actor, and unanticipated events. On that basis, then, beliefs or operational codes could help determine problem representation in intervention events.

### 2.1.3 Cognitive Mapping

A third approach is cognitive mapping. Axelrod (1977: 727) says that "argumentation is a vital part of the policy process when power is shared and when problems are cognitively complex." Because interests (goals) must be developed, not assumed by the participants, meetings serve three purposes: to develop interests through self-expression, to listen to others' interests and perhaps agree with them, or to bolster one's initial position by successfully persuading others (1977: 728-9). Using transcripts and minutes, he examines the British Eastern Committee's handling of the Persian question in 1918, the initial Hitler-Chamberlain talks in 1938, and the Japanese Council on National Security regarding 1970 U.S. military access. He turns each statement into a cognitive map of casual assertions  $A \rightarrow B$ , where B may be a utility. Each relationship is labelled as positive, negative, non-zero, non-negative, non-positive, no relationship, or universal (indeterminate what the relationship is). He compares these causal chains to the defense/attack model, which hypothesizes that participants will defend their arguments with specific evidence and mutually supporting arguments, while attacking others' (1977: 733-7). He finds, however, that none of these is the case. Instead, participants present a wide range of different arguments without attacking anyone else's perceptions. This was true even in the pre-Munich case, where disagreements simply remained latent. Axelrod concludes that the persuasive argument often is the one that has not yet occurred to anyone else.

Levi and Tetlock (1980) examine the Japanese decision on whether and how to expand the Pacific War in 1941. They are not interested in problem representations, but rather in whether they can identify symptoms of stress in the decision making process. The study nevertheless is interesting because it establishes some metrics for cognitive maps, including



measures of differentiation, value-ladenness, causal integration, and hierarchical integration. They hypothesize that integrative complexity will decrease as time passes (supposing that stress would be increasing), but do not find this to be the case.

Bonham and Shapiro (1994) develop a model of negotiation based strictly on language. Decision making, they say, should not be understood as a conflict between individuals who have positions, but as a conflict between positions that happen to be represented by people. Thus text, or the discursive chain, is the appropriate unit of analysis. The role of the individual is to justify the position; for negotiations to proceed, the negotiators must create a "shared discursive space" in which positions can cohabit (1994: 8-15). They build their problems into cognitive maps, per Axelrod, based on the verbatim transcripts of meetings, supplemented with documents, diaries, and correspondence. (1994: 20).

Maoz and Shayer (1987) also use cognitive maps, but they aim at uncovering cognitive complexity. They agree that argumentation is used to justify or bolster a position, and propose that "the more...complex a persuasion task, the more complex the argumentation." (1987: 583). While their dimensions of cognitive complexity may possibly be useful, it is not apparent that complexity is directly related to the two worldviews.

#### 2.1.4 Text-Based Approaches

Beasley suggests that operational codes are not a definitive enough approach to problem representation, and that cognitive mapping overemphasizes utility and causal connections (Beasley, 1994: 14-17). We have already discussed his approach to belief structures and their link to problem solving elements. He then applies these concepts to the issue of aggregation. He proposes using the transcripts of original discourses to gain access to this problem. He breaks his problem representation and participation variables into ones that apply to the "Individual-in-Group (such as dominance of an individual problem representation

and the centrality of an individual's role). and those which apply to the Group as a whole, including its problem orientation and the distribution of group discussion. He also describes six types of group problem solving interactions, which are indicated by certain values of his variables. This work is directed toward groupthink and the type of process more than toward the content of the problem representation. He emphasizes the need to address content; but this effort was aimed perhaps as an attack on the structuralists.

Voss (forthcoming) proposes an Information Processing Model of problem solving. His approach flows directly from Taylor's (1974) work on ill-structured problems. He investigates how individuals step through the problem space, along the lines of Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver (1972). For Voss, a "problem" is a situation in which "an individual, group, or organization has a goal and that goal is not being obtained" (forthcoming: 3). This definition seems inferior, for our purposes, to defining a problem (also from Taylor) as a conflict between current state and desired state. Voss assumes that the external environment is not necessarily equal to the internal representation, that individuals are serial processors, and that human memory is finite and requires time to search (forthcoming: 5). Voss only takes Taylor's Type II Ill-structured problem: that where the goal state is uncertain, but critiqueable. The decision maker tries to generate a solution that is internally and externally acceptable by generating constraints; the satisfaction of these constraints becomes part of the solution evaluation.

Voss' example of trying to solve Soviet agricultural problems illustrate the way his definition of this topic leads to a particular method of problem solving. He suggests that there will be a problem representation phase, in which the actor tries to convert the problem into a well-structured one. This involves weak analytical methods like analogy, means-ends analysis, worst-case generation, or decomposition into subproblems. The object here is not so much to find an optimal solution as to find a problem that the decision maker "knows" how to solve (forthcoming: 14). If you "know" the solution to a "Munich" is to stand up to opponents and reject their demands, forcefully if necessary, decision-makers may try (unconsciously) to convert a

crisis into a Munich rather than develop a new representation. Because the new representation is well-structured, it has by definition only one basic solution (Voss notes that even well-structured problems may have "better" solutions, defined by efficiency or elegance, perhaps (forthcoming: 5).). The "solution phase" therefore consists of the decision makers justifying why this solution meets the constraints, and why those were the appropriate constraints to place on the problem. When representations compete in a group setting, the discussion will center on the nature of the constraints, not the course to take given those constraints (forthcoming: 15-6). While Voss is presented here as a model, it is more of a framework: Voss has not operationalized it into something that one can use (as he acknowledges). There are no metrics of problem representations and no defined means of applying it to a group setting.

Breuning's (forthcoming) approach appears to be another potentially very useful one. She aims to determine whether or not foreign assistance is considered a subset of economic issues or a separate issue area in its own right. To do this, she uses the text of parliamentary debates in Belgium and the Netherlands, examining both the volume and content of foreign assistance discussions. She concludes that the two areas are distinct in the Netherlands, but linked in Belgium, perhaps due to the different intensity of their colonial rule and their contrasting national images. This dissertation also examines different conceptions by decision making groups, and try to account for them. Not all intervention decisions will involve important discussions with a legislature. In cases, however, where leaders anticipate a war, this discussion might be very useful in uncovering national positions. This type of analysis might also be useful in establishing the presence of the three paradigms with the state structure over time. It also would serve to identify national sub-groups who seem to adhere to one paradigm or the other, which would allow for the building of a broader theory than the Voss approach. One question to investigate might be whether political groups maintain their view once in office, or if they are captured by a more consistent bureaucracy whose worldviews cannot be obtained through this method.

### 2.1.5 Paradigm-Based Computational Models

Taber (forthcoming), in contrast to Voss, does have a well-developed model for problem representations. He suggests a cognitive theory in which working memory is serial (slow) and limited to 5-9 items, but long-term memory is associative, parallel (fast) and non-permanent. He finds that most information processing is top-down, i.e., the role of stored knowledge in perceptions is very important relative to that of the characteristics of the inputs themselves. Thus individuals will tend to have predispositions for certain explanations -- and different individuals will have different predispositions and different interpretations (forthcoming: 4-7). These predispositions can be best understood using Shank and Abelson's (1977) conceptual dependency and the script-schema framework. Rather than storing templates of stimuli, individuals create prototypes abstracted from stimuli either experienced (scripts) or conceived of (schemata). Taber accepts the possibility, derived from Kolodner (1991), that some important cases are stored, with strong links to prototypes (forthcoming: 9-12). Using Voss' language, that may mean a quick conversion is made from ill-structured stimulus to prototype to well-structured case to solution.

Within memory, knowledge is partitioned several ways. Actors and the model must have general knowledge, such as goals, and domain-specific knowledge. There also must be declarative knowledge (know that) and procedural knowledge (know how). His model is much better developed than Voss' because he can compare knowledge patterns between individuals. Of course, he loses some distinction by grouping subtly different knowledge contents together, but this aggregation is a necessary step to move toward science. By moving the knowledge structure to the level he calls a paradigm (and this dissertation calls a worldview), his definitions will be more reliable over time than a single individual's beliefs. Finally, he suspects that affect will bias the interpretation of stimuli, but suggests that accuracy may itself be a motivation that balances affect. To a certain extent then, interpreters' desires to promote a particular

interpretation will be limited by a desire to be perceived as "right" within the organization (forthcoming: 14-18).

Taber's current model is an elaboration of his POLI model (1992). POLI asserted that decision-makers' worldviews can be captured in belief "paradigms." These paradigms would shape the representation of new inputs. They are not absolute, however. Each belief in a paradigm had an associated [un]certainty factor. For his case, U.S. Asian policy in the 1950s, he used the Congressional Record to build three paradigms: Militant Anti-Communism, Pragmatic Anti-Communism, and Isolationism. POLI would use these to make policy recommendations based on each paradigm, and then select the most likely one to accept. His new model, EVIN (forthcoming), revises POLI to improve its validity.

#### 2.1.6 A Text Processing Computational Model

Young (1994) confronts three issues relevant to using problem representations: identification of beliefs, representing them in a formal structure, and developing measures for changes in, and between, actors' problem representations. He developed his model to identify the changes in problem representation that precede a behavior change. His technique thus is appropriate for an effort to pinpoint the causes of a shift in intervention behavior. This section discusses his model and outlines how it could be used to compare bystander perspectives.

Since there is no way to directly assess the cognitive states of other individuals, Young must use some outward manifestation of that cognitive state to build his model. For his WorldView model, he uses prepared texts. In part, this is out of necessity -- the possibly less self-conscious discussions one might find in closed meetings would not be available as input data until some time has passed (if ever). Young makes a virtue of this, however, by suggesting that prepared statements, being better thought out and planned, will more accurately reflect the speaker's worldview than unreflective conversation. Furthermore, in any society (but especially

a democratic one), leaders' public speeches may constrain future behavior. There thus is a limit to the amount of crafting a leader can do without risking being trapped in his or her own rhetoric (Snyder, 1991:42). While Young does not emphasize this point, it also seems that crafting and secrecy are more likely to apply to factual information than to the leader's worldview. Since the worldview is that part of the individual ontology that deals with international affairs, it may not easily be concealed. Indeed, it may not even be something the leader thinks of as concealable.

From these texts, Young created cognitive maps similar to those developed by Axelrod (1977). He uses the sentence as a basic unit of analysis, turning each into a relationship between a subject and object, generally modified by a truth value and/or a relationship-modifier. Relationships can be causal or logical, indicate an attribute of the subject or classify it, indicate location or strategy, or offer support for a thesis. Young creates a spanning set of truth values, adding partially true, possible, and impossible to the basic true and false. Finally, relationships in his model can be modified by placing them in the past, present or future, or by indicating that a relationship is a goal, is hypothetical, or is normative. Young also keeps a frequency count of all relationships so as to get a rough estimate of salience. These sentences are represented in semantic nets using a Macintosh LISP program. The nodes in the nets indicate objects, concepts, or situations; the links indicate a relationship. The software representation has great power because one can deduce attributes of a node by knowing that it is part of a class concept.

Young develops seven measures of belief systems -- four structural and three comparative (1994: 70-5). Concept dependency (the opposite of interdependence) is the lack of connections between different parts of the worldview. Connectedness is the ratio of connecting relationships to the sum of all concepts and relationships. Size is simply the number of concepts in the worldview; Young takes a larger size to indicate greater expertise, but also expects the number of concepts to decrease when the leader becomes focused on a specific issue. His last structural measure is the uniformity of salience. If most concepts and relationships are of equal

salience, policy may be inconsistent; where some concepts or relationships dominate, one expects to find a consistent policy.

His comparative measures would be the most useful for this research question. The first is a simple comparison of concepts in two worldview maps: the concepts may be unique, common but with different relationships, or common with the same relationships. Another comparative measure involves the transformation costs of changing one map to another by adding and deleting concepts and relationships. Finally, he measures incongruence as a subset of concept comparison: it takes concepts that remain common for an individual over time and looks for changes in relationships. He expects that there will be a large number of such changes, which also involves reordering goals and strategies at a higher level, as a prelude to a large change in behavior.

If WorldView were to be used for this dissertation, the first step would be to develop "template" cognitive maps that would correspond to the "ideal type" realist and liberal problem representations. Next, one could use official policy statements by leaders of the subject countries to discern the "real" worldview underlying the statements. These "real" cognitive maps would be compared to the "ideal" cognitive maps: through a combination of identifying the common concepts in two maps and measuring the transformation costs of changing one map to another, one could evaluate the "distance" between two problem representations. This distance would be the value of the dependent variable. Changes in its value over time could be compared to changes in a variety of independent variables.

In this method, one could not represent the bases for response as lying on a two-dimensional continuum. A decrease in distance from balance of power realism does not necessarily mean there will be an equivalent (or even any) increase in distance from collective security liberalism. In some situations both formulations may be used more strongly than in others. In any case, the two bases do not entirely contradict each other: they share some concerns and at times entail the same response. Second, this method would not be comparing

any problem representations to each other. Doing so would cloud the issue: many problem representations are consistent with a neorealist worldview; they may be quite different from each other without being of differing distances from the ideal type. Furthermore, any measurement errors stemming from the translation of text to map (or from the real worldview to the text), would have greater effect if the maps were compared directly.

WorldView creates its semantic networks by processing text that has been coded according to rules set forth in great detail by Young (1994: 144-203). It does not directly parse text; the question of interpreting the complexities of English text is left to the coder. This adds to the effort required in processing texts, but an educated human coder will perform more reliably than existing computer software for this portion of the analysis -- the computer is a tool for finding relationships, but interpretation should be left to those with intelligence. The coder translates the ordinary text into a five-"word" set with the form

*subject relationship truth-value relationship-modifier object*

For the most part, objects remain as stated in the text, with pronouns replaced by the noun itself. The relationships are coded from a list of actual verbs cross-referenced to a smaller set of WorldView relationships. This coding effort is relatively straightforward. The rules Young developed cover the complexities of President Carter's speeches, and should be sufficient for the texts relevant to later statements of foreign policy problems by other leaders.

In addition to the text-based nets, we would need a set of assumed categorizations. One effect of the WorldView methodology was that a newly expressed relationship would appear as a change of worldview, even though the belief may have been long-held, just never expressed. Since the specific changes over time from one speech to another do not necessarily matter, we would carry over some ideas. Thus, if a country is described at one time as an ally (or if, in fact, a formal allied relationship exists), then that information will remain accessible until that country is categorized as something else. For example, within the United States section of the project, one might find the "knowledge" that *united-kingdom is-a true present ally*. Another sort of



"assumed knowledge" that might be left unexpressed in the text as received is the idea of interests. If the statement is made that "Bosnia has a lot of oil," this would be translated to *bosnia possess true present oil-reserves*. But that is meaningless unless one adds the information *oil-reserves is-a true present national-interest*. The speaker would have little other reason to mention the subject otherwise. This small, specified set of facts would be maintained as "background beliefs," much as Alker, et al (1991), do in their work with the RELATUS text processor.

One of the great difficulties in using WorldView would be developing the "ideal templates" to use for comparison. There are three ways these templates could be generated. One way would be to directly code the statements of international relations theorists. Unfortunately, the statements of theory are not directly comparable to the statements of policy (Waltz, of course, discourages such use of his words (1986: 121)). Furthermore, since no single author should be taken as the Font of Truth on these subjects, it would be best to parse several statements and merge the resulting maps into a single one. By processing the concepts of the leading theorists (and those who have applied them in specific cases) into clear distinctions between neorealism and neoliberalism before building the templates, one can be more certain that one's template is an efficient distillation of their accumulated wisdom. Doing so, however, removes the enterprise from the purity of simply parsing the texts of the masters.

A second way to create templates would be to write ideal policy texts from the theory, and translate them into worldview nets. These would present scenarios for intervention and non-intervention in each case. Cases of non-intervention, however, may not appear in official statements -- if the war is subjectively perceived as too "minor" to warrant action, it may be too minor to discuss. The difficulty with doing this is that these texts are rather stilted and cannot cover every eventuality. After several attempts at writing "ideal policy," it seems impossible to avoid being too context-specific in a "real" text. Furthermore, significant additional error would be created by adding this step.

A third method of building the template maps would be the most parsimonious and direct: create a rather sketchy map using only the five indicators identified in Chapter 1. The template "map" would be disconnected, but it would best capture the key relationships inherent in the worldviews. Because we will only search for relationships between types of concepts, much of the WorldView text would be generic -- the ideal WorldView text could not be translated back into English. After processing a text and comparing it to these templates, WorldView would output two numeric values indicating the distance of the textual worldview from each ideal. These values will be the values of the dependent variable for that particular text.<sup>43</sup> After all texts have been processed, we would have a series of values, showing variation across some independent variable (one hopes) in the "distance" of the expressed worldview from each ideal.

WorldView has four main attractions as a methodological tool. It allows for complex comparisons of large texts, one of its measures yields a numeric value for the "distance" between a text and "ideal" policy, it has a well-defined, thorough coding system, and appears to be more objective tool than most qualitative analysis. As the search for distinctions between neorealism and neoliberalism became more focused, however, it became clear that this project would not require comparing whole texts. Any valid distinction between the two perspectives requires setting forth specific differences between them. If using WorldView, these distinctions would need to be recast as generic policy statements and translated. WorldView would then take a translated text and compare its "closest" set of elements to those policy statements. For this project, none of the whole-text measures (such as complexity, size, etc.) of WorldView would be utilized. Only a very small portion of the program would be used. Thus one must question what the gain would be from using WorldView, since the small set of distinctions could be searched for manually.

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<sup>43</sup>In other words, there will be two numbers associated with the worldview at any one time, reflecting this belief that distance from neorealism does not necessarily indicate closeness to neoliberalism. A failure to intervene may instead reflect isolationist sentiments; an intervention may be strong on both aspects. Not placing the dependent variable on a single continuum adds complexity to the model, to processing the text, and to interpreting the results. The benefits of this complexity, however, outweigh the disadvantages.

One advantage of proceeding with WorldView was that it would produce a numeric value on which many econometric operations could be performed. The real meaning of this "distance" is not clear, however. The number of operations required to reach an ideal policy from the textual would increase as the speaker adopts the opposite perspective, but it also would increase if the speaker made his or her case in an oblique way. More significantly, "N is a victim" is only one step away from "N is an ally," while "N has come to our aid in the past and would again" is further from "N is an ally" in the WorldView sense (but not in meaning). So this number, on which any statistics would be based, would be very difficult to interpret.

WorldView's coding system is thorough and well-established, but it also would require a great deal of time to learn and use. WorldView coding of a text would require the formal processing of the entire statement, even portions which do not seem relevant. Thus the implementation would be inefficient: a large amount of processing time per text. If another means of evaluating texts were chosen, this might allow a greater number of texts to be included in the data set. Increasing N would compensate (at least in part) for any possible scientific losses incurred by not using WorldView.

Finally, WorldView offered the greater rigor promised by computational models. This argument only goes one way, however. While computational models require one to make one's assumptions explicit, the use of other methodology does not prevent one from making one's assumptions explicit. Indeed, this project will retain the assumptions regarding problem representation and worldviews that the program is based on. Using WorldView would not eliminate some of the other problems with text analysis: Before coding a statement into WorldView or comparing it to qualitative "themes," the coder still must consider the possibilities of sarcasm, colloquialism, semantic ambiguity, propaganda, and instrumental rhetoric. In other words, whatever methods are chosen, the human coder still must decide what the statement "means" before coding it.

This is not to say that WorldView has no value in the context of this project. A number of related questions would be well suited for that model. Are realist perspectives more or less complex than liberal ones? Which has the greater size? Before a switch from one perspective to the other, are there any cues in the coherence of the text? WorldView can answer these questions; since they are questions that require analysis of a series of whole texts, WorldView is the only method that can answer them. But these are not our questions, and they cannot be answered until someone first identifies which texts reveal a neoliberal or neorealist perspective.

## 2.2 Using Content Analysis to Identify Realism and Liberalism

### 2.2.1 Scope of this Research

This research investigates the conditions under which liberal and realist worldviews are found in policies toward foreign wars. "Foreign war" is defined as a paraphrase of the definition used by SIPRI (Sollenberg, 1995: 20): *a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where armed force is used between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, and neither party is the government or citizenry of the state observing the war*. Wars may be international or internal; by this definition, any governmental use of deadly force against political opposition could be considered a war. While this is admittedly a low threshold, we argue that if the conflict is significant enough to deserve comment by a foreign leader, then it should not be excluded.<sup>44</sup> This research focuses on the period 1978-94. System level change was dramatic during this period: relations among the major powers moved from the end of détente to a renewed cold war, followed by the end of the cold war and the end of bipolarity. Thirty-six wars were selected from a list of wars derived from Sivard (1993),

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<sup>44</sup>And it will always be easier to later exclude conflicts below an arbitrary threshold than to go back and collect data to move that threshold lower.

Sollenberg (1995), the *SIPRI Yearbooks*, and Tillema (1994). See section 3.2 for a discussion of this selection process, and Appendix B for a complete list of wars during the period under investigation.<sup>45</sup> This research examines the foreign policies of Canada, India, and the United States; section 3.1 discusses the selection of these three nation-states.

### 2.2.2 Data Selection

Worldviews will be identified in texts issued by the governments of these three nation-states. Only texts that represent an "official" government position will be used. We assume that any text prepared for the head of government or cabinet member is intended to reflect official policy, as would any statement delivered -- officially -- by a spokesperson for either. These include speeches, statements to the press, and testimony to legislatures -- limited, essentially, to items prepared for public consumption.<sup>46</sup> Introductory statements at a press conference would be coded where relevant, but we cannot assume that answers to press questions reflect the "official" problem representation rather than the speaker's own position.<sup>47</sup> The reactive statements would provide insight into the individual worldview of the decision-maker, but without systematic access to the discourses within the decision unit, that information is of little value.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>General references to the "cold war" or to Soviet-U.S. rivalry were not included in the dataset because it was not a war in the usual sense. While security issues were obviously relevant, the problem might be represented by an entirely different set of indices than a shooting war.

<sup>46</sup>Internal correspondence poses several problems. First, it will not always be available. Second, it may reflect the internal debate prior to the formation of an official problem representation. Therefore, it will not be used, except perhaps to selectively check the assumption that it reflects a problem representation similar to that in the prepared statements.

<sup>47</sup>We are also not assuming that such reactive statements do not represent an official worldview. We simply cannot justify making either assumption without conducting further research.

<sup>48</sup>An interesting avenue for further research would be to compare the conditions for liberal and realist perspectives in these two settings.

Within the collection of official texts, only those statements that refer to the selected ongoing foreign wars will be used. Other texts may provide insights into aspects of a national worldview, but there is no need to presume that a liberal worldview on economic matters would correspond to a liberal worldview on military matters.<sup>49</sup> Even within these texts, only the specific portions dealing with the conflict and/or the national policy toward it will be coded. A mere reference to a war, such as "the Prime Minister and the President discussed regional conflicts in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia during their meeting" is not codable. That statement is a representation of the leaders' activity, not of the conflict in question.

If all texts relating to a particular war or country were evaluated consecutively, bias could develop as the coder infers worldviews in one text that were present in an earlier text. This potential is mitigated by ordering all texts chronologically, and then alternating texts from the beginning and end of the dataset. In other words, the approximately 2500 statements will be sorted by date, and then evaluated in the following order: 1, 2500, 2, 2499, etc.

### 2.2.3 Evaluation of the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, briefly stated, is the perspective on a foreign war identified from a problem representation in an official text. The value of this variable is developed via a thematic content analysis, similar to Winter and Stewart's (1977). Whole texts will serve as the sampling units (Krippendorff, 1980: 57-61). If a text refers to more than one foreign war, then it will be considered repeatedly -- one case for each war addressed in the text. Because references to wars are often interwoven in the texts, it would be impractical to break the texts into parts. While these "sampling units," the official texts, are physical, the "recording units" are thematic. Each sampling unit will be analyzed for references that relate to each of the five themes that distinguish liberal from realist worldviews. In the content analysis, the coding will

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<sup>49</sup>This might be an interesting question for later research, however.

extend beyond the immediate confines of the text to provide meaning to references where the speaker did not find explicit explanation necessary. For example, a national interest is assumed when a speaker expresses concern that a war is ongoing very close to the national borders. Krippendorff (1980: 61) refers to this technique as "referential context units."

Each "sampling unit" is evaluated on the five dimensions described in the Chapter 1 (See Appendix A for the coding rules). Each theme is coded twice, once for evidence of liberalism and once for evidence of realism. Each of the resulting ten indicators is assigned a value in the range 0-2, where 0 indicates "trait not observed," 2 indicates a clear expression of liberalism (or realism) and 1 indicates a weaker expression of liberalism (or realism). Note that a score of 0 does not indicate that the trait is not present, only that it is impossible to infer it from the given information. It is also possible for an indicator to receive non-zero scores on both indicators of a single theme. Weber advocates (1985, 18) this use of several constructs as indicators of a single concept, as a way to enhance validity.

The content analysis performed in this research is not based on frequency counts. We are interested in the meaning of the whole text, not just its component "parts." (George, 1959: 22-3). It would be misleading to view a repeated assertion of the virtues of a multilateral approach as somehow stronger than a single assertion. In both cases, the position is held by the speaker. Repetition may be only a rhetorical technique aimed at persuading others of the virtues of the problem representation being stated. Because the text is instrumental--it was constructed in order to be interpreted in a certain way--it would be misleading to code the manifest meanings out of context (George, 1959: 26).

Osgood (1959: 36) asserts that the inferences derived from content analysis require an indicator, a state in the individual, and a link between them. In this research, the indicators have been developed in Chapter 1. The ontological state is the worldview, hypothesized to be reflected in the way problems are represented by "the administration." The link between them is that the ontology shapes how speakers think about the problem: if the representations are

distinct, one can use the statements to infer back to the worldview. He asserts that it would be difficult for a speaker to manipulate the structure of his or her associations for an instrumental purpose (1959: 75). Osgood supports viewing these worldviews as foreign policy (1959: 73): "when the source is an institution...it would probably be safer to speak of the 'policy' of the source rather than its association structure."

The resulting five liberal and five realist scores are aggregated into liberal and realist total scores, with a range of 0-10.<sup>50</sup> The single worldview variable is a combination of these two aggregates, hereafter referred to as LnWorldView:

$$\ln((\text{total liberal} + 1)/(\text{total realist} + 1)).$$

The ratio is used to locate the observed worldview relative to the Weberian ideal realist and liberal worldviews. The "1" is added to avoid division by zero. The natural log transforms this expression into a linear expression, a requirement before attempting a linear regression. This model assumes that a distribution (realist, liberal) of (7,0) is exactly as "distant" from an indeterminate worldview as the distribution (0,7). By using the ratio alone, however, with "1" indicating a neutral value, the former distribution would have the value 0.125, while the latter the value 8. The linear distances from 1 are not the same. The logarithmic transformation, on the other hand, yields values of -2.079 and 2.079, equidistant from the neutral point, 0 (ln of 1).<sup>51</sup>

The location of these values on a line between pure realism and pure liberalism does not reflect an assumption that realism and liberalism are the only measures for worldviews. Even while restricting our meaning of worldview to that portion of an individual's ontology that relates

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<sup>50</sup>This approach bears some similarity to the methods used in coding autocracy and democracy in the Polity II dataset (Gurr, 1990). There is no solid theoretical basis for weighing the indicators of liberalism and realism. Using several indicators for the same concept increases the validity of the findings, as long as the indicators correlate with each other (Weber, 1985: 18).

<sup>51</sup>In general terms,  $\ln(A/B) = \ln(A) - \ln(B)$ . Thus  $\ln(B/A)$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \ln(B) - \ln(A) \\ &= -1 * (\ln(A) - \ln(B)) \\ &= -1 * (\ln(A/B)), \end{aligned}$$

which is the desired property.



to international politics, there is a very large N-dimensional space within which possible worldviews can be located. However, located within that space are the two "ideal" liberal and realist worldviews. A line segment can be drawn between those two points; since coordinate systems are a device of Man, not of God, that line can be given the status of an axis within the N-dimensional space.<sup>52</sup> Like all line segments, this realist-liberal axis can be bisected by an (n-1)-dimensional surface; the intersection of that surface with the line segment can be assigned the value 0. By evaluating worldviews as if they were on a continuum between realism and liberalism, we are in fact projecting the observed worldview (from which we infer an actual worldview) onto that line, and measuring its distance from the neutral point.

In some cases, it will be appropriate to reclassify the worldview into a smaller number of categories. The major breakpoint will be when the absolute value of  $\text{LnWorldView}$  is greater than 0.5. This assignment places into the "strong realist" and "strong liberal" categories all cases where the total realist score is double the total liberal score (and vice-versa).<sup>53</sup> The "strong" categories also include cases where the scores are 9-5 (worldview ratio =  $10/6 = 1.667$ ). One aberration in the formula is that it would assign a "strong" value to a 1-0 score (worldview ratio =  $2/1 = 2$ ). This score would thus carry the same weight as scores of 3-1 or 5-2, despite being a distribution in which the author has very little confidence. All 1-0 distributions were reassigned to the same ratio as a 4-3 distribution.

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<sup>52</sup>The author does not believe this assignment is so arbitrary. Realism and liberalism have been taught to practitioners of diplomacy for quite some time; the literature in the field also finds this to be a salient dimension. Nevertheless, even if one does not accept that this is a relevant dimension, it is still mathematically reasonable to draw this line.

<sup>53</sup>In an earlier conception of the dependent variable, it was cast dichotomously, including only the "strong realist" and "strong liberal" categories. This earlier decision on the degree of difference needed to have confidence that the observed worldview is sufficient evidence of an actual worldview has been maintained in these later coding decisions.

### 2.3 Hypotheses and Independent Variables

This dissertation tests nine hypotheses, drawn from the existing literature on realism and liberalism. Two of these are "systemic," that is, based on the distribution of capabilities in the international system. The next four are "situational," based on the nature of the war and its participants. The final three are "domestic," based on factors primarily internal to the state being examined. If some combinations of hypotheses seem contradictory or inconsistent, that may only reflect the current state of the literature and the cumulative effect of asserting hypotheses without then testing them. The precise operationalization of the variables discussed in this section is described in Chapter 3.

**H1:** *If a state is not itself a great power, and is a close military ally of a great power, then it will be more likely to display a liberal perspective on foreign wars than those states that occupy a polar position in the system.* Waltz asserts that realism is the more common pattern among states that are great powers, at the global or regional level:

So long as European states were the world's great powers... politics among [them] tended toward the model of a zero-sum game. Each power viewed another's loss as its own gain.... The emergence of the...superpowers created a situation that permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states of Western Europe. They became consumers of security...and the means of their preservation were provided by others. These new circumstances made possible the...thought that all should work together to improve everyone's lot rather than being obsessively concerned with the precise division of benefits (Waltz, 1986: 58-9).

He goes on to note that the precise catalyst for this change was when "the possibility of war among states disappears" (1986: 59).<sup>54</sup> Many reasons could account for that change. Some of the later hypotheses stem from this position. At the structural level, however, the cause of this change is simply the that allies of poles have "insurance" on their security, and so need not have the realist concern with relative gains and losses. The associated independent variable is the

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<sup>54</sup>Waltz's assertion that realism applies so long as the coercive use of power remains a possibility is consistent with previously quoted statements by Waltz (1986: 101-2), Keohane (1993: 275), and Niou and Ordeshook (1991: 484).

position of the bystander state in the international system (**INSURED**). This variable can take two values: the state has its security guaranteed by a pole (1), or the state takes responsibility for its own security, as either a pole or a non-aligned state (0). The operationalization of this definition is discussed in section 3.1.

**H2:** *If a state is a close military ally of a great power, then it will be more likely to display a liberal perspective on foreign wars when the distribution of capabilities in the international system is bipolar than when it is not bipolar.* This second systemic hypothesis takes Waltz more literally in his assessment of the change in European security. He argues that a multipolar system is less stable, in the sense of preventing war, than a bipolar distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1964). James and Brecher (1988) tested and supported this theoretical argument. If this is true, then the first hypothesis should hold only as long as the international system was bipolar. The polarity of the current international system is open to dispute; Waltz did not consider unipolarity as a likely distribution. Even if the system is momentarily unipolar (see Krauthammer, 1991), Layne (1993: 7) illustrates why realists would expect other states in a unipolar system to behave as if the system were multipolar. States must balance to get security, so they will balance against even an apparently benevolent unipole. The second independent variable, **INSBIPOL**, can take two values: the state has its security guaranteed by a bipole (1) or the state either has its security guaranteed by a great power that is not a bipole or is responsible for its own security (0). For this research, the bipolar era is held to have ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 31 Dec 1991.

**H3:** *If no long-term adversary is involved in the foreign war, either as an initial participant or as a bystander that has chosen to intervene, then a bystander state will be more likely to adopt a liberal perspective than in cases where an adversary is involved.* This is the first situational hypothesis, meaning that it is based on factors peculiar to the conflict itself and its original protagonists. Greico (1993a: 129) says "The coefficient for a state's sensitivity to gaps in payoffs...will be greater if a state's partner is a long-term adversary rather than a long-term ally;

if the issue involves security rather than economic well-being; if the state's relative power has been on the decline rather than on the rise..." The associated independent variable, **ENEMY**, could take three values: at least one of the military participants in the war is a long-term rival of the observing state (2); at least one of the military participants in the war is a current (short-term) rival of the observing state (1), or none of the military participants in the war are rivals of the observing state (0). In order to fit the assumptions of linear regression, this trichotomous variable is represented by two dummy variables. **CURR\_RIV** has value 1 if at least one of the military participants in the war is a current (short-term) rival of the observing state; **LONG\_RIV** has value 1 if at least one of the military participants in the war is a long-term rival of the observing state. The operationalization of these definitions is discussed in section 3.2.1.

**H4:** *If no formal military allies of the observing state are initial parties to the conflict, then the state would be more likely to adopt a liberal perspective than it would toward wars in which such allies were initial parties.* By forming a bilateral alliance with another state, a state indicates that it sees that other state's security as important to itself. This seems to be a corollary of Grieco's statement just above: if an ally is engaged in conflict with a third state, then interests will be affected. Reiter (1994: 496) and Moul (1988) also support the position that states do support allies if they become involved in conflict. The independent variable for this hypothesis is **ALLY**, coded 1 if at least one of the initial participants in the conflict is a formal military ally of the observing state; coded 0 otherwise. The operationalization of this definition is discussed in section 3.2.2.

**H5:** *If one of the initial combatants is perceived to be a procedural democracy, then bystanders that are also procedural democracies are more likely to adopt a liberal perspective toward the war than they would toward wars in which no procedural democracy is an initial combatant.* It was noted earlier that Waltz sees liberalism as more likely to obtain in situations where "the possibility of war...disappears." While he looks to structure to identify those circumstances, others have argued that the threat of war is non-existent among democracies.

Jervis (1988: 336) and Herrmann (1988) observe the importance of how a state attributes intentions to the other states. Lake (1992) argues that the proper understanding of Kant is not that democracies are "peace-loving," but that they will tend to band together against non-democracies. He does not present this on a "moral" basis, but rather in economic terms: democracies will not extract the high rents from society required to pose a threat to each other, thus will be less likely to regard each other as hostile. Maoz and Russett (1993) find evidence in support of the more normative argument that states will adopt policy frameworks consistent with liberal democratic norms when observing other liberal democracies, and illiberal policies with respect to non-democracies. The associated independent variable, **DEMOCRAT** will be coded 1 if at least one of the participants has a democratic regime, 0 otherwise. This definition is operationalized in section 3.2.3.

**H6:** *As the distance from a conflict to the bystander state increases, liberalism becomes more likely to be displayed.* If the adoption of realism or liberalism is based in part on the extent of a military threat, than one should expect conflicts that are remote from a state to be viewed in a more liberal light. Nearby conflicts are more likely to spill over into one's own state. They are also more likely to result in gains for a state which can pose a military threat than distant ones. **DISTANCE** can take three values: 0 if the war is within or on the borders of states that border the bystander state, 1 if the war is in other proximate areas of concern to the bystander state, 2 if the war is more distant. In order to meet the assumptions of linear regression, this trichotomous variable is replaced by two dummy variables: **SPHERE** equals 1 if the war is in the proximate area of concern; **FAR\_AWAY** equals 1 if the war is more distant from the state. This definition is operationalized in section 3.2.4.

**H7:** *If a state's economy is in decline, then it is more likely to adopt a realist perspective than when its economy is growing.* A number of scholars involved in the current debate have suggested that links should be sought between the domestic level and the prevalence of realism or liberalism (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 101-2; Baldwin, 1993: 23; Keohane, 1993: 294; and

Grieco, 1993: 328). Hypotheses relating domestic politics to responses to war have placed the likelihood that a state will use force, not realism or liberalism, as the dependent variable (see Meernik, 1994: 131-2). These factors include the current state of the national economy and the relative security of the state leader. It is not clear, however, whether a realist or a liberal perspective is more likely to lead to the use of military force: while realists may be more to act unilaterally and accept the use of force, liberals may categorize fewer conflicts as "irrelevant." Perhaps for this reason, Meernik finds no significant relationship between these variables and the American use of force (1994: 134). Grieco (1993a: 129) does argue that states experiencing economic decline are more sensitive to relative gains than states whose power is increasing – i.e., they will be more realist. This could be seen as a corollary of Wolfers' "security rich" idea: a state in a recession or depression will adopt a more self-interested view of the world because it can see more potential threats. Two independent variables are associated with this hypothesis. The first, **ABSRECES**, equals 1 if the state's GNP is in a period of recession, defined as a decline in GDP for consecutive fiscal quarters. The second, **RELRECES**, equals 1 if the state's GDP is declining relative to the GDP of other states. The operationalization of these definitions is discussed in section 3.2.5.1.

**H8:** *As a leader's popularity among his or her constituency increases, so does the probability that his or her government will display a liberal perspective.* Hagan (1993) argues that opposition can make it more difficult for leaders to maintain commitment unless broad national interests are involved. It would follow that leaders who perceive a greater threat to their own hold in power would be more likely to be realist. One measure of this, in a democracy, is the popularity of the head of government. The associated independent variable, **POPULAR**, will be assigned a raw aggregate of support in national public opinion polling. This variable will be assigned values between 0 and 1. Its operationalization is discussed in section 3.2.5.2.

**H9:** *If no election in which a leader could lose office is scheduled or required to be held within the following three months, then the state is more likely to adopt a liberal perspective than*

*at times when no election is approaching.* Regardless of current popularity, a leader would be more sensitive to losing office as an election approaches (in procedural democracies). While it is not clear how close an election would need to be to lead to this heightened awareness, three months appears to be a standard indicator (see Meernik, 1994: 131). The independent variable **PREELECT** will be coded 1 if an election will occur in that period. This operationalization is further discussed in section 3.2.5.3

## 2.4 Trial Run

Before proceeding with the main portion of this research, a trial run was conducted in May 1995. This preliminary research included attempts at data collection, coding, and a coder reliability test. A complete description of this trial run can be found in Appendix C. The results of this trial run were sufficiently encouraging to allow continued investigation of this question. These results, however, also resulted in some significant changes in the methods of data selection and data coding that have been used in this research. This chapter presents only the final version of that methodology.

## 2.5 Analytic Techniques

While this project has identified a very large number of variables, the number of cases (coded texts) will far exceed the number of variables. While each of these hypotheses could be tested separately, with a simple correlation or comparison of means, that would be likely to bias the results. Since each of the hypotheses has the same dependent variable, a linear regression will be conducted on the data.<sup>55</sup> Data analysis methods and results are presented in Chapter 4.

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<sup>55</sup>An ANOVA would not be appropriate since one of the independent variables is ordinal.

## 2.6 Reliability

Coder reliability was assessed by assigning 2% of the texts to a second coder. The texts were chosen systematically; every 50th text following a random starting point. The results of the reliability checks are presented in Chapter 4.

## 2.7 Validity

This research demonstrates that one can use content analysis classify problem representations into realist and liberal categories. This effort is only meaningful, of course, if "realism - liberalism" is a valid dichotomy of problem representations. Furthermore, the problem representations found in contemporaneous statements should reflect a consistent official worldview. A final validity issue asks whether the worldview correlates with actions taken by the state leaders. This section introduces these questions; Chapter 5 discusses them more fully in context with the results of the data analysis.

### 2.7.1 Are liberalism and realism valid concepts?

As has been noted before, this dichotomy of perspectives has been asserted in large part because, at least in the Western tradition of scholarship that covers North America and Western Europe, realism and liberalism have been competing paradigms for centuries. Even if the national leaders themselves have not had formal training in them, one suspects that most policy advisors will have at least been exposed to one or the other paradigms (even if not by name) in their academic or professional training. The only competitor to these, also as noted above, would be a Marxist/structuralist approach. It seems unlikely, however, that leaders in the United States, Canada, or other countries in the Euro-American tradition adopt that perspective. Indian leaders might; this dissertation will only examine whether realism and liberalism seem to



be valid for that country's policy. Further study, involving communist, former communist, or underdeveloped countries would include such a worldview as an option.

Are there other coherent competitors to this framework? Vasquez suggests one candidate (1987: 373). He accepts the notion that "a person's security views are not derived from 'objective' factors, but are a function of individual beliefs and predispositions." He offers the labels "hard-liner" and "accommodationist." Hard-liners accept the use of force and will not compromise their goals. Accommodationists promote peaceful resolutions. He says that these categories do not map onto realism and idealism: "although hard-liners have a general predisposition to *realpolitik* practices...there can be both hard-line (i.e., militant) idealists and accommodative realists." (Vasquez, 1987: 374) As his argument proceeds, however, it becomes clear that accommodationists are distinguished by a predilection for multilateral action in accordance with international norms and rules, while hard-liners are more inclined to take unilateral action and avoid such norms and rules to the extent possible (Vasquez, 1987: 378-9). It is thus unclear how one would distinguish between Vasquez's categories without reducing them to realism or idealism.

Another candidate comes from the public opinion literature. Wittkopf (1986) suggests two dimensions for distinguishing foreign policy beliefs (of Americans): a unilateralist-multilateralist dimension and an isolationist-internationalist dimension. He argues that these dimensions seem to be stable over time, although the numbers of people in each category may vary. The first dimension is reasonably consistent with the realist-idealist or hardliner-accommodationist distinction. The second dimension, on the other hand, points toward a bias in favor of or in opposition to intervention in foreign wars. This distinction could certainly influence problem representations, at least in the United States and Canada.<sup>56</sup> In his later work, however, Wittkopf (1987) concludes that most people are "selective internationalists:" they will favor

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<sup>56</sup>It might be reasonable to wonder if it is possible for a European, especially a continental one, to be "isolationist."

intervention in some situations, and not in others. Where intervention is favored, the unilateralist-multilateralist dichotomy influences the preferred type of involvement. Thus Wittkopf also does not in fact contradict the proposed theory: this dissertation would shed light on the circumstances in which a foreign war is considered important enough to warrant a policy position, and on the circumstances in which a realist or liberal approach dominates the definition of that situation.

Ripley (1993) argues that a psychological, decision making research programme can compete with "neorealism." This research is deeply sympathetic to his approach, and suggests a bridge between his theories and the dominant realist ones. His six "defining tenets" (1993: 406) of the decision making approach are consistent with this research: foreign policy elites are the actors, they act based on their "definition of the situation," policy is an exercise in constrained problem solving, information is the currency, and the global system is primarily an arena. This research suggests that "definitions of the situation" will be informed by either realist or liberal worldviews (both of which fit more or less into the "neorealist" research programme). This research links the theoretical motivations of realism and liberalism with the actors -- individuals, not nation-states -- who take action based on those motivations.

Nevertheless, realism and liberalism may simply be academic constructs: they may be a poor basis for classifying the many variations that could result from the combination of competing individual worldviews. One signal of this problem would be if a large number of cases were indeterminate (or nearly so) on our scale. The coding procedure used in this research retains a wealth of data about each case. After coding is complete, the patterns of indicators coded will be evaluated to identify the characteristics of the worldviews that appear to actually be expressed. If coherent patterns can be found that do not correspond to realism or liberalism, they will be evidence that other worldviews better fit foreign policy problem representations in these nation-states.

### 2.7.2 Do official statements reflect official worldviews?

This theory has assumed that, if an official statement is made on a foreign war, then it reflects a single underlying problem representation. This in turn assumes that a single worldview is represented in the official statement. To a limited extent, this assumption can be tested as the following hypothesis: *If the statement reflects an official worldview, then its perspective should not be significantly affected by the identity of the person presenting the problem representation, the audience of the statement, the venue of its delivery, and the presence/absence of foreign leaders.* Independent variables will be coded for each of these, as noted in Appendix A: **SPEAKER** can be coded as head of government, the government's official spokesperson, foreign minister, subordinate official in the foreign ministry, official spokesperson for the ministry, head of state, other cabinet minister or other government official. **VENUE** can be coded as domestic or foreign. **FORLEADS** can be coded as official(s) of at least one of the combatant states present, official(s) of only non-combatant foreign states present or no foreign officials present. Finally, **AUDIENCE** can be coded as an address to a national governing body, testimony to a portion of a legislature, a formal International Organization, other international grouping (e.g., the G-7 or a peace conference), the Press, a national public audience (broadcasted to), a select audience (e.g., reception or dinner toast), a professional or interest organization (e.g., the AFL-CIO, Los Angeles World Affairs Council), or a non-national public audience (e.g., a campaign speech, remarks made in Honolulu upon return from a trip to Indonesia). If the assumption is valid, none of these variables should systematically affect the problem representations identified in official statements, all other factors being constant.

The trial run in the Bush Administration (see Appendix C) identified one interesting pattern: the worldview seemed to vary based on whether or not the statement was focused on policy toward the conflict or only made reference to it in context of a statement on other topics. The latter references were overwhelmingly liberal, while the focused policy statements were liberal to a lesser degree. It could be argued, however, that the "passing references" either do

not represent a focused effort to express official policy or that the reference is too brief for accurate coding. This distinction will be captured in a dichotomous variable, **MAINPT**; analysis will examine whether or not the pattern is present in a larger sample.

### 2.7.3 Do liberalism and realism matter?

So far, this dissertation only identifies the circumstances under which the leaders of certain states tend to adopt liberal or realist perspectives. For some, that might be interesting in itself. Others would argue that if the findings only apply to "rhetoric," then this study falls short of its goals. After completing this initial phase of this research programme, we will begin to investigate "Do foreign policy statements correspond to foreign policy action?" As already noted, it is difficult to classify action as realist or liberal. Nevertheless, two means can be employed to examine the validity of making such an inference. First, case studies can examine whether actions seem inconsistent with the way statements are classified. If a conflict lasts over a long period of time, and its representation in foreign policy statements changes over that time, then one might expect to see some change in action. This approach cannot "prove" the validity of the inference, but it would provide an additional reason not to reject its results. Candidates for this approach cannot be identified until the statements are coded, but possibilities will be drawn from extended conflicts such as the war in Afghanistan, the Contra war in Nicaragua, the Iran-Iraq war, and the war in Former Yugoslavia.

A second approach will be to investigate the relationship between stated perspective and involvement in war. One can design a Guttman scale of involvement, ranging from diplomatic thorough economic to indirect and direct military involvement. We can then test whether different levels of current involvement correspond to different worldviews, or whether variation in the initial worldview corresponds to variation in future involvement. This may be particularly interesting in cases such as the Iran-Iraq war and the Yugoslav wars, where the eventual military

involvement by the United States was certainly not the plan of American leaders at the onset of those conflicts.

### CHAPTER 3

#### CASE SELECTION

Based on the hypotheses set forth in Chapter 2, cases must be selected along three dimensions. First is the choice of nation-states. Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest that variation should occur between states whose leaders are observing the same war. Second is the choice of wars. Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, and 6 suggest that leaders will tend to view some particular wars in the same way. All democracies should view wars similarly according to hypothesis 5; most sets of countries will have vast areas of overlap in the categories of non-adversaries, non-proximate, and non-allied participants. Thus the variation will occur across different wars. Finally, one must select which texts to include in the dataset. For brief conflicts there may be only one or two statements issued; for longer or more salient (from the perspective of the decision makers) wars, there may be many. Variation could occur within a given country-war combination based on hypotheses 7, 8, and 9.

This examination is also limited along a fourth dimension, time. Cases have been selected during the period 1978-1994. These include wars during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The dataset was extended into the 1970s so not all United States cases during the Cold War would occur during the Republican Reagan-Bush administrations. Likewise, the data set was extended to 1994 so not all United States post-Cold War cases would occur during the Bush administration. It was not practical to include 1995. In the other two nation-states selected, similar changes in administration occurred. The Progressive Conservative party ruled Canada and the Congress (I) party ruled India during the middle of the time period. Further research could easily be done for other time periods using this methodology.

### 3.1 Selection of Nation-States

Given a fixed and finite amount of time, case selection must balance the breadth of hypotheses covered against the depth of examination of each hypothesis. Nation-state selection is the most critical of these three dimensions, because a shift from two to three nation-states (for example) will increase the effort (i.e., decrease the coverage of other dimensions) more than would a 50% increase in either of the other two dimensions. For this research, three nation-states were selected, so the other hypotheses can be investigated to reasonable extent.

The first two hypotheses suggest that different nation-states will respond differently to a given war. Waltz's first hypothesis indicates that the United States, as a pole, would tend to define each situation in realist terms. Allies of the U.S., such as Japan or Canada, would have a greater tendency to represent conflicts in liberal terms. Countries that are not allied to a pole, such as India, Sweden, or Swaziland, would also tend to define situations in realist terms. His second hypothesis modifies the first, arguing that this liberal tendency for allies only applies when a bipolar distribution of capabilities is present in the international system. We shall select nation-states to ensure variation along these variables -- within the limitations of available data.

Two constraints limit the choice of cases. One is theoretical: the author is testing the possibility that the European concepts of liberalism and realism can serve as paradigms for foreign policy perspectives. He accepts the possibility that these paradigms may not be universally valid. For example, the leaders of less-developed countries (especially in Latin America) and communist countries might adopt a Marxist/structuralist worldview. Future research must develop this third paradigm, so such nation-states can be included in this research programme. Even within the "First World," the author does not assume that the European-conceived notions of realism and liberalism influence the leadership of Asian states such as Japan and China. Finally, the use of these paradigms as surrogates for the actual individual worldviews assumes that some competition and discussion of foreign policy problems occurs. In nation-states where a single individual dominates policy making, his or her own idiosyncratic

worldview will be more important. Future research can examine such states, to see if the theory holds for them as well, but this initial examination should avoid stretching the concepts too far. Cases will only be chosen to generalize to the democracies of Europe, North America, and Oceania -- and two other states. Israel and India also share enough characteristics to include in the pool of cases. Israel seems to be a "Western industrialized democracy." India is clearly democratic; it may sufficiently fit the other characteristics as well. While not in the European tradition, similar competition between sovereignties is recurrent in Indian history; the British education system also created an elite somewhat socialized into these notions. India also has adopted a role as a regional power, not a dependent supplicant.

The second constraint is more practical. The author's language skills outside English are limited to a familiarity with French and Spanish. While it might be possible to translate statements in either of those languages to English, this would be a slow process of uncertain accuracy. The author has not identified any countries that publish their policy statements in languages other than their own official language(s).<sup>57</sup> The author does not believe that limiting the selection of nation-states to those which are English-speaking will introduce serious systematic bias, or limit the generalizability of these results among the states listed in Figure 3.1. Such concerns cannot be conclusively addressed, of course, until further research includes non-English speaking nation-states. The possibility of bias, however, is balanced by avoiding the following errors that could be introduced by including such states.

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)* provides translations of some policy statements, but poses several difficulties. First, the media of a country must choose to publish or broadcast the statement in its entirety (an uncertain event in a democratic country), and then *FBIS* must choose to translate and publish it. A brief review of *FBIS* indicates that these texts are not commonly reprinted. Most often, the reporter paraphrases a government statement,

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<sup>57</sup>In some cases, they do not even publish them in all their official languages. According to Professor Michael Keren of Tel Aviv University, the Israeli Knesset minutes are published only in Hebrew, even though English is an official language.



perhaps quoting brief passages. Interviews with officials are also common. While either of these might be codable, doing so may introduce additional error into the process: the publications of a free press do not necessarily include all the nuances of "official government statements." The press may also be biased in which statements it chooses to cover.

Second, *FBIS* is not indexed. It thus adds additional effort to the search for texts, since even the monthly tables of contents, where they exist, may not provide enough information to rule an entry in or out without checking that microfiche. *Keesings' Contemporary Archive* lists some events which might be occasions for policy statements, but does not provide enough detail to be certain. Furthermore, a comparison of *Keesings'* with the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* indicates that the vast majority of such statements, issued by the US,

#### Nation-States to which this Research could Generalize

Pole, provides own security	United States	
Security insured by a pole	Australia Belgium Canada Denmark France <sup>a</sup> Germany Greece Iceland	Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand until 1986 Norway Portugal Spain since 1982 United Kingdom
Non-pole, provides own security	Austria Finland India Ireland Israel	New Zealand since 1986 Spain before 1982 Sweden Switzerland

<sup>a</sup>France is difficult to classify. While it is a nominal member of NATO, one could argue that its withdrawal from the unified military command makes it technically a non-ally of the United States. It thus would be a poor choice for selection early in this research programme. It would be an excellent candidate for follow-up research into whether it behaves more like a state whose security is ensured by another state or like one that provides its own security.

Figure 3.1: Nation-states to which this Research could Generalize.

are not noted in *Keesings'*. A month-by-month search of *FBIS* is possible, but the time involved in doing so would reduce the number of wars and texts examined. Nation-states sourced via *FBIS* will also have a shallower coverage than the English-speaking ones. In the short run, the only immediate use for *FBIS* would be to check the statements of several states regarding a seminal event, such as an invasion or major escalation of a conflict, to broadly compare perspectives on a single event.

Figure 3.1 lists the possible nation-states according to the value of **INSURED**. One nation-state will be selected from each category. One will be a nation-state whose security is insured by another. The other two nation-states will be ones that provide their own security, one occupying a polar position in the international system and the other not. The United States must be selected because it is the only polar power among these states. Given language constraints, the other nation-states which could be chosen are Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Three options exist for selecting a nation-state whose security is insured by the United States: Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom. Canada has been chosen because it offers several advantages over the other two. First, it shares a number of traits with the United States, including its location in North America, similarly distant from particular wars. Second, Canadian documents are easier to acquire than Australian, and better indexed than British. Third, travel to Canada to look for additional statements was easier than travel to either of the other countries.

Any of four states could be chosen from among those whose security is not guaranteed by the United States. One is Israel. Although, as noted above, the Knesset proceedings are not published in English, translations of some foreign policy statements may be available from various advocacy groups. Nevertheless, two arguments eliminate Israel from consideration. First, Israel, perhaps more than any other nation-state, faced imminent and catastrophic threats to its security. A confirmation that Israel had realist tendencies would be hard to generalize to

more "typical" Waltzian states. Second, Israel is a minor power: Keren (1995) indicates that few declarations are made on any wars other than those Israel is involved in -- even large regional wars like the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>58</sup> Since Israel is not an initial bystander to those wars (except for the Lebanese Civil War), its views would not be useful to this project.

New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Ireland present a complementary problem. They also are minor powers and thus unlikely to take a position on distant wars. But they are at the opposite extreme in terms of security from Israel. Because of its geographic isolation, New Zealand may face fewer security threats than any other state. Ireland potentially has concern over a reconquest by the United Kingdom, but otherwise can free ride on the NATO alliance. Either of these states would be problematic to select. A liberal finding in either could be explained away by their unusual geopolitical context. To be sure, it would be interesting to discover that New Zealand is realist (or that Israel is liberal), but it will be less risky to choose a country where any finding will be significant.

The ideal third nation-state would be a non-aligned English-speaking state with aspirations to being considered a major power and facing real, but not overwhelming, security threats. India fits these specifications. The major drawback to selecting India is that it is not an industrialized state in the Western tradition. The leadership in developing countries could adopt a structuralist view of international relations. The author also does not assume that the intellectual traditions of liberalism and realism are in the curriculum outside the European experience. On the other hand, if competing worldview theory applies to any countries in the former "Third World," it should apply to India. India had a more "developing" colonial experience than many European possessions. The British educated a large elite in the European tradition, so realism and liberalism could be viable worldviews there. Indian history is also one of competing sovereignties, more so than the unified Chinese experience. The only way to test this possibility is to examine Indian foreign policy statements. If those statements easily fit the

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<sup>58</sup>The brief review of *FBIS* on this point has been inconclusive.

framework of this theory, then this dissertation may be more broadly generalizable than at first expected. If the theory turns out not to be valid for India, then we have a stronger foundation for limiting its generalizability to Europe and European-settled countries and developing a broader theory that can include the less-developed democracies.

In summary, this research has selected three nation-states: the United States, Canada, and India. Its results should be generalizable to the other nation-states listed in Figure 3.1. If the Indian data fit the theory, then it may be possible to generalize, with somewhat less confidence, to other developing countries (especially those whose elites are linked to European diplomatic training). The author would not attempt to generalize these results to nation-states whose decision makers are more independent from the European perspectives. Nation-states thus excluded include Japan, China, South Korea, Thailand, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and the states of the former Communist bloc.

### 3.2 Selection of Wars

With these three nation-states -- the United States, Canada, and India -- selected, the next step is to choose which wars will be examined. In hypotheses three through six, the governments of the states chosen will (hypothetically) display similar worldviews when representing a given war. This common perspective would vary, however, from one war to another. To test these hypotheses, we must select wars that offer variation across the independent variables involved in them.

#### 3.2.1 Rivals

The third hypothesis cites Greco regarding the involvement of a "long-term adversary" in a conflict. This term is similar to the idea of "enduring rivalry," which can be operationalized in

several ways. Goertz and Diehl (1993) suggest several definition, which vary greatly in strictness. Since there is no way to determine which definition is "correct," **RIVAL** will be an ordinal variable with three values. It will be coded "2" if an enduring or long-standing rival of a state is participating in the war. Such a rival is a "participant" if the war is an internal war within its borders or if the country's involvement in the war is included in Tillema's (1994) cases of Overt Military Intervention. **RIVAL** will be coded "1" if a current, short term rival of a state is participating in the war. It will be coded "0" otherwise.<sup>59</sup>

#### 3.2.1.1 Enduring rivals

Among the strictest definitions of rival is that proposed by Wayman and Jones (1991: 5-6). Goertz and Diehl (1993: 166) say this definition provides the "'must' cases for any definition." It states that enduring rivals require "at least five reciprocated militarized disputes involving the same two states, such that each of these disputes lasts a minimum of 30 days." The disputes must span a period of at least 25 years. The rivalry is found to have ended if 25 years pass after the end of the final dispute, or if ten years pass and the underlying "territorial domain and issues" are resolved.

Geller (1993: 180-1) uses this definition to develop a list of enduring rivalries. For the countries subject to this study, India is engaged in a rivalry with Pakistan and with China; the United States is engaged in a rivalry with the Soviet Union. Geller's study ends in 1986, but the COW data through 1992 indicate that a prolonged active dispute with China continued until 1987 and with Pakistan until 1991. While in theory those rivalries could now be at an end, this seems unlikely since the underlying issues remain unresolved. The United States' rivalry with the Soviet Union experienced its last major dispute in 1986; as the underlying issues in that rivalry

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<sup>59</sup>In the regressions of Chapter 4, **RIVAL** is replaced by two dummy variables, **LONG\_RIV** and **CURR\_RIV**.

appear to be resolved, that rivalry may have ended in that year. This strict definition is one of the earliest dates ever proposed for the end of the Cold War.

For the countries and period under study, participation by a long-standing rival is a rare event, as seen in Appendix 2. The Soviet Union only participated in three wars: a border conflict with China in 1978, the occupation of Afghanistan, and an intervention in civil strife in Yemen in 1978. Of India's enemies, China had the same border conflict with the Soviet Union, intervened in the Third Indochina War, and had several internal revolts. Pakistan likewise experienced internal conflicts during the period, and had some spillover from the Russo-Afghan war. Note that because this dissertation is not interested in India's perspective on its direct conflict with Pakistan, that war will not be coded for India. Nine of the 146 wars, or 6.2%, involved long-term rivals.

#### 3.2.1.2 Current Rivals

Goertz and Diehl (1993: 166) raise the concern the Wayman and Jones (1991)/Geller (1993) definition may omit some rivalries, in particular those that last less than 25 years. In the context of this study, for example, the Wayman and Jones (1991) definition automatically excludes any rivalries that may have begun as early as the 1970s but may endure long enough to qualify. The U.S.-Iranian rivalry is one candidate of particular interest to this study. Diehl (1985) offers a more inclusive definition: three disputes within a fifteen year period; the rivalry terminates once 10 years pass since the last dispute. Goertz and Diehl admit (1993: 164) that this definition can artificially break up rivalries if a lull occurs in the fighting, but it includes many rivalries of shorter-term interest.

According to this definition, additional rivals for India include Bangladesh (6 militarized disputes from 1976 to 1987; the rivalry may have ended then) and Sri Lanka (3 militarized disputes from 1984 to 1992; the rivalry seems to have continued). Canada, it is claimed, had a

rivalry with the United States from 1974-79; additional disputes in 1989 and 1991 only missed continuing the rivalry by 4 months. The United States adds a rivalry with Cuba (16 disputes from 1959 to 1990; the rivalry seems to continue), Peru (five disputes from 1955-79), Syria (three disputes from 1973-84), Ecuador (eight disputes from 1952-80), Iran (seven disputes from 1979-91; there is no reason to believe it has ended), Iraq (four disputes from 1987-92; there is no reason to believe it has ended), Panama (three disputes from 1976-89; it may have ended with the United States invasion), and Libya (eight disputes from 1973-89; the rivalry may have continued after that point).<sup>60</sup>

Short term rivalries are more common than the enduring variety, but they are still rather rare in the overall list of wars. Sri Lanka experienced its civil war, which India eventually became involved in; as did Bangladesh. Several enemies of the United States -- Syria, Iraq, and Iran -- also faced internal warfare during this period. Libya engaged in conflicts with Tunisia and Chad, Syria intervened in Lebanon while still a current rival of the United States, Iraq and Iran began their war while Iran was a current rival of the United States, and Iraq invaded Kuwait as a current rival of the U.S. Cuba also sent troops to participate in the war in Angola and the Ogaden conflict. Turkey intervened in Iraq in the 1990s, and Ecuador and Peru had a border incident in 1978. 14 of the total 146 wars, or 9.6%, involved current rivals.

### 3.2.2 Allies

The presence of an alliance will be based on Kegley and Raymond (1990:52): "formal agreements between sovereign states for the putative purpose of coordinating their behavior in the event of specified contingencies of a military nature." As Sorokin (1994: 425) notes, informal

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<sup>60</sup>The three of these rivalries that seem least plausible disappear in the data: neither the United States nor Canada participated in a war from 1978 to Aug 1979, so their rivalry does not matter. Likewise, neither Peru nor Ecuador participated in a war before their rivalry with the United States terminated in 1980 and 1979 (their border war in 1981 occurs after the rivalry ends).

arrangements as allowed by Walt (1987:12) do not impose the same degree of obligation on the parties; they are also distinctly difficult to operationalize. Rieder's (194: 495) definition, "a formal and mutual commitment to contribute military assistance in the event one of the alliance partners is attacked," is too restrictive for this research. Non-reciprocal commitments of assistance still "bind" one state to aid the other, since one state has determined that the other's security is critical to itself.

Not all the states under consideration have the same allies. Categorizing wars on this variable is simplified, however, by the fact that India has no formal allies. US allies, as listed in Cheney (1991: 8), include the members of NATO, Australia, New Zealand until 1986, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and the members of the Rio Treaty.<sup>61</sup> Canada's allies are limited to the members of NATO.<sup>62</sup>

**ALLY** will be coded "1" (and "0" otherwise) if one or more of the principle parties to the dispute is a formal ally of the state being observed. The concept of a principle party, as opposed to a mere participant as in the previous variable, is drawn from the Sollenberg (1995) definition. A war is a dispute over regime or territory. A state is a principle party to a dispute over territory if it is a claimant to the disputed territory. A state is a principle party to a dispute over regime if it is ruled by the regime in question or if it was an initial proponent of regime change. Thus, for example, the border conflicts between Thailand and Malaysia and Myanmar involve an ally of the United States, but the spillover of the Third Indochina War into Thailand does not lead that war to be coded as allied involvement. Likewise, Pakistan's service as a conduit of aid to the

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<sup>61</sup>The status of the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) is unclear. The DOD Report (Cheney, 1991) includes it as a "treaty obligation," but there is a heated debate among scholars specializing in the region whether it exists in fact. Declaring it non-operational, however, begs the question of whether or not alliance commitments influence a state's perspective on a war. If the Rio Treaty is not "operational," then the data will probably show that the participation of allies is not enough to influence the problem representation.

<sup>62</sup>When Canada joined the Organization of American States in 1990, it did not sign into the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (Reuters Report, 8 Jan 90).



Afghans does not make them a principle party to the Soviet-Afghan War. 39 wars, or 26.7% of the total involve allies of one or more of the states.

### 3.2.3 Democracy

Since all three subject states are democracies, the fifth hypothesis argues that they would all react in the same way to the involvement of another democracy in the war. A procedural definition for democracy has been chosen because it is easier to objectively define the concept in terms of procedures than in terms of subjective normative goals. One such definition is provided by the POLITY II dataset (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). That dataset defines a "coherent" democracy as one that scores seven or more points on a scale that measures the competitiveness of political participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the chief executive. Studies on the democracy-war puzzle operationalize the concept using Gurr's (1990) POLITY II (Lake, 1992: 35, lowers the threshold to a score of 6 or more; Maoz and Russett, 1993: 628-9, manipulate the democracy scores in dyadic relationships). POLITY III is an update of POLITY II to include more cases and reassess some earlier coding. This definition is similar to the standard definitions used in comparative politics, such as Linz (1975: 182-3).<sup>63</sup> Layne (1994) does not seem to define democracy; one might assume that he accepts the definition used by the democracy-war studies he critiques.

**DEMOCRAT** will be coded "1" (and "0" otherwise) if one or more of the principle parties in the war receives a score of seven or greater on democracy in the POLITY III index described

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<sup>63</sup>"We shall call a political system democratic when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule; a democratic system does this without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference by norms requiring the use of force to enforce them."

above. The greatest anomaly produced by this measure is coding South Africa as democratic throughout the period. This leads to a technical case of democratic war in the South African raids on Botswana. The value of this variable can change during the course of the war -- democratic parties may cease to be such, or non-democratic ones may adopt a democratic regime. This occurred in three of the selected wars. In Peru, the democracy of the 1980s ended when President Fujimori suspended the constitution and dismissed the other branches of the government on 5 April 1992 (*The New York Times*, 7 April 1992: A16). On February 25, 1986, after several weeks of unrest, Philippine President Marcos fled to Hawaii, allowing President-elect Aquino to assume the office (*The New York Times*, 26 February 1986: A1). In the Sudan, an elected coalition led by Sadeq al-Mahdi assumed power on 4 May 1986 (*The New York Times*, 5 May 1986: A5). Prime Minister Mahdi's government was overthrown on 30 June 1989 (*Washington Post*, 15 July 1989). 47 of the 143 wars, or 32.9%, involve at least one democracy.

#### 3.2.4 Proximity

The sixth hypothesis argues that realism will become more prevalent as distance from the observing country decreases. At one extreme, **DISTANCE** can take the value "0" for if the theater of combat lies within, or along a border of, a country which shares a land border with the observing nation-state. The United States borders only Canada and Mexico; Canada borders only the United States; and India borders Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Burma/Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Only 11, or 7.7% of the wars during 1978-95 bordered a state studied in this dissertation.

The concept of proximity, however, means more than just sharing a border. Some studies operationalize a define a middle range of distance based on distance by sea. Bremer (1993: 236), for example, defines "contiguous" to include states less than 150 miles distant by

sea. One obvious problem with this method is that it defines the United States and Soviet Union as contiguous across the Bering Strait. One must either accept that definition and bias the research by finding proximity to correlate with the entire cold war or make an ad hoc exclusion for that case.

Another method, and that chosen by this author, begins by noting that the leaders of some nation-states take particular interest in a somewhat broader geographic region, similar to the old realist notion of "spheres of influence" or the American phrase "in our own backyard." Canada does not seem to have such a region. For the United States, this region includes the Caribbean basin: the Caribbean Islands, Central America, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. Nearly all of the US interventions in Latin America occurred in this region; it has special trade and strategic relevance to the US (see Pastor, 1992: 22-5). President Reagan's development scheme for Latin America, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, limited itself to this region. India's proximate region, based on its own government's delineation, includes Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Afghanistan.<sup>64</sup> Wars occurring in one of these regions (that do not involve the subject state as a an initial party to the dispute) will be coded "1" on **DISTANCE**. 14 wars, 9.6% of the total, occurred in regions proximate to an observing state.

All other war-observer combinations will be coded "2" for **DISTANCE**.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Prime Minister Gandhi referred to Afghanistan, in contrast to the Persian Gulf, as "in our part of the world," in a speech on 4 June 1988 (*Foreign Affairs Record* 34: 161). "Our neighbors" included Afghanistan and Sri Lanka in a speech by President Venkataraman on 7 June 1989 (*Foreign Affairs Record* 35: 173).

<sup>65</sup>In the regressions of Chapter 4, **DISTANCE** is replaced by two dummy variables, **FAR\_AWAY** and **SPHERE**. Since so few cases occurred where both the variables had value "0" (i.e., **DISTANCE** had value "0"), **SPHERE** was left out of the regression equations to reduce the serious collinearity problems introduced. The effect of this change was to collapse the border and sphere concepts into one another.

### 3.2.5 Other Independent Variables

The previous four variables were associated with hypotheses that linked the expressed worldview to factors associated with the states involved in a war. The remaining three hypotheses suggest that, even within a state-war pairing, the official worldview expressed by the leadership could vary over time. The war would be represented differently based on current economic performance, the public support for the democratically elected government, or by the approach of a national election. While these changes could be seen in any war, we shall try to select at least some wars that last for several years, during which the variables could change for one or more of the countries under study. These variables are discussed here to provide continuity with the other variable operationalizations.

#### 3.2.5.1 Economic Performance

According to the seventh hypothesis, a period of economic decline should lead to fewer liberal problem representations. If Grieco's reference (1993a: 129) is to long-term cyclical trends, similar to the decades-long cycles discussed by Doran and Parsons (1980), then this study cannot test this hypothesis. Two other interpretations of this hypothesis can be tested, however. The obvious one is to equate decline with an economic recession, defined as a decline in real GDP for two or more consecutive fiscal quarters. This variable, **ABSRECES**, would be coded "1" if that is the case; "0" otherwise. Based on data found in *International Financial Statistics*, the United States experienced two recessions during this period: July 1981-June 1982 and July 1990-March 1991. Canada had three recessions: January-June 1980, July 1981-December 1982, and January 1990-March 1991. *IFS* does not report quarterly statistics for India; nor do other publications. Annual statistics, found in *IFS*, *International Historical Statistics*, and the *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, are problematic: a comparison with annual data for Canada and the United States shows that the occurrence of an "annual recession" would be

coded very differently than official recessions; the rupee is non-convertible; and most suspiciously, Indian data reports an economic decline only for 1979 in the period 1978-94. Despite these limitations, **ABSRECES** will be coded for India.

Economic decline can also be interpreted in relative terms. National leaders may be more concerned with how their country's economic performance compares to that of other states. If an economy is growing, but at a slower rate than that of others, leaders may react as if they were experiencing a recession. The variable **RELRECES** will be coded "1" if the economy is in recession relative to certain other states. For the United States and Canada, the comparison will be to the G-7 (the U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, France, (West) Germany, Italy, and Japan). One could argue that the OECD as a whole (adding the other industrialized economies of Europe and North America to the group) could be a comparison; as it turns out, the performance of the United States and Canada is the same relative to both groups. These data have been identified only at the annual level. According to *OECD Economic Outlook*, the United States was in relative recession in 1979-80, 1982, 1985, and 1987-91. Canada was in relative recession in 1982 and 1989-92. While India could be compared to a group of East and South East Asian economies, discussions with several specialists on India revealed no consensus on an appropriate comparison group. **RELRECES** will not be coded for India.<sup>66</sup>

### 3.2.5.2 Popularity

The eighth hypothesis suggests a link between security in office, measured by current popularity, and the worldview held by leaders. **POPULAR** is coded as the raw popularity rating of the executive. Data for the United States are collected by Gallup and presented in *The Gallup Poll Monthly* and its predecessors, *The Gallup Report* and the *Gallup Opinion Index*. Gallup asks the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way [NAME] is handling his job as president."

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<sup>66</sup>This variable could also be operationalized using per capita GDP growth or decline instead of the absolute figures.

The percentage answering "approve" is coded in **POPULAR**. A similar question is reported for Canada in *Index to International Public Opinion*. The more appropriate, and also more frequent, questions asked in Canada, is "If a federal election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favor?" In a parliamentary system, unlike the American Presidential system, the head of government's tenure is linked to the performance of his or her party at the next election. This research will use the answers to this second question. In any case, the two questions, when asked in the same month, correlate within the polls' margin of error (less than 5% difference, at most). Poll answers are assumed to be valid for one month, or until the next poll is taken, whichever is shorter. Polling data have not been found for India. A small amount of data is missing for Canada and the United States when the gap between consecutive polls exceeded one month.

#### 3.2.5.3 Approaching Elections

The ninth and final hypothesis proposes a link between worldviews and the nearness of an election. **PREELECT** will be coded "1" if an election that could end the head of government's tenure, or that of his or her party, will occur within the next three months.<sup>67</sup> Elections in the United States occurred on 4 November 1980, 6 November 1984, 8 November 1988, and 3 November 1992; Canadian elections occurred on 22 May 1979, 18 February 1980, 4 September 1984, 21 November 1988, and 25 October 1993; Indian national elections occurred on 6 January 1980, 24 December 1984, 26 November 1989, and 17 June 1991 (Mackie and Rose, 1991; *The New York Times*, Reuters Wire Reports).

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<sup>67</sup>In parliamentary systems, elections do not usually occur at regularly scheduled intervals; often, the election is announced as little as one month before the voting is to occur. Nevertheless, the approach of an election is generally known to the public and is surely anticipated by the government leaders whose worldview we seek.

### 3.2.6 Wars selected for this research

Prior to selecting wars, a list of all wars during the 1978-94 period was prepared. The Correlates of War Project's Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset includes all interstate disputes in which at least some potential for the use of military instruments was present. The dataset includes 479 separate cases. Some of these, however, appear somewhat murky. For example, COW includes disputes between the United States and Canada in August 1979 and July 1991, which had the same "hostility level" as the Iranian hostage crisis that began a few months later -- and a higher "hostility level" than the Israeli bombing of Iraq's Osirek reactor in 1981. Furthermore, many of these separate entries could be considered aspects of a single war: the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-8 spawned many side disputes with Arab states and major commercial powers, including the Bahamas. Since it is very unlikely that state leaders isolated incidents like the sinking of the *Stark* from the overall war, it will be appropriate to try to aggregate these disputes into larger "wars." For these reasons, COW will be used only to help date the beginning and end of conflicts.

Sollenberg (1995) includes all wars with total deaths of 25 or more during the 1990-4 period. For the preceding period, 1985-9, the SIPRI yearbooks include a section on armed conflicts with total deaths of 1000 or more. This seems to be the best operationalization of war (see chapter 2), but unfortunately is cut short in time.

Tillema (1994) has prepared a more temporally complete data set. He codes cases of Overt Military Intervention during the Cold War.<sup>68</sup> The dataset includes 76 entries.<sup>69</sup> Tillema, like COW, has no fatality cut-off, thus it can supplement SIPRI during the years when their coverage overlaps. Sivard (1991) is an additional source, including internal wars as long as they

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<sup>68</sup>Thus, like COW, the dataset ends in 1992.

<sup>69</sup>A 77th entry codes the U.S. mission to the Virgin Islands after Hurricane Hugo in 1989 to restore order. This has been excluded because the Virgin Islands are U.S. territory and the disruption of civil order had no political motivation.

had a fatality rate of 1000 persons per year. The only wars that are "missing," then, are wars in which all of the following were true: 1) no national troops crossed a national border, 2) the death rate was less than 1000 per year, 3) it ended between 1/1/78 and 1/1/85 (else they would be ongoing into SIPRI's first *Yearbook*). This seems satisfactory because the early 1980s were not a period in which insurgencies were tending to become resolved.

Appendix B lists all 146 wars subject to this investigation, coded along the variables operationalized in sections 3.2.1-4. From this list, approximately 25% (36) have been selected. Selection of wars was based on 1) maximizing the combinations of variables (many combinations were empty); 2) selecting approximately 25% of the wars within each value of each variable (i.e., 3 of the 11 bordering a subject state, 3 of the 14 proximate to a subject state, and 30 of the 121 that were farther from all subject states); 3) selecting some of the longer wars, so as to vary **POPULAR**, **ABSRECES**, **RELRECES**, and **PREELECT**; 4) selecting wars with a variety of eventual involvements by the subject states, so as to later investigate validity issues; and 5) selecting wars that seemed more likely to be commented upon by India and Canada, whose documentation is more sparse than that of the United States.

Figure 3.2 lists the final selection of wars. Note, of course, that the variables listed for each war may hold for only one of the countries involved. For example, the Philippine and Argentine conflicts did not involve Canadian or Indian allies, only those of the United States. See Appendix D for capsule summaries of these wars.



### Wars Selected for this Research

Name of War	Variable				Years of Conflict																											
	R I V A L	D E M O C R	A L I E N I S T	D I S T	7 8	7 9	8 0	8 1	8 2	8 3	8 4	8 5	8 6	8 7	8 8	8 9	9 0	9 1	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 7	9 8	9 9	9 0	9 1	9 2	9 3	9 4	
Algeria Internal	0	0	0	2																												
Argentina Internal	0	0	1	2	*	*																										
Burma/Myanmar Internal	0	0	0	0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Contra-Sandinista War	0	0	1	1			*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Former Yugoslavia	0	0	0	2																												
Ghana Internal	0	0	0	2				*																								
Granada Occupation	0	1	1	2																												
India-Pakistan	0	1	0	2									*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Intifada	0	1	0	2																												
Iran-Iraq War	1	0	0	2			*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Iranian Hostage Crisis	0	1	1	2		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Iraq-Kuwait War	1	0	0	2																												
Kagara War	0	0	0	2	*	*																										
Liberia Internal I	0	0	0	2									*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Liberia Internal II	0	0	0	2																							*	*	*	*	*	*
Mexico Internal	0	0	1	0																												
Osirak Reactor Raid	0	1	0	2				*																								
Pakistan Internal	2	0	0	0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Panama Occupation	0	1	1	2																							*	*	*	*	*	*
Peru Internal	0	*	1	2				*					*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Philippines Internal	0	*	1	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Russo-Afghan War	2	0	0	1		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Shaba Crisis	0	0	0	2	*	*																										
Somalia Internal	0	0	0	2																												
South Africa Internal	0	1	0	2																												
South Atlantic War	0	1	1	2						*																						
Sri Lanka Internal	1	1	0	1							*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Sudan Internal	0	*	0	2							*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Third Indochina War	2	0	0	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
U.S.-Libya clashes	0	1	1	2				*																								
Uganda Internal	0	0	0	2				*					*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Western Saharan War	0	0	0	2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Yemen Internal	0	0	0	2											*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Yemen Internal	0	0	0	2																												*
Yemen War	0	0	0	2		*																										
Zaire-Zambia	0	0	0	2					*																							

Figure 3.2 Wars Selected for this Research. Dates of wars are compiled from Tillema (1994), SIPRI yearbooks, and Sivard (1991). Variable values are per the preceding discussion.

\*Indicates that the value of this variable changes during the course of the war.

### 3.3 Text Selection

Every attempt has been made to acquire a complete set of statements on these 36 wars by the United States, Canada and India. This section describes the sources for these texts, and the means of identifying the appropriate ones.

India's Ministry of External Affairs publishes a monthly collection of statements, *Foreign Affairs Review*. It includes press releases by the Ministry and statements made before various fora by government officials. *FAR* is not indexed, so texts were found by paging through each issue at the University of Toronto and the University of Pennsylvania. The following issues of *FAR* could not be located in North America: September 1982, August 1987, August-October 1988, December 1988, March 1990, January-August 1993, October-December 1993, January-March 1994, and May-December 1994.

The Canadian Ministry of External Affairs and International Trade publishes speeches and press releases in several collections. These speeches, and some issued by the Canadian Mission to the United Nations and the Office of the Prime Minister, are indexed in Barrett (1982; 1987; 1994). These documents were collected from the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto.

The United States publishes relevant documents in two collections. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* includes all statements issued by the President or his office. *Department of State Bulletin* and its successor, *Dispatch*, include selected statements on foreign policy, primarily by officials in the State Department. *Bulletin* and *Dispatch* are well-indexed; since *WCPD*'s index seemed thorough, it was supplemented by a Lexis/Nexis search.

A search of these sources identified 2461 cases, where a "case" is a representation of a particular war in a text. Most texts contained only one case, but a large number of texts included multiple cases. The number of official statements issued by each state varies greatly across these wars. In addition, the extent of the discussion of each war varies greatly. Rather than

selecting from the identified cases, this research coded all of them. The next chapter analyzes the results of that coding.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the data collected using the methodology described in the previous chapters. The first section examines the data in summary form. The second section discusses the reliability of the coding. The third section performs a linear regression of the worldview against the dependent variables, and discusses the implications of its results for the hypotheses set forth in section 2.3. Chapter 5 examines validity issues associated with this research.

#### 4.1 Summary of data collected

##### 4.1.1 The Final Dataset

The dataset identified during the text selection process (section 3.3) included 2461 cases. During the coding of these cases, 217 cases were eliminated from the dataset. Figure 4.1 lists the reasons these cases were excluded. Many of these are innocuous, representing cases that clearly should never have been included in the initial dataset because they did not fit the domain under study or duplicated other cases. For example, 26 cases were duplicates, resulting in most cases because the same text was reproduced in both *WCPD* and *Department of State Bulletin*. The author tried to weed out this duplication during the collection process, but missed some. A few duplicates also occurred in Canadian data, when speeches were released

by both the Canadian mission to the United Nations and by the Foreign Ministry. Case collection began before the final dates for the beginning or end of a conflict had been set. The author included 14 cases in the initial dataset that later turned out to be referring to events outside the span of the war (e.g., references to war in Afghanistan later in 1989, after the Soviet troops pulled out, should not have been included). In eleven cases, a text was included because it referred to the locale of a war (e.g., "Nicaragua"), but more careful perusal revealed that the text did not refer to the war underway at that locale. Joint statements of several countries could not be coded because we could not assess the extent to which the joint statement represented a US or Canadian problem representation. Ten such "joint cases" were inadvertently included in the initial dataset, and later removed. In seven cases, the text was only a summary of the perspective of another government or of an international organization. These also did not include represent US or Canadian policy. We did not include responses to questions at press conferences because we could not determine with certainty which answers were, indeed, prepared official statements, and which were ad lib reactions more representative of the speaker's personal perspective. Three statements were not governmental statements, representing the reaction of the minority party or parties in Parliament to government actions. Finally, three cases were the testimony of American Secretaries of State-select to Congress before they assumed office. In total, 78 cases were lost for these relatively innocuous reasons

An additional 11 were lost because of apparent mistakes in copying the citation or because it was unclear what war was being referred to. Most of these latter four cases were references to the "conflict in Central America" during a time when there were several such conflicts in progress. These cases might not accurately represent national policy (usually India's), so were left out. The seven "lost" cases are unfortunate, but there is no reason to think that there is any systematic cause for these errors. Random error introduces less error into the final analysis, and probably is lost amid other random error present in all social science analysis.

### Cases Excluded from Final Dataset

Reason for Excluding Case	Cases
Discussion was too brief or vague to include a problem representation	63
Reference only to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict	55
Duplicate of an included case	26
Case was after the conclusion of a war, or before it began	14
No reference to the conflict, just to its locale	11
Joint statement, not an official national problem representation	10
Statement includes only descriptive or factual information	10
Statement describes the views of another government or international organization	7
No reference found -- apparent mistake in citation	7
Statement is a response to questions, not a prepared statement	4
Referent is ambiguous (e.g., "Central America")	4
Not a governmental statement	3
Statement by Secretary of State-select prior to assuming office	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>217</b>

Figure 4.1: Reasons Cases were Excluded from Final Dataset. Six of these excluded texts were Canadian, 25 were Indian, and the remaining 186 were American.

The three remaining categories demand separate explanations. Ten cases were excluded because they presented only "factual" information without meeting any of the criteria for coding. Most of these were chronologies of a conflict, often in testimony to the United States Congress. While one could perhaps argue that the selection and presentation of such "facts" holds clues to an underlying perspective, the methodology of this research was not designed for such deeper psychological investigation.

An additional 63 cases were excluded because the reference was too brief or vague for any indicator to be coded. An example of such is "The President and the General Secretary also discussed the regional conflicts in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and Indochina." Such a statement eliminates three cases all at once. Most such remarks were never included in the initial dataset, because they were clearly not codable. If there was any doubt during the initial

review, however, they were left in with the expectation that there would be more time to decide if a case was codable or not during the coding phase of this research.

Finally, 55 cases referred only to the humanitarian consequences of a war. These dealt with refugees, famines, and human rights violations without taking a specific position on the root conflict. They also include vague hopes that peace will replace a war, without specifying how to bring that about. These cases form the root of a potential third worldview, one of humanitarianism or "paxism." Section 5.1 develops this idea more fully. It should be noted, however, that some of these 55 cases may also be too vague to be coded even under this third worldview (and likewise, some of the 62 vague cases may include enough information to code them under this third worldview). Also, of course, many of the remaining 2249 cases include indicators consistent with this humanitarian worldview.

One could argue that these cases, especially the 128 discussed in the preceding two paragraphs, should have been left in the dataset and coded as zero on both realism and liberalism. This would not have made the dataset more accurate. As noted in section 3.3, the case selection process included checking texts against references in various indexes. If a potential case, based on that review, seemed too insubstantial to code, it was not included in the initial dataset. If there seemed any possibility that the text could be coded, it was retained until it could be examined in depth. Including all indexed texts, even those without a codable problem representation, would have been inefficient -- this theory does not claim that every reference to a conflict will include such a representation. Including only these 128, out of an unknown (but large) number of other texts that could not be coded would not make the final dataset complete. Rather it would add an unrepresentative collection of cases, all with a neutral value on the dependent variable, to it. Including them would introduce a high degree of systematic bias which would, at best, lower the significance of our findings. Since they do not fit the question under study (problem representations of foreign wars) or the competing worldviews, and since they do not even represent the complete set of uncodable references, it is appropriate to exclude them.

Distribution of Cases Across Wars and States

WAR	CANADA		INDIA		USA		Total	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Afghan	11	5.8	40	14.5	325	18.2	376	16.7
Algeria	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	0.3	3	0.1
Argentina	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Burma	6	3.2	2	0.7	20	1.1	28	1.2
Chiapas	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1	1	0.0
Contra	14	7.4	11	4.0	393	22.0	418	18.6
Ghana	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Grenada	0	0.0	0	0.0	-	-	0	0.0
Hostage	3	1.6	2	0.7	-	-	5	0.2
IndoChin	14	7.4	32	11.6	180	10.1	226	10.0
IndoPak	0	0.0	-	-	8	0.4	8	0.4
Intifada	7	3.7	17	6.2	46	2.6	70	3.1
IranIraq	7	3.7	26	9.5	141	7.9	174	7.7
Kagara	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Kuwait	32	16.9	17	6.2	182	10.2	231	10.3
Liberia1	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	0.2	3	0.1
Liberia2	1	0.5	0	0.0	26	1.5	27	1.2
Libya	0	0.0	3	1.1	-	-	3	0.1
Osirak	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.1	2	0.1
Pakistan	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.1	2	0.1
Panama	2	1.1	0	0.0	-	-	2	0.1
Peru	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	0.6	10	0.4
Phil	0	0.0	0	0.0	41	2.3	41	1.8
SAfrica	33	17.5	46	16.7	71	4.0	150	6.7
SAtlanti	1	0.5	1	0.4	24	1.3	26	1.2
Shaba	0	0.0	1	0.4	6	0.3	7	0.3
Somalia	2	1.1	1	0.4	66	3.7	69	3.1
SriLanka	7	3.7	73	26.5	12	0.7	92	4.1
Sudan	3	1.6	0	0.0	24	1.3	27	1.2
Uganda	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	0.2	3	0.1
WSahara	1	0.5	0	0.0	13	0.7	14	0.6
Yemen1	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	0.3	5	0.2
Yemen2	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	0.3	6	0.3
Yemen3	1	0.5	0	0.0	1	0.1	2	0.1
Yugoslav	44	23.3	3	1.1	171	9.6	218	9.7
ZaiZam	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Cases	189		275		1785		2249	
% of Total	8.4		12.2		79.4			

Figure 4.2: Distribution of Cases Across Wars and States. The "cases" column indicates the number of cases that could be coded for the war/state combination. The "%" column indicates the percentage of that state's total cases that referred to each war. A "-" indicates that the state was not an initial bystander to the war, and thus its references to it could not be coded.



So 217 cases were excluded from the initial dataset of 2461 cases. The final dataset, which is listed in Appendix E, included 2249 cases. Five cases were "added" to the initial dataset. Each of these had been copied or downloaded from Lexus/Nexus, but not recorded as part of the initial dataset. When they were "found" amid the texts, they were added to the dataset.<sup>70</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Distribution of Cases Across the States

The three states did not seem to place equal emphasis on the 36 wars. Figure 4.2 tabulates the number of references to each war by each state. No references could be coded for five wars: the Argentine "dirty war," the United States invasion of Grenada, the Kagara war between Tanzania and Uganda, an ethnic conflict in Ghana, and a brief border incident between Zaire and Zambia. These findings do not indicate that these states ignored those wars entirely, or that their leaders did not form a problem representation of them. They only indicate that the worldview such a problem representation would be derived from could not be identified. See Appendix D for capsule summaries of these wars.

Figure 4.3 shows that there was some consistency in the attention each country paid to each war. Eight wars were common to these lists; the Sri Lankan Civil War was among the ten most frequently represented wars of both Canada and India.

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<sup>70</sup>It is, of course, always possible that other cases are "missing." While collecting texts, especially from the State Department publications, it was noted that where the index indicated one reference to a conflict on a given page, there sometimes were two texts on that page with a relevant reference. These texts were added to the initial dataset while it was being recorded. One reason for collecting cases from two U.S. sources was to ameliorate indexing errors. There is no reason to believe that any such errors in the data collection process would introduce systematic bias into the analysis. In fact, references missed in the indexing process are more likely to be brief and possibly uncodable ones, not major statements of policy.

### Most Frequently Represented Wars

RANK	CANADA		INDIA		USA		Total	
	War	Cases	War	Cases	War	Cases	War	Cases
1	Yugoslav	44	SriLanka	73	Contra	393	Contra	418
2	SAfrica	33	SAfrica	46	Afghan	325	Afghan	376
3	Kuwait	32	Afghan	40	Kuwait	182	Kuwait	231
4	Contra	14	IndoChin	32	IndoChin	180	IndoChin	226
5	IndoChin	14	IranIraq	26	Yugoslav	171	Yugoslav	218
6	Afghan	11	Kuwait	17	IranIraq	141	IranIraq	174
7	Intifada	7	Intifada	17	SAfrica	71	SAfrica	150
8	IranIraq	7	Contra	11	Somalia	66	SriLanka	92
9	SriLanka	7	Yugoslav	3	Intifada	46	Intifada	70
10	Burma	6	Libya	3	Phil	41	Somalia	69
No Reference		18			20			4
								5

Figure 4.3: Ten Most Commonly Represented Wars for Each State. The "No Reference" row indicates the number of wars for which no references could be found, excluding those for which the state was itself an initial participant.

#### 4.1.3 Distributions of Worldviews Across the States

The three states also differed in the worldviews expressed in their statements on these wars. Worldview has been operationalized as the natural log of the ratio of liberal to realist indicators.<sup>71</sup> Since the maximum difference between those indicators is 10-0, the worldview score can vary from -2.398 to 2.398; a score of 0 indicates balances between the liberalism and realism. Figures 4.4-7 show histograms of the worldviews identified for the total cases and for each state. Recall that scores greater than zero indicate liberalism and scores less than zero indicate realism.

<sup>71</sup>See section 2.2.3 for the extended discussion.




Figure 4.4: Distribution of Worldviews, All Cases.




Figure 4.5: Distribution of Worldviews, Canadian Cases.




Figure 4.6: Distribution of Worldviews, Indian Cases.




Figure 4.7: Distribution of Worldviews, American Cases.

We can also aggregate the worldview scores into more coarse categories. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 do so. In them, and in other discussion using the "coarse" categories, the worldview is considered strongly evident if it exceeds  $\pm 0.5$ . This is approximately equivalent to a distribution of indicators such that the total of the realist indicators is at least double that of the liberal indicators (or vice versa). The worldview is considered weakly evident if it is not zero, but is between 0.5 and -0.5. A worldview of zero (balanced) is considered neutral in this labeling scheme.

A casual analysis indicates that Canada seems more prone than the other states to represent foreign wars in terms consistent with liberalism. Such an inference, however, is meaningless without taking the rest of the independent variables into account, as we shall in section 4.3. The more relevant observation about the data of Figures 4.8 and 4.9 is that there is variation across the worldviews, the worldviews are not strongly skewed toward either liberalism or realism, and approximately two-thirds of the cases can be considered to be strongly consistent with one of the two worldviews.

Distribution of Worldviews, Aggregate Categories

STATE	Strong Realist		Weak Realist		Neutral		Weak Liberal		Strong Liberal	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Canada	15	7.9	7	3.7	28	14.8	10	5.3	129	68.3
India	82	29.8	19	6.9	38	13.8	28	10.2	108	39.3
USA	624	35.0	186	10.4	233	13.1	139	7.8	603	33.8
Total	721	32.1	212	9.4	299	13.3	177	7.9	840	37.3

Figure 4.8: Distribution of Worldviews, Aggregate Categories (Tabular Presentation). "Weak" categories include worldviews with absolute value between 0 and 0.5; "strong" categories include worldviews with absolute values greater than 0.5.




Figure 4.9: Distribution of Worldviews, Aggregate Categories (Graphic Presentation). The Canadian data labels that did not fit are 4% weakly realist and 5% weakly liberal.

#### 4.1.4 Distribution of the Indicators

The ten indicators of realist and liberal worldviews were not coded "present" with equal frequency. As shown in Figure 4.10, the indicators for unilateral and multilateral action were among the most commonly found. Several explanations suggest themselves. The fifth indicator is the one that is most directly linked to "what" the decision makers intends to do, and "how" they will try to do it. The others, especially the indicators for gains, interests, and precedent, relate more to "why" the policy is being followed. One might suppose that a policy statement could describe what a state will do without explaining why. It seems somewhat less likely that such a

statement would seek to justify the actions without stating what they are.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, the justification could use any of several indicators, thus reducing the frequency that each is present. coded.

Concerns over absolute and relative gains were found very rarely. It would probably not be wise, however, to infer from this that the issue of absolute or relative gains, on which so much of the current debate is based, is merely academic. "Not found" indicates only that an indicator could not be identified in a case. The concepts of relative and absolute gains may be part of the worldviews from which these problem representations were formed. These concepts may, however, not be commonly expressed in official statements. These concepts may also be more prevalent in other issue areas, such as trade, which this research does not address. Nevertheless, further investigation should be done to dispel the possibility that these concepts, central to the academic debate, are only peripheral to practical policy making.

As for the other three "pairs" of characteristics, we note that community interests (the promotion of democracy or support for international norms) are cited much more frequently than national interests (including the protection of allies), and the protection of other states is mentioned more often than protection of one's own borders. This may be a function of the selected nation-states, fairly isolated from most conflicts, but the inclusion of other states will allow us to examine this further. Finally, the classic liberal precedent argument as to the indivisibility of peace is invoked much less often than the narrow realist one that states will use current gains to seek further advantage. The liberal side of indicator four is most often invoked in representations of the Kuwaiti and Yugoslav wars. Perhaps this indicator is rare because of its association with appeasement and the League of Nations; once again, later research could examine why some indicators seem more common in some situations than in others.

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<sup>72</sup>Less likely, but not unusual. Once the policy actions are widely known, the speaker may gloss over the details and focus on the justification.

### Frequency of Coding the Indicators

Indicator		Not Found		Weakly Present		Strongly Present	
R1	Concern over Relative Gains	1861	82.7%	105	4.7%	283	12.6%
R2	National Interests	1539	68.4%	127	5.6%	583	25.9%
R3	National Protection	1972	87.7%	86	3.8%	192	8.5%
R4	Narrow Precedent	1670	74.3%	144	6.4%	435	19.3%
R5	Unilateralism/Bilateralism	1016	45.2%	142	6.3%	1091	48.5%
L1	Concern over Absolute Gains	2225	98.9%	19	0.8%	5	0.2%
L2	Community Interests	1198	53.3%	181	8.0%	870	38.7%
L3	Protection of Other States	1286	57.2%	175	7.8%	788	35.0%
L4	Broad Precedent	2128	94.6%	37	1.6%	84	3.8%
L5	Multilateralism	1166	52.8%	238	10.6%	845	37.6%

Figure 4.10: Frequency of Coding the Indicators. The five indicators of realism are listed first, followed by the five indicators of liberalism. The codes at left will be used to refer to these indicators in later figures.

### Frequency of Coding the Indicators, by State

	% Cases, trait not observed			% Cases, trait observed		
	CAN	IND	USA	CAN	IND	USA
R1	98.9	98.2	78.7	1.1	0.7	15.6
R2	85.7	78.2	65.1	13.2	18.9	28.3
R3	98.9	90.5	86.1	0.0	5.1	9.9
R4	83.6	91.3	70.6	9.5	5.5	22.5
R5	68.3	43.3	43.0	27.5	48.0	50.8
L1	97.9	99.6	98.9	0.5	0.0	0.2
L2	44.4	74.5	50.9	47.1	19.6	40.7
L3	64.0	59.6	56.1	28.0	31.3	36.4
L4	89.9	99.6	94.3	5.8	0.4	4.0
L5	24.9	54.5	54.3	69.8	34.5	34.6

Figure 4.11: Frequency of Coding the Indicators, by State. This table takes the data in Figure 4.10 and breaks each indicator out by state. The "Weakly Present" category was dropped from this presentation for reasons of space.



The aggregate numbers of Figure 4.10 do not tell the whole story, however. In Figure 4.11, the frequency of the ten indicators is listed for each state. As one might expect, the liberal indicators occur more often and the realist indicators less often for Canada than for India and the United States. With these liberal indicators, the same three (institutions and norms, protecting other states, and multilateralism) dominate in all three states. For the United States, these three are found with similar frequency. For India, support for international law and institutions is found less often than L3 and L5. For Canada, support for multilateralism is the most frequent indicator, with protection of other states found less often than the L2 or L5. This suggests that, while all three states display worldviews consistent with ideal liberalism at least one third of the time, the "actual" worldviews operating in them may be rather different. The U.S. official worldview may be the closest to the ideal. The Canadian version of liberalism may place greater emphasis on the forms and mechanisms of liberalism than on any goals of enhancing peace in general. The Indian version of liberalism may place less stock in the formal institutions than in using multilateral mechanisms to protect other states.

On the realist side, we must immediately note the relative frequency of R1, concern for relative gains. We noted before that the relative-absolute gains debate did not seem to be very salient in policy statements. Relative gains were more invoked more commonly than absolute gains; this was not unexpected in a military domain. We find here, however, that even the concern over *relative* gains is expressed almost exclusively by Americans. One explanation could be that relative gains are only important with respect to established rivals; only the United States had rivals who became involved in conflicts with third parties. Another explanation could be that even the relative gains side of the "debate" is an exclusively American, or perhaps great-power, concern. Either possibility is clearly at odds with the primacy of this issue in academic debates.

As for the other indicators, Canada and the United States corresponded fairly well (keeping in mind that Canada displayed a perspective consistent with realism half as often as did

the U.S.). One exception is the absence of any Canadian concern over threats to its own security (R3). Indian statements were notably lacking in concern for the future actions of the current participants in a war (R4), and somewhat less concerned with interests as well. All three seemed to include unilateralism and national interests at the core of a worldview congruent with realism; only the United States frequently added the other elements of ideal realism to its perspective.

#### 4.1.4.1 Correlation of the Indicators

In the above discussion, we began to assess the "actual" worldviews held by each country's leadership. For this study, we only need to evaluate the hypotheses regarding realism and liberalism as academic ideals. For future research, however, we will want to try to compare the ideal templates to the actual worldviews. We suggested, for example, that Canadians may include institutions and multilateralism at the core of their liberalism, while Indians may combine multilateralism with community protection. The United States, on the other hand, may use all three. Common frequency does not, however, indicate common occurrence. By looking at the bivariate correlation of these indicators, we can assess the coherence of these worldviews and find suggestions of the actual worldviews. Figure 4.12 presents this data.

In the liberal (upper left) quadrant of Figure 4.12, we find little support for these suggestions. Canadians may use institutions (L2) and multilateralism (L5) the most often, but their correlation (which is not significant) is negative. The same is true of community protection (L3) and multilateralism (L5) for the Indians. The only one of those connections supported by the data is between community protection (L3) and multilateralism (L5) in the United States; neither of those indicators significantly correlates with institutions (L2).

Correlation of the Ten Indicators

	L2	L3	L4	L5	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
L1	.14 .04 .01	.18* -.05 .04	.40*** -.00 -.00	.09 -.05 .01	-.01 .30*** -.03	.27*** .12* -.01	.53*** .24*** .02	.03 -.02 .05	-.09 .06 -.00
L2		.05 .16** .02	.31*** .04 .11***	-.10 .02 .04	.11 -.05 -.01	.15* -.10 .12***	.11 -.03 .12***	.10 .10 .13***	.04 .16** .10***
L3			.32*** .09 .16***	.13 -.04 .20***	.04 .02 .04	.28*** -.07 .14***	.16* -.02 .16***	.37*** .08 .30***	-.20** .07 .02
L4				.18* -.05 .13***	-.03 -.01 .00	.43*** .12* .05*	.38*** -.02 .09***	.23** -.02 .09***	-.21** .06 -.09***
L5					.01 -.09 -.11***	-.00 -.20*** -.08***	.07 -.16** -.07**	.09 .14* .04	-.54*** -.60*** -.47***
R1						-.04 .26*** .27***	-.01 .42*** .35***	.29*** .15* .27***	.05 -.03 .10***
R2			CAN IND USA				.26*** .59*** .57***	.26*** -.02 .41***	-.15* .10 .29***
R3								.12 .07 .41***	-.07 .11 .22***
R4									-.07 .01 .15***

Figure 4.12: Correlation of the Ten Indicators. Each combination of indicators has three entries.

The top is the Canadian score, the middle is the Indian, the bottom is the American.

\* = significant at  $p < .05$   
 \*\* = significant at  $p < .01$   
 \*\*\* = significant at  $p < .001$

In the realist quadrant (lower right), we find that all five indicators significantly correlate for the United States. For the other two states, however, interests (R2) and unilateralism (R5) do not correspond; for Canada there is a somewhat significant negative relationship between them. The other frequently-coded indicators are not related, according to this analysis.

Finally, let us examine the upper right quadrant of Figure 4.12, which displays the correlations of the realist and liberal indicators. Some of these are as one might expect: Unilateralism (R5) and multilateralism (L5) are significantly negatively correlated. Indeed, both unilateralism and multilateralism tend to have significant negative correlations with the other perspective's indicators. But other characteristics tend to have significant positive correlations, especially for the United States. Does Figure 4.12 call into doubt the coherence and distinctiveness of these two ideal worldviews?

There are two reasons to argue that it does not. One is methodological. Most of these characteristics are usually coded "0" for "not observed," as noted in Figure 4.11. For India, relative gains (R1) and absolute gains (L1) appear to coexist ( $r = .30$ , significant at .001). But for India, L1 is never strongly present, and R1 is strongly present only 0.7% of the time. For Canada, R3 is never coded and L1 is coded only 0.5% of the time. No surprise, then, that their values correlate at  $r = .53$  ( $p < .001$ ). What we may be finding, in other words, is a high correlation of "not observeds." In the next section, we discuss ways to analyze these relationships on a more sophisticated level.

The substantive reason not to be concerned can be illustrated with an analogy. Suppose we identify ideal characteristics of a football player and a jockey. To keep it simple, suppose the football player would be aided by being physically large and being quick; the jockey would be aided by being small and skillful at riding a horse. For "actual" jockeys, these traits may correlate highly: many jockeys may, in fact, be both relatively small and skillful at riding horses. This relationship approximates that found in our observations of realism. For football players, on the other hand, quickness and size may not be closely correlated. Either alone, however, may

be enough compete. This relationship approximates that found in our observations of liberalism. We would not say, however, that our "ideal" football player is somehow less coherent than the "ideal" jockey. Nor should the possibility that the characteristics of one may correlate the characteristics of the other disturb us. Small size may correlate with quickness, for example. The correlation analysis may be too simple to tell us very much about these worldviews.

#### 4.1.4.2 Co-occurrence of the Indicators

A more sophisticated analysis would examine only the co-occurrence of these indicators. That is, given that multilateralism (L5) has been observed in a case, which other liberal indicators are likely to also be observed in that case. This analysis can become as sophisticated as one wishes, perhaps by examining liberal cases separately from realist cases or by looking for triple or quadruple co-occurrences. This will be left for future research efforts. For the current effort, we examine only dual co-occurrences in the complete set of American data.

As shown in Figure 4.13, we do find that, given a liberal indicator in a case, we are generally more likely to find other liberal indicators than we are realist indicators. Likewise, given a realist indicator, we are generally more likely to find other realist indicators than we are liberal indicators. The opposite also seems to hold: we are more likely to code an indicator given that we have already coded another indicator of the same worldview than if we have coded an indicator of the other worldview.

We can note also some patterns in this data. L1 (absolute gains) and L4 (broad precedent) are rarely coded, but they are strong signs of liberalism: if either is found, we are more likely to find other liberal indicators accompanying them than we are if one of the other three is found (and also less likely to find realist indicators). R3 (national protection) is likewise the best single predictor of other realist characteristics, although it is also a strong predictor of certain liberal characteristics (most notably, appeal to international norms and institutions).

### Co-occurrences of Indicators, USA

Given	#Cases	L1	L2	L3	L4	L5	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
L1	4	-	50.0	100.0	0.0	75.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	50.0
L2	727	0.3	-	36.6	6.1	33.4	15.8	37.3	14.6	29.3	59.1
L3	649	0.6	41.0	-	7.9	44.2	17.3	37.1	15.6	38.8	52.9
L4	72	0.0	61.1	70.8	-	56.9	13.9	38.9	19.4	41.7	27.8
L5	618	0.5	39.3	46.4	6.6	-	10.0	23.3	6.8	24.3	19.4
R1	279	0.4	41.2	40.1	3.6	22.2	-	54.1	33.3	44.8	63.8
R2	506	0.0	53.6	47.6	5.5	28.5	29.8	-	35.0	46.8	71.5
R3	177	0.0	59.9	57.1	7.9	23.7	52.5	100.0	-	70.6	81.4
R4	402	0.5	53.0	62.7	7.5	37.3	31.1	59.0	31.1	-	63.2
R5	907	0.2	47.4	37.8	2.2	13.2	19.6	39.9	15.9	28.0	-

Figure 4.13: Co-occurrences of Indicators, USA. The rows list the percentage of cases in which an indicator is strongly present, given that the indicator in the left column is strongly present.

Clearly, more research can be done in this area to explore the "real" worldviews held by the decision makers in each of these states. Doing so now, however, would divert us from our primary goal, which is to test the hypotheses regarding liberalism and realism as ideals.

#### 4.2 Reliability of the Coding

Any content analysis is only as reliable as the rules used to transform texts into data. If the rules are not clear, different researchers could produce different data from the same cases, yielding different results. The content analysis in this research is, in some ways, more subjective than other such analysis. Rather than counting words or analyzing sentence structures, we have searched for broader concepts, understood in context with the rest of the text.<sup>73</sup> Thus the coding

<sup>73</sup>In some ways, this is only a trade-off. A word-counting algorithm can be reasonably certain to count the words one is looking for. But one must be careful both to search for all the

rules (see Appendix A) must be flexible enough to apply to many texts, yet stringent enough to apply consistently across those texts.

#### 4.2.1 Overall reliability

The reliability test was conducted with a senior graduate student in the Political Science Department at The Ohio State University.<sup>74</sup> The author systematically selected 2% of the coded cases to be checked by choosing every fiftieth case in the final dataset. Training included a review of the changes in the coding rules since the trial run reliability check (see Appendix C), in which the code checker had participated, and a "walk-through" of several cases from the dataset. The code checker then coded the cases on his own, and submitted them to the author. The code checker completed 12 texts, then an additional 8, and then the final 25 in separate groups. Between groups of texts, he received some clarifications on rules from the author (not a full retraining); these clarifications were not incorporated into previous cases. Appendix F lists the raw results of the reliability test.

The goal of the reliability checking was that the author and the checker agreement on 80% of the indicator codings. As shown in Figure 4.14, this goal was met in the aggregate. While the coders were not in 80% agreement for some individual indicators, they were within one point on at least 80% of the cases for all but one indicator (unilateralism).<sup>75</sup> As one might note from Figure 4.15, the code checker seemed somewhat reluctant to use the value "1," indicating

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synonymous ways in which a concept can be described and also to omit instances where the word is used, but with a different (perhaps even negated) meaning.

<sup>74</sup>Courtney Smith.

<sup>75</sup>To put these numbers in some further perspective, we can look at the context variables (speaker, venue, foreign leaders, and audience). While these factors are rather objective, being specified in the text, we had only 93% agreement on them.

#### Results of Reliability Analysis, Indicator Level

Indicators	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	L1	L2	L3	L4	L5	Total
% Cases in Perfect Agreement	84	76	87	78	67	98	78	89	78	80	81.3
% Cases with Disagreement $\leq 1$	91	82	96	89	78	100	84	93	89	91	89.6

Figure 4.14: Results of Reliability Analysis, Indicator Level. This table shows the percentage of the 450 indicators involved in the reliability analysis where the author and the coder agreed, and the percentage where they were in near-agreement

#### Crosstabulation of Reliability Check

Author's Score	Checker's Score			Total
	0	1	2	
0	282	7	22	311
1	12	1 <sup>a</sup>	12	25
2	27	4	83	114
Total	321	12	117	450

Pearson's  $r = 0.6626$

$\chi^2 = 198.737$ ,  $df = 4$

Figure 4.15: Crosstabulation of Reliability Check. Each cell indicates the number of times, out of 450 total chances, that the author and the code checker recorded each combination of indicator scores.

<sup>a</sup>This figure is quite low, probably because of the design of the coding rules. The definitions specify conditions under which a trait is present (=2) or absent (=0). The value "1" is assigned when the coder is unsure whether the trait is present or absent, not to indicate that the trait is "partially" present. Thus it is more subjective than the other values. Note, however, that the miscodings seem to be randomly distributed around the center cell. Thus we have introduced random unreliability, which is better than systematic unreliability.



that a trait was weakly present. This may account for some of the discrepancies in coding. The data from Figure 4.14 have also been used to calculate other statistics. The Pearson correlation of the two coders is 0.66. The  $\chi^2$  statistic was 198.7, which is highly significant with four degrees of freedom (A  $\chi^2 = 18.5$  would be significant at the .001 level). Thus we reject the hypothesis that the coders' results are independent of each other.

Finally, we can examine the results of the reliability test at the worldview level, rather than at the indicator level. In 80% of the cases, the difference in worldview scores between the coders was 0.75 or less. While this standard is admittedly rather arbitrary, it does correspond to the distance generally required to move a worldview score more than one aggregate category. The aggregate category standard was not used explicitly, because the analysis is conducted on the raw scores, not the categories. In any case, the substantive difference in coding the rather ambiguous Case 1807 (see Figure F.1) from -0.32 to 0.34 is less than the difference in coding Case 785 from 2.20 to 0.56, even though the latter technically remains in the same "strong liberal" aggregate category.

Encouragingly, the data show evidence of a learning curve. Looking only at the numbers on the last 20 cases, 85% of the indicator scorings matched exactly, compared to 79% in the first 25 cases. This seems to indicate that, with repetition, the coding became more consistent.

Reviewing the reliability check more finely does not reveal any clear patterns. Much of the variation in the number of misses noted in Figure 4.14 corresponds to the frequency of coding for each indicator (see Figure 4.10). The author was somewhat more likely to infer a characteristic than the code checker (27-21 in Figure 4.15). Much of this variation occurred in two indicators: R1 and R4. Nine times, the author inferred either a strong concern over relative gains or a narrow precedent where the checker found none; the coder never made such a strong inference when the author found none. This was balanced by the seven cases in which the checker strongly inferred unilateralism and the author found none, versus only two cases when the converse occurred. These results suggest that we review the definitions of these indicators,

but they also fall within random variation. The probability that all five misses on indicator R4 fall in the same direction is 0.06. The probability of at least an 8-2 split on indicator R5 is 0.11.

These results indicate that the coding was reliable enough to proceed with further analysis. The remainder of this chapter will address that analysis and evaluate the hypotheses.

### 4.3 Data Analysis

#### 4.3.1 Setup of the Regression Equation

This research investigates nine hypotheses that suggest a link between an a priori condition<sup>76</sup> and the worldview with which a state's foreign policy should be consistent. These hypotheses share a single dependent variable, so the effects of the various independent variables can be examined together. While most of the independent variables are dichotomous, an ANOVA analysis is not possible since not all are. Linear regression assumes that the dependent variable is continuous. Our dependent variable, the worldview, technically is not continuous, but the value of

$$y = \text{Ln} ((1 + \sum \text{Liberal Indicators}) / (1 + \sum \text{Realist Indicators})),$$

where the two sums vary between 0 and 10, can assume many values.

The regression equation for this analysis is

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_n x_n + u$$

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<sup>76</sup>In other words, it seems clear that the conditions represented by the independent variables occur before the policy is expressed, and thus the conditions could cause the policy.

where  $y$  is defined as in the top equation. Figure 4.16 summarizes the definition of each of the independent variables. Normalized  $\beta$  values will be compared, rather than the  $B$ 's, because the effect of each of these independent variables can only be evaluated relative to that of the other independent variables.<sup>77</sup> The hypotheses predict whether each  $\beta$  will be  $> 0$  (indicating a tendency toward liberalism) or  $< 0$  (indicating a tendency toward realism).  $\beta$  values will be considered significant at 0.05.

Note in Figure 4.16 that two different independent variables are being used to evaluate hypothesis 7. The first, **ABSRECES**, treats economic decline as an absolute concern. The second, **RELRECES**, treats economic decline as a relative concern. For hypothesis 3, two dummy variables have replaced the original trichotomous variable. If **CURR\_RIV** = 1, then a current rival of the state is involved in the war. If **LONG\_RIV** = 1, then an enduring rival is involved in the war. If both **CURR\_RIV** and **LONG\_RIV** are 0, then no rival is involved in the war. The two variables cannot both equal one: if both an enduring and a current rival are involved, the presence of the enduring rival is coded.<sup>78</sup> In hypothesis 6, we tried to make a similar substitution for the original trichotomous variable. This attempt failed because so few wars occurred on the borders of these three states. The dummy variables for "distant" and "sphere of interest" had collinearity -0.996. For this research, the "border" and "sphere of influence" values for that hypothesis have been collapsed together, leaving only a single dichotomous dummy variable for hypothesis 6. That variable equals 1 if the war is distant, and is 0 otherwise.

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<sup>77</sup>An absolute effect, such as "All other things being equal, the presence of a long-term rival of the observing state in the conflict causes the natural log of the incremented sum of the liberal indicators divided by the incremented sum of the realist indicators to move .6168 units in the direction of realism," is clearly beyond interpretation.

<sup>78</sup>This circumstance did not occur in this research, except in the degenerate case where a state is both an enduring and current rival.

## LIST OF HYPOTHESES AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

<u>Hypotheses</u>	<u>Independent Variable(s)</u>	<u>Expected Sign of <math>\beta</math></u>
H1 - Effect of security guarantees	$x_1 = \text{INSURED} = 1$ if the state's security is guaranteed by another state	$> 0$
H2 - Effect of bipolarity on <b>INSURED</b>	$x_2 = \text{INSBIPOL} = 1$ if <b>INSURED</b> = 1 and the international system is bipolar	$> 0$
H3 - Effect of rival involvement	$x_{3A} = \text{CURR\_RIV} = 1$ if a current rival of the state is involved in the war  $x_{3R} = \text{LONG\_RIV} = 1$ if an enduring rival of the state is involved in the war	$< 0$ $< 0$
H4 - Effect of ally involvement	$x_4 = \text{ALLY} = 1$ if an ally of the state is an initial participant in the war	$< 0$
H5 - Effect of democracy involvement	$x_5 = \text{DEMOCRAT} = 1$ if a democratic state is an initial participant in the war	$> 0$
H6 - Effect of distance	$x_6 = \text{FAR\_AWAY} = 1$ if the war occurs outside the state's "sphere of influence"	$> 0$
H7 - Effect of economic performance	$x_{7A} = \text{ABSRECES} = 1$ if the state is amid consecutive quarters of GDP decline  $x_{7R} = \text{RELRECES} = 1$ if the state's GDP is declining relative to other members of the G-7	$< 0$ $< 0$
H8 - Effect of public support	$x_8 = \text{POPULAR} = 100 * \text{the current public popularity of the leadership}$	$> 0$
H9 - Effect of approaching elections	$x_9 = \text{PREELECT} = 1$ if an election will be held in the next three months	$< 0$

Figure 4.16: Summary of Hypotheses and Independent Variables. Sections 2.3, 3.1, and 3.2 discuss the hypotheses and the operationalization of the variables in full detail.

### 4.3.2 Results of the Linear Regression

In an ideal research project, we could simply regress the worldview on these variables for the complete dataset. In this real world, we have no Indian data for  $x_{7B}$  or  $x_8$ . Since the regression procedures delete cases with missing data, the effect of running the "ideal" regression would be to delete all Indian cases.<sup>79</sup> That seems to be a sub-optimal outcome. Instead, we will look at results from two regressions. The first involves all three states across the variables for which all the independent variables have been coded. The second presents the results for the United States and Canada alone, using all the independent variables.<sup>80</sup> Based on these results, and those of some single-state regressions, we will decide that this research does not generally well to India. We will evaluate the hypotheses set forth in section 2.3 using the two-state regression. Appendix G presents some regression diagnostics.

#### 4.3.2.1 Overall Results

Figure 4.17 lists the results of these regressions. As one can see, the two regressions produce similar coefficients: the same variables have significant  $\beta$ s in both of them, and the signs are all the same. Even the magnitude of the  $\beta$ s is similar across the two sets of cases. As noted in Figure 4.18, the two-state regression accounts for slightly more of the variation than the three-state model. For that reason, and for reasons discussed in the next section, section 4.3.2.3 will evaluate the hypotheses based only on the two-state (Canada and United States) results.

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<sup>79</sup>More precisely, we could replace the missing values with the mean of the other values. This would clearly bias the results if it were done for so many cases.

<sup>80</sup>**POPULAR** is missing on 20 of 189 Canadian cases and 197 of 1785 American cases. These omissions, scattered across the cases, should not bias the regression because they are not linked to any other variables.

# Estimated Regression Coefficients, Multi-State Regressions

3-state regression			2-state regression		
<u>Variable</u>	<u><math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Sig T</u>	<u><math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Sig T</u>	<u>Expected sign of <math>\beta</math></u>
<b>INSURED</b>	<b>.208</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>.265</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>&gt; 0</b>
<b>INSBIPOL</b>	<b>-.149</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>-.153</b>	<b>.0002</b>	<b>&gt; 0</b>
<b>CURR_RIV</b>	<b>-.228</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>-.177</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>&lt; 0</b>
<b>LONG_RIV</b>	<b>-.255</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>-.252</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>&lt; 0</b>
<b>ALLY</b>	<b>-.204</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>-.134</b>	<b>.0099</b>	<b>&lt; 0</b>
<b>DEMOCRAT</b>	<b>-.129</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>-.176</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>&gt; 0</b>
<b>FAR_AWAY</b>	<b>.049</b>	<b>.1297</b>	<b>.105</b>	<b>.0503</b>	<b>&gt; 0</b>
<b>ABSRECES</b>	<b>.240</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>.249</b>	<b>.0000</b>	<b>&lt; 0</b>
<b>RELRECES</b>	-	-	<b>-.080</b>	<b>.0009</b>	<b>&lt; 0</b>
<b>POPULAR</b>	-	-	<b>.039</b>	<b>.2101</b>	<b>&gt; 0</b>
<b>PREELECT</b>	<b>.030</b>	<b>.1287</b>	<b>.031</b>	<b>.1578</b>	<b>&lt; 0</b>

Figure 4.17: Estimated Regression Coefficients. Values significant at the 0.05 level are highlighted in boldface, as are signs that correspond to the hypotheses' expectations.

KEY (all independent variables range between 0 and 1):

INSURED = 1 if the state's security is guaranteed by a great power  
 INSBIPOL = 1 if INSURED = 1 and the international system is bipolar  
 CURR\_RIV = 1 if a short-term rival of the state is involved in the war  
 LONG\_RIV = 1 if an enduring rival of the state is involved in the war  
 ALLY = 1 if an ally of the state is an initial party to the war  
 DEMOCRAT = 1 if any democracy is an initial party to the war  
 FAR\_AWAY = 1 if the war is occurring outside the state's "sphere of interest"  
 ABSRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is amid a consecutive-quarter decline  
 RELRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is in an annual decline relative to the G-7  
 POPULAR = 1 if the leader enjoys 100% support from the public  
 PREELECT = 1 if a national election will occur within the next three months

### Summary Statistics, Multi-state Regressions

	3-state regression	2-state regression
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.156	0.180
F	47.147	36.144
Sig F (df)	.0000 (2239)	.0000 (1745)

Figure 4.18: Summary Statistics for Multi-state Regressions.

#### 4.3.2.2 Single-state Results

Figure 4.19 lists the results of the single-state regressions. The American results are similar to those of the multi-state regressions; since most cases are American, this is not surprising. Four coefficients are significant with the predicted sign for the United States. Two others are significant with the opposite sign, and three coefficients are not significant. The theory seems to be useful in the American case, if not precisely accurate in all its hypotheses.<sup>81</sup>

At first examination, the theory appears not to be useful in the Canadian case. No variables were found to be significant with the predicted sign. A closer examination, however, allows us to have more confidence in including Canada in the research. In the two-state regression, **DEMOCRAT**, **ABSRECES**, and **INSBIPOL** were significant in the "wrong" direction. For Canada alone, two of these three remain significant in the "wrong" direction; **ABSRECES** is not significant but retains the "wrong" sign. In the two-state regression, five variables were

<sup>81</sup>This section only identifies which states to retain in the research. The next section of this dissertation evaluates the findings in detail.

significant in the "right" direction. Three of these (**INSURED**, **CURR\_RIV**, and **LONG\_RIV**) could not be tested for Canada because Canada's security was guaranteed by the United States during the entire period and Canada had no rivals involved in wars during the period under study. If the variable does not vary, we cannot keep it in the equation. Since only 6 of the 189 Canadian cases involved an **ALLY**, the insignificant result on that variable in the single-state regression can be attributed to lack of variation on the independent variable. Only **RELRECES**'s lack of significance cannot be explained as an artifact of separating Canada from the United States. Finally, three variables were not significant in the multi-state regression. The two that applied to Canada (**POPULAR** and **PREELECT**)<sup>82</sup> were also not significant there. Competing worldview theory fits Canada well enough to retain it in the final research.

The regression on only the Indian data did not produce many coefficients that were significant in the expected direction. Of the three variables in the multi-state regression that were significant in the "wrong" direction (**ABSRECES**, **INSBIPOL**, **DEMOCRAT**), neither of the two that applied to India were significant. Of the three that were not significant in the multi-state regression (**PREELECT**, **POPULAR**, **FAR\_AWAY**), the two that could be coded for India remained non-significant. Of the remaining five variables, only two could be coded; one (**CURR\_RIV**) remained significant in the "right" direction, while **LONG\_RIV** was not significant. We had noted when selecting nation-states for this research that there was some doubt as to whether this theory could apply outside the European tradition. Perhaps this methodology could not be used to infer worldviews from Indian documents. Perhaps the entire worldview framework does not apply to India. Perhaps, and more likely, Indian foreign policy reflects a competition between different worldviews. Chapter 5 will discuss a paxian or humanitarian worldview that seems to be consistent with many of the Indian texts. A structuralist or Marxist worldview may also exist among some Indian leaders.

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<sup>82</sup>All the wars were "far away" from Canada.



# Regression Coefficients, Single-State Regressions

	USA Only		Canada Only		India Only	
<u>Variable</u>	<u><math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Sig T</u>	<u><math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Sig T</u>	<u><math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Sig T</u>
INSURED	-	-	-	-	-	-
INSBIPOL	-	-	-.249	.0024	-	-
CURR_RIV	<b>-.207</b>	<b>.0000</b>	-	-	<b>-.373</b>	<b>.0013</b>
LONG_RIV	<b>-.267</b>	<b>.0000</b>	-	-	-.280	.1722
ALLY	<b>-.174</b>	<b>.0023</b>	.134	.0844	-	-
DEMOCRAT	-.173	.0000	-.324	.0001	.062	.3748
FAR_AWAY	.077	.1923	-	-	.037	.7242
ABSRECES	.277	.0000	.105	.2283	.056	.3476
RELRECES	<b>-.087</b>	<b>.0007</b>	-.004	.9703	-	-
POPULAR	.030	.2524	.000	.9983	-	-
PREELECT	.042	.0776	-.039	.6119	.013	.8102

Figure 4.19: Estimated Coefficients, Single-State Regressions.  $\beta$ s that are significant in the expected direction are highlighted in boldface. A "-" indicates that a variable did not apply.

KEY (all independent variables range between 0 and 1):

- INSURED = 1 if the state's security is guaranteed by a great power
- INSBIPOL = 1 if INSURED = 1 and the international system is bipolar
- CURR\_RIV = 1 if a short-term rival of the state is involved in the war
- LONG\_RIV = 1 if an enduring rival of the state is involved in the war
- ALLY = 1 if an ally of the state is an initial party to the war
- DEMOCRAT = 1 if any democracy is an initial party to the war
- FAR\_AWAY = 1 if the war is occurring outside the state's "sphere of interest"
- ABSRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is amid a consecutive-quarter decline
- RELRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is in an annual decline relative to the G-7
- POPULAR = 1 if the leader enjoys 100% support from the public
- PREELECT = 1 if a national election will occur within the next three months

Summary Statistics, Single State Regressions

	USA Only	Canada Only	India Only
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.145	0.146	0.157
F	31.052	5.115	9.563
Sig F (df)	.0000 (1578)	.0000 (161)	.0000 (268)

Figure 4.20: Summary Statistics, Single State Regressions.

In summary, the Canadian and American results are fairly consistent with the results of the multi-state regressions. Only the Canadian economic variables seem different.<sup>83</sup> The Indian data, on the other hand, produced only one significant result. For the remainder of this research, we will focus on the United States and Canada, retaining the belief that these results can be generalized to other states in the old "First World," Japan excluded. Such nation-states, like the United States and Canada, are industrial democracies with roots in the European traditions from which our theories of liberalism and realism developed.

Before evaluating the hypotheses, we must emphasize one point regarding India. We have effectively dropped India from this analysis. If we recall the discussion in section 4.3.1, retaining India would not change the evaluation of any of the hypotheses. The following discussion uses the two-state data because it seems more valid, not because of any difference in how well it fits expectations.

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<sup>83</sup>Another explanation for the anomalous result on **ALLY** with Canada lies in the definition. In most American cases involving allies, American decision makers are viewing the ally (the Philippines, Thailand, Honduras, etc.) as a country that they are helping to protect. While technically Canada is also sworn to protect the United States as through NATO, in practice the relationship is different. At the very least, Canadian decision makers probably do not see themselves as paternalistically looking out for a weak, backward, yet strategically important United States.

### 4.3.3 Hypothesis Evaluation

#### 4.3.3.1 Hypotheses Supported by this Analysis

Three of the nine hypotheses were supported in full by this analysis, and a fourth was supported in part. These hypotheses are H1, H3, H4, and H7 (in part). This section discusses these hypotheses, in descending order of the strength of the relationship. All references to coefficients refer back to the two-state column of Figures 4.17-8.

Hypothesis one argued *if a state is not itself a great power, and is a close military ally of a great power, then it will be more likely to display a liberal perspective on foreign wars than those states that occupy a polar position in the system*. Having one's security guaranteed by another state had the strongest influence on the worldview, all other things held equal ( $\beta = .265$ ). In practical terms, this finding argues that the NATO allies of the United States, as well as Australia, will be more likely to adopt a liberal foreign policy than the United States or other states who do not have an allied relationship with the United States. We cannot assert whether other allies of the United States, such as Japan, the Philippines, or Colombia, would be more likely to adopt a liberal foreign policy because they are outside the range of generalizability. The same holds for other non-allies of the United States that are not industrialized democracies in the European tradition (see Figure 3.1 for a complete list of such states).

Hypothesis three said *if no long-term adversary is involved in the foreign war, either as an initial participant or as a bystander that has chosen to intervene, then a bystander state will be more likely to adopt a liberal perspective than in cases where an adversary is involved*. The presence of either current or enduring rivals (all else held equal) contributed significantly to the worldview ( $\beta$  of .177 and .252, respectively). The presence of an enduring rival seemed to have more effect on worldviews than the involvement of a more-current rival; this finding seems logical. We can conclude then, that industrialized democracies in the European tradition are

more likely to adopt a liberal policy when its rivals -- countries whose gains or losses are of great significance to it -- are not involved, all else being held equal. While we cannot assert how other nation-states would respond to such wars, we note that the current rival variable was the only one that was significant for India.<sup>84</sup> This may therefore be a more robust finding than some of the others.

Hypothesis four is somewhat parallel to number three: *if no formal military allies of the observing state are initial parties to the conflict, then the state would be more likely to adopt a liberal perspective than it would toward wars in which such allies were initial parties.* The value of  $\beta$ , .134, is less than its value for the previous two variables, but seems high enough to be substantively important. The conclusion we can draw from this finding is like the previous: nation-states are more likely to adopt a liberal policy when its allies -- countries whose gains or losses have been defined by treaty to be of great significance to it -- are not involved, all else being equal. We cannot assert with confidence how states outside our range of generalizability would react. It seems somewhat interesting that the presence of a rival has greater impact than the presence of an ally; this is consistent with the notion that states are primarily self-oriented.

The final hypothesis supported by this research is one version of hypothesis seven: *if a state's economy is in decline, then it is more likely to adopt a realist perspective than when its economy is growing.* This research operationalized "decline" in both absolute and relative terms. We find support for the notion that state leaders tend to be more realist, all else held equal, during times of relative decline ( $\beta = .080$ ); we would reject the hypothesis that state leaders are more realist, all else held equal, during times of absolute decline ( $\beta = .249$ , significant in the direction of liberalism). Indeed, it would seem that leaders are most likely to display a realist perspective when the national economy is growing, but growing more slowly than others. Once

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<sup>84</sup>The variable for security guarantees in hypothesis one could not be tested for India alone, since it had value 0 throughout the period under study.

again, however, we cannot make any assertion regarding the policies of states that are not industrialized democracies in the European tradition.

Interestingly, all four of the hypotheses this research supports come from the realist side of the debate. Waltz (1986: 58-9) seems to be correct about the policies of states with "guaranteed security." Grieco's comment seems especially prophetic (1993a: 129): "The coefficient for a state's sensitivity to gaps in payoffs...will be greater if a state's partner is a long-term adversary rather than a long-term ally; if the issue involves security rather than economic well-being; if the state's relative power has been on the decline rather than on the rise..." His statement has been supported, even down to the relative weights of the  $\beta$ s for rivals and allies.

#### 4.3.3.2 Hypotheses Rejected based on this Analysis

This results of this research impel us to reject two of the nine hypotheses. The coefficients associated with these hypotheses were significant, but had the sign opposite to the expected one.<sup>85</sup> One of these hypotheses appears to simply be wrong, the other probably was a misinterpretation of the full body of literature.

Hypothesis two suggested that *if a state is a close military ally of a great power, then it will be more likely to display a liberal perspective on foreign wars when the distribution of capabilities in the international system is bipolar than when it is not bipolar*. The results of the regression analysis indicate that such states are more likely to display realism during the bipolar system ( $\beta = .152$ ) than after its end.<sup>86</sup> The most one can say in defense of this hypothesis would

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<sup>85</sup>In addition, we reject the absolute interpretation of economic decline, for the same reason.

<sup>86</sup>Strictly speaking, one could argue that Waltz has been proven correct: after the bipolar era, Canada's perspective is less distant from that of the United States. Rather than Canada becoming more realist, however, the United States became more liberal. This is probably not the effect that Waltz was hypothesizing (nor what we were testing for); but it suggests the possibility that liberalism could be a dominant perspective in a non-bipolar, or at least a quasi-unipolar, distribution of capabilities. On the other hand, while Canada's mean worldview

be that it has been too soon for decision-makers' worldviews to adjust to the new distribution of capabilities. The leaders might remain liberal until they are confronted with evidence that their protecting power could no longer be trusted. The loss of trust does not require that the new unipole becomes malevolent toward the nation-states it had been protecting. Pat Buchanan notwithstanding, it is more likely that the United States would lose interest in protecting the security of the states it had been insuring. Faced with the de facto, if not de jure, loss of that security, Canada and other allies would tend to display more realism. Another possible explanation would be that the state's decision makers will tend to hold liberal worldviews until a new generation of decision-makers -- ones not socialized into trusting the protecting power -- enters the government. The liberal tendency may have become habitual enough that it could survive the system change as long as the decision makers remain of the same cohort. Decision makers socialized outside the habit would be less likely to follow the liberal worldview.

These defenses of this hypothesis would be more plausible if no relationship were found. Instead, we find a significant increase in liberalism, in a state already more prone to display liberalism, once the bipolar era ended.<sup>87</sup> Neither explanation suggests why this should occur. Later research should, however, continue to explore this hypothesis in its original form. As we become able to include more post-bipolar cases, we will get a more complete view of the effects of this condition. Perhaps the increase in liberal representations is a response to the euphoria of the Cold War's end and the subsequent intervention into the Iraq-Kuwait war. The retention of liberalism may also be an artifact of the case selection. We may agree that none of the NATO

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changed from a liberal 0.55 during 1978-91 to a very liberal 1.07 during 1992-4, and the American mean worldview changed from a slightly realist -0.18 to a strongly liberal 0.74 across the same divide, the Indian worldview showed no such effect. It was 0.08 during the bipolar years and 0.10 in the post-bipolar years (note also, however, that very few Indian cases were coded in this latter period because the source texts could not be acquired).

<sup>87</sup>It might be a little facile to observe that, in late 1993, the "Liberal" party took power in Canada. They ruled during only one of the four post-Cold War years, and their party moniker was probably not chosen to indicate its adherence to a school of thought in international politics.

allies, or Australia, have concluded that the United States is now a malevolent unipole to be militarily feared. But some may have concluded that the United States no longer has the will or interest (or perhaps even capability) to guarantee their security. For reasons of proximity alone, Canada is probably the last of these allies whose security American leaders would lose interest. The inclusion of Germany or France or even the United Kingdom might produce different results, ones that support this hypothesis.

Hypothesis five stated *if one of the initial combatants is perceived to be a procedural democracy, then bystanders that are also procedural democracies are more likely to adopt a liberal perspective toward the war than they would toward wars in which no procedural democracy is an initial combatant*. The statistical effect of democracy, all else being held equal, was in the direction of the realist perspective ( $\beta = .176$ ). This finding is particularly significant since the support of democracy was coded as one of the indicators of liberalism. The author now suggests that this hypothesis was mis-specified. According to the democracy-war literature, there are only two types of "foreign wars:" those involving only non-democracies and those involving democracies versus non-democracies. Maoz and Russett (1993) argue that states will adopt liberal policies toward other democracies and "illiberal" policies toward non-democracies. Wars involving democracies also involve non-democracies, so liberalism should not be expected. Lake (1992) has demonstrated the tendency for democracies to form coalitions in support of democracies under attack. While lasting coalitions are features of liberalism, tactical coalitions against a current or imminent threat are consistent with realism. Further research, with more cases, more states, or a broader span of time, should respecify this hypothesis to be consistent with these results. We can make no assertion regarding the policies of states outside our realm of generalization, except to note that the effects of the democracy-war phenomenon are not alleged to be limited only "Western industrial" democracies. This variable may not have any effect on the leaders of non-democratic nation-states.

#### 4.3.3.3 Hypotheses for which no Conclusion can be Drawn

For the remaining three independent variables, we cannot reject the regression's null hypothesis that no relationship exists with the inferred worldview. For hypothesis six, which stated that *as the distance from a conflict to the bystander state increases, liberalism becomes more likely to be displayed*, the connection was not strong enough to be consistent. While the significance of  $\beta$  was .0503 for the two-state analysis, this "near miss" is not robust: the relationship is less significant in the three-state regression and in the single-state regressions. The value of  $\beta$  for hypothesis 6, .105, indicates that its contribution to the variation in worldview would be less than almost all of the significant variables in any case. Additional research may yet produce enough evidence to support this hypothesis.

The coefficients corresponding to the other two hypotheses were much less significant. We cannot assert that either the popularity of the leaders<sup>88</sup> or the approach of an election<sup>89</sup> affects the inferred worldview. In some ways, however, this finding supports the theory as a whole. If well-formed, consistent worldviews (informed, perhaps, by the academic notions of realism and liberalism) do guide policy, then they should not be affected by transient changes in popularity or the approach of an election. On the other hand, it is also possible that the measures used to operationalize popularity and elections, as well as distance, did not validly capture those concepts. Measures of popularity may be more complex than simple public opinion polls. Perhaps aspects of the polls, such as approval of the government's foreign policy, would be more accurate. We also should examine the leaders' own view of their popularity, and

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<sup>88</sup>The hypothesis stated *as a leader's popularity among his or her constituency increases, so does the probability that his or her government will display a liberal perspective*.

<sup>89</sup>The hypothesis stated *if no election in which a leader could lose office is scheduled or required to be held within the following three months, then the state is more likely to adopt a liberal perspective than at times when no election is approaching*.



their level of concern with that. Leaders may be more likely to try to avoid low popularity when elections approach. Leaders might also conceptualize popularity as a threshold quality. Any added popularity over 60% (for example) might have less impact than shifts in the neighborhood of 50%. A log scale of popularity could capture this effect. Elections may matter on a different time scale than the three-month interval used here. Finally, neither variable may apply to leaders who have already been turned out of office or cannot seek re-election.

#### 4.4 Summary

The data collected for this research seem reliable to the standards set prior to coding. Those data support four of the nine hypotheses and lead to rejection of two other hypotheses. The hypotheses supported by the data tend to be those set forth by realist theory. States seem more likely to adopt a liberal foreign policy when their security is guaranteed by a polar power, especially when the distribution of capabilities in the international system is not bipolar.<sup>90</sup> States also seem to tend to adopt a liberal foreign policy when the foreign war does not involve a rival, an ally, or a fellow democracy. Finally, states also seem to tend to adopt a liberal foreign policy when their national economy is growing more slowly than those of its economic competitors.

While these results are robust across datasets that include the United States or Canada, they do not seem to hold for India. They may not apply to India because they may be influenced by other worldviews, such as Marxism or the paxism described in the next chapter. They also may not hold because Indian decision makers are not socialized in the notions of realism and

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<sup>90</sup>Future research can examine other possible causes of the difference between Canada and the United States. Such causes include population, form of government, ethnic cleavages and military strength. Canada and the United States share many more characteristics, however. Both are continental, federal, majoritarian former colonies of the United Kingdom which are separated by oceans from most wars in the international system. If another nation-state had been chosen instead of Canada, there would be more possible explanations for their different tendencies (thus Canada was a good choice).

liberalism to the same extent that Americans, Canadians, and the leaders of European states. We can generalize these findings back in time; there is no obvious reason why they would not hold even before the bipolar era. We can generalize, as discussed in chapter 3, to other states whose heritage flows from the European tradition (including Australia, New Zealand, and Israel). Based on the Indian results, we cannot yet generalize to developing countries. We also cannot generalize to states like Japan, Russia, and the former Soviet Bloc, because worldviews other than liberalism and realism may be present there. Future research will evaluate this assertion.

## CHAPTER 5

### FROM WORLDVIEW TO ACTION

This chapter examines, in light of the results just presented, the validity issues raised in section 2.7. The first of these concerns regards whether other "ideal worldviews" would be as salient as the liberal-realist split assumed by this study. The second asks whether this research has identified a consistent "official government problem representation," as opposed to personal positions or situation-dependent propaganda. Finally, we ask if the worldview identified from official statements corresponds to other state actions.

#### 5.1 A Worldview Alternative

Section 2.7.1 discussed the possibility that other worldviews might be more appropriate ideals for this theory. It considered, and rejected, Vasquez's (1987) hard-liner-accommodationist dichotomy, Wittkopf's (1986) isolationist-internationalist dichotomy, and Ripley's (1993) decision-making alternative to realist theory. None of these appeared to present a coherent alternative worldview, distinct from and competing with either realism or liberalism as worldviews. The evidence gathered so far does not change that judgment. That section also proposed, however, two warning signs that would indicate that our liberal-realism continuum was invalid.

The first of these was a lack of variation in the coding results. This might indicate that only one of the worldviews applied, or that our measures were not able to capture the differences between them. This problem has not occurred. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 displayed the distribution of inferred worldviews across each state. Decision-makers and their representatives in all three

states made statements consistent with both worldviews; the United States displayed an almost perfect balance (35% strongly realist, 34% strongly liberal). Canada's tendency to issue statements consistent with liberalism (68% strongly so) helped to push the final distribution of inferred worldviews to 32% realist, 37% liberal. We conclude that there is sufficient variation to find that liberalism and realism are at least distinct and valid characteristics of official statements.

Even more encouraging is the relatively small number of cases that fell into the "weak" categories of Figure 4.8. For each state and each worldview, the "strong" inferences (for example, India's 30% strongly realist) were at least double the "weak" inferences (in this case, 7% of India's statements were weakly realist). This also bolsters the argument that the indicators identify clearly-held patterns, not just random sets of phrases. If it were the latter, then we should find more cases in the "weak" categories than in the strong.

It seems then, that the ideals of "liberalism" and "realism" are close to the actual worldviews held by decision makers in many cases. The other warning signal we suggested earlier was an inability to code cases; especially if the reason is consistent. For each state, 13-15% of the cases yielded exactly balanced indicators; another 9-18% were too ambiguous ("weak") to be confident in the results. If we wished, we could "spin" these results as a positive: in social science, confidence in 70% of one's cases seems quite good; the author was concerned that many more cases would be ambiguous. Instead, let us see if there is a pattern even in these numbers. As noted in Figure 4.1, we dropped 55 cases from the original dataset because they referred only to "humanitarian" issues. Many cases retained in the final dataset also included such references; the author recalls that these commonly produced weak or neutral inferences as to the underlying worldview. In other cases, large portions of the problem representation went uncoded because they did not match any of the realist or liberal indicators. Finally, this analysis omitted the cases initially excluded from the original dataset because they clearly could not have been coded under either liberalism or realism.

Some of these "uncoded" cases seem to share enough traits to induce a third worldview, which we shall call the humanitarian or "paxian" worldview. The latter label refers to its consistency with much of the peace studies literature. Barash (1991), for example, seems committed to the belief that war is a misunderstanding, not a means to achieving desired ends.<sup>91</sup> As a "misunderstanding," wars can be ended once the combatants agree to settle their differences by other means. The paxian might also place stock in arms control treaties (Barash, 1991: 363-5) and the use of "gradual and reciprocal initiatives in tension reduction" (Sakamoto, 1987: 148). Neutral peacekeeping forces are another paxian tool for peace (Diehl, 1988; Rikkye, 1989). One must note that these measures may or may not be associated with liberal "institutions;" Burton (1985), for example, observes how organizations of states restrict the problem-solving options to those that support the state system.

A paxian worldview includes a concern with the protection of individuals, as opposed to states. It is concerned with issues such as the famines and dislocations that usually result from wars; these concerns are not contingent on any effect the famine has states in the region. A realist might be concerned with refugee flows to the extent they might disrupt his or her own country or weaken a regional ally. A liberal might be concerned with them to the extent that they might disrupt any state, and might wish to apply the relevant international standards to the problem. The paxian, on the other hand, would address the displaced and starving persons in their own right, and argue for the provision of aid to them. Only the paxian is likely to address internal refugee flows, unless the internal disruption is within a state particularly salient to the liberal or realist (Clark, 1988). This aspect of paxism seemed to apply to the wars in Sudan, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. Paxians also support human rights and self-determination in principle (Marks, 1980).

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<sup>91</sup>See especially Barash (1991: 22). Note, however, that this section outlines an "ideal type" paxism; perhaps no single peace scientist would ascribe wholly to it, any more than any realist or liberal might ascribe wholly to the ideal types of those worldviews, as presented in chapter 1.

The paxian worldview would include a tendency to make a moral judgment on a conflict. The obvious example here is South Africa, which was often difficult to code. Many of the statements described the great moral injustice, even the evil, of apartheid. They spoke in terms of a mission or a crusade to rid the world of this system. These positions do not easily fit realism's concern with interests and liberalism's concern with formal rules and standards. Another example of this paxian trait may be in American characterization of Soviet communism as evil. As an "evil empire," it must be opposed not because (or not only because) it threatened American interests or undermined democracies, but because of the harm its imposition caused on other persons. Many statements on the Contra war, the Russo-Afghan war, the war in Kuwait, and those in the Former Yugoslavia seem consistent with this element of paxism.

Paxians also support peace processes. This third trait calls for negotiations to end any conflict, without necessarily expressing a preference of the terms of the settlement. Thus the argument in Bosnia that even an unjust peace is better than no peace at all -- at least it would end the suffering. The paxian worldview displays little preference over the means of achieving this agreement. Thus a statement may support both bilateral negotiations and the intervention of an international organization. In our coding, this trait often led to indications of multilateralism and bilateralism in the same statement (reducing the likelihood of drawing a strong inference from that case). India seemed especially prone to display this characteristic; it also was often present in representations of the Iran-Iraq war and the Third Indochina war.

We have induced a third worldview: can we place it within the literature on international politics? Paxism seems to bear some resemblance to what early realists refer to as "utopianism" or "idealism." Carr (1939: 6) compares utopianism to alchemy, describing it as a triumph of aspiration over analysis, "whose relation to existing facts was one of flat negation." This statement could open up the proverbial can of worms, but this is probably not the place for a great debate between positivism and its critics. The League of Nations did not succeed in preventing wars; some of the conclusions of this research bolster the conclusion that it could not

have worked at that time. This early utopianism seems to have given way to today's neoliberalism; Kegley (1995: 3) refers to idealism today as a "derivative" of liberalism. While there is some common ground between paxism and liberalism, the discussion above suggests ways of distinguishing them from each other.

By casting paxism as a worldview, not a theory, we avoid concern with whether it is "right" or "wrong." Some leaders' worldviews, it seems, correspond closely to the characteristics of realist and liberal theories. Likewise, some may correspond to a paxian approach. The paxian worldview, at first glance, appears to be one dominated by optimism and hope: we *can* achieve peace through negotiations, we *can* provide for the basic human needs of oppressed peoples, we *can* achieve a more just world. Even this distinction among these three worldviews betrays some bias, however. Paxism is only imbued with more hope if one sees those goals as superior to the goals the other worldviews. Those who hold a realist worldview are more or less hopeful that they can, through their own actions, assure their security and enhance their national power – thus providing for the well-being of their own citizens. They assume that a defensive stance will increase security, against the "fact" of Jervis' security dilemma (1978). Likewise, those with more-or-less liberal worldviews "hope" that cooperation, through the development of strong institutional structures, will enhance everyone's well-being.

To be sure, not all those who hold these worldviews are so optimistic. Realist decision makers may feel their position in the world is hopeless, but they nevertheless must try to maintain their state's sovereignty. A liberal decision maker may not be very hopeful that the United Nations will succeed, but nevertheless may note that no other options for stability exist. So too a paxian decision maker may not actually believe that peace and human rights can prevail in Bosnia or Sudan, but nevertheless make the attempt because it is the "right" thing to do.

We do not argue that paxism makes a "better" theory of international relations than realism or liberalism. Rather, we argue that some foreign policy seems to be shaped by

worldviews consistent with paxism. Future research should develop this worldview so its incidence can be analyzed. Under what circumstances do decision-makers behave in a manner consistent with paxism? Has it changed in salience in recent years? Speaking from impressions only, it seems that paxism has typically been evident in the United States with respect to wars that are less salient (Sudan, Western Sahara, India-Pakistan, Burma). In the 1990s, however, it seems that it has become more prominent: evidence from the dataset points to it in Somalia and former Yugoslavia; the Haitian intervention may also fit only awkwardly with realism or liberalism. Are these impressions accurate, or perhaps is the United States now more likely to engage in foreign policy actions flowing from paxism, rather than limiting itself to statements of principle?

If there has been an increase in paxism, it may derive from the prosecution of the Iraq-Kuwait war (see Mowle and Schmiedeler, 1995). The success of the United Nations-sponsored coalition suggested that interventions into wars could succeed. On liberal terms, the interventions into Somalia, Bosnia, and perhaps even Haiti, failed: states were not protected in a meaningful sense, and the relevant institutions were themselves called into question. On paxian terms, however, these missions were somewhat more successful. A peace of sorts has been achieved, and most persons in those territories have a greater likelihood of surviving another day than before. Weiss (1995:180) and Touval (1994) have advocated replacing liberal multilateralism with interventions "by regional powers or even hegemons operating under the scrutiny of a wider community of states." This approach, assumes, of course, that willing and capable regional powers (or willing hegemons) are available for the task.

Does this apparent third competing worldview invalidate the analysis of chapter 4? Only additional research can answer that with certainty, but the author suggests that it does not. Paxism seemed more prevalent in India than in the other states, and we have excluded India and other developing states from this study's generalizability. Paxian indicators appeared in only some of the American and Canadian texts; the conclusions as to the likelihood of liberal or realist



policy should remain valid. That likelihood, after all, is the question posed by the current debate and by this initial research project. If paxism is a coherent worldview, however, we must test this assessment later in the overall research programme.

## 5.2 Evidence for a Single Official Worldview

Section 2.7.2 discussed another assumption of competing worldview theory: that the worldviews inferred from official statements reflect a single official worldview held by the government issuing the statement. If the officials delivering a speech are expressing only their own personal position, then those statements are less likely to accurately reflect policy. Furthermore, any conclusions drawn from such personal worldviews would not be likely to be robust.

If this problem were to occur, one might expect a low significance among the regression coefficients -- personal statements by various officials would introduce additional error into the measurements. Since many of the regression coefficients were significant, we have more reason to believe this is not a problem. For a deeper look at the question, however, we must examine the variation in worldviews more closely. While coding the cases, we collected information regarding the speaker, the venue of the statement, the audience, and the presence of foreign leaders. We also noted whether or not a problem representation seemed to be a "main point" of the text, as opposed to just a brief reference embedded in larger topics.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>While this definition may seem to be the most subjective of all those coded so far, the "main point" variable was coded during the reliability check at a .978 rate of agreement. Even if it is difficult to define precisely what makes a reference a "main point" of the text, it seems we know it when we see it.

### 5.2.1 Contextual Factors

As a first look at the validity of this assumption, Figure 5.1 shows the variation in worldview across the contextual factors. Looking at both states together, there seems some cause for concern. Texts presented outside one's own country, and those delivered in the presence of foreign leaders, seem much more likely to indicate a liberal worldview than are domestic statements or those presented without foreign leaders in the audience. Statements made to international organizations (formal or informal) or to the press tend to indicate liberalism. Those made to a national audience, to interest groups, or to portions of a national legislature tend to indicate realism. Some of these contextual factors seem related to each other: which is the more dominant factor? We cannot regress these factors as dummy variables because many are highly collinear. The "speaker" variable provides a clue toward resolving this puzzle.

The factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph seem to support the idea that official policy statements are merely propaganda, with the alleged "worldview" tailored to the audience. One might note, however, that the head of government is apparently more realist than his or her press representative. In addition, the foreign ministers are more liberal than their subordinates but more realist than their spokespersons. This seems odd. One answer lies in the relative distribution of speakers -- and audiences -- in the United States and Canada. Most of the "subordinate in foreign ministry" statements are from the United States; a disproportionate share of the "foreign ministry spokesperson" statements are Canadian. Likewise, Canadian statements tend to be issued to the press, while American ones are more often to a national audience or to a professional/interest group. We can learn more about this validity issue by studying Figures 5.2 and 5.3, which isolate the American and Canadian components of Figure 5.1.

Distribution of Worldviews by Context, United States and Canada

	Strong Realist		Weak Realist		Neutral		Weak Liberal		Strong Liberal		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
<b>SPEAKER</b>												
Head of Govt	339	37	93	10	127	14	74	8	277	30	910	46
Govt Press Rep	38	26	6	4	21	15	13	9	67	46	145	7
Foreign Minister	66	23	31	11	35	12	19	7	133	47	284	14
Subord in ForMin	163	46	44	12	41	12	22	6	87	24	357	18
Ministry Speaker	20	12	13	7	30	17	10	6	101	58	174	9
Other Cab. Min.	2	50			1	25			1	25	4	0
Other Govt Offic'l	5	22	5	22	1	4	2	9	9	41	22	1
Delegate to UN	6	8	1	1	5	6	9	12	57	73	78	4
<b>VENUE</b>												
Domestic	594	36	173	10	230	14	121	7	546	33	1664	84
Foreign	45	15	20	7	31	10	28	9	186	60	310	16
<b>FOREIGN LDERS</b>												
Combatants	22	15	11	8	17	12	14	10	79	55	143	7
Only non-comb's	25	15	13	8	17	10	15	9	99	59	169	9
None	592	36	169	10	227	14	120	7	552	33	1660	84
<b>AUDIENCE</b>												
Other (Pub Rec.)	7	23			7	23	5	16	12	39	31	2
Legislature	26	36	6	8	12	16	4	6	25	34	73	4
Portion of Leg	154	44	38	11	44	12	23	7	95	27	354	18
IO	21	13	6	4	14	8	17	10	110	66	168	9
Other Int'l Group	1	5	2	10	5	24	1	5	12	57	21	1
Nat'l Broadcast	75	58	11	9	14	11	8	6	21	16	129	7
Press	144	21	44	6	107	15	58	8	345	49	698	35
Select Audience	9	26	7	20	2	6	3	9	14	40	35	2
Non-Nat'l Public	47	34	20	14	13	9	14	10	45	32	139	7
Profess/Int Group	155	48	59	18	43	13	16	5	53	16	326	17
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>639</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>732</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>1974</b>	<b>100</b>

Figure 5.1: Distribution of Worldviews by Context, United States and Canada. The first five "percentage" columns indicate the percentage of the texts delivered in a given context that fell in each range of worldviews (e.g., 37% of the texts delivered by a head of government were strongly consistent with a realist worldview). The final "percentage" column indicates the percentage of the total cases that were delivered within each context (e.g., 46% of the texts were delivered by a head of government). Appendix A more fully describes the criteria for each of these categories.

Distribution of Worldviews by Context, Canada

	Strong Realist		Weak Realist		Neutral		Weak Liberal		Strong Liberal		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
<b>SPEAKER</b>												
Prime Minister	1	17					2	33	3	50	6	3
Govt Press Rep	1	6	1	6					15	88	17	9
Foreign Minister	2	4	1	2	8	15	2	4	41	76	54	29
Subord in ForMin			1	33					2	67	3	2
Ministry Speaker	11	11	4	4	19	19	5	5	62	61	101	53
Delegate to UN					1	13	1	13	6	75	8	4
<b>VENUE</b>												
Domestic	15	9	6	4	24	15	8	5	110	68	163	86
Foreign			1	4	4	15	2	8	19	73	26	14
<b>FOREIGN LDRS</b>												
Combatants			1	6	2	13	1	7	12	75	16	9
Only non-comb's							1	14	6	86	7	4
None	15	9	6	4	26	16	8	5	111	67	166	88
<b>AUDIENCE</b>												
Parliament			1	9	2	18	1		7	64	11	6
Portion of Parl									6	100	6	3
IO					1	6	3	17	14	78	18	10
Other Int'l Group			1	17	1	17			4	67	6	3
Press	13	10	5	4	22	17	6	5	85	65	131	69
Select Audience									1	100	1	1
Non-Nat'l Public	1	17							5	83	6	3
Profess/Int Group	1	1			2	2			7	70	10	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	15	8	7	4	28	15	10	5	129	68	189	100

Figure 5.2: Distribution of Worldviews by Context, Canada. The first five "percentage" columns indicate the percentage of the texts delivered in a given context that fell in each range of worldviews (e.g., 17% of the texts delivered by the prime minister were strongly consistent with a realist worldview). The final "percentage" column indicates the percentage of the total cases that were delivered within each context (e.g., 3% of the texts were delivered by the prime minister). Appendix A more fully describes the criteria for each of these categories.

Distribution of Worldviews by Context, United States

	Strong Realist		Weak Realist		Neutral		Weak Liberal		Strong Liberal		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
<b>SPEAKER</b>												
President	338	37	93	10	127	14	72	8	274	30	904	51
Pres Press Sec	37	29	5	4	21	16	13	10	52	41	128	7
Sec of State	64	28	30	13	27	12	17	7	92	40	230	13
Subord in DoS	163	46	43	12	41	12	22	6	85	24	354	20
State Dept. Rep	9	12	9	12	11	15	5	7	39	53	73	4
Other Cab. Min.	2	50			1	25			1	25	4	0
Other Govt Offic'l	5	23	5	23	1	5	2	9	9	41	22	1
Delegate to UN	6	9	1	1	4	6	8	11	51	73	70	4
<b>VENUE</b>												
Domestic	579	39	167	11	206	14	113	8	436	29	1501	84
Foreign	45	16	19	7	27	10	26	9	167	59	284	16
<b>FOREIGN LDERS</b>												
Combatants	22	17	10	8	15	12	13	10	67	53	127	7
Only non-comb's	25	15	13	8	17	11	14	9	93	57	162	9
None	577	39	163	11	201	14	112	8	441	30	1494	84
<b>AUDIENCE</b>												
Other (Pub Rec.)	7	23			7	23	5	16	12	39	31	2
Congress	26	42	5	8	10	16	3	5	18	29	62	4
Portion of Cong.	154	44	38	11	44	13	23	7	89	26	348	20
IO	21	14	6	4	13	9	14	9	96	64	150	8
Other Int'l Group	1	7	1	7	4	27	1	7	8	53	15	1
Nat'l Broadcast	75	58	11	9	14	11	8	6	21	16	129	7
Press	131	23	39	7	85	15	52	9	260	46	567	32
Select Audience	9	27	7	21	2	6	3	9	13	38	34	2
Non-Nat'l Public	46	35	20	15	13	10	14	11	40	30	133	8
Profess/Int Group	154	49	59	19	41	13	16	5	46	15	316	18
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>624</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>603</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>1785</b>	<b>100</b>

Figure 5.3: Distribution of Worldviews by Context, United States. The first five "percentage" columns indicate the percentage of the texts delivered in a given context that fell in each range of worldviews (e.g., 37% of the texts delivered by the president were strongly consistent with a realist worldview). The final "percentage" column indicates the percentage of the total cases that were delivered within each context (e.g., 51% of the texts were delivered by the President). Appendix A more fully describes the criteria for each of these categories.

In the Canadian case (Figure 5.2), the distribution of worldviews does not seem to vary much by context. A  $\chi^2$  test on these tables was not significant -- indicating no relationship between context and worldview. Of the "major" categories (those with at least 5% of the Canadian cases), there seems to be only a slight tendency toward more liberalism in texts presented to international organizations, in the presence of foreign leaders, or by the foreign minister. The assumption of an "official problem representation," reflecting a single worldview, seems to be valid for Canada.

For the U.S. (Figure 5.3), the problem seems reduced, if not entirely attenuated. Statements to International Organizations and those by the UN delegate continue to be more consistent with a liberal worldview than other statements. National broadcasts and statements to professional or interest groups tend to be more consistent with the realist worldview.

While we could argue that it is bad form to spend one's time challenging the assumptions of a theory, there is a stronger argument for retaining these results. A critic could assert that these findings, especially those of Figure 5.3, indicate that the government officials twist their definition of the situation to suit the audience. International organizations receive messages consistent with liberalism, while the public hears realism; while this may suit the advance of policy as politics, it reveals nothing about the worldview of the government. It seems plausible -- and not at all surprising -- that leaders tailor messages to their audience, but such effects do not invalidate this research for the following reasons.

First, Figure 5.3 aggregates data from 28 wars and 17 years. Administrations have different styles: the proportion of statements made before different audiences or by different speakers can vary. If the tendency of those administrations to view foreign wars through a realist worldview (for whatever reason) varies, that variance will show up in figure 5.3 as a validity issue. For example, "subordinates in the State Department" are more frequently the speaker in the Carter and Reagan Administrations (19 and 23%, respectively, versus 14 and 16% in the Bush and Clinton Administrations); those two Administrations tended to issue

statements consistent with realism. The mean scores of the worldviews in each administration are presented in Figure 5.4. Likewise, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations issued over 21% of their statements to professional or interest groups; neither Bush nor Clinton issued more than 11% to that audience. Furthermore, across all administrations, some conflicts tend to be spoken about by the President, while others rarely make it above the deputy assistant secretary's testimony to a House subcommittee. Figure 5.3 does not say that the president's press secretary is more liberal than the president, when speaking at the same time about the same war.

In Figure 5.4, one can note a pattern of increasing liberalism over time, perhaps due to changes in the international system. The finding that policies of the Carter Administration were the most consistent with realism may surprise some people. The Clinton Administration has been accused, at least by pundits, of having a disjointed foreign policy. Not only are Clinton Administration policies toward foreign wars the most consistent with either worldview, the standard deviation of Clinton policies was much lower than that for the other presidencies (.69, versus > .90 for each of the others).

While interesting, we must not infer too much from these numbers. No attempt was made to select a representative sample of foreign wars within each U.S. Administration; a study focusing on these issues might produce different results. We can, however, attribute some of the variation in figure 5.3 to these deeper patterns.

#### Mean Worldview Expressed in each U.S. Administration

Carter	-.36
Reagan	-.26
Bush	+.56
Clinton	+.79.

Figure 5.4: Mean Worldview Expressed by Each Administration. The value given is the mean across all worldviews identified during the given President's term in office.

A more thorough analysis would fully examine the relationship between worldview and the context of a statement. The following discussion is only a preliminary effort, but it illustrates how future research on this issue would be conducted. Figure 5.5 takes Figure 5.3 and disaggregates it by Presidential administration. At that level, we find that statements by the United Nations delegate, statements made in the presence of foreign leaders, statements made outside the United States (the UN is considered "foreign" for our study) and statements made to International Organizations continue to be consistently more liberal than other statements. Those values of the context variables probably correspond to some degree.

Since we have shown in Section 5.3.1 that U.S. policy tends to be in accordance with the mean observed worldview, we could consider that set of cases as outliers. This leads us to suggest that, if administrations tailor statements to suit their audience, they are less "honest" in international fora and to other leaders.

The results of the "select audience" row are particularly intriguing. Foreign leaders, as a rule, will be present only when the audience is an IO, other international grouping, the press, or "select audiences" where the President and the other leader address each other less publicly, often at a state dinner. This category does not show the same skew toward liberalism that the IO categories do. It seems that the presence of foreign leaders per se does not alter the worldview; perhaps it is the ambiance of a formal organization that biases the perspectives.

It is not necessarily the UN delegate that skews the results, either. During Reagan's second term in office, the UN delegate was actually more consistent with realism than the other speakers. The presence of foreign leaders does not alter the perspective of the (generally liberal) Clinton Administration; the effect on the Bush Administration is also reduced. The only consistently strong area of bias is in the foreign venue. If any statements were to be rejected as being invalid statements of official policy, it would be those delivered outside the United States.



Context Variables, by Administration

	CARTER		REAGAN 1		REAGAN 2		BUSH		CLINTON	
	Mean	No.	Mean	No.	Mean	No.	Mean	No.	Mean	No.
<b>SPEAKER</b>										
President	-.624	77	.125	94	-.475	433	.589	197	.783	103
Pres Press Sec	-.242	10	-.073	12	-.159	46	.554	53	1.080	7
Sec of State	-.385	16	.177	58	-.201	90	.813	41	.783	25
Subord in DoS	-.126	28	-.330	95	-.454	145	.155	57	.583	29
State Dept. Rep	-.035	3	.697	17	-.038	10	.707	40	.767	3
Other Govt Offic'l	-.650	2	1.026	5	-.549	2	-.301	3	.868	6
Delegate to UN	.829	11	.675	16	-.642	8	.867	9	1.118	14
<b>VENUE</b>										
Domestic	-.526	121	-.067	230	-.466	659	.480	334	.743	157
Foreign	.433	26	.490	67	.192	95	.947	66	1.04	30
<b>FOREIGN LEADS</b>										
Combatants	.789	15	.446	34	.256	41	.658	22	.721	15
Only non-comb's	.091	14	.754	24	-.016	47	.914	45	.895	32
None	-.555	118	-.066	239	-.447	666	.500	332	.771	139
<b>AUDIENCE</b>										
Other (Pub Rec.)	-2.04	3	.354	5	-.043	7	.540	7	.841	9
Congress	-.681	6	.882	7	-.393	32	.673	9	.590	8
Portion of Cong.	-.363	27	-.497	76	-.422	136	.229	64	.758	45
IO	.778	18	.612	39	.328	48	1.065	26	1.204	19
Other Int'l Group	-.223	1	.549	2	.170	3	.954	6	.292	3
Nat'l Broadcast	-.636	6	-.758	15	-.657	88	.798	13	.674	7
Press	-.166	36	.499	75	-.190	209	.685	185	.834	62
Select Audience	-.197	6	.586	6	-.473	11	.658	7	.862	4
Non-Nat'l Public	-.650	7	.497	19	-.663	51	.407	41	.615	15
Profess/Int Group	-.829	37	-.313	53	-.578	169	.153	42	.583	15
Admin. TOTAL	-.357	147	.059	297	-.382	754	.557	400	.791	187

Figure 5.5: Context Variables, by Administration. The columns indicate the mean of the worldviews identified for all the cases during a given administration in each context. For example, 37 of the 147 cases in the Carter Administration were presented to professional or interest groups. The mean worldview of such statements was -.829, which is strongly consistent with realism.

Context Variables, by Administration, Isolating One War

	CARTER Afghan		REAGAN 1 IranIraq		REAGAN 2 Contra		BUSH Kuwait		CLINTON Yugoslav	
	Mean	No.	Mean	No.	Mean	No.	Mean	No.	Mean	No.
<b>SPEAKER</b>										
President	-.734	62	-.484	4	-.509	220	.698	124	.884	64
Pres Press Sec	-.389	8	1.609	1	.081	23	.883	26	1.024	4
Sec of State	-.346	7	-.092	5	-.038	27	.922	19	.918	21
Subord in DoS	.059	6	-.661	15	-.468	26	.445	6	.774	5
State Dept. Rep	.405	1	.642	3	.090	6	.828	3	.602	2
Other Govt Offic'l	-1.30	1			-.996	2	-.301	3	.681	4
Delegate to UN	.598	5	.896	2	.231	3	.847	1	1.145	10
<b>VENUE</b>										
Domestic	-.691	75	-.414	25	-.458	279	.693	152	.870	86
Foreign	.216	15	.672	5	.129	28	.890	30	1.015	24
<b>FOREIGN LEADS</b>										
Combatants	.922	7			.012	17	1.360	6	.982	9
Only non-comb's	-.246	10	.595	4	-.018	12	.960	18	.889	24
None	-.721	73	-.361	26	-.447	278	.675	158	.896	77
<b>AUDIENCE</b>										
Other (Pub Rec.)	-2.01	2					1.778	2	1.171	4
Congress	-.944	2					.532	5	.617	7
Portion of Cong.	-.450	10	-.637	13			.409	18	.954	21
IO	.720	8	.963	3			1.347	5	1.194	15
Other Int'l Group	-.223	1			.805	2			.438	2
Nat'l Broadcast	-.954	4			-.644	45	.744	11	.478	3
Press	-.268	23	.499	7	-.133	89	.990	78	.932	40
Select Audience	-.191	5	1.099	1	-.819	3	.999	3	.154	1
Non-Nat'l Public	-.723	4			-.773	29	.465	35	.699	8
Profess/Int Group	-.964	31	-1.03	6	-.587	78	.285	25	.765	9
Column TOTAL	-.540	90	-.233	30	-.404	307	.726	182	.901	110

Figure 5.6: Context Variables, by Administration, Isolating One War. The columns indicate the mean of the worldviews identified for a given war during a given administration in each context. For example, 31 of the 90 cases in the Carter Administration that referred to the Afghanistan war were presented to professional or interest groups. The mean worldview of such statements was -.964, which is strongly consistent with realism.

Also in Figure 5.5, we note a great consistency in perspective in both the Bush and Clinton Administrations. This can be contrasted most with Reagan's first term, where we find great disparity of worldview based on the speaker and audience. Nevertheless, we are still grouping together four years of policy and many different wars; Figure 5.6 disaggregates this question further.

Figure 5.6 takes a single war within each administration and examines the effects of the context variables. These wars were chosen based on the number of cases that could be included in this analysis and the consistency of US policy during that period. Unfortunately, there were changes in American perspective on all major wars during Reagan's first term, so we have not yet done enough to draw conclusions about that government. Figure 5.6 mostly confirms the tendencies found in Figure 5.5. Note, however, how some wars achieve higher levels of attention than others. Carter was himself the speaker in about half of the cases during his term, but was the speaker in over two-thirds of the cases that addresses Afghanistan.

For this line of analysis to produce deeper results, we would need to isolate each major war, and look at contemporaneous statements to try to find evidence that different perspectives are being offered. In the process, we will lower the N of each subset, perhaps below the point of being able to draw any conclusions.

The second response to those who might claim that variation in patterns of worldview by speaker or audience should be questioned is to note that such would be *post hoc* hypothesizing. Why should we expect that a government would twist its statements to the public in the direction of realism? Might one not have supposed that the soft democratic public would require higher ideals to fight for than narrow considerations of power and interest? Why should we expect that the state would ingratiate itself to international organizations? Might not a strong state resist internationalism and assert its sovereignty?

Third, such criticism overlooks other hypotheses. Statements made before international organizations may be more consistent with liberalism, not for propaganda, but because a

government is more likely to speak there on wars toward which it has adopted a liberal worldview. Likewise, perhaps governments prefer to speak to the general public about wars toward which they have adopted a realist worldview. In any case, much of the swing toward realism in public broadcasts and speeches to interest groups can be attributed to President Reagan's policy toward the Contra war. Seeking support for a realist policy, he campaigned to the public over a long period of time, skewing that portion of Figure 5.3.

Finally, the most telling response to such criticism is to point back to section 4.3. If context were so important in determining the problem representation, then the results of the hypothesized factors would not have been significant. While future research can try to cull the "truly official" statements from a dataset like this one, the author is comfortable that the results of this contextual analysis do not invalidate this research.

### 5.2.2 Main Subjects of Texts

In some of these cases, the text is entirely or substantially dedicated to a discussion of the war being described. In other cases, the reference to the war is only a few sentences (or less) embedded in a text dedicated to other purposes. Section 2.7.2 suggested that we examine differences between these two types of texts.

Before discussing these results, however, what can we say about "main point" references as opposed to "passing" references? We can be fairly confident that the author of an extended, prepared discussion of a conflict carefully crafted those passages in order to convey an intended message. The author of a passing reference to a conflict might be able to fall back on "boilerplate" phraseology, with less attention to the message -- but he or she might also pay close attention to the crafting of both major and minor parts of a text. In any case, the author still can select either liberal or realist boilerplate for the text.

When coding passing references, we acknowledge that sometimes too much may be inferred into the statement. The coding relies on the interpretation of a few words. When coding main point references, in contrast, we can be more confident in our observation of realist and liberal indicators. At the same time, however, main point references are more likely to ambiguously contain both realist and liberal indicators -- a passing reference often is too short to contain both types of indicator.

Finally, one could argue that main point references more accurately reflect official policy than passing references. Leaders clearly make a policy statement in the "main point references." Reviewing only such cases will eliminate some of the "noise:" variation in inferred worldview that could result from ill-considered passing references. On the other hand, one could also argue that passing references may be more likely to reflect an underlying worldview precisely because they are less "crafted." The main point references may be propaganda to an audience, while passing references may tell more about what the speaker believes.

The results of a regression using only main point references are quite similar to those of the regression across all cases for the United States and Canada. The only major difference between the results in Figure 5.7 and those in Figure 4.16 are that popularity now has a somewhat significant effect in the expected direction: increasing popularity produces a slightly increased tendency to issue foreign policy statements consistent with a liberal worldview. The significance of relative recessions is slightly reduced in main point references.

A comparison of the adjusted  $R^2$  supports the view that the passing references are only "noise." The variables account for 20% of the variation in worldview among the main point cases, and only 13% of the variation in the passing references. We will retain all cases, since there can be different interpretations of these regressions.<sup>93</sup> Later research may emphasize only the main point texts.

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<sup>93</sup>The mean worldview among main point references was .244, favoring liberalism. The mean worldview among passing references was -.161, favoring realism. As with the administration-specific means, this datum cannot be properly interpreted without further analysis.

Estimated Coefficients, Passing and Main Point References

Main Point References			Passing References	
<u>Variable</u>	<u><math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Sig T</u>	<u><math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Sig T</u>
INSURED	<b>.292000</b>	.0000	<b>.176583</b>	.0069
INSBIPOL	-.163592	.0011	-.100567	.1079
CURR_RIV	<b>-.224660</b>	.0000	<b>-.141522</b>	.0044
LONG_RIV	<b>-.144825</b>	.0000	<b>-.299526</b>	.0000
ALLY	<b>-.193425</b>	.0030	-.019921	.8208
DEMOCRAT	-.243444	.0000	-.083948	.0536
FAR_AWAY	.104811	.1260	.138871	.1188
ABSRECES	.244438	.0000	.262752	.0000
RELRECES	<b>-.086644</b>	.0054	-.071843	.0674
POPULAR	<b>.091279</b>	.0305	-.025615	.5469
PREELECT	.018974	.4902	.074445	.0511

Figure 5.7: Estimated Coefficients, Passing and Main Point References.  $\beta$ s that are significant in the expected direction are highlighted in boldface.

KEY (all independent variables range between 0 and 1):

- INSURED = 1 if the state's security is guaranteed by a great power
- INSBIPOL = 1 if INSURED = 1 and the international system is bipolar
- CURR\_RIV = 1 if a short-term rival of the state is involved in the war
- LONG\_RIV = 1 if an enduring rival of the state is involved in the war
- ALLY = 1 if an ally of the state is an initial party to the war
- DEMOCRAT = 1 if any democracy is an initial party to the war
- FAR\_AWAY = 1 if the war is occurring outside the state's "sphere of interest"
- ABSRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is amid a consecutive-quarter decline
- RELRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is in an annual decline relative to the G-7
- POPULAR = 1 if the leader enjoys 100% support from the public
- PREELECT = 1 if a national election will occur within the next three months

### Summary Statistics, Passing and Main Point References

	Main Point References	Passing References
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.198	0.135
F	26.487	9.900
Sig F (df)	.0000 (1118)	.0000 (615)

Figure 5.8: Summary Statistics, Passing and Main Point References.

### 5.3 Linking Inferred Worldviews to Observed Actions

We seem to have established that we can reliably infer a worldview from a given official text. These inferred worldviews seem to generally be consistent with the characteristics of either a realist or liberal perspective; they also seem to reflect a consistent "official government" description of the situation. These worldviews seem related to aspects of the situation itself: they are closer to the realist ideal if an ally or rival is involved, if a fellow democracy is involved, if one's economy is in relative decline, or if one's state must provide for its own security. Nevertheless, one could still ask: So What? What does this tell us about the actions a state is likely to take in a given circumstance? How do these rhetorical flourishes relate to the real issues of interventions into ongoing wars? Do states use power any differently while their leaders are issuing liberal statements than when they are issuing realist ones?

This final section addresses these important issues in two ways. First, we compare the dominant worldview expressed by state leaders toward a war with the other actions they took with regard to that war. Our goal here will be to show that the problem representations seem to

be more than "mere rhetoric:" state actions are generally consistent with (or at least not inconsistent with) the worldviews inferred from public statements. Second, we look for a relationship between the perspective expressed by a state toward a war and the highest eventual level of intervention by that state into that war. The question of whether a state's actions are driven by realist or liberal concerns becomes much more salient if those actions are likely to differ based on the underlying worldview.

### 5.3.1 Comparing Deeds to Words

As noted in the introduction and first chapter, it is not always easy to attach the realist or liberal label to state actions. Either perspective may lead decision makers to sign a treaty, break with an international organization, or take military action on one side of an ongoing war. This problem led us to develop this theory of competing worldviews. Of the characteristics of these worldviews, the one most closely linked to state action is the question of unilateral or multilateral approaches to problems. Decision makers following a realist foreign policy are, by definition, unlikely to defer to the preferences of an international organization; those following a liberal foreign policy are unlikely to take unilateral action, especially in the use of military force.

Note that we use the word "unlikely." There may well be circumstances in which a realist defers to an institution, or a liberal elects to act alone. If we were to find, however, that a state that we claim exhibits realist worldviews tended to consistently act only with the approval of the United Nations, we would be justified in asking how that inferred worldview influences the policy actions of that state. On the other hand, if we find that a state tends to take unilateral actions towards wars for which this research has inferred a realist perspective, and relies on multilateral action toward wars for which it has inferred a liberal perspective, we would be justified in claiming a relationship between policy statements and policy actions.



Our findings support this latter possibility: actions seem to be consistent with the worldviews inferred from statements. Figure 5.9 presents the mean worldview adopted by each state toward each war. This mean worldview is a very rough assessment of the state's foreign policy, especially for the longer wars, but it serves to illustrate our point. Canada generally displayed a liberal perspective toward these wars, and its actions have been consistent: promoting multilateral sanctions against South Africa, assisting the Contadora movement in Central America, serving on Committees on Indochina, and participating in multilateral peacekeeping forces in Somalia, Western Sahara, and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, we do not find Canada taking unilateral measures to intervene in these wars. Perhaps the closest Canada comes to such action is the rescue of a few American diplomats from Iran during the hostage crisis. The one realist Canadian war is the Sri Lankan conflict; this is also a case where Canada does not appear to have appealed to liberal institutions.<sup>94</sup>

For the United States, on the other hand, we see more variation in the mean worldviews. We find the US intervening unilaterally or bilaterally in Afghanistan, in Central America, and the Philippines; we find the US adhering to international constraints in Somalia, Kuwait, and Yugoslavia. Comparing the United States and Canada can be quite instructive. Both states imposed sanctions on South Africa. Canada (with a liberal perspective) worked towards multilateral mandatory sanctions; the United States (with a realist perspective) acted to discourage such an international approach. The United States reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and attacked Iranian positions in the Iran-Iraq war, consistent with its realist worldview; Canada, consistent with its liberal worldview, initiated no such actions. In that war, the United States did not adopt a consistently realist worldview until 1983, before these interventions occurred. Likewise, the US perspective on Afghanistan shifted from more liberal to more realist in 1983; 1985's National Security Decision Directive 166 increased the aid to the Afghan rebels (Simpson, 1995: 446-7). Within the texts on the Kuwaiti War (Desert Shield/Storm), the United States

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<sup>94</sup>See Appendix D for a more complete treatment of each state's actions toward each war.

# Mean Worldview of Each State toward Each War

WAR	Mean Worldview	
	CAN	USA
Afghan	1.113	-.320
Algeria	---	.170
Burma	.414	.017
Chiapas	---	-.510
Contra	.779	-.236
Hostage	1.072	---
IndoChin	1.067	.083
IndoPak	---	-1.01
Intifada	.543	.050
IranIraq	.584	-.434
Kuwait	.934	.725
Liberia1	---	-.571
Liberia2	.510	.870
Osirak	---	.366
Pakistan	---	.000

WAR	Mean Worldview	
	CAN	USA
Panama	.895	---
Peru	---	.026
Phil	---	-.366
SAfrica	.188	-.430
SAtlanti	.000	-.098
Shaba	---	.257
Somalia	1.354	.646
SriLanka	-.130	.124
Sudan	.305	-.116
Uganda	---	-.963
WSahara	1.098	.264
Yemen1	---	-.501
Yemen2	---	-1.15
Yemen3	1.098	.693
Yugoslav	1.116	.910

Figure 5.9: Mean Worldview for Each State toward Each War. Scores less than zero indicate a tendency toward realism. Dashes indicate that a war is not coded for a state.

displays a stronger liberal worldview beginning in November 1990. During the less liberal early months, the United States sent troops to Saudi Arabia and mobilized the United Nations in support of its own objectives and actions. Once that was achieved, the United States displayed a more liberal perspective; the United States also adhered to United Nations deadlines and limits on the final prosecution of the war.

On the basis of this review, we conclude that the perspectives found in official statements adequately correspond to the actions taken by the leaders of these states. The official statements on which we have based this analysis are more than just rhetoric. They are valid indicators of other state behavior. It is therefore reasonable to assert that the findings of

chapter 4 indicate the circumstances in which a state is likely to engage in a foreign policy consistent with realist or liberal theory, as opposed to merely indicating when the leaders of a state are likely to speak in realist or liberal language.

### 5.3.2 Comparing Interventions to Perspectives

Does knowing whether a state holds a liberal or realist perspective tell us anything about the likelihood that a state would intervene in a conflict? We suggested early in this research that a liberal policy might lead to a greater tendency to intervene. Decision makers acting from a realist perspective might more easily argue that a given war can be ignored. This tendency could be balanced, however, if decision makers acting from a liberal perspective are unable to find an appropriate course of action. While we did not formally hypothesize this question, the results suggest a weak link between liberalism and intervention. Figure 5.10 presents the results of the following regression:

$$(\text{Level of Intervention}) = B_0 + B_1(\text{Mean Worldview}) + u$$

The results of this regression (see Figure 5.7) lack much statistical significance. Only in the case of the United States do we see weak support for the suggestion that liberal worldviews are more likely to coincide with higher levels of intervention. For the US, an increase of one point in the mean worldview suggests a corresponding one-level increase in the intervention scale. The Canadian statistic is similar, but is not significant: perhaps the lower variation in the mean worldview held by Canadian decision-makers toward different wars lowers the significance of the relationship.

### Regression of Intervention Level against Mean Worldview

Statistic	Canada Only	USA Only	Both States
Mean level of intervention	1.556	2.250	1.978
Correlation between intervention level and mean worldview (significance)	.338 (.085)	.429 (.011)	.170 (.130)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.059	.152	.007
F, df (Significance of F)	2.06, 16 (.171)	5.85, 26 (.023)	1.30, 44 (.260)
B <sub>i</sub> (Significance)	1.199 (.171)	1.161 (.023)	.411 (.260)

Figure 5.10: Results of Regressing Intervention Level against the Mean Worldview expressed by the leaders of the state toward a war. Intervention Level is a Guttman scale where 0 = No intervention, 1 = Diplomatic Action Taken (beyond simply expressing an opinion), 2 = Economic Action Taken, 3 = Military Assistance Provided, 4 = Direct Military Intervention.




Figure 5.11: Scatterplot of Intervention Level versus Mean Worldview. Mean Worldviews are as noted in Figure 5.9. Intervention Levels are described in Figure 5.10 and in Appendix D.

It may be more useful, however, to examine Figure 5.11 when assessing this relationship. While the data in Figure 5.10 quantify some results, they also raise questions as to their own validity. The independent variable in the regression is the mean of the worldviews identified in all the statements by a state regarding a given war. This measure, especially for longer wars, is rather imprecise. The dependent variable, a five-point Guttman scale of intervention levels is neither continuous nor truly an interval scale; furthermore, it notes only the highest level of intervention during the war. Future research can examine this aspect of this validity issue in a more sophisticated manner.

Nevertheless, this exploration allows us to more confidently hypothesize that leaders who express a liberal worldview toward a given conflict<sup>95</sup> are more likely to eventually intervene in that conflict. We can see in Figure 5.11 that Canada did not move beyond economic intervention in the eight wars toward which it expressed the least-liberal perspective. Likewise, the US took no more than diplomatic action in the only three wars towards which its policy was very strongly realist;<sup>96</sup> the US military intervened directly in four of the five wars toward which its policy was strongly liberal.<sup>97</sup>

The more significant finding, however, regarding links between worldview and action, is that of section 5.3.1. The pattern of actions taken by states toward foreign wars seems consistent with the perspective inferred from official policy statements. Even a review of declassified portions of National Security Directives (Simpson, 1995), while only including a few policies toward a few wars, indicates that official policy statements issued to the public are consistent with official policy statements issued for internal government reference. Public

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<sup>95</sup>The discussion in the previous portions of this chapter suggests that "leaders who express a liberal worldview toward a given conflict" is equivalent to "states whose leaders follow a liberal foreign policy toward a given conflict."

<sup>96</sup>The three wars are the Indo-Pakistan conflict (where even diplomatic action came very late in this round of that conflict), the internal war in Uganda, and the mid-1980s internal war in Yemen.

<sup>97</sup>The four wars in which the US intervened are the Yugoslav wars, Somalia, the Kuwaiti war, and the second Liberian chaos (where US action was limited to rescue operations). The outlier among these cases was the 1994 war between northern and southern Yemeni factions.

statements do not seem to be "mere rhetoric." They appear to be valid and reliable proxies for other foreign policy behavior, proxies that (unlike other forms of foreign policy behavior) can be reliably classified as consistent with realist or liberal perspectives.

#### 5.4 Summary

The findings of this research seem valid in several areas. Realism and liberalism seem to be valid archetypes for the many different worldviews held by national decision makers. While the cases suggest a third perspective, paxism, this third perspective does not seem dominant enough in the United States or Canada to invalidate our results. Official policy statements appear to reflect an underlying consistency of perspective regarding specific wars. Non-public policy statements also appear consistent with the publicly-displayed worldview. State actions seem to be consistent with the worldview inferred from public descriptions of a war. Each of these areas merits further research, both as interesting issues in their own right and to further confirm the validity of this study. The findings of this chapter seem sufficiently robust, however, to place the burden of proof on those who would question either the notion of using public statements as indicators of foreign policy or the idea that the study of decision-makers' worldviews can provide insights into international politics. We certainly do not claim that these findings are beyond reproach or rebuttal, but we do assert that they cannot responsibly be rejected without serious scholarly examination.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS

This chapter first presents a summary of our findings. This includes a discussion of the hypotheses and some suggestions as to different interpretations of the analysis. The remainder of the chapter suggests additional research avenues. Some of these are improvements that could be made to this study as is, others are extensions of this research into other areas.

#### 6.1 Conclusions and Implications

As an initial foray into what could become a rich research programme, this dissertation succeeds on several levels. First, the findings strongly support the utility of competing worldview theory. We had suggested that realism and liberalism operate, not as neutral laws of state interaction, but as perspectives through which decision makers can interpret world events. We have now demonstrated that decision makers in the United States and Canada do interpret some events in ways consistent with their holding liberal worldviews, and other events in ways consistent with their holding realist worldviews. We do not claim, of course, that any of these decision-makers thinks in terms of an ideal realist or liberal ontology. Rather, aspects of their actual (and unobservable) perspective can be inferred from their public statements. These aspects often are similar to aspects of the ideal worldview. We have shown that subsequent actions taken by a decision-maker who displayed a worldview consistent with (for example) liberalism tend to conform to liberal theories of international politics. We have succeeded in

transforming two theories that lacked clear observable implications into a new theory that does have observable implications.

Second, we have validated a methodology that identifies these perspectives. Public statements tend to conform to both the actions of states and the secret policy statements issued by governments (Simpson, 1995). Unlike actions, however, public statements include rationales for policy, rationales that reduce the ambiguity inherent in some actions. Unlike secret or internal statements, public statements of policy are easily accessible in large quantities. We have demonstrated that a thematic content analysis can reliably identify indicators of each of these worldviews. This would allow this theory to be tested by teams of scholars examining many states and many texts. Using this methodology will move this debate closer to the scientific principle of examining evidence collected across a variety of explanatory variables.

Finally, we have evaluated several hypotheses that have been presented in the international politics literature but never (apparently) rigorously tested. We have found that Canada tends to issue statements more consistent with liberalism than those of the United States. According to our hypothesis, this can be attributed to the fact that the United States relies on itself for security while Canada has its security ensured another nation-state. This finding will need to be confirmed through examining other states that do and do not provide for their own security.

Might other differences between the United States and Canada, not controlled for in the regression, account for the difference in perspective? Canada has a much smaller population and less military power than the United States. It is not a great power. Realism could be an ontology held only by leaders of great powers. While much of the literature on conflict and war focuses on great powers, the author doubts that academic proponents of realist theory would be pleased to find that their theory has such low generalizability. Many more states are non-great powers than are great powers, so realism could not explain the vast majority of international interactions. In any case, we should also recall that Indian leaders displayed almost as much



realism as the United States. While we have excluded India from the hypothesis evaluation section of this study, this hypothesis seems to have held for India (the relevant variable could not be evaluated in a single-state regression). Non-great powers can exhibit realism as much as great powers; it is Canada that does not. Canada is not a weak state, either; one could call it an intermediate power. Could liberalism be a trait of such states? Perhaps, but India's size and regional dominance may qualify it as also an intermediate power.

Canada suffers from a serious ethnic cleavage: the French-speaking Quebecois seek autonomy from the English-speaking national majority. One has trouble determining, however, how this condition would manifest itself in a higher degree of liberalism in foreign policy than the United States. In any case, India also suffers from linguistic and other groups seeking autonomy or full independence. And India is not so liberal.

Canada has a parliamentary government, unlike the United States (but, once again, like India). In a later section we will present an untested hypothesis that refers to the type of regime. This hypothesis, however, considers the difference between majoritarian regimes, where the head of government does not depend on the support of other parties to remain in office, and coalition regimes, where the head of government can be ousted if other parties disagree with his policies. Both the U.S. and Canada have had majoritarian regimes; there seems little reason to think that the means of electing the government should affect the worldview of its members.

In most other areas, either the United States and Canada are similar or the analysis controls for the difference. Both are distant from most conflicts, isolated by oceans and continental space. The United States, unlike Canada, takes special interest in a nearby region, but the regression analysis controlled for that. Both have continental landmasses. Both have been at peace with their immediate neighbors for nearly a century and a half. The United States has more rivals and allies, but the regression analysis controls for that. We can explore some of these differences as other nation-states are added to the research, but none of these seems

more plausible than the hypothesized relationship: the United States must provide its own security and Canada does not.

Another hypothesis for which we found support regards the presence of a rival. National decision makers are more likely to express a worldview consistent with realism when a rival state is involved in a conflict. This effect holds for enduring rivals and "current" rivals. This seems to be one of the more robust findings, as it held for India as well as the United States. Canada did not observe any rivals involved in wars, in part because Canada seems not to have any rivals. Canada did not display a tendency toward realism when observing wars that involved rivals of its ally, the United States; Figure 5.6 indicates that such wars may have inspired a more *liberal* response from Canadian decision makers. Rivalry appears to only have a direct effect, and is not passed through to allies of rivals.<sup>98</sup> Further research should try to select states that have some rivals involved in wars, in order to bolster this finding. Further research should also directly examine this second-order effect of rivals on allies of rival states. Canada could be anomalous, as it has little experience with rivalry. Perhaps the leaders of states who face their own rivals display more solidarity with their allies who face other rivals.

A third hypothesis supported by this study regards allies. State decision makers are more likely to display a realist worldview toward wars in which an ally is an initial party. Note that the conditions of this hypothesis differ from those of the previous. We suggested that the involvement of a rival in a war, whether as an initial action or via later intervention, would prompt a more realist response. For allies, however, we suggest that the effect is only seen if an ally is attacked or is the initiator of a conflict. An ally may intervene into a conflict, but this need not change the observing state's problem representation. Future research could test that hypothesis separately, but it would need to also control for the level of allied intervention and perhaps the

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<sup>98</sup>The adage, after all, says "The enemy of my enemy is my friend," not "The enemy of my friend is my enemy."

perceived successfulness of the intervention. This result supports including the Rio Pact as an alliance, from the perspective of the United States. Conflicts involving Rio Pact members (Contra and Chiapas), like the Philippine conflict, tended to be represented more consistently with realism than other conflicts. Wars involving quasi-allies like Israel and Pakistan also tended to have a somewhat more realist problem representation than wars involving true non-allies, but the definition of the situation appeared to be less realist than those involving formal allies. The United States took a fairly neutral view toward the South Atlantic war, in which two formal allies faced each other.

The result on this hypothesis seems to be somewhat less robust than the others, as the relationship did not hold for Canada (the coefficient indicated a non-significant link between allies and liberalism). Future research should explore deconstructing the definition of ally. We have considered all allied relationships to be similar, but there are at least two different ways an ally can be perceived. An ally may be a nation-state that one's own government has promised to protect and defend. This is the relationship between the United States and its Asian and Latin American allies: the U.S. will protect them, but is not expecting protection in return. An ally may also be a nation-state that has promised to protect one's own state, but is not expecting the protected state to defend it. This would be the relationship perceived by the Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the members of the Rio Pact regarding the United States.<sup>99</sup> While it is reasonable for a nation-state to adopt a realist perspective toward threats to its "protected" allies, it may not be so reasonable for a nation-state to adopt a realist perspective toward threats to its "protecting" ally, so long as those threats do not seem so large as to reduce the "protecting" ally's ability to carry out that task.<sup>100</sup> Canada probably does not see itself as the "protector" of

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<sup>99</sup>In the case of the Rio Pact, even if the United States believes it is sworn to protect the other members from outside attack, the members of the Rio Pact may not regard the United States as a protector to the extent that the Japanese or South Korean governments might.

<sup>100</sup>There may also be a third type of allied relationship, based on a more equal sharing of responsibilities.

the U.S., especially against threats from Iran and Panama, thus it should not be surprising that its leaders did not display a worldview consistent with realism with respect to those conflicts.

We have also found support for a hypothesis that democratic states will tend to adopt a realist perspective toward wars in which other democracies are an initial party. This relationship was even stronger for Canada than for the United States. This finding supports the democracy war literature in showing that democracies tend to support each other when one is attacked (Maoz and Russett, 1993). It would seem that the locus for democratic peace may lie as much in the shared caution accorded non-democracies as in any liberal regard democratic leaders may have for one another.

Finally, we have found support for the hypothesis that states in relative economic decline would be more likely to display a realist perspective. Such states would be more sensitive to relative losses in power than states that are gaining economic positionality vis-à-vis its economic peers. This may be the least robust of our findings, as no relationship was found for Canada (the coefficient was significant at .97). Future research involving other members of the G-7 will tell us whether Canada or the United States is the anomalous case.

This analysis leads us to reject the suggestion that "protected" states, like Canada, would become more likely to display realist perspectives now that the bipolar era has ended. One had supposed that Canadians (and the leaders of other such states) would either distrust the intentions of the remaining pole or lose confidence in its protection. We should not completely eliminate this hypothesis from later research, however. It may be too soon, at the end of 1994, for this effect to have overcome the inertial trust of the bipolar era. The lack of confidence in the United States may also affect other protected states more quickly than it would Canada, since the United States can afford to ignore the security of Europe and Asia more than it can Canada. We also should note, in defense of Waltz, that his hypothesis probably was grounded on a comparison of bipolar certainty with multipolar uncertainty. In a unipolar world, you need only be concerned with the actions and intentions of that single pole; at least in this particular unipolar

world, the overall level of threat in the international system seems to have receded. Thus Canada can, for the time being, display even greater levels of liberalism than before.

This research could not confirm that distance affected the decision makers' perspective, but the near-significant results encourage us to retain this concept. Future research will be better able to assess the direct relationship between distance and liberalism if it includes more wars that are on the border of or in the "sphere of interest" of the bystander state. As it turned out, with the elimination of India from the dataset, only one case involved a war on the border of a bystander state (Chiapas), and the "sphere of interest" cases all involved the Contra war. Better case selection can allow us to better explore this variable.

Finally, we found no relationship between popularity or the approach of elections and the expressed worldview. These variables may, of course, have been poorly operationalized. Polls, however, seem to be the only available "measure" of popularity. We could tinker with the lag time before elections (currently set at three months) until we find a length that supports a relationship, but that seems like a questionable way to advance our knowledge. Both of these hypotheses were seeking a link between worldviews and a leader's self-perceived job security. Perhaps these variables do not validly represent that concept. Section 6.2.2 will suggest another way to measure the security of leaders, based on the type of regime he or she leads.

So this research has found that both liberal and realist conceptions of international politics operate in the formation of foreign policy. Neither realist nor liberal "theory" can thus explain all the actions of states. Nevertheless, we must also note that the conditions under which liberalism operates do not include the wars that could be described, *a priori*, as important. Roughly speaking, industrialized democratic states and their leaders tend to exhibit liberalism toward wars when they do not have to provide for their own security, when no rivals or allies are involved in the war, and when other democracies are not principle parties to the war.<sup>101</sup> On the

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<sup>101</sup>67 out of 143 wars involve only non-democratic, non-rivals and non-allies of the United States or Canada, only one (the Turko-Kurd war since 1991) involves democracies and both a rival and

other hand, there may be a slight tendency towards greater intervention into wars toward which a liberal policy is followed. This produces the rather paradoxical conclusion that states tend to get involved in wars that they would not have been expected to find salient. Further research can examine that puzzle.<sup>102</sup>

We have indicated that these results generalize to "industrial democracies in the Western tradition." These states are listed again in Figure 6.2; they include much of Western Europe, Canada, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and Israel. This should not be taken as the ultimate extension of this approach, however. The leaders of Non-Western or developing democracies probably also view the world through ontologies, but we cannot assume that realism and liberalism can serve as models for those worldviews. Such leaders may be motivated by a Marxist or a paxian worldview; there may be other worldviews more removed from these that operate in East Asian or Islamic states. Research in both international and comparative politics can uncover candidate worldviews. The methods used in this study could then be used to test competing worldview theory for these states. The methodology could also be applied to non-democratic states, although one would not expect significant results. In a non-democratic state, the definition of the situation may rely more on the individual worldview of a single individual, rather than being tempered by debate among individuals with different worldviews. This concern would not obtain for institutionalized non-democratic states, such as the old Soviet Union or Mexico.

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an ally of the United States. While these "liberal" wars make up 47% of all wars in this period, and 44% (16/36) of the wars examined in this study, only 19% of the American cases (and 70% of Canadian) referred to such wars.

<sup>102</sup>It should be emphasized that whatever this research reveals about *when* states follow liberal policies, it cannot answer another fundamental question in the liberal-realist debate. Waltz (1986) and Mearsheimer (1995) repeat Carr's (1939) assertion that even if leaders choose to ignore realism, they are fools for doing so. Morgenthau (1985) also said that realism is the proper way to view international politics, but not all will do so. I cannot affirm or deny that assumption: but it does seem to move realism from an observational theory to a prescriptive theory. This research attempts to find out when states "ignore realism," foolishly or not.

## 6.2 Directions for Further Research

This final section suggests some areas where further research can be done, to improve or extend this study. First, we will explore some changes within the scope of this study. Second, we will examine how it could be made to apply to other states and other domains.

### 6.2.1 Improvements within the Scope of this Study

Within this study, changes could be made to the indicators, the operationalized independent variables, to the means of analysis, and to the validity analysis. In addition, the research could be redone using a different selection of wars for the these two states and/or over a different period of time.

#### 6.2.1.1 Improving the Indicators

For this study, each worldview had five equally-weighted indicators (summarized in Figure 6.1). These indicators had equal weight because there did not seem to be any reason to apply different weights to them. After conducting this research, however, we could argue for reducing the weight of the third indicator of each worldview. For realism, this is a concern with national protection. In many ways this is a subset of the second indicator, national interest. While interests are often invoked without specifying a threat to national integrity, it is difficult to code national protection without an interest being invoked. Thus this indicator should not, perhaps, receive equal weight. On the liberal side, the third indicator notes a policy of protecting a non-allied state. In practice, when speaking about a war in which a non-ally is involved, cases that are otherwise realist often refer to defending a state involved in the war. This may be a

<u>Realist Characteristics</u>	<u>Liberal Characteristics</u>
Concern with relative gains and losses	Concern only with absolute gains and losses
Concern with national interests	Concern with international norms and democracy
Protection of one's own state	Protection of other states
Precedent applies to combatant states	Precedent applies to all states
Advocate unilateral or bilateral action	Advocate multilateral action

Figure 6.1: Summary of Characteristics of an Ideal Realist or Liberal Worldview.

state facing an insurgency or international aggression. While this indicator still seems consistent with an ideal liberal worldview, it may be less distinctively liberal than the other four indicators.

Future researchers may also wish to disaggregate these indicators. The second characteristic of liberalism, for example, now includes both the encouragement of democratic regimes and support for norms of international institutions. We might gain more insight into different worldviews if these were not mixed together.<sup>103</sup> There are also several different sorts of national interest included in the second realist indicator. In the fifth realist indicator, we could distinguish between cases where unilateral action by one's own state is advocated, where unilateral action by another state is defended, or where bilateral cooperation is sought. In the

<sup>103</sup>This characteristic also includes the promotion of free trade. While that aspect of "community interests" was not very salient in this domain, it would be if competing worldview theory is applied to economic issues.



fifth liberal indicator, we could distinguish cases where the state suggests it would assist multilateral action from cases where the state merely is pleased that others are behaving thusly.

#### 6.2.1.2 Improving the Variables

In the first section of this chapter, we noted several possible changes in the operationalization of our independent variables. These included distinguishing protected allies from protecting allies and accounting for situations where a state may be both an enduring and a current rival. We also could examine the effect of "transmitted" rivalry: do states take any note of their allies' rivals, or of their rivals' allies, or of their rivals' rivals?<sup>104</sup> The democracy variable could be recoded using the actual POLITY III values, rather than treating it as a dichotomous condition.<sup>105</sup> The economic variables could be retested using per capita growth instead of absolute growth; they also could use the absolute values instead of the dichotomous recession/no recession coding.

#### 6.2.1.3 Alternative Means of Analysis

For this research, we chose to treat worldviews as a pseudo-continuous variable and conduct an ordinary least squares regression with the worldviews as the dependent variable. This allowed us to account for some of the uncertainty associated with the coding: while coding results of 4-0 and 10-0 may both be "strongly realist," we are more confident that the latter result

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<sup>104</sup>As noted earlier, an eyeball regression suggests that "transmitted" rivalry is not a strong factor.

<sup>105</sup>The dichotomous treatment seems to better fit how decision makers (and most other people) view states: they are democratic or non-democratic, not partially or somewhat democratic. But some finer divisions might be present. It is worth looking at.

is indicative of a realist perspective than the former. On the other hand, this methodological choice also may introduce unwarranted variation into the dependent variable. If both the 4-0 and 10-0 case are consistent with realism, then we may be giving too much influence to the variation in the way that worldview happens to be expressed.

An alternative method, which was considered but not used here, would treat the worldview as a dichotomous variable. Doing so would eliminate approximately one-third of the cases, all those that did not indicate strong realism or liberalism. We would still have over 1500 cases, however. A maximum likelihood estimation, such as a Logit regression, could then be conducted using the dichotomous dependent variable. If we are sufficiently confident that the cases are accurately categorized, this analysis should produce results with less "noise."

If we were to travel this route, we could still use the "ambiguous" or "weak" cases. We could develop hypotheses suggesting that under some conditions states are likely to not take a strong position. A "threshold" analysis could be done with a dichotomous variable coded "0" if the worldview is in categories -1, 0, or 1 (weakly realist, neutral, or weakly liberal) and coded "1" if the worldview is in category -2 or 2 (strongly realist or liberal). Some hypotheses might link variables which seemed insignificant in this study to ambiguity. Perhaps popularity or the approach of elections are linked, not to realism or liberalism, but to the tendency to take a clear policy position. It might be appropriate then to exclude such variables from the second stage of the analysis: given that a clear perspective is expressed, when is it more likely to be consistent with realism and when with liberalism?

Finally, we also could, as suggested in section 5.3.2, treat worldview as an intervening variable between these factors and the tendency to intervene. Since both variables in that section were rather rough, we would need to first refine the analysis somewhat. One refinement would be to look at worldviews and intervention actions in smaller chunks of time. For example, technically Canada sent armed forces to Nicaragua before the Contras fully stopped fighting Sandinista forces. And yes, the peace agreement could have broken down and exposed the

Canadians to hostile fire. But this "level 4" intervention seems different in scope from the steady American involvement during that conflict. Plausible break points could be added, based on changes in the character of the war, in the international system, and perhaps even in the domestic regime. We could then code the dependent variable, the level of intervention, during each "phase." The same would be true for the worldview -- the mean (or some other measure of central tendency, such as the median) could be used for each phase. This might capture some of the shifts in worldview during, for example, the Iran-Iraq war as viewed by the United States.

We could also treat either or both of these variables as dichotomous, and run a "threshold analysis" similar to the one discussed earlier in this section. We could hypothesize that an ambiguous perspective would be more likely to produce no, or at least low levels of, intervention behavior. Ambiguity might, in this case, need to incorporate the variance of the worldview during a phase of the conflict. We also could dichotomize the level of intervention, and "stair-step" the analysis. We could first have a dependent variable of action/no action. Then, discarding the conflicts for which no action was taken, we could regress (using maximum likelihood estimation) using diplomatic action/stronger than diplomatic action as the dependent variable. This could be continued up our Guttman scale through economic action, military aid and direct military intervention, as long as we retained enough degrees of freedom.

#### 6.2.1.4 Improving the Validity Analysis

Finally, the validity analysis could be strengthened. If we can acquire the documents, we could more rigorously and thoroughly compare public statements with private statements. As noted previously, some in the debate (Greico, 1990; Mastanduno, 1991; Hellman and Wolf, 1993) do rely on public statements and more private correspondence to validate their claims. If authoritative individuals privately contradict the views expressed in public statements, then this approach might be questioned. Simpson's (1995) collection of National Security Decision

Directives is too limited to provide a final answer. The National Security Archive is one source for additional documentation. They have compiled documents on U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua, among other events. A systematic collection of such documents may be rather difficult to regularly obtain.

We could more finely examine the relationship between rhetoric and actions. One could argue that once a state has become involved in an external war, it would be more likely to use liberal rhetoric for propaganda purposes, even if the internal ("true") problem representation was realist. Thus statements made after a war has been joined, and for a short time before that (when the decision to intervene has been privately made), would tend to reflect a liberal worldview. This latter possibility, running counter to a naive view of causality, is emphasized by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 191). An examination of the full record might help resolve whether shifts in problem representation drive shifts in action, or if worldviews are adjusted to conform to actions decided upon. The analysis conducted in this research suggests that shifts in worldview precede shifts in action, but it has only used annual summaries of policy tendencies.

We also could improve the analysis of whether it matters if states follow liberalism or realism. As in this study, the perspective would be the independent variable, and the type of action taken by the bystander would be the dependent variable. We looked only at the mean perspective and the maximum action taken. This is inefficient, as (for example) U.S. unilateral military actions only occurred during the final portion of the Iran-Iraq war. The mean perspective on the war may be dominated by the perspective taken in earlier periods of that war. As another example, the United States refrained from military involvement for a long time during the Yugoslav war, despite consistently exhibiting a liberal worldview. This deeper analysis would give us a better understanding of state behavior in response to foreign wars, as these perspectives act as the intervening variable channel from perceived characteristics of the states and system to state actions.

## 6.2.2 Extensions of this Research Programme

This research can be extended in four areas. It could examine additional hypotheses, with the same states and domain. It could add worldviews. It could add other states to the research. Finally, it could examine other domains of foreign policy, including trade policy.

### 6.2.2.1 Adding Hypotheses

We could add two hypotheses to this study. This research has not examined a possible relationship between the nature of the government and worldviews. Elections are not required in most countries to remove a leader. In parliamentary systems, if the prime minister presides over a coalition, he or she could lose office at any time if a member party in that coalition stops supporting it.<sup>106</sup> In keeping with the other "leader security" hypotheses, we suggest the following: *If a democracy is parliamentary, then leaders who preside over a majority in parliament will be more likely to display a liberal perspective than those who do not.* This argument seems consistent with Hagan's (1993) assertion that ruling groups that are fragmented and/or vulnerable to replacement will have a more difficult time committing to a policy unless it has broad appeal. Thus, they will tend to be risk-averse.

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<sup>106</sup>As seen in the replacement of Thatcher by Major in the United Kingdom, a prime minister can fall rather unexpectedly even if presiding over a majority government. That seems rather infrequent however, and so will not be taken into account.

# Distribution of Nation-States by Government Type

	Majoritarian Government	Coalition/Minority Government
Pole	United States	Ø
Ally of a Pole	Australia, -10/80, 3/83- New Zealand -86 Spain 10/82- Canada -5/79, 2/80- United Kingdom Greece -6/89, 10/93+ Portugal 10/87- France -3/86, 6/88-3/93 <sup>a</sup>	Australia, 10/80-3/83 Belgium Canada 5/79-2/80 France 3/86-6/88, 3/93- Germany Greece, 6/89-10/93 Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Denmark Iceland Portugal -10/87 Italy
Non-ally of a Pole	New Zealand, 86- Austria -4/83 Ireland -6/81	Spain -10/82 Sweden Finland Switzerland Austria 4/83- Israel Ireland 6/81-

Figure 6.2: Distribution of Nation-States by Government Type. Sources: Mackie and Rose (1991), *New York Times*, *The Guardian*.

<sup>a</sup>Recall that France was difficult to place on the ally/non-ally dimension. It also is difficult to place on the majority/coalition dimension. Periods of condominium, when the President and Prime Minister are from different parties, are coded as coalition.

Figure 6.2 locates each state in our range of generalizability in terms of this hypothesis. We would need to select one state from each of the cells in the second column, as well as replacing India in the non-ally row. The Soviet Union could not be included in this study until after a Marxist/structuralist worldview has been identified. Even so, the cell (Coalition, Pole) would remain empty going back to 1945 or earlier.<sup>107</sup>

A second hypothesis that could be explored in future research would be a link between the inferred perspective and the nature of the war being described. We have not tried to distinguish between "internal" and "international" wars, even though we could posit a relationship between problem representation and this dimension. Liberal institutions, including the League of Nations and United Nations, emphasize action in the case of international wars more than internal wars. International wars tend to violate international norms of conduct, to the extent that peaceful relations and respect for sovereignty and boundaries are goals of the dominant international institutions. Internal wars do not *per se* violate these norms, although they may often be more brutal in their abuse of the "rules of war." The difficulty, however, is in trying to categorize wars as internal or international: many wars have elements of both. What sort of war, for example, was the Russo-Afghan war or the Wars of the Yugoslav Secession? Either could be viewed as internal wars with international intervention or international wars punctuated by internal resistance.

A potentially more fruitful dichotomy is used in Sollenberg (1995) and the *SIPRI Yearbooks*. They ask if the basic incompatibility underlying the conflict regards territory or regime? Conflicts over territory involve attempts to establish the independence of an integral part of a state (such as the Sri Lankan civil war), to end the sovereignty of a recognized nation-state (such as the Iraq-Kuwait war), or to adjust the borders between two nation-states (such as the Wars of the Yugoslav Secession). Conflicts over regime involve armed attempts to resist

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<sup>107</sup>Casual reflection hints at a correlation between status as a pole and a majoritarian regime: few great powers with coalition governments come to mind.

changes in the nature of the government (such as in Burma) or to cause such change. These latter may be internally-led (as in the Philippines) or internationally-led (as in Panama). Where there is ambiguity, the *SIPRI* studies provide neutral arbitration of the issue, at least into the mid-1980s, and a pool of analogous situations for earlier conflicts. It is unclear, however, how one would relate worldviews to this distinction. Further research must be conducted to develop hypotheses grounded in the liberalism-realism literature.

#### 6.2.2.2 Adding Worldviews

We can add states from Figure 6.1 to this study with ease. The liberal or realist ideals should apply to each of them. Before adding other states, however, we should define the characteristics of the alternative ideal worldviews. Section 5.1 introduced a paxian/idealist perspective. Indicators of this worldview might include a concern for the fate of individuals (as opposed to only states), a tendency to speak in terms of moral imperatives, and the promotion of negotiations for their own sake. Paxians may be very interested in what they characterize as universal norms and principles, but would not necessarily rely on international institutions (dominated by the interests of certain powerful states) to define those norms. A more complete review of the peace studies literature will help to distill these traits. We would not be surprised to find that paxism is more prevalent in the "South" than in the "North," but that remains a hypothetical proposition.

We also have discussed a Marxist/structural perspective. Such a worldview would be most concerned with relationships between center and periphery. Indicators for this worldview are less developed than those for paxism; they might include assertion of the rights of smaller powers and regions vis-à-vis the great powers, suspicion of global organizations, promotion of regional (South-South) cooperation, and an emphasis on the economic motivations for warfare. While such a worldview might be expected to be present in the former Soviet Union and its



satellites, or (in theory, at least) in China. The structuralist worldview might also be found more often in the "South," especially in Latin America, than in the "North."

Before adding these perspectives, however, we also need to devise a better means of distinguishing between them. A single measure on a continuum will not suffice. Our hypotheses may need to assert whether each is likely to promote a problem representation consistent with specific perspectives, and regress on each worldview as a separate dependent variable.

#### 6.2.2.3 Adding States

If we were to add states, some seem more immediately useful than others. Adding the United Kingdom, Australia, or another ally of the United States would help confirm the Canadian results, or perhaps show that another explanation for Canadian liberalism is needed. New Zealand would be a particularly interesting case, if they issued enough statements on these wars, because they left the ANZUS alliance in 1986. If they were liberal as a member of the alliance, did they become more realist after they left it (recalling, of course, that New Zealand faces a minimal number of plausible threats to its security)? The effect of security guarantees could also be investigated by adding countries like Germany and Austria or Norway and Sweden, pairing an NATO member with a non-aligned state facing a similar strategic position. These allies could, to a greater degree than Canada, have less confidence in American security promises; they might thus be more likely to have abandoned liberalism after the bipolar era ended.

The Soviet Union would be another interesting case to add to the research. This would allow us to compare two superpowers, instead of only one. It also would be a test of whether structuralism dominated the Soviet perspective, as that perspective's Marxist lineage might suggest. We also could examine how that perspective may have changed when the state broke up (if at all). Finally, the Soviet Union (like the United States) had allies that it protected, as opposed to having allies that protected it (other than in the strictly geographic sense).

Finally, we should continue to explore cases from among the less developed countries of the "South." At the least, we would like to discover the reach of realism and liberalism. We would also like to test for the two worldviews that may be more prevalent among those states, paxism and structuralism. As a first step, we should re-examine India after the characteristics of these perspectives have been defined. Mexico would serve as an interesting second developing country, since it is located in North America along with Canada and the United States. It (like the old Soviet Union) would also be an example of an institutionalized non-democracy; it would be interesting to see if the type of regime mattered.

#### 6.2.2.4 Adding Domains

We chose this domain because of its substantive importance and because it seemed the simplest in which to identify cases. Now that the basic approach has been validated, future research can extend this to other domains. The simplest extension would consider wars in which the subject state is an initial participant, as well as those to which it is a bystander. For the current study, this would mean adding American descriptions of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the invasions of Panama and Grenada, and the raids on Libya. We would hypothesize *if a state is an initial bystander to a conflict, it is more likely to adopt a liberal perspective than if it is one of the initial parties to the conflict*. That, at least, is the scientific translation of Wolfers' (1962: 13) assertion that everyone is a realist when "the house is on fire."

We also can extend this research to include economic and perhaps even other diplomatic issues. We chose "foreign wars" because such texts were more readily indexed. With some effort, however, we could assemble a collection of official statements that refer to issues in international political economy. The relevant characteristics of liberalism and realism might need to be redefined slightly, but most of the issues will still apply. A realist (mercantilist) will view economics in terms of relative gains, national interests, national protection, the direct

(short-term) consequences, and unilateral or bilateral action. The liberal (free-trader) will view economics in terms of absolute gains, shared interests, development of others' economies (as potentially more attractive trading partners), long-term consequences, and multilateral agreements. Structural concerns may be easier to identify with respect to economics than to warfare; it is not yet clear whether there would be an economic version of paxism.

### 6.3 Final Remarks

In this theory, we have advanced the discussion of realism and liberalism by moving them into the realm of individuals, rather than whole states, engaged in foreign policy behavior. This theory examines the ontology that underlies actions, rather than only the often-ambiguous actions. It sets forth hypotheses and systematically tests them across a large number of cases. It engages theory in a dialogue with data, producing results grounded in scientific methods.

In a larger sense, this theory and analysis attempt to bridge the gap between two major schools in the study of international politics: the state-centered and the decision-maker-centered. It reminds the former school -- to which liberals, realists, structuralists, and peace scientists all seem to belong -- that "states" do not respond to universal forces in the way matter responds to the laws of physics or ideal rational beings respond to the laws of logic. The reaction of states cannot be finally separated from the perceptions of individuals who help shape those reactions. If, for example, states repeatedly tend to balance one another's power, this is not evidence of a mysterious realist force. It more probably results because situations are likely to arise, sooner or later, that prompt decision-makers to react in accordance with the suspicion and self-reliance that are part of realist doctrine. Since such actions tend to provoke equal and opposite reactions, international politics would tend to drift toward the realist model.

This research also challenges the decision-making school to apply its discoveries about individual psychology and group decision making to larger patterns of activity. Much of the work

in this area focuses on a few case studies, sometime only one. This approach has certainly deepened our understanding of human reasoning and the politics of policy-making. It is now appropriate to apply this knowledge to some of the larger questions of interstate interactions. In this case, we address the important issue of why states intervene in some wars, and not in others; why some states intervene into a war, while other states do not; and the varying nature of those interventions. Competing worldview theory offers a way out of the deadlock revealed in Baldwin (1993). Other models, grounded in an understanding of the process by which foreign policy is developed and implemented, could inform other puzzles where the state and system levels of analysis have proved inconclusive.

APPENDIX A  
CODING TEXTS

1. Referring to the dataset printout, write the text number and war on the coding sheet (Figure A.1)
2. Note that information on the text, if not already present.
3. Note today's date as date coded.
4. Note date text was delivered; verify with dataset printout. Annotate any differences.
5. Circle the code corresponding to the "speaker." Note that Canada and India have "secretaries of state" who are subordinate to the Foreign Minister/Minister of External Affairs. Note also that the Indian president is head of state while the Prime Minister is head of government, while the American President fills both roles.
6. Circle the code of the venue, from the perspective of the country being coded.
7. Indicate whether any foreign leaders or official representatives are present for the statement, and whether they are combatants. The addressees of letters transmitted to foreign leaders count as being "present."
8. Note the audience: a national governing body (domestic or foreign), testimony to a portion of a legislature (a committee or legislative leadership), a formal International Organization, other international grouping (e.g., a peace conference), the Press, a national public audience (broadcasted to), a select audience (e.g., reception, dinner toast, or foreign leader), a professional or interest organization (e.g., the AFL-CIO, political or government agencies, Los Angeles World Affairs Council), a non-national public

audience (e.g., a campaign speech, remarks made in Honolulu upon return from a trip to Indonesia, university commencements), or a statement for the public record.

9. Code the speech for the war in line 1, first looking for realist characteristics (left column), then for liberal characteristics (right column). For this section, code "0" if the characteristic is absent; "1" if it is present, but only weakly or ambiguously; "2" if it is clearly and strongly present.
10. Note if the representation of this war seems to be a main point of the text.

### **REALIST CHARACTERISTICS**

**Relative Gains:** Concerns that any other country could gain or has gained an advantage over the speech-giver's country as a result of the foreign war or as a result of actions taken or not taken by the speech-giver's country. Also, concerns that the speech-giver's country could fall behind others as a result of such (in)action. Any expression of concern over gains that a rival of the speaker's country is accruing will fit this characteristic -- a liberal discussion of gains would not be alarmed about it. These gains could be expressed in terms of enhanced military basing or reach, or increased influence over an area where important national interests have been identified.

**National Interests:** Statement refers to specific, generally material, interests of the speech giver's country. Such interests could include military access or bases, the physical security of its citizens, the security of allies, access to important national resources, export markets, sources of important imports, and others. The term "national interest" without specification is not sufficient to code this characteristic. It is not the coder's place to judge whether or not the interest is legitimate or not, but to note whether or not the speaker invokes them. This characteristic can also be coded if the speaker links an absence of national interests to an intention not to get involved in the conflict.

**National Protection:** The conflict is discussed in terms of how it can affect the speech-giver's own country. This includes military threats to national integrity, refugee flows, and threats to significant economic interests. A reference to the Persian Gulf would not be coded at all; a statement that access to Persian Gulf oil is important to one's country or one's allies would be coded as a national interest; an expression that the loss of that oil would have dire effects on one's economy would be coded as national protection (and national interest). This interest could be indirect, if the interests of allies are expressed with an emphasis on the alliance and its importance for national protection.

**Narrow Precedent:** Ramifications only for the parties involved in the war are being addressed. This includes a concern that the victor in the conflict might go on to attack other countries, or a victorious insurgent group would later assist other insurgencies. This would be coded if a statement can be made "As the result of war W, perpetrator P would now be able to/more likely to attack bystander B." Concerns that a war might "spill over" into other countries would fit this characteristic.

**Unilateral/Bilateral:** The statement indicates a predilection for taking action independent of the support of other countries. Preference is shown that two parties engaged in a dispute should interact directly. Requests for international support would be unilateral if that support is not made a prerequisite for action. "Taking action" involves more than just making a statement to the countries involved. It includes providing military or economic aid and engaging the parties in negotiations.

## LIBERAL CHARACTERISTICS

**Absolute Gains:** Statement refers to potential gains or losses to the speech-giver's country that are not linked to gains or losses by others. These gains or losses could be military, economic, or diplomatic. Recall that in most cases, if the statement refers to gains by an adversary, even if not explicitly linked to losses by one's own country, the statement would not be coded as absolute gains.

**Collective Interests:** Statement refers to the interests of the world in general. Examples include the promotion of democracy, free trade as a principle, or the norms of international organizations (such as peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for national sovereignty and borders). To code such norms, the principles must be invoked with reference to an IO or to common international law (such as freedom of the seas or diplomatic immunity). Humanitarianism is not linked to any liberal theory; humanitarianism that invokes the genocide convention or supports United Nations or other international agencies would be a liberal interest. Mention of a UN resolution is insufficient to code this characteristic.

**Community Protection:** The conflict is discussed in terms of defending or protecting the interests of other states. The protection of countries identified as allies would be coded as national interest, not community protection. However, the interests of allied countries fit this category if the alliance is not mentioned. "Friends" are not considered allies. This principle may also be expressed as a call for restoring the independence of a conquered state, or as protecting the unity of a state facing internal conflict. This characteristic does not involve concern for individuals or groups of people.

**Broad Precedent:** The war is linked to a concern over actions other, uninvolved, countries might take as a result of this war. This includes concern for the precedent set if aggression succeeds or the possibility that a successful insurgency would encourage other insurgencies to develop and/or grow without direct assistance. This would be coded if a statement can be made



"As the result of war W, bystander B would now be able to/more likely to attack victim V." These concerns may be presented as a conditional: "if action is not taken to stop perpetrator P, then bystander B..."

**Multilateral:** The statement refers in a positive manner to the ongoing efforts of international organizations or groupings of several (more than two) states. Statements that the speaker's country is acting in coordination with the approach of such organizations indicates multilateralism. Code also if the statement indicates that the speech-giver's country will seek the support of international organizations before taking any action. Support for a UN resolution calling for a end to a conflict is not multilateralism; the IO must be engaged in actively promoting a resolution to the conflict, through diplomacy or more direct intervention.

**NOTE:** These characteristics are coded independently. National and collective interests may both be invoked; it is even possible for multilateralism and unilateralism to both be coded for the same problem representation.

# **CODING SHEET**

Text Number: \_\_\_\_\_ War: \_\_\_\_\_ Date Coded: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of text: \_\_\_\_\_

**Speaker**      1) head of gov't      2) gov't spokesperson      3) foreign minister  
                  4) subordinate in foreign ministry      5) ministry spokesperson  
                  6) head of state (if not "1")      7) other cabinet minister  
                  8) other gov't official      9) delegate to UN

**Venue**      1) domestic      2) foreign

**Foreign leaders present**      1) combatant(s)      2) only non-combatants      3) no

**Audience**      1) national legislature      2) portion of national legislature  
                  3) IO      4) other int'l grouping      5) national public broadcast  
                  6) the Press      7) select audience      8) non-national public  
                  9) professional or interest group      0) other \_\_\_\_\_

## **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DESCRIPTION**

	<b>0 = absent,</b>	<b>1 = weakly present</b>	<b>2 = strongly present</b>
Relative Gains	0	1	2
Absolute Gains	0	1	2
National Interests	0	1	2
Collective Interests	0	1	2
National Protection	0	1	2
Community Protection	0	1	2
Narrow Precedent	0	1	2
Broad Precedent	0	1	2
Unilateral/Bilateral	0	1	2
Multilateral	0	1	2

**IS REPRESENTATION A MAIN POINT OF THE TEXT?**      0) No      1) Yes

Figure A.1: Coding Sheet for Collecting Case Data

APPENDIX B  
LIST OF WARS, 1978-94

This appendix includes a table listing all wars identified during the period 1978-94. Wars in **BOLDFACE** have been selected for study in this dissertation. The symbol † indicates that the war appears twice in the table, once with democratic regimes and once without. Variable codes are as follows: R = Long-term rival (Geller, 1993) of one of the subject states involved in war\*

E = Current rival (Diehl, 1985) of one of the subject states involved in war\*

S = States involved include no rivals

D = At least one of the initial disputants was a procedural democracy (Polity III)

O = All of the original disputants have other regimes

A = At least one of the original disputants was an ally of a subject state\*

N = None of the original disputants are allied to any of the subject states\*

B = The war occurs within or on the border of a state bordering a subject state\*

P = The war occurs within a "sphere of influence" of a subject state\*

F = The war occurs farther away from all of the subject states\*

\*The subject states' perspective is only examined if the subject state is not one of the original disputants. Thus the Indian perspective on the Indo-Pakistan conflicts is not of interest, and the contextual variables for that war would apply only to Canada and the United States.

# List of Wars, 1978-94

RIVAL	DEM	ALLY	DIST	WAR
R	O	N	B	Ussuri River Incident, 5/78 Afghan revolt in Pakistan, 3/79 China Internal, 83-4 China Internal, 89 China Internal, 90 <b>Pakistan Internal (-87)</b>
R	O	N	P	<b>Russo-Afghan War</b>
R	O	N	F	Ismail coup in Yemen <b>Third Indochina War</b>
R	O	A	B	NONE
R	O	A	P	NONE
R	O	A	F	NONE
R	D	N	B	NONE
R	D	N	P	NONE
R	D	N	F	NONE
R	D	A	B	NONE
R	D	A	P	NONE
R	D	A	F	NONE
E	O	N	B	Bangladesh Internal 1982-1990†
E	O	N	P	<b>Sri Lankan Civil War</b>
E	O	N	F	Angolan War, until Cuban troops withdrawn (8/88) Ogaden War, until 8/79 Syria Internal Lebanese Civil War <b>Iran-Iraq War (First Persian Gulf)</b> Libya-Tunisia 5/84 <b>Iraq-Kuwait</b> Iraq Internal Libya-Chad War Iran Internal
E	O	A	B	NONE
E	O	A	P	NONE
E	O	A	F	Qualquiza (Ecuador-Peru, 1/78)
E	D	N	B	Bangladesh Internal Since 1991†
E	D	N	P	NONE
E	D	N	F	NONE
E	D	A	B	NONE
E	D	A	P	NONE
E	D	A	F	Turco-Kurd 91+
S	O	N	B	<b>Burma Internal</b>
S	O	N	P	Haiti Internal 1991 Afghanistan Internal
S	O	A	B	Chiapas Raids by Guatemala 82-83 Chiapas Raids by Guatemala 4/84 <b>Chiapas Internal 1994</b>
S	O	A	P	Nicaraguan Civil War Salvadoran Civil War, through 1983† Guatemalan Civil War <b>Contra-Sandinista War</b>

Figure B.1: List of Wars, 1978-94 (Continued on next page).

Figure B.1 (Continued)

S	O	A	F	Maw Pokey (Thai-Myanmar 3/84) <b>Peru-Sendero Luminoso 1992+†</b> Thai internal -87 Turco-Kurd in Iraq, 83 <b>Argentine Dirty War</b> Brazil Internal War Chile Internal South Korea Internal (1980) <b>Philippine Insurgency to 1986†</b> Paraguay Internal 1989
S	D	N	B	NONE
S	D	N	P	Jamaican Internal, 1980 Trinidad and Tobago Internal 1990
S	D	N	F	<b>Sudan Internal 86-88†</b> Armenia-Azerbaijan Chechnya 94+ <b>India-Pakistan 82-92</b> Lamaca Raid, 2/78 <b>Osirak Reactor Raid</b> Namibian War Rhodesian War in 1978† Bori Cedria raid (Tunisia) India Internal <b>Israel-PLO 89+ (Intifada)</b> Malaysia Internal -89 Livingstone Raid (on Zambia, 4/87) Matola Raid (SAfr on Mozambique, 1/81) Maseru Raid (Lesotho 83) Papuan Insurgency 10/88 Nigeria Internal 80-1 <b>South Africa Internal 83-92</b> Maitengwe Disorders (Zimbabwe-Botswana) Gabarone Raid 6/85 (Botswana) Anti-ANC raids, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana 5/86 Gabarone Raid, 3/88
S	D	A	B	NONE
S	D	A	P	Salvadoran Civil War, since 1984† Venezuela Internal 1992 Colombia Internal Wars
S	D	A	F	<b>Philippine Insurgency 1987+†</b> Ecuador Internal 85-6 Turco-Kurd 84-87 <b>Libya Raids by US</b> <b>Iran Hostage Crisis</b> Spain Internal -90 Bokassa Overthrow (France in CAE) Vemerana Secession (Vanuatu) Kanak (New Caledonia) Northern Ireland Thai-Malay Conflict (77-80) <b>Peru-Sendero Luminoso 1980-91†</b> Paquisha (Ecuador-Peru 1-2/81) Corrientes (Ecuador-Peru 1/84) <b>South Atlantic War</b> <b>Grenada Occupation</b> <b>Panama Occupation</b> Herrera Mutiny (12/90) in Panama

(Continued on next page)

Figure B.1 (Continued)

S	O	N	F	<p> Zimbabwe Internal 1979-87<sup>†</sup>  Egypt Internal 92+  Yemen War, 2-3/79  Al-Dibal (Qatar-Bahrain 4/86)  Yemen Wars 86-7  Yemen 94  Angolan War, since 8/88  <b>Western Saharan War</b>  Eritrean War  Ogaden War, after 10/79  Second Chadian Civil War  <b>Shaba Crisis, 78-9</b>  <b>Kagara War (Tanzania-Uganda)</b>  Monrovia Rice Riots 4-5/79, Liberia &amp; Guinea  Banjul Occupation (Senegal-Gambia 80)  Sanyang Coup (Senegal Gambia 81)  <b>Zaire-Zambia 82</b>  Mozambique Civil War  Luqa Airport (Malta-Egypt, 11/85)  Agacher (Mali-Burkina Faso 12/85)  Todghere (Ethiopia-Somalia 2/87)  Anti-Deby Raids, Chad-Sudan 89-90  Hare-Hare, Somalia-Kenya 9/89  Moyo Raids, Sudan-Ethiopia, 89-90  Mauritania-Senegal 90-91  Casheu (Senegal, Guinea-Bissau), 5/90  Gabonese Riots 5/90  <b>Liberian Civil War 89+</b>  Tutsi Invasion of Rwanda  <b>Somalian Civil War</b>  Kinshasa Riots 10/91  Romania Internal, 1989  Georgia Internal  Moldova Internal  Tajikistan Internal  <b>Wars of Yugoslav Secession</b>  Cambodia Internal  Indonesia-East Timor  Burundi Internal 88+  Ghana Internal 1981  Kenya Internal 91-2  <b>Earlier Liberian War 85-8</b>  Nigeria Internal 84  Nigeria Internal 91-2  Rwanda Internal 90+  <b>Sudan Internal 83-85, 89+<sup>†</sup></b>  Uganda Internal -78  <b>Uganda Internal 81-91</b>  Laos Internal 75-92  <b>Algeria Internal 92+</b>  Mauritania Internal 89  Mali-Niger 1990  Chad Internal continuing  Comoros Internal 1989  Djibouti Internal 91+  Niger Internal  Senegal Internal  Sierra Leone Internal  Togo Internal 1991 </p>
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## APPENDIX C

### TRIAL RUN

During the design of this project, trial runs were conducted using earlier versions of the methodology. The first of these was a test of codability. It investigated whether or not foreign policy statements coherently corresponded to the categories described in the theory section, and whether or not the perspective expressed would vary across cases. The second was a test of the reliability of the coding process. Both of these trials were conducted on Presidential texts from the Bush Administration. That universe was chosen because that government appeared to be one during which variation in liberal or realist perspectives could occur, if such variation is based on systemic changes. This period also witnessed a reasonable number of foreign wars in which the United States expressed its representation of the problem. No attempt was made to infer anything beyond the Bush Administration from these very limited trials.

#### C.1 Codability Test

##### C.1.1 Data Selection

Texts were collected from *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (WCPD)* during the Bush Administration (20 Jan 89 - 19 Jan 93). All statements that referred to any ongoing foreign war were selected. This yielded 1452 pages of statements, or approximately 750 texts. Not all of these texts, however, included codable wars, since some were copied

### Statements Selected for Codability Trial

STATEMENT	WAR DESCRIBED	DATE OF STATEMENT
TR02A	Nicaraguan Civil War	3/31/89
TR03A	Lebanese Civil War	5/21/89
TR03B	Central American Wars	5/21/89
TR04A	Tiananmen Square Violence	6/6/89
TR07A	Latin American Wars	12/5/89
TR08A	Cyprus	2/6/90
TR09A	Afghan War	4/6/90
TR10A	Tiananmen Square Violence	5/24/90
TR12A	Iraq-Kuwait	8/10/90
TR14A	Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Race	11/29/90
TR15A	Iraq Kuwait	1/12/91
TR16A	Iraq-Kuwait	2/15/91
TR18A	Cambodian Civil War	5/27/91
TR18B	Korean Peninsula	5/27/91
TR20A	Arab-Israeli Conflicts	7/30/91
TR20B	Afghan War	7/30/91
TR21A	Peruvian Civil Wars	9/17/91
TR23A	Arab-Israeli Conflict	12/25/91
TR23B	Afghan Wars	12/25/91
TR25A	Colombian Civil Wars	4/23/92
TR26A	Afghan Wars	7/16/92
TR26B	Angolan Civil Wars	7/16/92
TR28A	Haitian Coup d'Etat	9/30/92
TR30A	Iraqi Civil Conflicts	1/19/93
TR30B	Iraq-Kuwait	1/19/93

Figure C.1: List of Statements Selected for Codability Trial. The second column indicates a war that was described in the text, some texts referred to several wars. Missing code numbers (such as TR01 and TR05) indicate that the selected text did not in fact include any references to an ongoing or unresolved foreign war. Speech TR06 did have such referents, but was inexplicably omitted from the coding.



before that definition was finalized. The inclusion of these "extra" texts in the data selection process allows later research to evaluate the intercoder reliability of the text selection as well as on coding the six indicators.<sup>108</sup> Since this trial run was only designed to investigate indicator reliability and variation in the dependent variable, there are no independent variables as such. Independent variables for the dissertation are discussed immediately following this section.

A small sample (approximately 3%) was systematically sampled from this universe of statements.<sup>109</sup> Every 50th page collected was selected from the universe, in order to gather statements separated in time. For each page so sampled, the first relevant text that began on that page was selected.<sup>110</sup> If no such text began on that page, the text continuing onto that page was selected. The only bias introduced by this selection method is a somewhat higher probability that a longer (multipage) statement will be selected than a shorter one. For this study, however, that bias does not appear to be relevant to the results found.<sup>111</sup> Starting with page 02 (selected from a random number table), this process yielded 30 statements, which included 25 different referents to a foreign war. Figure C.1 lists these texts and the war(s) to which they referred.

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<sup>108</sup>The results of this codability trial led to the elimination of a sixth indicator, which was not discussed in Chapter 1. This indicator addressed the terminology used in reference to the war -- realists would be rather neutral, while liberals would use more value-laden terminology.

<sup>109</sup>Given the authoritative nature of the source, those statements can be called the "universe" of statements from the Presidential level during the Bush Administration.

<sup>110</sup>Each page of *WCPD* might include several statements, not all of which refer to a foreign war.

<sup>111</sup>One could argue that it even makes the test harder, since a longer statement might be more likely to reflect conflicting perspectives on a single war than a shorter one.

### C.1.2 Coding Rules

During the codability trial, each text was evaluated across the six indicators. Rather than evaluating each indicator separately for realist and liberal characteristics, each indicator was given a single realist or liberal assessment. The text as a whole was coded realist if the total number of realist characteristics was at least double the total number of liberal characteristics, and vice-versa. This coding method lost much of the information captured in the final method, such as cases where both unilateralism and multilateralism are advocated, which is why it was abandoned.

### C.1.3 Results and Analysis

The results of the coding, presented in Figure C.2, confirmed that statements could be categorized as realist or liberal. Of the 25 texts coded, 20 (80%) could be so categorized. Furthermore, many of these cases are quite conclusive: all indicators are identical in 11 of the 20 (55%). In addition, variation can be seen in the dependent variable: fifteen statements are liberal, and five are realist.

Three of the six indicators correlate very well with each other, and two others were found too infrequently for formal analysis. Figure 2.3 presents the results of the Pearson correlation. The relationships between NAT/COL, NAT/COM and MULTI are both statistically and materially significant. Inspection of Figure 2.2 indicates that, while four observations were insufficient to correlate OBJECT, it agreed with at least three other indicators in three of the four cases. The two instances of REL/ABS are more ambiguous. DESCR, however, shows no significant correlation with the other indicators. The high correlation of the other five indicators supports allowing statements to be coded with only a single indicator when only one can be identified.

# Results of Initial Codability Test

STATEMENT CODE	REL/ ABS	NAT/ COL	NAT/ COM	OBJECT	MULTI	DESCR	Worldview	Main Point ?
TR02A		1			2		Indet.	No
TR03A					1	2	Indet. <sup>λ</sup>	No
TR03B		1	1		1		Liberal	No
TR04A		1		1	1	1	Liberal	No
TR07A		1			2	2	Realist <sup>†</sup>	No
TR08A		1			1	2	Liberal	Yes
TR09A		1					Liberal	No
TR10A	1	2			2	1	Indet. <sup>p</sup>	Yes
TR12A					2	1	Indet. <sup>p</sup>	Yes
TR14A		1	1	1	1		Liberal	Yes
TR15A		1	1	2	1	1	Liberal	Yes
TR16A		1	1	1	1	1	Liberal	Yes
TR18A						2	Realist <sup>†</sup>	No
TR18B						2	Realist <sup>†</sup>	No
TR20A		1			1	2	Liberal	No
TR20B	1	1			1	2	Liberal	No
TR21A		2	2		2	1	Realist	Yes
TR23A		1			1		Liberal	No
TR23B					1	2	Indet. <sup>λ</sup>	No
TR25A					2	2	Realist	No
TR26A		1				1	Liberal	No
TR26B		1				1	Liberal	No
TR28A		1			1	1	Liberal	Yes
TR30A		1	1		1	1	Liberal	Yes
TR30B					1	1	Liberal	Yes

Figure C.2: Results of Initial Codability Test. For all indicators, a value of 1 indicates liberal, 2 indicates realist. Uncodable indicators are left blank.

## KEY

REL/ABS = Indicates a concern for relative or absolute gains

NAT/COL = Indicates emphasis on national or collective interests

NAT/COM = Indicates war evaluated with reference to national or "community" protection

OBJECT = Indicates whether the parties to the war are the ultimate object of the reference

MULTI = Indicates support for multilateral or unilateral approaches

DESCR = Neutral or evaluative description of the conflict

Category = Liberal if mean of codable indicators  $\leq 1.33$ , realist if mean  $\geq 1.66$ , indeterminate otherwise.

Main Point? = Was the reference to the war a main point of the statement?

<sup>λ</sup> = Category changes to liberal if DESCR omitted (see analysis below).

<sup>p</sup> = Category changes to realist if DESCR omitted (see analysis below).

<sup>†</sup> = Category changes to indeterminate if DESCR omitted (see analysis below).

### Correlation Coefficients

	NAT/COL	NAT/COM	MULTI	REL/ABS	OBJECT	DESCR
NAT/COL	1.0000 ( 18) P= .	1.0000 ( 6) P= .000	.6504 ( 15) P= .009	. ( 2) P= .	. ( 4) P= .	-.2843 ( 13) P= .347
NAT/COM	1.0000 ( 6) P= .000	1.0000 ( 6) P= .	1.0000 ( 6) P= .000	. ( 0) P= .	. ( 3) P= .	. ( 4) P= .
MULTI	.6504 ( 15) P= .009	1.0000 ( 6) P= .000	1.0000 ( 20) P= .	. ( 2) P= .	. ( 4) P= .	-.0510 ( 16) P= .851
REL/ABS	. ( 2) P= .	. ( 0) P= .	. ( 2) P= .	1.0000 ( 2) P= .	. ( 0) P= .	. ( 2) P= .
OBJECT	. ( 4) P= .	. ( 3) P= .	. ( 4) P= .	. ( 0) P= .	1.0000 ( 4) P= .	. ( 3) P= .
DESCR	-.2843 ( 13) P= .347	. ( 4) P= .	-.0510 ( 16) P= .851	. ( 2) P= .	. ( 3) P= .	1.0000 ( 20) P= .

Figure C.3: Correlation Coefficients, Codability Trial. 2-tailed Significance. ". " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed.

### Effects of Omitting DESCR

MEAN SCORE	FREQUENCY, ALL INDICATORS	FREQUENCY, DESCR OMITTED
1.00	11	16
1.2	1	
1.25	1	1
1.33	2	
1.5	5	2
1.67	1	1
1.75	1	
2.00	3	3

Figure C.4: Effects of Omitting DESCR indicator in Codability Trial

Figure C.4 illustrates the effects of the DESCR indicator. It presents a frequency table of the mean score in each case, with and without that indicator. The mean score is calculated by treating each realist liberal indicator as a score of 1, and each realist indicator as a score of 2. One effect of omitting DESCR is to greatly increase the number of cases where the liberal or realist categorization is by consensus. It also slightly reduces the number of uncodable cases (in addition to the two where the mean = 1.5, two other cases are lost because DESCR was the only indicator for them). In this sample, omitting DESCR also increases the share of liberal versus realist statements from 15-5 to 17-4. On the basis of this analysis, it seems that the type of terminology used to describe a conflict does not reflect a realist or liberal worldview. This indicator, therefore, was dropped from the methodology.

One final question regarding the validity of these results might be that they mix together one or two sentence references with descriptions of a conflict that last for several paragraphs. If we only include those texts where the reference to the foreign war is a "main point" of the statement (see Figure C.2), the results are somewhat different. All ten such texts can be categorized; the breakdown (omitting DESCR) is 7-3 liberal. While this is consistent with the 17-4 overall balance, it also indicates that "passing references" to conflict are overwhelmingly liberal in this sample (10-1). This finding suggests a hypothesis that more complete references to foreign wars tend to be more realist than the less complete references, perhaps because the more complete references represent a more conscious effort to state policy.

## C.2 Reliability Test

Coder reliability, the tendency for different coders to produce the same results, is very important in content analysis. Even where, as in this case, all the coding is conducted by a single coder, one should verify that the coding rules are clear enough that other coders would produce the same results. For this test, the author hired two political science graduate

students<sup>112</sup> to perform a reliability check on the test run. At the first meeting, the original coding rules and coding sheet were discussed, and some sample texts were coded. After trying some preparatory coding on their own, each of them received the thirty texts used in the trial run. Krippendorff (1980: 147) recommends a standard of 80% intercoder agreement. The goal in this project is to exceed his requirements in some ways. 80% will be a minimum standard for each part of the reliability check. First, 80% of the initial 30 texts must be consistently found to contain or not contain a relevant reference to a foreign war. Second, within the 19 usable texts, 80% of the 25 separate descriptions of situations must be chosen. Within those 25 cases, 80% of the 150 total indicators must be coded as they were in the original data run. These indicators included the sixth original indicator, the characterization of the conflict, which was been rejected in the codability trials.

The coders selected were political science graduate students, one ABD in international politics and the other an international politics minor. Less experienced coders, such as undergraduates or even non-political science majors, could have been used. The problem with doing so, however, is that anyone who might use this coding scheme is likely to be experienced in these theories of international relations. Even if it fails among naive users, it may yet be valid for more sophisticated users.

During this process, results were evaluated at each stage. The author consulted with the other coders after they selected the texts, then re-initiated the process of finding cases within the texts he used, then finally used the 25 cases to verify the indicators. The intent of this process was to improve the methodology by making it more understandable and replicable.

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<sup>112</sup>Courtney Smith and Blair King.

### Results of War Selection Test

TEXT	WARS DESCRIBED	A	B	C	AGREE (WAR)	AGREE (TEXT)	REMARKS
TR01	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR02	Nicaragua – Internal	√	X	X			Is war still active?
TR03	Lebanon – Internal Central American Wars	√ √	√ X	√ X	A-B-C		My fault – vague
TR04	China – Internal	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR05	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR06	El Salvador – Internal Nicaragua – Internal	√ √	√ √	√ √	A-B-C A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR07	Latin American Arms	√	X	X			My fault – vague
TR08	Cyprus	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR09	Lithuania (Soviet – Internal) Afghan War Soviet: Jewish Emigrants	X √ X	√ √ √	√ √ X	A-B-C A-C		Crisis began early Below threshold?
TR10	China – Internal	√	X	√	A-C	A-C	C persuades B
TR11	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR12	Iraq-Kuwait	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR13	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR14	Argentina-Brazil Nuclear	√	√	X	A-B	A-B	C: Fits clear def.
TR15	Iraq Kuwait	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR16	Iraq-Kuwait NBC Proliferation	√ X	√ √	√ X	A-B-C A-C	A-C	B: Not clear def.
TR17	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR18	Cambodia – Internal Korean Peninsula Proliferation	√ √ X	√ √ √	√ √ X	A-B-C A-B-C A-C	A-C	Does this fit def?
TR19	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR20	Arab-Israeli Conflicts Afghan War Cambodia – Internal	√ √ X	√ √ √	√ √ √	A-B-C A-B-C		I missed it
TR21	Peru – Internal	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR22	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR23	Arab-Israeli Conflict Afghan Wars	√ √	√ √	√ √	A-B-C A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR24	NONE	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR25	Colombian Civil Wars Arab-Israeli	√ X	X √	√ √	A-C		To war or drugs? Enough reference
TR26	Afghan Wars Angola – Internal Cuba – Internal	√ √ X	√ √ √	√ √ √	A-B-C A-B-C		Enough violence?
TR27	Arab-Israeli	X	√	X	A-C	A-C	"talking peace"
TR28	Haiti – Internal	√	√	√	A-B-C	A-B-C	
TR29	Somalia – Internal	X	√	√			No ref. to war
TR30	Iraq – Internal NBC Proliferation Iraq-Kuwait	√ X √	√ X √	√ √ √	A-B-C A-B A-B-C	A-B	Specific enough?

Figure C.5: Raw Results of Reliability Test, War Selection Portion. Symbols explained in text.

### C.2.1 War selection

In this first stage of the reliability test, each of the coders received the 30 texts that had been coded in the codability test. Each coder was to identify what codable conflicts, if any were presented in each text. The results of this stage are presented in Figure C.5. "War agreement" indicates which coders agreed (✓) that the war listed was described in the text. "Text agreement" indicates which coders selected the same wars out of the entire text. For example, in text TR01, all both coders agreed with the author (Coder A) that no codable wars were present. For text TR16, coder C agreed with the author that the only reference was to the Iraq-Kuwait war; coder B identified references to potential non-conventional weapons proliferation. In that case, only Coder C and A are in "text agreement." The results of this test were not encouraging. Taking whole texts, of which there were 30, the author (Coder A) agreed with Coder B on 18 of them, or 60%. A agreed with Coder C on 20 or 67%. Three way agreement occurred on 16, or 53%. At the level of references to wars, of which there were 45, A agreed with Coder B on 31, or 69%. A agreed with Coder C on 35, or 78%. Three way agreement occurred on 29, or 64%. In other words, the 80% plateau was not attained in this trial.

The disagreements seemed to fall into three major categories, many of which could be eliminated via a different method of selecting cases. Several disagreements arose over whether a crisis was ongoing at a particular time. In TR02, the other coders believed the war in Nicaragua was over early in 1989, tying the end of the war to the election. The election was not held until the end of that year, and TR06 makes it clear that violence was still ongoing in Nicaragua at that time. In TR09, the author did not believe the Lithuanian situation constituted a crisis, although it turns out that Lithuania had already declared independence. A compilation of crises and wars, such as *SIPRI Yearbooks*, or Sivard (1993), can help define the extent of the conflict in a neutral way. This modification -- not in coding, but in who defines a crisis -- would raise reliability to 33/45 (73%) with B, and 37/45 (82%) with C.



A larger number of disagreements fell in the area of arms control. The working definition of arms control was not sufficiently clear, especially to Coder C (who indicated that he did not want to ask while coding so as not to contaminate the process). That definition was: "Arms control is codable if the effort is focused on a specific dyad of potential conflict, not involving the subject country." In other words, for the U.S., U.S.-Soviet arms control is not codable, nor is general opposition to proliferation, nor would be efforts to eliminate weapons from a specific country if it is not clear who the potential opponent would be. This renewed definition eliminates the author's finding of war in TR07, Coder C's miss on TR14 (as he agrees), Coder B's hit on TR16 (as he agrees). TR18 and TR30 would remain in disagreement, however. The better option, however, was to eliminate arms control entirely from the domain of this research. If arms control is excluded entirely, agreement (now out of 40) is, with B: 31 (78%), C: 35 (88%).

The third major area of disagreement was over thresholds: Is TR26's reference to Cuban human rights violations enough of a referent to count as a war? Does TR09's reference to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union imply a reference to codable internal violence? While the author's inclination in both of these cases is "no," a neutral reference to internal unrest, such as SIPRI, might answer the question objectively. Another way around the question would be to define internal unrest as public collective actions aimed at the government in power, either involving violence in themselves or provoking a violent response. Under that definition, TR09 would clearly be excluded; the author also does not believe dissidence is sufficiently broad and coordinated in Cuba to include TR26. Excluding both of these topics, on the assumption that an acceptable objective standard can be found (and none of these has been identified in the sources noted above as an "internal war"), would bring agreement with B to 31/38 (82%) and C to 34/38 (89%). Three way agreement, at this point, would also be 82%.

The remaining disagreements fell into less regular patterns of coder error. Several just involved one coder or another missing a reference. Other issues included whether or not

references to the Arab-Israeli peace talks constituted enough reference to a war, and whether the initial statement on Operation Restore Hope referred to the Somali conflict, or just the famine.

### C.2.2 Coding Check

This portion of the reliability test met the goals better than the war selection portion. The coding check was conducted only on the 27 cases coded by the author during the codability test. Figure C.6 indicates the raw results of this portion of the test. Figure C.7 displays the initial percentage agreement. In that figure, the first line includes all 27 cases, the second excludes the four cases rejected in Part I (TR03B, TR07A, TR25A and TR14A), the third line includes only the 11 texts where the conflict was the "main point" of the statement. While these agreements are not as high as desired, they are fairly close to the 80% level. This is particularly true if some minor clarifications are made in coding. One should also note the very high correlation between the two coders: the author succeeded in training them to consider the indicators in the same way as each other, if not always the same way as he did himself.

In most cases, relative and absolute gains were seen similarly by the coders. One clarification in the coding rules is to emphasize that gains and losses are conceived at a national level: the potential loss of aircraft cited by coder B in TR30A would not be the kind of gain or loss that either a realist or liberal would be focusing on.

For national versus collective interests, no change in coding rules seemed necessary.

For national versus community protection, poor grammar on the coding sheet misled the coders into including the physical protection of citizens of other countries, as opposed to the regimes, as an indicator of liberalism. Thus in TR10A, referring to Tianenmen Square, the coders should not have equated concern with Chinese citizens with protection of the Chinese government. This clarification also applies to TR26A/B.

# Results of Reliability Test, Coding Portion

STATEMENT CODE	REL/ ABS	NAT/ COL	NAT/ COM	OBJECT	MULTI	DESCR	Worldview w/o DESCR	Main Point ?
TR02A	-	L-L	-	-	R	-	I R I	No
TR03A	-	-	-	-	L	R	L	No
TR03B	-	L	L--	-	L	-	L	No
TR04A	-	L	-	L-L	L-L	L	L	No
TR06A	-	L	-LL	-LL	L	L	L	Yes
TR06B	-	L	L	-LL	L	L	L	Yes
TR07A	-	L	-	-	RLL	RLL	ILL	No
TR08A	-	L	-	-	L	R	L	Yes
TR09A	-	L	-	-	-	-	L	No
TR10A	L--	R	-	-	R	L	R L I	Yes
TR12A	-	-LL	-LL	-RR	RLL	L	RLL	Yes
TR14A	-	L	L	L-L	L	--L	L	Yes
TR15A	-	L	L	R--	L	L	L	Yes
TR16A	-	L	L	L-L	L	L	L	Yes
TR18A	-	-	-	-	-LL	R	ILL	No
TR18B	-	-	-	-	-LL	R	ILL	No
TR20A	-	L	-	-	L	R R -	L	No
TR20B	L--	L--	-	-	L	R	L	No
TR21A	-	R-L	R-L	-	R-R	L	RLL	Yes
TR23A	-	L	-	-	L	-	L	No
TR23B	-	-	-	-	L	R	RLL	No
TR25A	-	--L	-L-	-	R-L	R	L	No
TR26A	-	L	-LL	-	-	L	L	No
TR26B	-	L	-LL	-	-	L	L	No
TR28A	-	L	-	-	LRL	L	L	Yes
TR30A	-L-	L	L	-	L	L	L	Yes
TR30B	-	-LL	-LL	-R-	L	L	L	Yes

Figure C.6: Raw Results of Reliability Test, Coding Portion. Where cell has only one entry, all three coders agreed.

## Key

REL/ABS = Indicates a concern for relative or absolute gains

NAT/COL = Indicates emphasis on national or collective interests

NAT/COM = Indicates war evaluated with reference to national or "community" protection

OBJECT = Indicates whether the parties to the war are the ultimate object of the reference

MULTI = Indicates support for multilateral or unilateral approaches

DESCR = Neutral or evaluative description of the conflict

Main Point? = Was the reference to the war a main point of the statement?

### Inter-Coder Agreement

	REL/ ABS	NAT/ COL	NAT/ COM	OBJECT	MULTI	DESCR	TOTAL (w/o DESCR)	Worldview (w/o DESCR)
Author with coder B	89%	78%	63%	74%	70%	100%	74%	70%
	87%	74%	65%	74%	70%	100%	75%	74%
	82%	64%	45%	45%	64%	100%	64%	73%
Author with coder C	93%	78%	67%	85%	89%	93%	82%	81%
	91%	78%	65%	83%	96%	96%	83%	87%
	91%	64%	45%	64%	91%	100%	73%	73%
Coder B with Coder C	96%	89%	93%	81%	78%	93%	87%	85%
	96%	91%	96%	83%	74%	96%	88%	83%
	91%	91%	91%	73%	73%	100%	84%	91%
Three-way agreement	89%	74%	63%	70%	67%	93%	72%	70%
	87%	74%	65%	70%	70%	96%	72%	74%
	82%	64%	45%	45%	64%	100%	60%	73%
ADJUSTED								
A-B	96%	78%	78%	83%	83%		84%	87%
A-C	96%	83%	78%	91%	96%		90%	91%
B-C	100%	91%	96%	91%	87%		94%	96%
A-B-C	96%	78%	78%	83%	83%		84%	87%

Figure C.7: Inter-coder Agreement for Initial Reliability Test. Data explained further in the text.

The definition of the precedent, or "ultimate object," indicator also needed some clarification. If the speaker asserts that the outcome of the war in question could influence the future actions of one of the parties to that war – generally, encouraging them to seek further gains through war – then realism is indicated. If the speaker asserts that the outcome of the war in question could influence the future actions of states that are not a party to that war, then liberalism is indicated. Ambiguity in this definition led to coding disagreements in four cases.

The initial definition of multilateralism did not specify a category for bilateral cooperation. Bilateralism is not liberal: realist will work with other countries on issues, as interests direct.

Finally, the greatest agreement came in the descriptive category, which will be excluded from the main research. The coding test did confirm, however, that it would be wise to eliminate that category.

In figure C-7, the reliability data are adjusted in the bottom rows to show what the inter-coder agreement would have been, had the coding been done after these clarifications in definition. While the second and third categories could stand a little more precision, overall the results of this trial were very positive.

### C.3 Lessons of the Trial Runs

These trial runs led to several changes in the final methodology of this research. First, one of the six original indicators was eliminated, since it did not seem to reliably correlate with the other indicators. Second, the text selection process was revised. Rather than looking at texts to see if they refer to some war, the process now begins with the list of "official" wars, with beginning and ending dates taking from others' research. Texts will be sought that contain selected wars from that list. Third, the coding rules were clarified for several of the indicators. Finally, to reduce some of the judgement calls between liberalism and realism, each indicator will be coded separately for each worldview. Rather than trying to decide if a text refers more to national interest or community interests, the coder can record both tendencies.

## APPENDIX D

### CAPSULE SUMMARIES OF WARS

This appendix provides a short description of the wars selected for this dissertation. Each subsection begins with the name used for the war in this dissertation. This appendix also codes the maximum level of involvement by each state in the war. This is a Guttman scale<sup>113</sup>, where each level includes the characteristics of lower levels. 0 = no involvement; 1 = diplomatic action taken; 2 = economic actions taken; 3 = military equipment or funds supplied; 4 = direct military involvement. This scale is coded only for the United States and Canada, since India was dropped from the final set of nation-states.

Afghan. The Russo-Afghan War began with the 27 Dec 79 occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and ended with their withdrawal on 15 Feb 89 (Tillema, 1994: 17). This war resulted in the deaths of approximately 15,000 Soviet troops (Tillema, 1994: 17) and 1.5 million total fatalities (Sivard, 1993: 21). The Soviet intervention was preceded and succeeded by internal warfare in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the portion of this conflict involving the Soviet Union presents a different problem than the civil wars. At times this war spilled over into Iran and Pakistan (Tillema, 1994: 17).

The United States became involved in this war at level 3 -- the supply of armaments to one side. The U.S. also orchestrated a series of United Nations resolutions condemning the

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<sup>113</sup>In a Guttman scale, each value assumes that the conditions for lower values of the variable have been fulfilled. Thus if a war is coded level 3, we assert that both diplomatic and economic actions are also being taken.

invasion and invoked trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, as would be expected in a Guttman scale. Canada participated in the 1980 grain embargo against the Soviet Union, but did not provide military aid, making their involvement level 2.

Algeria. In 1992, Islamic "fundamentalists" took up arms against the military regime that annulled their electoral victory in a 11 January coup (Metz, 1994: xxx-xxxiii, 64). Fighting continued between the two groups through 1994. The United States government has expressed concern over the final outcome of the conflict, and urged dialogue, but does not appear to have engaged in active diplomacy aimed at resolving it (The Washington Post, 1 Jan 1995: C1). No Canadian statements have been located. Both are coded at level 0.

Argentina. From 1976-9, the military rulers of Argentina prosecuted the "Dirty War" against suspected subversive elements in its society. Approximately 15,000 deaths resulted from this internal conflict (Sivard: 1993: 21); many of the dead simply "disappeared." President Carter pressured Argentina both diplomatically and by cutting aid (Pastor, 1992: 49, 61; Blasier, 1987: 227-8); this is level 2 on the Guttman scale.<sup>114</sup> Neither the United States nor Canada, however, issued any codable statements regarding this conflict after 1977.

Burma. Many insurgencies have plagued Burma (recently known as Myanmar) since its independence in 1948. Many of these represent ethnic separatists. A 1988 pro-democracy movement was crushed by the military; many of its members later found common cause with the rebel groups (Lindgren, et al, 1989: 345). The Bush administration imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar (The Washington Post, 23 July 1991: A10); the Clinton Administration continued them and urged others to join in (The Washington Post, 26 March 1994). While the U.S. is thus at level 2, Canada is at level 0, having apparently only expressed its support for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's democracy movement.

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<sup>114</sup>Cutting military assistance is at the upper limit of level 2, but there is a qualitative difference between this and providing arms to the opponents of the Argentine regime (level 3).

Chiapas. On 1 Jan 94, a group of insurgents seized several towns in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. Mexican forces contained the rebellion fairly quickly, although its core remained at large through the end of 1994. No Canadian statements on this conflict have been located; no evidence has been found that the United States intervened above level 0, either.

Contra. The Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary effort began in 1980, by various groups opposed to the Sandinista regime that followed the 1979 revolution (Wilson and Wallenstein, 1988: 297). The United States issued no public acknowledgment of the war until 1982. The war ended in 1990, after the Sandinistas lost power in the 25 Feb election. Intermittent fighting continued by contra members later in the year, but the contra demobilization agreement went into effect on 26 June 1990 (Lindgren, et al, 1991: 377-8). United States involvement was at level 4, military intervention. While American forces did not openly engage the Nicaraguan government forces, they provided logistical assistance to forces in Honduras, and engaged in some covert actions. While this is not as strong an intervention as , for example, the Kuwait war, it goes beyond the provision of military aid. Canada directly assisted the Contadora negotiations (Statements and Speeches 85/27). Canada also provided economic aid to Nicaragua and other Central American nation-states, in an attempt to address some of the underlying causes of the conflict (Communiqué 87/113). By the end of the conflict, Canadian peacekeepers participated in the contra demobilization (News Release 90/143), increasing Canada's final involvement to level 4 as well.

This war is distinct from the simultaneous war in El Salvador. References to conflict in "Central America" were not included in the dataset unless it was clear in context that Nicaragua was the proper referent.

Ghana. From April to July 1981, 3000 were killed in fighting between the Nanumba and Konkomba in Ghana (Petchenkine, 1993: 105). Neither Canada nor the United States became involved in any way; indeed, neither commented on it.



Grenada. On 25 Oct 1983, the United States invaded the Caribbean state of Grenada, accompanied by small contingents from other Caribbean states. This pseudo-multilateral action removed the leftist New Jewel Movement from power. American troops were withdrawn by 15 Dec of that year (Tillema, 1994: 19). Since the United States was an initial party to this war, its perspective has not been coded. Canada issued no statements on the invasion while it was underway, so it is coded level 0.

Hostage. On 4 Dec 1979, a group of Iranians captured the U.S. embassy in Teheran. They held the occupants hostage until 20 Jan 1981. While the only military action taken in this conflict was the abortive Desert One rescue attempt on 24-5 April 1980 (Tillema, 1994: 17), the support of the embassy seizure clearly constituted an act of war by Revolutionary Iran against the United States. Canada helped some Americans escape the country in early 1980, and placed economic restrictions on Iran (Communiqué 80/27, 80/38) during this conflict. It took no military action, so is coded at level 2.

IndoChin. The beginnings of this war are difficult to untangle, as the states of Indochina and Thailand were in conflict with one another from mid-1976 (Tillema, 1994: 16). This period also coincides with the Khmer Rouge genocide. The best date for beginning this war seems to be the 25 December 1978 full-scale invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam (Munro and Day, 1990: 202), since the "problem" being represented is the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia/Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge and other factions fought the occupying army until its withdrawal on 26 September 1989 (Lindgren, et al, 1991: 363-4), then returned to fighting themselves. The boundary of this war follows the logic used in the Afghan and Ugandan cases. A civil war can remain a civil war even if another country is aiding one side. But if the second country deposes the government on its own authority and emplaces a new one, then the war is of a different character.

Canada sponsored a United Nations General Assembly Resolution on negotiating peace in this conflict in 1979 (Statements and Speeches 79/24) and actively participated in United

Nations conferences toward that end (News Release 89/175; Statement/Discours 89/36). Its involvement is at level 1. The United States imposed economic measures on Vietnam to try to persuade them to leave Cambodia (Evans and Rowley, 1984: 212). While the US clearly was pleased to see aid transmitted to the "non-communist resistance," even formerly classified documents do not provide a smoking gun that the US provided that assistance directly (NSDD 158 and 319, in Simpson, 1995: 440-1, 490-2, 854, 883). We shall code US involvement at level 2.

IndoPak. India and Pakistan have been in intermittent conflict since their independence. The conflict included here concerns the Siachen Glacier along the Kashmir cease-fire line (Lindgren, et al, 1991: 359-60). The first military action was the shootdown of a Pakistani helicopter on 17 April 1984 (Munro and Day, 1990: 167). Approximately 600 were killed from 1982 until the two countries initiated confidence-building initiatives in late 1990 (Heldt, et al, 1992: 419). Tillema (1994: 19) bounds the conflict from 8 June 1984 to 21 Aug 1990, but since the boundary remained in dispute, the Heldt dates seem most appropriate. U.S. involvement was diplomatic (level 1) -- CIA Director Robert Gates negotiated with both sides during a tense period in 1990 (Boston Globe, 23 March 1993: 10). Canada issued no statements on this conflict, as far as can be determined.

Intifada. On 9 December 1987, Palestinian inhabitants of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip began an uprising (Metz, 1990: 303-6). The immediate spark was the death of four Palestinians in a traffic accident with an army vehicle on December (Munro and Day, 1990: 93). This intifada seems to have been the impetus for the Israeli-PLO talks that culminated in the Palestinian autonomy agreements on 13 September 1993. This broad, popular resistance movement, and the Israeli response to it, are here isolated from the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. In particular, references to "terrorist attacks" are not considered part of the intifada. Sollenberg (1995: 13) also isolates the PLO/Intifada from other Palestinian organizations. This distinction is made here because only the intifada has the characteristics

commonly associated with a "war" as a problem to be resolved. Canada took an active role in some of the negotiations (Statement 93/55), a level 1 involvement.

The United States engaged in private and public diplomacy with the PLO during the Intifada (The Guardian, 10 Sep 1993: 1-10). The United States also engaged in economic action, linking loan guarantees for immigrant housing to a moratorium on settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (The Washington Post, 25 June 1992: A1). While the United States provides military aid to Israel, this probably did not influence the intifada; U.S. actions are at level 2.

IranIraq. Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1979, seeking control of the Shaat al' Arab waterway and the ethnic Arab province of Khuzistan (Munro and Day, 1990: 123-6). Fighting continued in both countries, and on the Persian Gulf shipping lanes, until 20 August 1988 (Lindgren, et al, 1989: 343). Around 500,000 lost their lives in this war (Sivard, 1993: 21). The United States took military action against Iranian installations during the latter part of the war, making its eventual involvement level 4. Canada engaged in diplomacy with the combatants (Communiqué 84/93). While Canada "fully supported" later actions to safeguard oil tankers in the Gulf, Canada did not participate in such actions, leaving its involvement at level 1 (News Release 88/089). Canada did send peacekeepers to help implement the cease-fire at the end of the war (News Release 88/171).

Kagara. Ugandan forces annexed a part of Tanzania, north of the Kagara River, on 1 November 1978, after fighting began on 9 Oct 1978 (Tillema, 1994: 17). In response, Tanzanian forces invaded Uganda on 14 November, and occupied Kampala on 10 April 1979 (Byrnes, 1992: 204). Tanzanian forces were withdrawn on 30 June 1981 (Tillema, 1994: 17). Approximately 3000 were killed in the conflict (Sivard, 1993: 21). No Canadian statements on this war have been located. The United States also took no action, although an economic embargo was already in place against Uganda (Avirgan and Honey, 1982: 48).

Kuwait. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded, occupied, and ultimately annexed Kuwait. A multinational force, under United Nations mandate, expelled the Iraqi forces in January and

February 1991. While some UN forces remained in Iraq until July (Tillema, 1994:20), fighting ended with the Iraqi surrender on 28 February (Heldt, et al, 1992: 430-1). The subsequent fighting by Iraqi Shiites and Kurds is not part of this war. Both Canada and the United States participated in this war at level 4, military combat.

Liberia1. In 1985-8, government reprisals killed 5,000 (Sivard, 1993: 21). No evidence of American involvement has been found; Canada was silent on this conflict.

Liberia2. A second war in Liberia began in December 1989 when rebel factions entered the country from the Ivory Coast. Despite intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the war continued past 1994 (Lindgren, et al, 1991: 369-71). Over 20,000 have been killed (Sivard, 1993: 21). American forces intervened only to rescue American citizens (The New York Times, 8 August 1990: A3). In later years, American embassy security engaged in conflict with factions (The Washington Post, 12 April 1996: A1). By these rules, however, this categorizes the American involvement as level 4. Canada did not become involved.

Libya. The United States launched two raids against Libya. On 19 August 1981, the U.S. shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra. The Libyan and U.S. Navy exchanged blows 24-6 March 1986, and on 15 April the United States bombed Benghazi and Tripoli (Metz, 1989: 252-5). These raids are considered together because they are spikes in an overall pattern of hostility between the two states. In any case, Canada was silent about both.

Osirak. On 7 June 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor (Tillema, 1994: 18). Materials from that reactor were suspected of being used by Iraq's secret nuclear program. Canada did not issue any statements on this intervention. The United States suspended delivery of four F-16s to Israel for several months (Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, 1982: 164-5). This seems most similar to a level 2 involvement (level 3 would have funded Iraq, or Israel at a higher level).

Pakistan. Baluch and Pathan separatists fought Pakistan from 1972-87 (Wilson and Wallensteen, 1988: 291). Armed conflict was replaced by non-violent competition in 1987 (Lindgren, et al, 1989: 339). The United States provided military aid to Pakistan during this period, which was used in part to fight this rebellion. US involvement is at level 3. Canada did not comment on this war.

Panama. On 20 December 1989, United States forces invaded Panama. They removed President Noriega from office and remained until 30 April 1990 (Tillema, 1994: 20). Fatalities were estimated at 1000 (Sivard, 1993: 21), almost all of which occurred in 1989 (Lindgren et al, 1991: 345). While not happy about the U.S. action, Canada only expressed its "understanding" for the action, and did not otherwise get involved (News Release 89/313).

Peru. Sendero Luminoso opened its campaign against Peru's government on 17 May 1980 (McCormick, 1990: 15). A second rebel group, MRTA, began fighting in 1986. (Lindgren, 1991: 378). Peruvian forces also battle cocaine traffickers, but this is considered a police action since the traffickers do not seek formal autonomy for any territory nor the violent overthrow of the Peruvian government. At times Sendero and the traffickers have found common cause, although Sendero is more likely to support the peasant coca farmers than the (capitalist) cocaine processors. Some 20000 deaths have been recorded in these insurgencies, which continued through 1994 (Sivard, 1993: 21). Peru was considered a democracy during this war, until President Alberto Fujimori launched his *autogolpe* (self-coup) on 5 April 1992 (*The New York Times*, 7 April 1992: A16). Some United States combat forces assisted Peruvian military forces, making this a level 4 involvement. Canada issued no codable statements on this war.

Phil. Two insurgencies were active in the Philippines during this period; as has been the pattern in other internal wars, they will be considered together. The Islamic Moros, fighting for independence on Minandao, were active from 1970-90 (Wilson and Wallensteen, 1988: 293; Lindgren, 1991: 365-6). The New People's Army has fought to overthrow the government since 1970 as well (Sivard, 1993: 21). They remained active through 1994. The United States

provided military funding for the Philippine government, both under the autocratic Marcos regime and the subsequent democracy: level 3. Once again, Canada was officially silent.

SAfrica. The internal violence in South Africa is related to, but separable from, the conflicts in Angola and Namibia, as well as South African cross-border raids into Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. While the African National Congress announced its "armed struggle" in 1961 (Heldt, et. al., 1992: 451), the sustained conflict began in 1984 (Sivard, 1993: 21; Wilson and Wallenstein, 1988: 295). Munro and Day (1990: 70) date the violence to September 1983, with the riots in Sharpeville. As Sollenberg (1995) does not include this conflict as active in 1994, it can be said to have ended in Dec 1993 when power shifted to the Transitional Council (Wallenstein and Axell, 1994: 94). Both the United States and Canada imposed economic sanctions against the government of South Africa, which is a level 2 involvement.

One of the difficulties in coding South African references is the need to separate representations of apartheid from representations of the violence engaged in by its supporters and opponents. If a text only expresses opposition to the apartheid system, then it was not included in the dataset.

SAtlanti. The South Atlantic War of 1982 was fought over larger Argentine claims than just the Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas. Argentina also claimed South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands; their Antarctic claim overlapped with the British (Munro and Day, 1990: 287). It began when Argentine citizens landed on South Georgia on 19 March, followed by the armed invasion of the Falklands on 2 April 1982. It ended with the surrender of those forces to the British on 14 June 1982 (Munro and Day, 1990: 291). Canada placed a trade embargo on Argentina during the war, which is a level 2 action. The United States provided military support, including intelligence information, to the United Kingdom after first trying to negotiate a settlement (Pastor, 1992: 80).

Shaba. The Second Shaba invasion (the first was in 1977, outside the scope of this research) began on 13 May 1978 when a rebel front captured several cities and towns in the Shaba province (the group had been quietly infiltrating the region). Troops from France and Belgium, assisted by the U.S. Air Force, helped Zaire counter the attack. Most of the fighting ended in May; the Europeans were replaced by an ad hoc African peacekeeping force (Meditz and Merrill, 1994: 294-7). The peacekeepers remained until 14 August 1979 (Tillema, 1994: 17). The U.S. logistical effort would code this at level 4. Canada did not comment on this conflict.

Somalia. While opposition to the Siad Barre regime persisted throughout the 1980s (Heldt, et al, 1992: 450), SIPRI initiates a purely Somali war category with the peace agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia on 3 April 1988 (Lindgren, et al, 1989: 340). The rebel factions, after joining forces, succeeded in overthrowing Barre in January 1991 (Heldt, et al, 1992: 450). Fighting over control on the government continues to this day, however, despite the introduction of United Nations forces in 1992. Since these forces included U.S. and Canadian contingents, both were involved at level 4.

SriLanka. Fighting between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the majority Sinhalese began on 23 July 1983 (O'Ballance, 1989: 21). This fighting continues to the present. Indian forces intervened in a peacekeeping effort from 30 June 1987 to 24 Mar 1990 (Tillema, 1994: 19). Their efforts were unsuccessful. Sivard (1993: 21) estimates 32,000 deaths through 1992. Canada often expressed its concern during the war, but apparently did not take action; the United States did not either.

Sudan. The Sudanese civil war, since 1983, has led to the death of over 500,000, mostly civilians (Sivard, 1993: 21). The war was sparked by the imposition of Islamic Sharia laws on the non-Arab southern provinces (Heldt, et al, 1992: 452-3). The war continues through 1994 (Sollenberg, 1995: 18). Sudan had a democratic government from 4 May 1986 (*The New York Times*, 5 May 1986) until a coup on 30 June 1989 (*Washington Post*, 15 July 1989). Canada provided relief funding for Sudanese refugees, and worked with the United Nations on

pressuring Sudan (News Release 93/81). President Clinton sent a representative to try to negotiate peace (The New York Times, 1 June 1994: A10); both thus are at level 1.

Uganda. From 1981-1986 the National Resistance Army fought Milton Obote's government in Uganda. The war was more devastating to Uganda than the better-known Idi Amin period (Byrnes, 1992: 33-5). One guerrilla faction took power on 26 January 1986 (Byrnes, 1992: 206), but fighting continued until December 1991 against other rivals (Heldt, et al, 1992: 453). The fighting seems to have ended in military victory for the original rebel forces (Amer, et al, 1993: 82); although it may have re-ignited in 1994 (Sollenberg, 1995: 10). The war resulted in the deaths of over 300,000 Ugandans, mostly civilians (Sivard, 1993: 21). Canada did not comment on this war; the United States did not intervene, either.

WSahara. When Spain withdrew from this territory in 1975, it ceded control to Morocco and Mauritania. The Polisario Liberation Front fought against Morocco's claim (Mauritania quit its claim in 1979, leading to Morocco's annexation of the whole territory). The war effectively ended in September 1991 with the arrival of United Nations peacekeepers. (Heldt, et al, 1992: 446-7). Sivard (1993: 21) lists 16,000 casualties in this fighting. The United States voted for the UN Security Council Resolution that led to the cease-fire, which could be coded as a level 1 involvement. Canada contributed troops to the peacekeeping effort, but only after we list the war as having ended.

Yemen1. On 26 June 1978, fighting broke out between pro and anti-government factions in South Yemen (Nyrop, 1986: 286). Soviet and Ethiopian troops intervened (Tillema, 1994: 17). The Soviet troops departed immediately; the Ethiopians left after a week, their preferred party having won the war in which "hundreds were killed." (Nyrop, 1986: 286). Canada did not comment on this war; the United States did not become involved.

Yemen2. A civil war in South Yemen claimed 11,000 lives in 1986 and 1987 (Sivard, 1993: 21). No foreign intervention occurred, apparently even at the diplomatic level.



Yemen<sup>3</sup>. Fighting occurred in the reunited Yemen in 1994, as rebel forces linked to the former South Yemen attacked the new capital (The New York Times, 6 May 1994: A6). The war ended after northern forces captured Aden on 7 July (The Washington Post, 7 July 1994: A16). The United States and Canada left diplomacy to regional groups (The New York Times, 5 July 1994: A16). The US supported the UN Security Council's call for a cease-fire (Wall Street Journal, 2 June 1994: A1). The US is thus coded at level 1. Canada expressed the same position, but was unable to take the positive action of voting, which leaves its intervention at level 0 (News Release 94/131).

Yugoslav. The wars in the former Yugoslavia began in September 1990, when ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region of the Yugoslav republic of Croatia organized referenda on "political and cultural autonomy." (Heldt, et. al., 1992: 427). Fighting continued as Croatia and Slovenia moved toward independence in June 1991. The Slovenian theater was relatively minor: only 50 dead through 18 Jul 91 (Heldt, et. al., 1992: 428). The war in Croatia was much more intense, involving the regular Yugoslav army as well as Serb militias. Approximately 10000 deaths resulted before a cease-fire took effect in early 1992 (Amer, et. al., 1993: 121). Meanwhile, ethnic Serbs and Croats were organizing similar militias in a third Yugoslav republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Active fighting began in March 1992, involving the ethnic militias and Yugoslav forces (Amer, et. al., 1993: 90). In 1993, regular Croatian forces fought in Bosnia with Croat militias against the central government; Croat and Serb forces also fought each other directly in Bosnia and Croatia (Wallenstein and Axell, 1994: 83, 88). The war continued, with intermittent cease-fires through 1994.

This research does not disaggregate the "Wars of the Yugoslav Secession" into separate territorial wars. The three main ethnic parties were all fighting to occupy territory in the western portion of the former Yugoslavia. The events of 1995 -- the recapture of Serb-held lands by Croatia and the cooperative offensives by Croats and Bosnians in Bosnia proper -- emphasize the point that the "two" wars were only aspects of a single war. If one were to make the

distinction between them, one might also need to separate out the Muslim-Croat fighting around Mostar in 1993 and the intra-Muslim fighting around Bihac. It seems more logical, and more consistent with the decisions made for prior conflicts, to leave this as a single unified war.

Canada and the United States both have sent military troops to the former Yugoslavia, which is a level 4 involvement.

ZaiZam. On 28 Feb 1982, Zairian troops crossed into Zambia; 3 were killed (Tillema, 1994: 18). This is the most minor of all wars chosen; no statements were made about it by any of the three states. It even did not merit mention in Meditz and Merrill (1994: 269, 281), even in context of sustained border tension with Zambia. Neither Canada nor the United States intervened.

APPENDIX E  
FINAL DATASET

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1	05/19/78	USA	Shaba	News Conference statement	.2231
2	05/25/78	USA	Shaba	News Conference Statement	1.6094
3	06/07/78	USA	Shaba	Carter at Annapolis (WCPD)	.0000
4	06/20/78	USA	Shaba	Vance Speech to Jaycees	.0000
5	08/05/78	IND	Shaba	Min Ext Aff speech at seminar	.2231
8	01/04/79	USA	IndoChin	Vance Rpt to Congress	-1.0986
9	01/04/79	USA	Yemen1	Vance Rpt to Congress	-1.0986
10	01/11/79	USA	IndoChin	UnderSec Address	.0000
12	02/14/79	USA	Shaba	Proposal for Aid to Zaire	-.5108
13	02/20/79	IND	IndoChin	Min Ext Aff statement	-.4055
14	02/20/79	USA	IndoChin	Speech at Georgia Tech	-1.2528
15	02/21/79	IND	IndoChin	Min Ext Aff address parl	1.0986
16	02/22/79	USA	IndoChin	Remarks at Press Conf	-.5108
17	02/23/79	USA	IndoChin	Amb Young to UNSC	.5596
18	02/26/79	USA	Yemen1	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
19	02/27/79	USA	IndoChin	Amb Young to UNSC	.4055
20	02/28/79	USA	Yemen1	DoS Statement	.0000
21	03/01/79	USA	IndoChin	Asst Sec to Senate FRC	-.1335
22	03/05/79	USA	Shaba	AsstSec to House Sub	.2231
23	03/07/79	USA	Pakistan	DepSec to House Sub	-.2231
24	03/12/79	USA	Yemen1	AsstSec to House FAC	-.5596
25	03/16/79	USA	IndoChin	Alt Amb Petree to UNSC	.6931
26	05/07/79	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.0000
28	06/08/79	IND	IndoChin	Min Ext Aff speech to Non-Align	.2231
30	06/13/79	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	-.9808
31	06/18/79	IND	IndoChin	PM speech in Belgrade	1.0986
32	07/02/79	USA	IndoChin	Vance to ASEAN	-1.2528
33	07/24/79	USA	WSahara	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
34	07/26/79	USA	WSahara	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.2231
36	08/02/79	IND	IndoChin	Min Ext Aff speech to commonwealth	1.0986
37	09/06/79	IND	IndoChin	Min Ext Aff speech to Non-Align	.2231
38	09/21/79	USA	IndoChin	Alt Amb Petree to UNGA	1.6094

Figure E.1: List of Cases in Final Dataset. The first column indicates the index number applied to the case. The cases are ordered by date. The final column indicates the worldview inferred from the text, with liberal scores being > 0 (Continued on next page).

Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
39	10/03/79	IND	IndoChin	Min Ext Aff UN Address	-1.3863
40	10/16/79	USA	IndoChin	Advisor to House Sub	-2.0794
41	10/16/79	USA	Yemen1	Advisor to House Sub	.0000
42	10/19/79	CAN	IndoChin	Relief effort	.0000
43	11/14/79	CAN	IndoChin	Statement in New York	.8473
45	12/01/79	USA	Pakistan	Desk Off Speech	.2231
46	12/06/79	USA	IndoChin	Statement	-1.0986
47	12/11/79	IND	Hostage	Ministry statement	1.6094
48	12/12/79	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
49	12/26/79	USA	Afghan	DoS Statement	.4055
50	12/28/79	IND	Afghan	Ministry statement	1.0986
51	12/28/79	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Reporters	1.3863
52	12/28/79	CAN	Afghan	Statement	1.6094
53	01/02/80	USA	Afghan	Statement by Press Sec	-1.0986
54	01/04/80	USA	Afghan	Address to the Nation	-.6061
55	01/06/80	USA	Afghan	Amb McHenry to UNSC	.9808
57	01/07/80	CAN	Afghan	Notes for UN	.6931
58	01/08/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Brief Congress	-.5878
59	01/10/80	USA	Afghan	Speech	1.0986
60	01/11/80	CAN	Afghan	Notes for UN	1.5041
61	01/12/80	USA	Afghan	Amb McHenry to UNGA	.4700
62	01/12/80	USA	Afghan	White House Statement	.0000
63	01/13/80	USA	Afghan	Amb McHenry to UNSC	.9163
64	01/13/80	USA	Afghan	Amb McHenry to UNSC	-.2231
65	01/14/80	USA	Afghan	White House Statement	1.3863
66	01/15/80	USA	Afghan	Statement at Q&A	-.2877
67	01/20/80	USA	Afghan	Letter to USOC	-.5878
68	01/21/80	USA	Afghan	Part of Annual Msg to Congress	-.7885
69	01/21/80	USA	Afghan	Letter Re: Sanctions on SU	-.9808
71	01/21/80	USA	WSahara	Part of Annual Msg to Congress	.0000
73	01/21/80	USA	IndoChin	State of Union Msg to Congress	.0000
74	01/22/80	USA	Afghan	UnderSec to Senate Comm	-.1542
75	01/22/80	USA	Afghan	White House Statement	.4055
76	01/23/80	IND	Afghan	MEA to Parl	-.9808
77	01/23/80	IND	IndoChin	Pres to Parl	.2231
78	01/23/80	USA	Afghan	State of the Union	-1.0116
79	01/24/80	IND	Afghan	MEA to Parl	-1.0986
82	01/26/80	USA	IndoChin	Department Statement	-.5108
85	01/31/80	USA	Afghan	WH Statement (WCPD)	-.5108
86	02/01/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks	.5108
87	02/01/80	USA	Afghan	Vance to SAC	-1.0986
88	02/05/80	USA	Afghan	Vance to HAC	.0000
93	02/07/80	USA	Afghan	Australian PM leaving	-.4055
94	02/07/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.7918
95	02/08/80	USA	Afghan	Statement on Selective Service	-1.7918
96	02/11/80	USA	Afghan	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
97	02/15/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to students at W.H.	-1.0986
98	02/19/80	USA	Afghan	Speech to American Legion	-1.7047
99	02/20/80	USA	Afghan	Statement on meeting with Kenya	-1.0986
101	02/20/80	USA	Afghan	Welcome to Pres of Kenya	-1.0986

(Continued on Next Page)

Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
102	02/21/80	USA	Afghan	Statement on briefing	-1.6094
103	02/25/80	USA	Afghan	Speech	.0000
104	02/25/80	USA	Afghan	Speech	.0000
105	02/26/80	USA	Afghan	Statement at Q & A	-1.3863
106	02/26/80	USA	Afghan	Toast to Governors	-.9163
107	02/27/80	USA	Afghan	Message to Congress	-1.0986
108	03/03/80	USA	Afghan	Vance Speech to CFR	-1.0986
109	03/05/80	USA	Afghan	Letter to Congress	-1.3863
111	03/06/80	USA	Afghan	SecDef Speech to CFR	-1.2993
112	03/10/80	USA	Afghan	Amb HumRts to UNHRC	1.3863
113	03/10/80	USA	IndoChin	Amb HumRts to UNHRC	1.3863
114	03/11/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to City Leaders	-1.9459
115	03/13/80	USA	Afghan	Statement	-1.0986
116	03/20/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.6094
117	03/21/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-.2231
118	03/24/80	USA	IndoChin	Asst Sec to Senate Sub	-.2877
119	03/26/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Democrats	.2231
120	03/28/80	USA	Afghan	Statement	-1.0986
121	04/01/80	USA	Afghan	Speech	-1.6094
122	04/05/80	USA	Afghan	Mail to USOC	-.5596
124	04/10/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Q & A	-.4055
125	04/11/80	USA	Afghan	UnderSec Speech	-1.0986
126	04/15/80	USA	Afghan	Order	-1.9459
127	04/17/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to 4-H	-1.0986
128	04/23/80	CAN	Hostage	statement	1.6094
129	04/24/80	USA	Afghan	UnderSec to House Subs	1.6094
130	04/24/80	USA	IndoChin	UnderSec to House Subs	1.6094
131	04/25/80	IND	Hostage	Statement	1.3863
132	04/30/80	USA	Afghan	Statement at Q & A	-1.6094
133	05/09/80	USA	Afghan	Speech	-1.2040
136	05/19/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to campaign	-1.0986
139	05/22/80	CAN	Hostage	statement	1.6094
140	05/26/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.7918
141	05/27/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.3863
142	05/27/80	CAN	IndoChin	Statement in Geneva	-.4055
145	06/12/80	IND	Afghan	Press Release	-.2877
146	06/12/80	IND	IndoChin	Press Release	-1.3863
147	06/12/80	USA	Afghan	Statement at Q&A	-1.0986
148	06/17/80	IND	Afghan	MEA to Parl	-1.7918
149	06/17/80	USA	Afghan	Toast to King Hussein	-.2231
151	06/20/80	USA	Afghan	Toast Italian PM (WCPD)	-1.2040
152	06/22/80	USA	Afghan	Statement to Reporters	.2231
153	06/23/80	USA	Afghan	Final Statement at G-7	-.2231
154	06/23/80	USA	Afghan	Statement to Reporters	-1.6094
155	06/24/80	USA	Afghan	Toast in Yugo (WCPD)	1.6094
156	06/25/80	USA	Afghan	Muskie at North Atlantic Council	-.6931
157	06/25/80	USA	IndoChin	Muskie Statement	-1.6094
158	06/25/80	USA	Afghan	Toast in Spain (WCPD)	-.2231
159	06/25/80	USA	IndoChin	Toast in Spain (WCPD)	-.2231
160	06/25/80	USA	Afghan	Written Answers Portuguese Press	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
161	06/26/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks on return to USA	.0000
163	06/27/80	CAN	IndoChin	Incursion into Thailand	1.3863
164	06/28/80	USA	IndoChin	Muskie Statement at ASEAN	.1823
165	07/01/80	USA	IndoChin	Announcement of Airlift to Thailand	.0000
166	07/03/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks in Oakland	.2231
167	07/03/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Dems	1.0986
168	07/04/80	USA	Afghan	Speech to NAACP	-1.3863
169	07/07/80	IND	IndoChin	MEA to Parl	.0000
171	07/24/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Boys Nation	-1.3863
172	07/29/80	USA	IndoChin	Amb statement to House Sub	-.6931
173	07/29/80	USA	Afghan	Carter Statement (WCPD)	.4055
174	07/30/80	USA	Afghan	Muskie to HFAC	-.5108
175	08/14/80	USA	Afghan	Acceptance Speech at Nomination	-1.0986
176	08/14/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Dems	-1.0986
177	08/20/80	USA	Afghan	UndSec to House Sub	-.6931
178	08/21/80	USA	Afghan	Speech to American Legion	-1.0986
179	09/04/80	USA	Afghan	Speech to AFL-CIO	-1.0986
180	09/04/80	USA	Afghan	Speech to B'nai B'rith	-.8473
181	09/18/80	USA	Afghan	Muskie speech to Pitt WAC	-1.0986
182	09/22/80	USA	Afghan	Muskie to UNGA	2.0794
183	09/22/80	USA	IndoChin	Muskie to UNGA	1.7918
184	09/23/80	USA	IranIraq	Remarks to Dems	-.4055
185	09/23/80	USA	IranIraq	Statement to reporters	.9163
186	09/24/80	USA	IranIraq	Remarks to reporters at WH	.8473
187	09/26/80	USA	IranIraq	White House Statement	.6931
188	09/28/80	USA	IranIraq	Amb McHenry to UNSC	1.6094
189	09/30/80	USA	IranIraq	DOD Statement	.0000
190	10/02/80	USA	Afghan	Remarks with Zia	.0000
191	10/02/80	USA	IranIraq	Remarks with Zia	1.0986
192	10/03/80	IND	Afghan	MEA to UNGA	.1823
193	10/03/80	IND	IndoChin	MEA to UNGA	-1.0986
194	10/03/80	IND	IranIraq	MEA to UNGA	.0000
195	10/03/80	IND	IranIraq	Statement	-1.6094
196	10/07/80	USA	IranIraq	DepSec Address to Press	.1542
198	10/12/80	USA	IranIraq	Radio Address	-1.6094
199	10/14/80	USA	IranIraq	Muskie Speech	-.2513
200	10/19/80	USA	Afghan	Radio Address on ForPol	-1.0986
201	10/23/80	USA	IranIraq	Amb McHenry to UNSC	1.2528
202	10/25/80	USA	Afghan	Campaign Speech	-.9163
203	10/28/80	USA	IranIraq	Muskie speech	-.4055
204	11/18/80	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec Address	-.3365
205	11/18/80	IND	IranIraq	MEA to Parl	-.5108
206	11/19/80	USA	Afghan	Amb McHenry to UNGA	.8473
207	12/04/80	USA	WSahara	AsstSec to House Sub	.5596
208	12/15/80	IND	Afghan	PM to Parl	.0000
209	12/24/80	USA	Afghan	Anniversary Statement	1.0986
213	01/13/81	USA	Afghan	Proclamation	-2.0794
214	01/13/81	USA	IranIraq	Proclamation	-2.0794
215	01/15/81	IND	Afghan	MEA Article	-1.6094
216	01/15/81	IND	IndoChin	MEA Article	-.6931

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
217	01/15/81	IND	IranIraq	MEA Article	-1.0986
218	01/20/81	CAN	Hostage	Statement on Release	.0000
219	03/23/81	USA	IranIraq	DepAsstSec Speech	-.3365
220	03/25/81	USA	WSahara	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
221	03/25/81	IND	Afghan	MEA to Parl	-1.0986
222	04/06/81	USA	IranIraq	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.2231
223	04/10/81	USA	Afghan	USUN press release	1.3863
224	04/10/81	USA	IndoChin	USUN press release	1.3863
225	04/10/81	USA	WSahara	USUN press release	1.0986
226	04/24/81	USA	Afghan	Statement to lift grain embargo	-1.3863
227	04/24/81	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Address	.0000
228	04/27/81	USA	Afghan	DepAsst Sec to House Sub	-.6931
229	05/08/81	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
230	06/08/81	USA	Osirak	Dept Statement	.2231
232	06/10/81	USA	Afghan	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
233	06/10/81	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
234	06/11/81	IND	Afghan	MEA in Pak	-1.6094
235	06/11/81	IND	IndoChin	MEA in Pak	.5108
240	06/19/81	USA	Osirak	Un Amb Statement	.5108
241	06/20/81	USA	IndoChin	Haig to ASEAN	.2231
242	06/30/81	USA	Afghan	CaptNat Proc	.2231
243	06/30/81	USA	Afghan	Haig Statement	.6931
244	06/30/81	USA	IndoChin	Haig Statement	1.3863
245	07/07/81	CAN	IndoChin	SS at UN Conference on Kamp	1.0986
237	07/13/81	USA	IndoChin	Haig to UN Conf on Kampuchea	1.9459
246	07/13/81	CAN	IndoChin	Proposed Solution	1.9459
247	07/15/81	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to SenSub	-.5108
248	07/28/81	USA	Afghan	Amb to CSCE	.0000
249	07/28/81	USA	Afghan	UndSec to Sen FRC	-.5108
250	07/28/81	USA	IndoChin	UndSec to Sen FRC	-.2877
251	08/11/81	USA	Afghan	Haig to ABA	-.5108
252	08/11/81	USA	IndoChin	Haig to ABA	.0000
253	09/13/81	USA	Afghan	Haig Address in Berlin	1.0986
254	09/13/81	USA	IndoChin	Haig Address in Berlin	.6931
255	09/16/81	USA	Afghan	Statements to House Sub	-.8473
256	09/21/81	USA	Afghan	Haig to UNGA	.2231
257	09/21/81	USA	IndoChin	Haig to UNGA	1.6094
258	09/21/81	USA	IranIraq	Haig to UNGA	1.0986
259	09/25/81	USA	IranIraq	DepAsstSec Speech	-1.2993
260	09/28/81	IND	Afghan	MEA to UNGA	1.0986
261	09/28/81	IND	IndoChin	MEA to UNGA	1.3863
262	09/28/81	IND	IranIraq	MEA to UNGA	1.0986
263	10/01/81	IND	Afghan	PM to CHOGM	-1.0986
264	10/01/81	IND	IndoChin	PM to CHOGM	-1.0986
266	10/06/81	USA	IndoChin	Toast to Thai PM	-.2877
268	10/19/81	USA	IndoChin	Kirk to UNGA	1.0986
269	10/21/81	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
270	10/22/81	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	.6931
271	10/28/81	USA	Afghan	AsstSec Speech	-1.0986
272	11/10/81	USA	IndoChin	Bureau Chief to Senate Sub	.6931

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
273	11/12/81	USA	Afghan	Haig to House FAC	-.5108
274	11/17/81	IND	Afghan	ForSec to UNGA	-.5596
275	11/18/81	USA	Afghan	Kirkpatrick to UNGA	1.2528
276	11/19/81	USA	Afghan	Dept Statement	1.7918
278	12/27/81	USA	Afghan	Anniversary Statement	1.9459
279	01/29/82	USA	Contra	Dept Announcement	-1.0986
280	02/02/82	USA	IndoChin	Haig to Sen FRC	.0000
283	02/12/82	USA	WSahara	Haig remarks at News Conf	-.6931
284	02/14/82	IND	SAfrica	to UNHRRights	-.4055
285	02/24/82	USA	Contra	Address to OAS	.0000
286	02/25/82	USA	Contra	AsstSec to Senate Sub	1.0986
287	03/02/82	USA	Afghan	Haig to House FAC	-.4055
288	03/02/82	USA	IndoChin	Haig to House FAC	.0000
289	03/08/82	USA	Afghan	DepSec to Senate FRC	1.9459
290	03/09/82	USA	IndoChin	DepSec to ASEAN	.6931
291	03/10/82	USA	Afghan	Afghan Day Proclamation	1.6094
292	03/10/82	USA	Afghan	Remarks on Day	1.6094
294	03/19/82	CAN	Afghan	Statement by SS on Afghan Day	1.9459
295	03/20/82	USA	Afghan	Statement	.0000
296	03/22/82	USA	Afghan	DepSec	1.6094
297	03/22/82	USA	IndoChin	DepSec	1.6094
298	03/22/82	IND	Afghan	Press Release	-2.1972
299	03/30/82	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	-2.0794
300	03/30/82	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	-.9808
301	03/31/82	USA	Afghan	AsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
302	03/31/82	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	1.3863
303	03/31/82	CAN	Contra	Relations	1.0986
304	04/02/82	USA	SAntlanti	Statement by Speakes	.0000
305	04/05/82	USA	Afghan	Speech to AFL-CIO	.2231
306	04/07/82	USA	SAntlanti	White House Statement	-1.0986
307	04/08/82	IND	IranIraq	Pres in Moz	-1.3863
308	04/10/82	USA	SAntlanti	Radio Address	-1.0986
309	04/13/82	CAN	SAntlanti	On status	.0000
310	04/14/82	USA	SAntlanti	Haig Statement	-1.0986
311	04/14/82	USA	Afghan	Und Sec to Sen FRC	-.6931
313	04/15/82	USA	SAntlanti	White House Statement	-1.0986
314	04/19/82	USA	SAntlanti	Haig Statement	-.4055
315	04/19/82	USA	SAntlanti	Haig Statement	-1.0986
316	04/20/82	USA	SAntlanti	OAS Amb Statement	-1.6094
317	04/25/82	USA	SAntlanti	Dept Statement	-1.0986
318	04/26/82	USA	SAntlanti	Haig to OAS	.0000
319	04/26/82	USA	SAntlanti	Speech to Chamber of Commerce	-.2231
320	04/27/82	USA	IndoChin	Bush Toast in Singapore	1.7918
322	04/28/82	USA	SAntlanti	OAS Amb Statement	-1.0986
323	04/30/82	USA	SAntlanti	Haig Statement	.6931
325	05/09/82	USA	Afghan	Commencement Address	.9163
326	05/09/82	USA	IndoChin	Eureka College Commencement	-.2231
327	05/10/82	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
331	05/18/82	USA	SAntlanti	Haig Remarks at News Conf	1.0986
332	05/19/82	USA	WSahara	Remarks after meeting King Hassan	.2231

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
333	05/21/82	USA	WSahara	Dept Statement	1.0986
334	05/21/82	USA	SAtlanti	Statement by Speakes	.2231
335	05/26/82	USA	Afghan	Haig Speech	-.8473
336	05/26/82	USA	IranIraq	Haig Speech	-.1542
337	05/26/82	USA	SAtlanti	Kirk Statement	1.0986
338	05/27/82	USA	SAtlanti	Haig to OAS	.0000
339	05/28/82	USA	SAtlanti	OAS Amb Statement	1.7918
340	05/28/82	USA	SAtlanti	Remarks to Mexicans	.0000
341	06/03/82	USA	IranIraq	Haig Statement	1.3863
342	06/03/82	USA	SAtlanti	Haig Statement	1.0986
344	06/06/82	USA	SAtlanti	Haig at G7	.6931
345	06/06/82	USA	SAtlanti	Ron at G7 (WCPD)	-.2231
346	06/08/82	USA	SAtlanti	Address to UK Parliament	1.0986
347	06/08/82	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to SenSub	-.5108
348	06/09/82	USA	SAtlanti	Remarks in UK	.0000
350	06/11/82	USA	Afghan	Address to Berlin	.0000
355	06/17/82	USA	Afghan	Remarks to UNGA	.4055
356	06/17/82	USA	IranIraq	Toast to Perez de Cuellar	1.0986
357	06/18/82	USA	IndoChin	DepSec to ASEAN	.5108
359	07/09/82	USA	IranIraq	Dept Statement	1.3863
360	07/12/82	USA	IranIraq	DepAmb to UNSC	1.0986
361	07/14/82	USA	IranIraq	Statement by Speakes	1.6094
362	07/15/82	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to Senate Sub	1.6094
365	08/02/82	IND	Afghan	PM in US	-1.0986
367	08/15/82	IND	Afghan	MEA to NAM	.0000
368	08/15/82	IND	IndoChin	MEA to NAM	1.0986
369	08/15/82	IND	IranIraq	MEA to NAM	.4055
370	08/15/82	IND	SAtlanti	MEA to NAM	-.4055
371	09/01/82	USA	Afghan	Address to Nation	.0000
373	09/15/82	USA	IndoChin	Asst Sec to House Sub	1.9459
374	09/16/82	USA	IndoChin	Welcome Marcos	1.0986
375	09/21/82	USA	Contra	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
376	09/25/82	USA	IndoChin	Dept Statement	.0000
377	09/30/82	USA	Contra	AsstSec Speech	-.1823
378	09/30/82	USA	Afghan	Shultz to UNGA	-1.0986
379	10/01/82	IND	Afghan	MEA to UNGA	1.3863
381	10/01/82	IND	IranIraq	MEA to UNGA	1.0986
383	10/11/82	IND	SAfrica	PM to UN	1.0986
384	10/12/82	USA	IndoChin	Welcome Soeharto	1.0986
385	11/05/82	USA	Contra	Letters to Venezuelans	-.4055
386	11/13/82	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
387	11/24/82	USA	Afghan	Kirk in UNGA	.5108
389	11/30/82	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.0000
391	12/01/82	USA	Afghan	Report on CW	1.9459
392	12/01/82	USA	IndoChin	Report on CW	1.9459
393	12/09/82	USA	Phil	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.9459
394	12/09/82	USA	Afghan	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
395	12/10/82	USA	Afghan	Shultz Remarks at NewsConf	1.0986
396	12/22/82	USA	Afghan	UndSec Statement	.0000
397	12/26/82	USA	Afghan	Anniversary Statement	.4055

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
398	01/08/83	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.3863
399	01/21/83	IND	SAfrica	MEA introduce ANC Pres Tambo	-1.0986
401	02/19/83	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
402	02/22/83	USA	Afghan	Speech to American Legion	-1.0986
403	02/24/83	USA	Afghan	Shultz Address	-1.0986
404	02/24/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Address	-1.6094
405	02/28/83	USA	Afghan	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
406	02/28/83	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
407	02/28/83	USA	Afghan	Shultz Speech	-.2231
408	02/28/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Speech	1.0986
409	03/02/83	USA	Afghan	AsstSec to Senate Sub	-.9808
410	03/02/83	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to Senate Sub	-.2877
411	03/03/83	USA	Afghan	Und Sec to House Sub	-.8473
412	03/03/83	USA	IndoChin	Und Sec to House Sub	-1.9459
413	03/05/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Address	-.9808
414	03/07/83	USA	Afghan	Asst Sec to House Sub	-.9163
417	03/07/83	IND	SAfrica	PM Keynote at NAM Summit	.2231
415	03/11/83	IND	IranIraq	PM Closing at NAM	.2231
418	03/11/83	USA	Phil	AsstSec to Senate Sub	-1.7918
419	03/14/83	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.7918
420	03/18/83	USA	Phil	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
421	03/21/83	USA	Afghan	Afghan Day Proclamation	1.3863
422	03/21/83	USA	Afghan	Dept Statement	.2231
423	03/21/83	USA	Afghan	Message re Afghan Day	.2231
424	03/23/83	USA	Afghan	Address to Nation	-1.0986
425	03/31/83	USA	IndoChin	Dept Statement	1.0986
426	04/04/83	USA	IndoChin	Dept Statement	1.3863
427	04/14/83	USA	Contra	AsstSec to House FAC	.4055
428	04/27/83	USA	Contra	Address to Joint Congress	-.6061
429	05/09/83	USA	Contra	Kirk to UNSC	.8473
430	05/16/83	USA	Contra	Kirk to UNSC	.2877
431	05/18/83	USA	Afghan	Kirk to UNSC	1.0986
432	05/18/83	USA	Contra	Kirk to UNSC	.9163
433	05/20/83	USA	Afghan	Dept Statement	1.3863
434	06/02/83	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	.5108
352	06/15/83	USA	Afghan	Shultz to Senate FRC	-.6931
353	06/15/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to Senate FRC	.0000
435	06/16/83	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.7918
436	06/23/83	USA	SAfrica	UndSec Address	-.5108
437	06/25/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Remarks i	1.0986
438	06/26/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Statement	1.0986
439	06/28/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to ASEAN	.0000
440	06/30/83	USA	Contra	Speech to GOP	-1.0986
441	07/03/83	USA	Afghan	Shultz Statement	-.4055
442	07/04/83	USA	Contra	Bush Address	.9163
443	07/14/83	USA	IndoChin	Asst Sec to House Sub	1.6094
444	07/18/83	USA	Afghan	Amb CSCE Statement	1.0986
445	07/18/83	USA	Contra	Speech to Longshoremen	-.5878
446	07/19/83	USA	IranIraq	Arrival of Amir of Bahrain	-.5108
447	07/20/83	USA	Contra	Statement by Speakes	1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
448	07/29/83	CAN	Contra	Peace initiatives	1.6094
449	08/05/83	CAN	SriLanka	Situation in Sri Lanka	1.0986
450	08/13/83	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.1823
451	09/02/83	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Address	-.4055
452	09/13/83	USA	WSahara	Bush good-bye	1.0986
453	09/15/83	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.8473
454	09/22/83	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	1.0986
455	09/22/83	USA	IndoChin	Statement by Speakes	1.7918
456	09/26/83	USA	IranIraq	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
457	10/03/83	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Heritage Found	-.4055
459	10/18/83	USA	Contra	Shultz Letter to Congress	1.3863
460	10/19/83	USA	Afghan	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.3863
461	10/19/83	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.3863
462	10/19/83	USA	IranIraq	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.6094
463	10/19/83	USA	IndoPak	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
465	11/10/83	CAN	Contra	Threats to sec & peace	1.2528
466	11/13/83	USA	Afghan	Remarks to troops	.2231
467	11/21/83	CAN	Afghan	Statement to Plenary at UNGA	1.2528
471	12/22/83	USA	IranIraq	Written replies	-.9163
470	12/27/83	USA	Afghan	Fourth Anniversary Statement	1.6094
472	01/12/84	USA	Contra	Statement by Speakes	-1.0986
473	01/14/84	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.5878
475	01/18/84	USA	IndoChin	Mtg w/PM of Malaysia	1.0986
476	01/19/84	USA	Contra	AsstSec Speech	.8473
477	01/26/84	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
478	02/06/84	USA	Afghan	DepAstSec to House Sub	-.6931
479	02/06/84	USA	SriLanka	DepAstSec to House Sub	.2877
480	02/06/84	USA	IndoPak	DepAstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
481	02/06/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Eureka	-1.0986
482	02/07/84	USA	Sudan	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.0000
483	02/09/84	USA	Sudan	Sec to House FAC	-1.7918
484	02/09/84	USA	IndoChin	Sec to House FAC	.0000
485	02/15/84	USA	Afghan	Request for Aid	-.6931
486	02/23/84	IND	SriLanka	Pres to Parl	-1.6094
487	03/05/84	USA	IranIraq	Dept Statement	1.3863
488	03/06/84	USA	Contra	Speech to Evangelicals	-1.9459
489	03/08/84	USA	IndoChin	UndSec to House Sub	.0000
490	03/13/84	USA	Afghan	Speech to United Jewish Appeal	-1.9459
491	03/13/84	USA	IranIraq	Speech to United Jewish Appeal	-1.6094
492	03/15/84	USA	Afghan	Asst Sec to House Sub	-.6931
493	03/15/84	USA	IranIraq	Asst Sec to House Sub	-1.7918
494	03/15/84	USA	Contra	Shultz to Congress	.8473
495	03/19/84	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.5108
496	03/20/84	USA	Afghan	Proclamation of Afghan Day	1.0986
497	03/21/84	USA	Afghan	Shultz on Afghan Day	.4055
498	03/22/84	USA	Phil	AstSec to Sen Sub	-.8473
499	03/22/84	USA	IndoChin	AstSec to Sen Sub	-1.9459
500	03/28/84	USA	Contra	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
501	04/06/84	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to CISS	-1.0986
502	04/06/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks at CISS	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
503	04/06/84	CAN	IndoChin	Statement on incursions into Thai	1.0986
504	04/09/84	USA	Afghan	Kirk Speech	.2231
505	04/09/84	USA	Contra	Kirk Speech	-.6061
506	04/10/84	USA	Contra	Statement by Speakes	.1823
507	04/14/84	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.0000
509	05/01/84	USA	Contra	Speech	-.5108
510	05/01/84	USA	Afghan	Statement	1.0986
511	05/02/84	USA	Contra	AsstSec to House Sub	-.4055
512	05/09/84	USA	Afghan	Address to Nation	-1.0986
513	05/09/84	USA	Contra	Address to the Nation	-1.0116
514	05/09/84	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Speech	.0000
515	05/09/84	USA	Afghan	Written response to Qs	.0000
516	05/09/84	USA	Contra	Written response to Qs	.9163
517	05/09/84	USA	IndoChin	Written response to Qs	.0000
518	05/10/84	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	1.6094
519	05/12/84	USA	Afghan	Bush Toast in New Delhi	.2231
520	05/12/84	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Speech	-1.9459
521	05/17/84	USA	Afghan	Bush to Refugees	1.0986
522	05/22/84	USA	Contra	Statement at News Conference	-.2513
523	05/29/84	USA	IranIraq	Dept Statement	-.8473
524	05/30/84	USA	IranIraq	UN Amb to UNSC	.6931
525	06/04/84	USA	Contra	Address to Irish Parliament	1.0986
526	06/05/84	USA	IranIraq	UndSec to Sen Sub	-.5878
527	06/06/84	CAN	IranIraq	Statement on War	-1.0986
528	06/09/84	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
529	06/18/84	USA	Contra	Amb to OAS	1.3863
530	06/18/84	USA	SriLanka	Welcome to SL President	-.5108
531	06/21/84	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
532	06/27/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks to US-SU Exchange Conf	1.0986
533	06/28/84	USA	Contra	AsstSec Address	.2231
534	07/13/84	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to ASEAN	.0000
535	07/16/84	USA	Contra	Cap Nat Proc	-1.3863
536	07/16/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks on Captive Nations Week	.0000
537	07/16/84	USA	Contra	Remarks on Captive Nations Week	.0000
539	07/18/84	USA	Contra	Remarks	1.3863
540	07/18/84	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to CFR	.4055
541	07/19/84	USA	Contra	Remarks to Carib Heads of State	1.0986
542	07/25/84	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
543	07/26/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Rally	-1.0986
544	07/26/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Rally	-.2231
547	08/09/84	USA	Sudan	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.3863
548	08/09/84	USA	Uganda	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.3863
549	08/20/84	USA	Contra	Shultz to VFW	.0000
551	08/24/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks to VFW	-.4055
552	08/31/84	IND	IranIraq	NAM day	-1.0986
553	09/06/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks to B'nai B'rith	-1.0986
554	09/06/84	USA	Contra	Speech to B'nai B'rith	1.3863
555	09/11/84	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec Statement	.5596
556	09/18/84	USA	Phil	Asst Sec to Sen Sub	-.5108
557	09/24/84	USA	Contra	Address to United Nations	.6931

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
558	09/24/84	USA	IndoChin	Address to United Nations	1.0986
560	09/24/84	USA	Afghan	Address to United Nations	1.0986
561	09/26/84	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to SenSub	-.8473
562	09/27/84	IND	Afghan	MEA to UNGA	1.3863
563	09/27/84	IND	Contra	MEA to UNGA	1.0986
564	09/27/84	IND	IndoChin	MEA to UNGA	.2231
565	09/27/84	IND	IranIraq	MEA to UNGA	.0000
566	09/27/84	IND	SriLanka	MEA to UNGA	-1.9459
567	10/01/84	IND	Contra	MEA to NAM at UN	1.0986
568	10/01/84	IND	IranIraq	MEA to NAM at UN	-1.0986
569	10/10/84	USA	Afghan	UndSec Address	-1.5041
570	10/10/84	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Address	-1.0986
571	10/15/84	USA	Contra	Argument to ICJ	1.9459
572	10/16/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
573	10/19/84	USA	Afghan	Shultz Speech	.0000
574	10/19/84	USA	Contra	Shultz Speech	.9163
575	10/19/84	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Speech	1.6094
576	10/19/84	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Speech	-.8473
577	10/20/84	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
578	10/22/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
579	10/23/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
580	10/23/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
581	10/24/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
582	10/24/84	USA	Afghan	Remarks	1.0986
583	10/25/84	USA	Contra	UN Rep to UNGA	.9163
584	10/26/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
585	10/26/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
586	10/29/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
587	10/29/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
588	10/29/84	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	1.0986
589	10/30/84	USA	IndoChin	Kirk to UNGA	.3365
590	11/14/84	USA	Afghan	Kirk to UNGA	.5108
591	11/20/84	CAN	SAfrica	By Stephen Lewis	.0000
592	12/04/84	USA	Contra	Welcome Pres of Venezuela	1.6094
593	12/07/84	USA	SAfrica	Statement by Speakes	.0000
599	12/10/84	USA	Contra	Remarks on Intl Human Rights Day	.2231
600	12/10/84	USA	SAfrica	Remarks on Intl Human Rights Day	.0000
601	12/12/84	USA	Afghan	UndSec Speech	-.5596
602	12/12/84	USA	SriLanka	UndSec Speech	-.2877
603	12/12/84	USA	IndoPak	UndSec Speech	-.2231
604	12/26/84	USA	IndoChin	Dept Statement	-.2231
605	12/26/84	USA	Afghan	Fifth Anniversary Message	.5108
606	12/27/84	CAN	Afghan	Fifth Anniversary Statement	1.6094
607	12/28/84	CAN	IndoChin	Statement	.5108
609	01/17/85	IND	SriLanka	Pres to Parl	-1.6094
610	01/18/85	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	-.3365
611	01/24/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to West Hem Leaders	1.6094
612	01/25/85	USA	Contra	UndSec Address	-.4055
613	01/29/85	USA	Contra	AsstSec to House Sub	-.6061
614	01/29/85	USA	Phil	UndSec Address	-.5108

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
615	01/29/85	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Address	.5108
616	01/30/85	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
617	02/06/85	USA	Contra	State of the Union	.0000
618	02/11/85	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Remarks	-.5108
619	02/11/85	USA	Afghan	Welcome for King Fahd	-1.6094
620	02/11/85	USA	IranIraq	Welcome for King Fahd	-.8473
622	02/16/85	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.6931
623	02/19/85	USA	Peru	Shultz to House FAC	-.6931
624	02/19/85	USA	Phil	Shultz to House FAC	-.5108
625	02/19/85	USA	Afghan	Shultz to House FAC	-.5108
626	02/19/85	USA	Contra	Shultz to House FAC	.2877
627	02/19/85	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to House FAC	-1.0986
628	02/20/85	USA	Phil	Asst Sec to House Sub	-.3365
629	02/20/85	USA	Burma	Asst Sec to House Sub	-1.6094
630	02/20/85	USA	IndoChin	Asst Sec to House Sub	-1.2040
631	02/22/85	USA	Phil	AsstSec Address	-.6931
632	02/22/85	USA	Afghan	Shultz Address	-.2231
633	02/22/85	USA	Contra	Shultz Address	-.6061
634	02/22/85	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Address	-.3365
635	02/28/85	USA	Contra	Bush Address	-.6061
636	02/28/85	USA	Contra	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-1.2993
637	02/28/85	USA	Peru	UndSec to House Sub	.0000
638	02/28/85	USA	Phil	UndSec to House Sub	.5108
639	02/28/85	USA	Burma	UndSec to House Sub	-1.0986
640	02/28/85	USA	IndoChin	UndSec to House Sub	-.5108
641	03/01/85	USA	SAfrica	Deft Statement	-.4055
642	03/01/85	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to Cons PAC	-1.0986
643	03/01/85	USA	Contra	Speech to Conservative Union	-1.3863
644	03/02/85	USA	Contra	Shultz Statement	1.9459
646	03/05/85	USA	Liberia1	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
647	03/06/85	CAN	IranIraq	Statement by SS on POWs	1.6094
648	03/07/85	USA	Sudan	Bush Statement	-1.0986
649	03/14/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to Magazine Publishers	-.4055
653	03/19/85	USA	Contra	Welcome for Alfonsin	.5108
654	03/21/85	USA	Afghan	Afghan Day Proclamation	1.3863
655	03/21/85	USA	Afghan	AsstSec to SenSub	-.8109
656	03/21/85	USA	SriLanka	AsstSec to SenSub	.0000
657	03/25/85	USA	Contra	Remarks	-.7885
658	03/27/85	USA	Contra	Rep to OAS	.0000
659	03/27/85	USA	Contra	Written Response	-.6931
660	03/30/85	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.2993
661	04/01/85	USA	SAfrica	Shultz Address	-.6931
662	04/04/85	USA	Contra	Announcement of Peace Plan	-.7885
663	04/04/85	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	.2231
664	04/04/85	USA	Contra	Letters to Presidents	.0000
665	04/04/85	USA	Contra	Remarks after meeting Betancur	.5108
666	04/04/85	USA	Contra	Written Response	.8473
667	04/04/85	USA	IranIraq	Written Response	.0000
668	04/06/85	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.0000
669	04/10/85	IND	IranIraq	PM speech	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
670	04/10/85	IND	SriLanka	PM speech	-1.0986
671	04/15/85	USA	Contra	Remarks at Refugee Fundraising	-1.0986
672	04/16/85	USA	SAfrica	DepSec to Sen Comm	-.8473
673	04/16/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to Conf on Religious Lib	-1.0986
674	04/16/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to Deficit Red Coalition	-.5878
675	04/16/85	USA	SAfrica	Shultz Address	-.2231
676	04/17/85	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
677	04/17/85	USA	Contra	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8109
678	04/18/85	USA	Contra	Remarks at Q&A	-1.0986
679	04/20/85	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	.0000
680	04/20/85	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.2993
681	04/22/85	USA	Contra	Shultz Address	-.3185
682	04/23/85	USA	Contra	Letter to Senate	-.6931
683	04/23/85	USA	Contra	Statement	-.3365
684	04/24/85	USA	Contra	Statement	.5108
685	04/24/85	USA	Contra	UndSec Address	-.2513
686	04/25/85	USA	Contra	Shultz Address	-.4055
687	04/25/85	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.0000
688	04/29/85	IND	SriLanka	MEA Statement	-1.9459
689	04/29/85	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.5108
690	04/29/85	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.5108
691	05/01/85	USA	Contra	Message to Congress	-.5878
692	05/01/85	USA	Contra	Statement by Speakes	-.6931
693	05/01/85	USA	Afghan	UndSec Address	-.1823
694	05/01/85	USA	Contra	UndSec Address	.0000
695	05/01/85	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Address	-.1823
696	05/04/85	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-.2231
697	05/04/85	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	-.2231
698	05/06/85	USA	IndoChin	Dept Statement	.0000
699	05/07/85	USA	Contra	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.2993
700	05/08/85	USA	Afghan	Address to EurParl	-1.0986
701	05/14/85	USA	Peru	DepAsstSec to Sen Comms	-1.0986
702	05/14/85	USA	Burma	DepAsstSec to Sen Comms	-1.3863
703	05/16/85	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	.0000
704	05/16/85	USA	Contra	Remarks on meeting Duarte	.0000
705	05/17/85	USA	Afghan	Remarks to GOP	-1.0986
706	05/17/85	USA	Contra	Speech	.0000
650	05/18/85	USA	Afghan	Armed Forces Day	-1.0986
707	05/18/85	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.0986
708	05/21/85	USA	Contra	Remarks on Meeting Suazo	-.4055
709	05/21/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to Council of Americas	-.6931
711	05/24/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to Natl Assn of Manufact	-.7885
712	05/27/85	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-.5878
713	06/05/85	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-2.0794
714	06/05/85	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-.5878
715	06/06/85	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-1.0986
716	06/08/85	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.2040
717	06/12/85	USA	Afghan	Shultz Toast Gandhi	.2877
718	06/12/85	USA	Contra	Statement	-.5108
719	06/13/85	IND	Afghan	PM to US Congress	.9163

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
722	06/14/85	USA	Contra	Flag Day Speech	-.2231
724	07/08/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to ABA	-1.0986
725	07/08/85	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Remarks	.0000
726	07/08/85	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Toast	1.0986
727	07/12/85	USA	Afghan	Shultz to ASEAN	-.9163
728	07/12/85	USA	Contra	Shultz to ASEAN	.5596
729	07/12/85	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to ASEAN	.6931
730	07/17/85	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Address	-1.6094
731	07/19/85	USA	Afghan	CapNat Proc	-1.0986
732	07/19/85	USA	IndoChin	Captive Nations Proc	-1.0986
733	07/23/85	CAN	SAfrica	On State of Emergency	-.2231
734	07/25/85	USA	SAfrica	UN Amb to UN	-1.0986
735	07/26/85	USA	SAfrica	Alt UN Amb to UN	-1.0986
736	07/26/85	USA	Contra	Shultz Statement	.6931
737	07/29/85	CAN	SAfrica	Speech by Joe Clark	.0000
738	08/05/85	USA	IndoChin	Remarks at Q&A	-1.0986
739	08/08/85	USA	Afghan	Signing Statement	-1.0986
740	08/08/85	USA	Contra	Statement on Law	.5108
741	08/08/85	USA	IndoChin	Statement on Law	-1.0986
977	08/14/85	IND	SAfrica	PM statement	-1.0986
742	08/15/85	USA	SAfrica	Statement by NSA	.0000
743	08/16/85	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec Address	-.4700
744	08/16/85	USA	Contra	Statement on Signing Bill	.5108
745	08/19/85	IND	SAfrica	MEA to Parl	1.6094
746	08/19/85	USA	Afghan	NSA Address	-1.0986
747	08/19/85	IND	SAfrica	PM statement	.2231
748	08/30/85	USA	Contra	Statement	-.2877
749	09/06/85	IND	Contra	PM to NAM	1.6094
750	09/06/85	IND	IranIraq	PM to NAM	1.0986
751	09/06/85	IND	SAfrica	PM to NAM	.1823
752	09/09/85	USA	SAfrica	Msg to Congress	-.6931
753	09/09/85	USA	SAfrica	Statement at Q&A	-1.6094
754	09/09/85	USA	Afghan	UndSec Address	.0000
755	09/11/85	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Address	.0000
757	09/18/85	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-.4055
758	09/21/85	USA	IranIraq	Radio Address	-1.6094
759	09/23/85	USA	Afghan	Shultz to UNGA	.2877
760	09/23/85	USA	Contra	Shultz to UNGA	1.9459
761	09/23/85	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to UNGA	1.9459
762	09/23/85	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to UNGA	-1.0986
763	09/23/85	USA	SAfrica	Shultz to UNGA	.0000
764	09/26/85	IND	Afghan	Min to UNGA	.9163
765	09/26/85	IND	Contra	Min to UNGA	1.6094
766	09/26/85	IND	SAfrica	Min to UNGA	.0000
768	10/02/85	USA	Contra	Shultz Address	-1.2528
769	10/02/85	USA	SAfrica	Shultz Address	-1.0986
770	10/07/85	USA	Contra	Remarks to GOP	-.4055
771	10/07/85	USA	Afghan	Remarks to GOP	-.4055
772	10/08/85	USA	IndoChin	Welcome for Singapore PM	1.0986
773	10/16/85	IND	SAfrica	PM to Commonwealth	1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
774	10/22/85	USA	Afghan	Written Reply	.0000
775	10/23/85	IND	SriLanka	PM to CFR	-1.6094
777	10/24/85	USA	Afghan	Address to UNGA	-1.0986
781	10/30/85	USA	Phil	Asst Sec to Sen FRC	-.6931
782	10/31/85	CAN	SAfrica	Statement to UN	.5108
783	10/31/85	USA	IndoChin	Written Replies	-1.0986
784	10/31/85	USA	Afghan	Written Response	-1.0986
785	11/05/85	USA	IndoChin	UN Amb to UNGA	2.1972
786	11/06/85	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Supporters	-1.0986
788	11/12/85	USA	Afghan	Amb to UNGA	1.9459
789	11/12/85	CAN	Afghan	Statement to UN	.3365
790	11/13/85	USA	Sudan	AsstSec Speech	-.5878
791	11/13/85	USA	Peru	AsstSec to House Sub	.5108
792	11/14/85	USA	Afghan	Address to Nation	-1.3863
793	11/14/85	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congressmen	-.1823
794	11/14/85	USA	IndoChin	Written Replies	-1.0986
795	11/14/85	USA	Afghan	Written responses	-1.0986
796	11/19/85	IND	Contra	MEA statement	1.6094
799	11/22/85	USA	Contra	UN AMB to UNGA	.0000
800	11/23/85	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	1.0986
801	11/25/85	CAN	Contra	Statement to UN	.6931
803	12/04/85	USA	Contra	Statement on Intel Bill	-.5108
805	12/10/85	USA	Liberia1	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
806	12/10/85	USA	SAfrica	Human Rights Remarks	-1.0986
807	12/10/85	USA	Contra	Remarks on HR	1.0986
808	12/10/85	USA	IndoChin	Remarks on HR Proc	-1.0986
809	12/10/85	USA	Afghan	Ron on HR (WCPD)	-1.0986
810	12/10/85	USA	Contra	Shultz Speech	-.3365
1040	12/10/85	USA	Afghan	Remarks on HumRghts	-1.0986
811	12/13/85	USA	Afghan	DepSec Speech	.5108
812	12/14/85	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.6931
813	12/21/85	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
814	12/21/85	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	-1.0986
815	12/27/85	USA	Afghan	Anniversary Statement	1.6094
816	12/28/85	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-.2877
818	01/02/86	USA	Contra	Written Reply	.2231
819	01/04/86	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.0000
820	01/13/86	USA	IranIraq	Statement by DPS	-.6931
821	01/15/86	USA	Contra	Shultz at NDU	.0000
823	01/24/86	USA	Afghan	Announcement	-.4055
824	01/24/86	USA	SAfrica	UndSec Speech	-.6931
825	01/28/86	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
826	01/28/86	USA	Yemen2	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.9459
827	01/28/86	USA	Contra	Shultz Meets Contras	1.0986
829	01/30/86	USA	Phil	Statement	-.5108
830	02/04/86	USA	IndoChin	State of the Union	-1.0986
831	02/04/86	USA	Contra	State of the Union	-.8473
1357	02/04/86	USA	Afghan	State of the Union	-1.0986
832	02/05/86	USA	Contra	Shultz to House FAC	.2231
833	02/06/86	USA	Afghan	Exec Forum	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
834	02/06/86	USA	Afghan	Msg to Congress	-1.0986
835	02/06/86	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	-.5108
836	02/06/86	USA	SAfrica	Msg to Congress	-1.6094
837	02/06/86	USA	IndoChin	Msg to Congress	1.0986
838	02/06/86	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.0986
839	02/06/86	USA	IndoChin	Remarks	-1.0986
840	02/06/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to Executive Forum	-.8473
841	02/06/86	USA	Phil	Ron Msg to Congress (WCPD)	.0000
842	02/11/86	USA	Phil	Statement	-.5108
843	02/18/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to Reporters	-.2877
844	02/18/86	USA	Contra	Written Replies	-1.9459
845	02/19/86	USA	Phil	Shultz to Sen Budg Comm	-.2231
846	02/19/86	USA	Afghan	Shultz to Sen Budg Comm	-1.7918
847	02/19/86	USA	Contra	Shultz to Sen Budg Comm	-.3365
848	02/19/86	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to Sen Budg Comm	.0000
849	02/19/86	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to Sen Budg Comm	-1.2993
850	02/19/86	USA	Yemen2	Shultz to Sen Budg Comm	-1.0986
851	02/19/86	USA	SAfrica	Shultz to Sen Budg Comm	.0000
852	02/20/86	USA	Contra	Speech in Granada	-1.0986
853	02/22/86	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.2993
854	02/22/86	USA	Phil	Statement by DPS	1.0986
855	02/23/86	USA	Phil	Statement by DPS	-1.6094
856	02/25/86	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	-.6931
857	02/26/86	USA	Afghan	Address to Nation	-.6931
858	02/26/86	USA	Contra	Address to the Nation	-1.6094
859	02/27/86	USA	Contra	Shultz to Sen FRC	-.1542
860	03/03/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to private Contra aiders	-1.2993
861	03/03/86	USA	Contra	Shultz to VFW	-.3185
862	03/04/86	USA	SAfrica	Statement by DPS	-1.0986
863	03/05/86	USA	Contra	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
864	03/05/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to Jewish Leaders	-.7885
865	03/05/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	.5108
866	03/06/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to GOP	-1.3863
867	03/06/86	USA	Phil	UndSec to House Sub	-.5108
868	03/07/86	USA	Contra	Remarks	.0000
869	03/08/86	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.2993
870	03/10/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to private aiders	.0000
871	03/11/86	USA	Contra	Remarks at Q&A	-1.2993
872	03/12/86	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	-.2877
873	03/12/86	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	-.9163
874	03/12/86	USA	Burma	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
875	03/12/86	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
876	03/12/86	USA	Afghan	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.4700
877	03/12/86	USA	SriLanka	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.2877
878	03/12/86	USA	IndoPak	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.9163
879	03/13/86	USA	SAfrica	DPS Statement	.0000
880	03/13/86	USA	Contra	Remarks	-.6931
881	03/14/86	USA	Yemen2	Message to Congress	-1.0986
882	03/14/86	USA	Afghan	Msg to Congress	-.3365
883	03/14/86	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	-.2877

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
884	03/14/86	USA	IndoChin	Msg to Congress	.1335
885	03/14/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to Private aiders	.0000
886	03/15/86	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.8109
887	03/16/86	USA	Contra	TV Address	-.7885
888	03/18/86	USA	Sudan	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
889	03/18/86	USA	Contra	AsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
890	03/19/86	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	-.6931
891	03/20/86	USA	Contra	Statement on House Vote	-.8473
892	03/21/86	USA	Afghan	Afghan Day Proclamation	.5108
893	03/21/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to Private Aiders	-1.0116
894	03/22/86	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.0116
895	03/25/86	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	.0000
896	03/25/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	.0000
897	03/25/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	-.5108
898	03/26/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	-.5108
1411	03/26/86	USA	Contra	PS Statement	-.5108
899	03/27/86	USA	Contra	Statement	.0000
1412	03/27/86	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-.4700
900	03/29/86	USA	Contra	Radio Address	1.6094
901	04/08/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	1.0986
902	04/08/86	USA	Afghan	UndSec Speech	-.6931
903	04/08/86	USA	Contra	UndSec Speech	-.5108
904	04/08/86	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Speech	-.5108
905	04/08/86	USA	Yemen2	UndSec Speech	-1.0986
906	04/09/86	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
907	04/09/86	IND	IranIraq	PM Statement	-1.0986
908	04/09/86	USA	Contra	Remarks at Q&A	-2.3979
909	04/10/86	USA	IndoChin	Written Replies	1.6094
910	04/10/86	USA	Phil	Written Responses	.9163
911	04/14/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to Asso. General Contrac	.0000
912	04/15/86	IND	Libya	MEA Statement	.5108
913	04/15/86	IND	Libya	PM Statement	.2231
914	04/16/86	USA	Afghan	AsstSec to House Sub	-2.1972
915	04/16/86	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.3863
916	04/16/86	USA	Yemen2	AsstSec to House Sub	-.9808
917	04/16/86	USA	Contra	Law Day Remarks	.0000
919	04/17/86	USA	Contra	DepAsstSec Speech	-.4520
921	04/22/86	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to Heritage Foundation	-.6931
922	04/25/86	IND	SriLanka	PM statement	-1.9459
923	04/26/86	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	1.3863
924	05/01/86	USA	IndoChin	Address to ASEAN	1.9459
925	05/01/86	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Remarks at NewsConf	.6931
2462	05/06/86	USA	IranIraq	PS Statement	-.9808
926	05/12/86	USA	IranIraq	Statement by DPS	-.3365
927	05/13/86	IND	SriLanka	MEA speech	-1.3863
928	05/15/86	USA	Phil	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
930	05/15/86	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Speech	-1.9459
931	05/16/86	USA	Afghan	NSA Speech	.2877
932	05/16/86	USA	Contra	NSA Speech	-1.3863
933	05/16/86	USA	IranIraq	NSA Speech	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
934	05/21/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to GOP	-.2877
2463	05/21/86	USA	IranIraq	Veto Statement	-.6931
935	05/22/86	IND	SAfrica	PM Speech	.0000
936	05/22/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	.9163
937	05/27/86	USA	Contra	Farewell to Pres Honduras	.0000
938	05/27/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	1.0986
939	06/02/86	USA	SAfrica	Shultz Speech	-.5108
940	06/04/86	USA	Phil	Shultz Speech	-.5108
941	06/06/86	USA	Contra	Remarks at WH	-1.2040
942	06/09/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to CSIS	-.5596
943	06/09/86	USA	Contra	Written Response	-.5108
944	06/10/86	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congressmen	.1542
945	06/11/86	USA	Contra	Ron Remarks at NewsConf (WCPD)	-2.3026
946	06/13/86	USA	Contra	AsstSec to IADB	-.6931
947	06/13/86	USA	Contra	Shultz Speech	-.7885
948	06/13/86	USA	SAfrica	Soweto Anniv Statement	.0000
949	06/13/86	USA	Contra	Statement	-.2877
950	06/16/86	IND	SAfrica	MEA Speech	.0000
951	06/16/86	USA	Contra	Remarks at WH	-.6931
952	06/16/86	USA	Afghan	Statement	.0000
953	06/18/86	USA	IranIraq	Ltr to Congress Ldrs	-.3365
954	06/18/86	USA	Contra	Statement	.0000
956	06/23/86	USA	Contra	Statement by DPS	.0000
957	06/23/86	USA	SAfrica	Written reply	.0000
958	06/24/86	USA	Contra	Address to Nation	-.6061
959	06/24/86	USA	Contra	Ltr to Speaker	-.6931
960	06/25/86	USA	Contra	Statement	-.6931
961	06/26/86	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to ASEAN	1.0986
962	06/27/86	USA	Contra	Shultz to ASEAN	-.6931
963	06/27/86	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to ASEAN	.1542
964	07/01/86	USA	Contra	AMB to UNSC	.0000
966	07/16/86	USA	Afghan	Toast Pak PM	1.0986
967	07/16/86	USA	Afghan	Welcome Pak PM	.0000
968	07/21/86	USA	Afghan	Remarks on CapNat Wk	-1.6094
969	07/21/86	USA	Contra	Remarks on CapNatWk	-1.6094
970	07/22/86	USA	SAfrica	Speech to World Affairs Council	-1.0116
971	07/23/86	USA	SAfrica	Shultz to Sen FRC	.1823
972	07/23/86	USA	Contra	Speech at Fundraiser	-.9808
1179	07/23/86	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	-.5108
973	07/24/86	IND	SAfrica	MEA Speech	.6931
974	08/05/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to K of C	-.5108
975	08/12/86	USA	Contra	Ron Remarks at NewsConf (WCPD)	-1.2040
976	08/13/86	USA	Contra	Statement	.0000
978	08/14/86	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.5108
979	09/04/86	USA	SAfrica	Msg to Congress	-1.0986
980	09/09/86	IND	Contra	Pres to Ortega	1.7918
981	09/10/86	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congress Ldrs	-.2877
982	09/15/86	USA	Phil	Written Replies	.5108
983	09/17/86	USA	Phil	Remarks after Mtg Aquino	.5108
984	09/22/86	USA	Afghan	Address to UNGA	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
985	09/22/86	USA	IndoChin	Address to UNGA	-1.0986
986	09/22/86	USA	Contra	Ron to UNGA (WCPD)	-1.0986
987	09/23/86	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.6094
988	09/23/86	USA	Contra	Remarks in WH	-1.6094
989	09/23/86	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to Supporters	-1.0986
990	09/24/86	CAN	SAfrica	Clark to UNGA	1.3863
991	09/25/86	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to Natl Frat Congress	-1.0986
1229	09/25/86	USA	Contra	Remarks to Frat Congress	.0000
992	09/26/86	IND	Afghan	MEA to UNGA	1.0986
993	09/26/86	IND	Contra	MEA to UNGA	1.9459
994	09/26/86	IND	IndoChin	MEA to UNGA	1.0986
995	09/26/86	IND	IranIraq	MEA to UNGA	-1.0986
996	09/26/86	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry statement	.8473
997	09/26/86	USA	Afghan	UndSec Speech	-.1823
998	09/26/86	USA	Contra	UndSec Speech	-.3365
999	09/26/86	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Speech	.0000
1000	09/26/86	USA	SAfrica	Veto Msg	-.3365
1001	10/02/86	USA	SAfrica	Statement	.4055
1003	10/06/86	USA	Afghan	Remarks at WH	-.2231
1004	10/06/86	USA	Phil	UndSec Speech	.6931
1005	10/07/86	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.0986
1006	10/07/86	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to Republicans	-1.0986
1239	10/07/86	USA	Contra	Speech to Govs	-1.0986
1007	10/08/86	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5596
1008	10/08/86	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	-1.0986
1009	10/10/86	CAN	IranIraq	Ministry statement	1.0986
1010	10/13/86	USA	Afghan	Address to the Nation	-1.3863
1011	10/13/86	USA	IndoChin	Address to the Nation	-1.3863
1012	10/13/86	IND	IndoChin	PM in Indonesia	1.3863
1013	10/17/86	USA	Contra	UndSec Address	.5596
1014	10/18/86	USA	Contra	UndSec Address	-.5108
1015	10/18/86	USA	SAfrica	UndSec Address	-1.7918
1016	10/20/86	USA	IndoChin	Amb to UNSC (GOOD)	2.1972
1017	10/24/86	IND	IranIraq	Press Release	-1.0986
1018	10/29/86	USA	IndoChin	Speech	1.3863
1019	11/03/86	USA	Contra	DepAmb to UNGA	.6931
1021	11/03/86	USA	Contra	Shultz Speech	.5108
1022	11/04/86	USA	Afghan	DepAmb to UNGA	1.7918
1023	11/06/86	USA	Sudan	DepAsstSec Speech	1.0986
1026	11/10/86	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congress Ldrs	-.6931
1027	11/11/86	USA	Contra	Shultz to OAS	.3365
1028	11/13/86	USA	IranIraq	Address to the Nation	-2.3979
1029	11/13/86	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.7918
1030	11/15/86	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-2.0794
1031	11/18/86	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.0986
1032	11/18/86	USA	Contra	Speech	-1.0986
1033	11/24/86	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Speech	-.5108
1034	11/25/86	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Speech	-1.0986
1035	12/01/86	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec Speech	-.2877
1036	12/04/86	USA	Contra	Mtg w/Arias	-1.2040

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1037	12/04/86	USA	SAfrica	Shultz Speech	-.2877
2464	12/06/86	USA	IranIraq	Radio Address	-2.1972
1038	12/08/86	IND	SAfrica	MEA statement	.5108
1039	12/08/86	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to House FAC	-1.0116
1043	12/11/86	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec Speech	-.2231
1044	12/27/86	USA	Afghan	7th Anniversary Statement	1.2528
1045	12/27/86	CAN	Afghan	Ministry statement	1.6094
1046	01/11/87	IND	IndoChin	PM in VN	-.2231
1047	01/16/87	IND	Afghan	Statement	1.0986
1048	01/19/87	IND	SAfrica	MEA speech	.0000
1049	01/21/87	IND	SAfrica	MEA speech	.3365
1050	01/23/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement	-.5596
1051	01/24/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.0986
1052	01/27/87	USA	Afghan	Annual Msg to Congress	1.0986
1053	01/27/87	USA	Contra	Annual Msg to Congress	.2877
1054	01/27/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to Sen FRC GOOD	-.7885
1055	01/27/87	USA	Afghan	State of the Union	.4055
1056	01/27/87	USA	Contra	State of the Union	-.8473
1057	01/28/87	USA	SAfrica	Dept Statement	-.2877
1058	02/05/87	USA	Contra	AsstSec to Sen FRC	-.7885
1059	02/05/87	USA	Contra	Envoy to SenFRC	.3365
1060	02/05/87	USA	SAfrica	UndSec to SenSub	-1.0986
1061	02/10/87	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to American Legion	-1.7918
1062	02/10/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks to AmLegion	-1.6094
1063	02/10/87	USA	Contra	Speech to American Legion	-1.9459
1064	02/12/87	USA	Contra	Shultz Speech GOOD	-.7885
1065	02/20/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Speech	-1.6094
1066	02/23/87	IND	Afghan	Pres Address to Parl	1.6094
1067	02/23/87	IND	Contra	Pres Address to Parl	1.0986
1068	02/23/87	IND	SriLanka	Pres Address to Parl	-1.0986
1069	02/23/87	IND	SAfrica	Pres Address to Parl	1.0986
1070	02/25/87	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
1071	02/25/87	USA	Burma	AsstSec to House Sub	-.6931
1072	02/25/87	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
1073	02/25/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement	-.8473
1074	02/28/87	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Speech	-.5596
1075	03/03/87	USA	Contra	Ron Msg to Congress (WCPD)	-.5108
1076	03/05/87	USA	Afghan	DepSec Speech	-1.0986
1077	03/05/87	USA	Contra	Memorandum	.0000
1078	03/06/87	USA	Contra	AsstSec to SenFRC	1.7918
1079	03/07/87	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.3863
1080	03/07/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.0000
1081	03/09/87	CAN	SAfrica	Clark in HOC	-.4055
1082	03/11/87	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.6931
1083	03/12/87	USA	SriLanka	DepAsstSec to HouseSub GOOD!	.5108
1084	03/12/87	USA	Sudan	DepAsstSec to SenSub	-.2231
1085	03/12/87	USA	Liberia1	DepAsstSec to SenSub	-.6931
1086	03/12/87	USA	Uganda	DepAsstSec to SenSub	-1.0986
1087	03/12/87	USA	SAfrica	DepAsstSec to SenSub	-.8473
1088	03/14/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.8473

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1089	03/19/87	IND	SriLanka	Statement by MEA	-1.0986
1090	03/20/87	USA	Afghan	Afghan Day Proclamation	.0000
1091	03/20/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks on Afghan Day	.0000
1092	03/23/87	USA	Afghan	AsstSec to SenSub	-.8473
1093	03/23/87	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to SenSub	-1.2040
1094	03/23/87	USA	SriLanka	AsstSec to SenSub	.9163
1095	03/23/87	USA	Yemen2	AsstSec to SenSub	-.6931
1096	03/25/87	USA	Contra	Asst Sec to SenSub	-.8473
1097	03/30/87	CAN	Afghan	Clark on Pak Attacks	-.5108
1098	03/30/87	USA	Afghan	Exec Forum	-1.3863
1099	03/30/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to Executive Forum	-1.3863
1148	03/30/87	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to Exec Forum	-1.0986
1100	04/02/87	IND	SAfrica	Pres in Angola	.5108
1101	04/06/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to Canadian Parl	-1.6094
1102	04/06/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Canadian Parl	-1.0986
1103	04/10/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks to LA World Aff Council	-.3365
1104	04/10/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to LA World Aff Council	-1.0986
1105	04/10/87	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to LA World Aff Council	-1.0986
1107	04/18/87	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
1108	04/21/87	USA	Contra	AsstSec Speech	-.7885
1109	04/21/87	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-.4055
1110	04/21/87	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	.0000
1111	04/22/87	CAN	SriLanka	Ministry statement	.0000
1112	04/27/87	USA	Afghan	Advisor Speech	1.0986
1113	04/28/87	USA	Contra	AsstSec Speech	-1.2993
1114	04/29/87	USA	Contra	Remarks at Fundraiser	.0000
1115	04/29/87	USA	Afghan	UndSec Address	-.5596
1116	04/29/87	USA	SriLanka	UndSec Address	.0000
1117	04/29/87	USA	IndoPak	UndSec Address	.0000
1118	04/30/87	IND	SriLanka	Statement	.0000
1119	05/01/87	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	.0000
1120	05/03/87	IND	Afghan	EAM in Kabul	.9163
1121	05/03/87	USA	Contra	Speech at Ellis Island	-.6061
1122	05/07/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Remarks	-1.0986
1123	05/08/87	IND	SriLanka	MEA statement	.0000
1124	05/12/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to Council of the Americas	1.0986
1125	05/12/87	USA	IranIraq	Written Replies	.0000
1126	05/13/87	USA	Contra	Remarks with Pres Guatemala	.0000
1127	05/14/87	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Speech	.6931
1128	05/17/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Statement	-1.7918
1129	05/18/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement	-.5108
1130	05/18/87	USA	IranIraq	WH Statement (WCPD)	-1.6094
2465	05/18/87	USA	IranIraq	PS Statement	-1.0986
1131	05/19/87	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec Statement (WCPD)	-.7885
1132	05/19/87	USA	Contra	AsstSec to HouseSub	-1.9459
1133	05/19/87	USA	IranIraq	Remarks at Q&A	-1.6094
1134	05/20/87	USA	IranIraq	Dept Statement	-.2231
1135	05/20/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Ltr to Congress	-.5596
1136	05/21/87	USA	IranIraq	Remarks on E Bill	-.8473
1137	05/22/87	USA	IranIraq	Remarks at Service for Stark	-2.1972

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1138	05/24/87	IND	SAfrica	MEA statement	.5108
1139	05/27/87	IND	SriLanka	MEA Statement	-1.9459
1140	05/27/87	IND	SAfrica	MEA statement	.5108
1141	05/27/87	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Speech	1.0986
1142	05/28/87	IND	SriLanka	PM statement	1.3863
1143	05/29/87	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to Sen FRC	-.4520
1144	05/29/87	CAN	Contra	Ministry statement	-1.3863
1145	05/29/87	USA	IranIraq	Remarks on US Policy	-.6061
1146	05/29/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement by Asst	-.9163
1147	05/29/87	USA	IranIraq	UndSec Address	-1.9459
1149	06/01/87	USA	IranIraq	George C. Marshall Month	-2.1972
1150	06/01/87	IND	SriLanka	Messages to Govt	-1.0986
1151	06/02/87	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
1152	06/03/87	CAN	SriLanka	Ministry statement	-.5108
1153	06/03/87	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
1154	06/03/87	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.3863
1155	06/03/87	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.3863
1159	06/09/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Remarks at NewsConf	.5108
1160	06/15/87	USA	IranIraq	Address to the Nation	-2.1972
1161	06/15/87	USA	SAfrica	UndSec Address	.0000
1162	06/16/87	USA	IranIraq	UndSec to Sen FRC	-.6061
1163	06/17/87	USA	Contra	Statement by Press Asst	.5108
1164	06/22/87	USA	IndoChin	Shultz Statement	-1.0986
1165	06/26/87	IND	SAfrica	Address by MinExtAff	.3365
1166	06/29/87	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	.0000
1167	06/30/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement by Press Asst	-.5878
1168	07/01/87	USA	Afghan	UndSec Speech GOOD!	-1.0986
1169	07/01/87	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Speech GOOD!	-1.0986
1170	07/01/87	USA	IranIraq	UndSec Speech GOOD!	-.7885
1173	07/17/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement post mtg Thatcher	-.5108
1174	07/18/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.8109
1175	07/20/87	CAN	IranIraq	Ministry statement	.6931
1176	07/20/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Statement	.5878
1178	07/20/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement	.1823
1180	07/24/87	USA	Afghan	Captive Nations Conf	.0000
1181	07/24/87	USA	Contra	Speech to CapNat Conf	-1.2993
1182	07/28/87	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5878
1183	07/29/87	IND	SriLanka	PM statement	-.8473
1184	07/29/87	IND	SriLanka	Radio Address	.0000
1185	07/30/87	CAN	SriLanka	Ministry statement	-1.0986
1186	07/31/87	IND	SriLanka	PM on Agreement	-.3365
1187	08/05/87	USA	Contra	Announce Peace Initiative	.2877
1188	08/06/87	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry statement	1.6094
1189	08/08/87	USA	Contra	Statement	.0000
1190	08/12/87	USA	Contra	Address to the Nation	-.9808
1191	08/13/87	USA	Contra	Remarks	.0000
1192	08/14/87	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	-.1542
1193	08/15/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.5108
1194	08/15/87	USA	IranIraq	Radio Address	.5108
1195	08/17/87	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	1.6094

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1196	08/22/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.8473
1197	08/26/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks	.0000
1198	08/26/87	USA	Contra	Remarks	.0000
1199	08/27/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to Contras	.0000
1200	08/29/87	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.6094
1201	08/29/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.9163
1202	08/29/87	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	-1.0986
1203	09/08/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to Appointees	-.2877
1204	09/09/87	IND	Contra	MinExtAff to UNGA	1.0986
1205	09/09/87	IND	IndoChin	MinExtAff to UNGA	1.0986
1206	09/09/87	IND	IranIraq	MinExtAff to UNGA	.0000
1207	09/09/87	IND	SriLanka	MinExtAff to UNGA	.0000
1208	09/09/87	IND	SAfrica	MinExtAff to UNGA	.8473
1209	09/09/87	USA	Afghan	SecSt Arms Control Speech	-.5108
1210	09/09/87	USA	Contra	SecSt Arms Control Speech	-.2231
1212	09/10/87	USA	Phil	DepAsstSec to House Sub GOOD	.5108
1213	09/10/87	USA	Contra	Shultz to Sen FRC	-.4520
1215	09/12/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.8109
1214	09/14/87	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Speech	.9163
1216	09/14/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.5108
1217	09/17/87	USA	Afghan	DepAsstSec to Sen FRC	-1.0986
1218	09/17/87	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to Sen FRC	-1.0986
1219	09/18/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1220	09/20/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.5108
1221	09/21/87	USA	Afghan	Address to UNGA	.6931
1222	09/21/87	USA	Contra	Address to UNGA	.5596
1223	09/21/87	USA	IranIraq	Address to UNGA	-.8473
1224	09/22/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Remarks at NewsConf	.5108
1225	09/22/87	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.6931
1226	09/24/87	USA	IranIraq	Ron Ltr to Congress (WCPD)	-.5108
1227	09/24/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement	-.4520
1228	09/25/87	USA	Contra	Remarks	-1.2993
1230	09/25/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement	.5108
1231	09/28/87	USA	Afghan	Written Response	1.0986
1232	09/29/87	USA	SAfrica	Shultz Speech	-.5596
1233	09/30/87	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to HouseSub	1.9459
1234	10/01/87	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec Speech	.0000
1235	10/01/87	USA	SAfrica	Ltr to Congress	-.5108
1236	10/02/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.5108
1238	10/07/87	USA	Contra	Address to OAS	-.2513
1240	10/08/87	USA	Phil	AsstSec to SenSub GOOD	.5108
1241	10/10/87	USA	Afghan	DepSec Speech	-1.0986
1242	10/13/87	IND	SAfrica	PM to Commonwealth	.5108
1243	10/13/87	USA	Contra	Shultz to House FAC	-.4520
1244	10/14/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1245	10/17/87	USA	IranIraq	Radio Address	-.5108
1246	10/17/87	USA	IranIraq	Shultz Remarks at News Conf	-.5108
1247	10/19/87	USA	IranIraq	Amb Ltr to UNSC	-.5108
1248	10/19/87	USA	IranIraq	SecDef Statement	-1.6094
1249	10/19/87	USA	IranIraq	Statement	-.5108

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1250	10/20/87	USA	IranIraq	Ltr to Congress	-.5108
1251	10/20/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1252	10/20/87	IND	Afghan	PM statement in DC	1.6094
1253	10/20/87	USA	SriLanka	Remarks after mtg Gandhi	-1.0986
1254	10/20/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks w/Gandhi	.2231
1255	10/21/87	CAN	Contra	Clark Toast	.6931
1256	10/22/87	USA	IndoPak	Advisor to House Sub	-2.0794
1257	10/24/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1258	10/26/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1259	10/26/87	USA	IranIraq	Ron Statement (WCPD)	.0000
1260	10/28/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1261	10/28/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks to USMA	-1.0986
1262	10/28/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to West Point	-.5878
1263	10/29/87	IND	SriLanka	MinExtAff statement	.5108
1264	10/30/87	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	.0000
1265	11/01/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1266	11/04/87	USA	Afghan	Address to WEur	.0000
1267	11/05/87	USA	SAfrica	Dept Statement	-1.0986
1268	11/05/87	USA	SAfrica	PS Statement	.0000
1269	11/07/87	USA	Phil	Radio Address	.0000
1270	11/07/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	1.6094
1271	11/09/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks to OAS Reps	-1.0986
1272	11/09/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to OAS Reps	-.8473
1273	11/10/87	USA	Afghan	DepRep to UNGA	.8473
1274	11/10/87	USA	Contra	Shultz to OAS	-.2513
1275	11/12/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-.2877
1276	11/14/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.2877
1277	11/15/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1278	11/16/87	USA	Contra	PS Statement	.2877
1279	11/19/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.5108
1280	11/22/87	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.5108
1281	11/23/87	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	-.3365
1285	11/30/87	USA	Afghan	Heritage Foundation	.0000
1286	11/30/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to Heritage Found	-.5596
1287	12/01/87	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congress	.0000
1288	12/01/87	IND	SAfrica	PM Msg to ANC	-1.0986
1289	12/01/87	USA	Contra	Remarks to HS	-1.9459
1290	12/01/87	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to HS Students	.2231
1291	12/01/87	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Students	.0000
1292	12/02/87	CAN	Contra	Clark in HoC	1.9459
1293	12/02/87	USA	Phil	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
1297	12/04/87	IND	IndoChin	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1298	12/04/87	USA	IndoChin	Written Responses	-.2231
1299	12/05/87	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	.2231
1300	12/05/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.2231
1301	12/05/87	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	1.6094
1302	12/09/87	USA	SAfrica	DepAsstSec Speech	-.6931
1303	12/10/87	USA	IndoChin	Address to the Nation	-1.0986
1304	12/10/87	USA	IranIraq	Address to the Nation	.0000
1305	12/11/87	USA	Contra	Remarks at Q&A	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1307	12/14/87	USA	Intifada	Asst Sec to House Sub	.5108
1308	12/15/87	USA	IranIraq	Asst Sec to House Sub	-.2513
1309	12/16/87	USA	IranIraq	Remarks post mtg w/Italian PM	1.7918
1310	12/17/87	IND	Intifada	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1311	12/19/87	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-2.3979
1312	12/22/87	USA	Intifada	DepAmb to UNSC	1.7918
1313	12/22/87	USA	Contra	Remarks on Bills	-1.0986
1314	12/27/87	USA	Afghan	Anniversary Statement	1.6094
1315	01/05/88	USA	Intifada	DepAmb to UNSC	1.0986
1316	01/19/88	USA	Afghan	Exec Forum	1.0986
1317	01/19/88	USA	Contra	Exec Forum	.5108
1318	01/19/88	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congress	.6931
1319	01/19/88	USA	Contra	PS Statement	.5108
1320	01/19/88	USA	Contra	WH Statement	.6931
1322	01/20/88	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	-.4520
1323	01/22/88	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	-.6061
1324	01/23/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.6931
1325	01/25/88	USA	Afghan	Annual Msg to Congress	.0000
1326	01/25/88	USA	Contra	Annual Msg to Congress	-.6061
1327	01/25/88	USA	IranIraq	Leg Msg to Congress	-.6931
1328	01/25/88	USA	Intifada	Msg to Congress	1.0986
1329	01/25/88	USA	Contra	State of the Union	-.2231
1330	01/25/88	USA	IndoChin	State of the Union	-.4055
1331	01/25/88	USA	Afghan	State of the Union	-.4055
1332	01/26/88	USA	Afghan	Written Response	1.3863
1333	01/26/88	USA	Intifada	Written Responses	.6931
1334	01/26/88	USA	IranIraq	Written replies	.2877
1335	01/27/88	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	-.1335
1336	01/27/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Res Offs	-.4055
1337	01/27/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to Reserve Officers Assn	-.1542
1338	01/27/88	USA	Contra	WH Statement	.5108
1339	01/28/88	USA	IranIraq	Welcome Mubarak	.0000
1340	01/28/88	USA	Intifada	Welcome Mubarak	-.2231
1341	01/29/88	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1342	01/29/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to State Legs	-.2231
1343	01/29/88	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	-.2877
1344	01/30/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.6931
1346	02/01/88	USA	Contra	Speech to Relig Broadcasters	-.8109
1347	02/02/88	USA	Contra	Address to Nation	-.3185
1349	02/02/88	USA	Contra	PS Statement	-.5108
1350	02/02/88	USA	Afghan	Shultz to House FAC	.0000
1351	02/02/88	USA	Contra	Shultz to House FAC	-.2231
1352	02/02/88	USA	IndoChin	Shultz to House FAC	.0000
1353	02/02/88	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to House FAC	-.5596
1354	02/03/88	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congress	.5108
1355	02/03/88	USA	Contra	PS Statement	-1.0986
1356	02/04/88	USA	Contra	PS Statement	-1.0986
1358	02/04/88	USA	Contra	Statement	.2877
1359	02/06/88	IND	Intifada	Ministry Statement	.6931
1360	02/06/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.5108

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1361	02/08/88	IND	Afghan	PM Statement	.0000
1362	02/10/88	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.5108
1363	02/11/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to PACs	-.5108
1364	02/24/88	USA	Contra	Remarks at NewsConf	-.2231
1365	02/24/88	USA	Intifada	Ron Remarks at NewsConf (WCPD)	.0000
1366	02/25/88	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	-.2231
1367	02/25/88	USA	Afghan	UN Amb to House Sub	1.0986
1368	02/25/88	USA	IranIraq	UN Amb to House Sub	1.0986
1369	02/25/88	USA	Intifada	UN Amb to House Sub	1.7918
1370	02/26/88	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	.5108
1371	02/27/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.6931
1372	02/29/88	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.5108
1373	02/29/88	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to American Legion	-1.0986
1374	02/29/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to AmLegion	-1.3863
1375	02/29/88	USA	Contra	Speech to AmLegion	-.6061
1377	03/03/88	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congress	-.8473
1378	03/03/88	USA	Contra	Statement	.0000
1379	03/04/88	USA	Contra	Statement to Congress	.2877
1380	03/07/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to VFW	-.9808
1381	03/09/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-.2231
1382	03/10/88	USA	Afghan	Shultz to House Sub	.2877
1383	03/10/88	USA	Contra	Shultz to House Sub	-.3365
1384	03/10/88	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to House Sub	.5108
1385	03/10/88	USA	SAfrica	Shultz to House Sub	.0000
1386	03/15/88	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	-1.6094
1387	03/15/88	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	-.2877
1388	03/16/88	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	-.6931
1389	03/16/88	IND	Afghan	PM Address	1.3863
1390	03/16/88	IND	IndoChin	PM Address	.0000
1391	03/16/88	IND	SriLanka	PM Address	.0000
1392	03/16/88	USA	Contra	PS Statement	.2877
1393	03/16/88	USA	Intifada	Remarks post talk to Shamir	.0000
1394	03/17/88	IND	SriLanka	MinState in Parl	.5108
1395	03/17/88	USA	Contra	Shultz Statement	-.9163
1396	03/19/88	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	-.2231
1397	03/19/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.4700
1399	03/21/88	USA	Afghan	Afghan Day Proc	.0000
1400	03/21/88	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1401	03/21/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks on Afghan Day	.0000
1402	03/22/88	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec Speech	-.6061
1403	03/22/88	USA	Intifada	AsstSec Speech	-.4055
1404	03/22/88	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-.5108
1405	03/22/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to GOP	-.2877
1406	03/22/88	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	.0000
1407	03/24/88	USA	Afghan	AstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
1408	03/24/88	USA	IranIraq	AstSec to House Sub	-.7885
1409	03/24/88	USA	Intifada	AstSec to House Sub	-.5108
1410	03/24/88	CAN	Contra	Ministry Statement	-.4055
1413	03/30/88	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.0986
1414	03/30/88	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec to House Sub	-.9163

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1415	04/06/88	IND	SriLanka	MinState in Parl	.5108
1416	04/08/88	CAN	Afghan	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1417	04/10/88	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to Broadcasters Assn	-.5108
1418	04/10/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Broadcasters	.0000
1419	04/10/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to Broadcasters Assn	-.5108
1420	04/11/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks on Peace Agmt	-.4055
1421	04/11/88	USA	Afghan	Shultz Statement	.9163
1422	04/13/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to Editors ASSN	.0000
1423	04/13/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to Eds	-1.0986
1424	04/14/88	IND	Afghan	Ministry Statement	-.5108
1425	04/14/88	USA	Afghan	Shultz Statement	1.5041
1426	04/14/88	USA	Afghan	US Statement	1.6094
1427	04/17/88	IND	Intifada	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1428	04/18/88	USA	IranIraq	Ltr to UNSC	-.5108
1429	04/18/88	CAN	IranIraq	Ministry Statement	-.4055
1430	04/18/88	USA	IranIraq	Msg to Iran	-.2877
1431	04/18/88	USA	IranIraq	Ron Remarks (WCPD)	-1.6094
1432	04/18/88	USA	IranIraq	Statement by PS	-.8473
1433	04/19/88	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-1.0986
1434	04/19/88	USA	Afghan	Fundraiser	-1.0986
1435	04/19/88	USA	IranIraq	Ltr to Congress	-.8473
1436	04/19/88	IND	IndoChin	MinState in Parl	-1.0986
1437	04/20/88	IND	Afghan	PM in Parl	.2877
1438	04/20/88	IND	Contra	PM in Parl	1.6094
1439	04/20/88	IND	IranIraq	PM in Parl	1.0986
1440	04/20/88	IND	SriLanka	PM in Parl	-.3365
1441	04/20/88	IND	Intifada	PM in Parl	1.0986
1442	04/20/88	IND	SAfrica	PM in Parl	.6931
1443	04/21/88	USA	Intifada	NSA Statement	.0000
1444	04/21/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.2993
1445	04/21/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to World Aff Council	-.2877
1447	04/23/88	USA	IranIraq	Radio Address	-.5108
1448	04/28/88	USA	IranIraq	Shultz to SenSub	-.1823
1449	04/28/88	USA	SAfrica	Shultz to SenSub	.0000
1450	04/29/88	USA	Contra	Ltr to Congress	.0000
1451	04/29/88	USA	IranIraq	SoD Statement	.5108
1452	05/04/88	IND	Afghan	Pres Speech	-.5596
1453	05/11/88	USA	Contra	Remarks	-1.6094
1454	05/11/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks	-1.9459
1455	05/13/88	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
1456	05/18/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks at USCGA	.0000
1457	05/19/88	USA	IranIraq	Written replies	1.0986
1458	05/20/88	USA	Contra	AID Dir to Sen Sub	-1.0986
1461	05/23/88	USA	IndoChin	Written Replies	.6931
1462	05/23/88	USA	Afghan	Written Responses	-1.0986
1463	05/24/88	USA	Contra	Statement	.2877
1464	05/25/88	USA	Afghan	Asst Sec to House Sub	1.0986
1465	05/25/88	USA	IranIraq	Asst Sec to House Sub	.2231
1466	05/25/88	USA	IranIraq	Remarks	1.0986
1467	05/26/88	IND	IndoChin	Statement	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1468	05/26/88	IND	SAfrica	Statement on OAU	1.6094
1469	05/28/88	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	1.0986
1470	05/31/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Q&A	-.2231
1471	06/01/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks at NewsConf	-.2231
1472	06/04/88	IND	Afghan	PM Speech	-.4055
1473	06/04/88	IND	IranIraq	PM Speech	1.3863
1474	06/04/88	IND	Intifada	PM Speech	1.7918
1475	06/04/88	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
1476	06/06/88	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to World Gas Conf	-1.0986
1477	06/06/88	USA	Afghan	Speech to World Gas Conf	-1.0986
1478	06/07/88	IND	Afghan	PM Speech	.2877
1479	06/07/88	IND	SAfrica	PM Speech	.8473
1480	06/07/88	IND	Afghan	PM Speech	.2231
1482	06/07/88	IND	IndoChin	PM Speech	-.4055
1483	06/07/88	IND	SriLanka	PM Speech	-.5108
1484	06/07/88	IND	Intifada	PM Speech	1.3863
1485	06/07/88	IND	SAfrica	PM Speech	1.6094
1486	06/10/88	IND	Afghan	PM Speech	1.3863
1487	06/10/88	IND	SriLanka	PM Speech	-1.6094
1488	06/10/88	USA	Contra	PS Statement	.0000
1489	06/13/88	USA	Phil	Remarks to Atlantic Council	1.9459
1490	06/15/88	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	.2231
1491	06/18/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.0986
1496	06/22/88	USA	SAfrica	DepSec to Sen FRC	-1.0986
1497	06/22/88	USA	Afghan	UndSec Speech	-.3365
1498	06/22/88	USA	IndoChin	UndSec Speech	.0000
1500	06/23/88	USA	Afghan	UndSec to Sen FRC	-.3365
1501	06/24/88	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1502	06/24/88	USA	IndoChin	POW Medal	.2231
1503	06/24/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks	.2231
1504	06/24/88	USA	Contra	Remarks	-.9163
1505	06/28/88	USA	Intifada	WH Statement	.4055
1506	06/29/88	USA	Afghan	Fundraiser	-1.0986
1507	06/29/88	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-.2877
1508	07/03/88	IND	IranIraq	PM msg to Iran	-.2231
1509	07/04/88	IND	IranIraq	Ministry statement	-.2231
1512	07/06/88	USA	IranIraq	Ltr to UNSC	-.5108
1513	07/06/88	IND	Afghan	Pres Speech	-.5108
1514	07/06/88	IND	SriLanka	Pres Speech	-1.0986
1515	07/10/88	USA	Contra	WH Statement (WCPD)	1.0986
1516	07/11/88	IND	Afghan	Pres Speech	1.0986
1517	07/11/88	IND	IranIraq	Pres Speech	1.0986
1518	07/11/88	IND	SriLanka	Pres Speech	-.5108
1519	07/11/88	IND	Intifada	Pres Speech	1.7918
1520	07/11/88	USA	IranIraq	Statement by PS	-.6931
1521	07/12/88	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	1.3863
1522	07/12/88	IND	SriLanka	Ministry statement	.2877
1523	07/12/88	USA	IranIraq	Remarks after mtg PM Kuwait	.8473
1524	07/12/88	USA	Intifada	Remarks post talk w/PM Kuwait	.0000
1525	07/12/88	USA	Phil	Shultz Remarks at News Conf	-.6931

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
965	07/13/88	USA	IranIraq	Ast Sec Statement	-.3365
1527	07/13/88	USA	Afghan	Captive Nations Week Remarks	-1.0986
1528	07/13/88	USA	Contra	Remarks on CapNatWk	-2.3026
1529	07/13/88	USA	IndoChin	Remarks on Captive Nations Week	-.5108
1530	07/14/88	USA	Contra	Amb to OAS	.5108
1531	07/14/88	USA	IranIraq	Bush to UNSC	-.1335
1532	07/14/88	IND	SAfrica	PM Speech	1.0986
1533	07/14/88	IND	IranIraq	PM Speech	1.0986
1534	07/14/88	IND	SAfrica	PM Speech	1.0986
1535	07/15/88	USA	Contra	PS Statement	-.5108
1536	07/17/88	IND	Afghan	PM Speech	1.6094
1537	07/17/88	IND	IranIraq	PM Speech	.0000
1538	07/17/88	IND	Intifada	PM Speech	1.0986
1510	07/18/88	IND	IranIraq	Ministry statement	1.0986
1540	07/18/88	CAN	IranIraq	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1541	07/18/88	IND	SAfrica	PM msg	.4055
1542	07/18/88	USA	SAfrica	PS Statement	.0000
1543	07/18/88	IND	SAfrica	VP speech	1.3863
1544	07/27/88	USA	IranIraq	AsstSec to House Sub	.3365
1545	07/30/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	.0000
1546	08/02/88	USA	IndoChin	Dep Asst Sec to Sen Sub	.5596
1548	08/03/88	USA	Contra	WH Briefing	-.8109
1549	08/06/88	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
1550	08/06/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.0986
1551	08/08/88	USA	Peru	Shultz Statement	.2231
1552	08/09/88	CAN	IranIraq	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1553	08/12/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to Appointees	-1.6094
1554	08/13/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-1.6094
1555	08/15/88	USA	Afghan	GOP Convention	-1.0986
1556	08/27/88	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-1.0986
1557	08/27/88	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.6094
1558	08/27/88	USA	Contra	Radio Address	-.2877
1559	08/27/88	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	-1.0986
1560	09/01/88	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	.0000
1561	09/06/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to AmLegion	-1.6094
1562	09/06/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to AmLegion	-1.0986
1563	09/13/88	USA	Afghan	WH Statement	1.0986
1564	09/14/88	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	-1.0986
1565	09/15/88	USA	Contra	Remarks at WH	.2877
1566	09/19/88	CAN	Burma	Ministry Statement	-.5108
1567	09/19/88	USA	Afghan	UndSec Speech	-.3365
1568	09/20/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to JCs	-1.0986
1569	09/22/88	USA	Contra	Campaign Speech	-1.0986
1570	09/22/88	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-2.1972
1571	09/23/88	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-1.0986
1572	09/24/88	USA	Afghan	Radio Address	-1.0986
1573	09/24/88	USA	IndoChin	Radio Address	-1.0986
1574	09/26/88	USA	Afghan	Address to UNGA	2.1972
1575	09/26/88	USA	Contra	Address to UNGA	.2231
1576	09/26/88	USA	IndoChin	UN Address	1.3863

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1577	09/29/88	USA	IndoChin	OffDir Speech	.8473
1602	09/30/88	USA	Contra	Fundraiser	-.2231
1578	10/01/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Georgetown	-1.0986
1579	10/04/88	USA	SAfrica	Shultz to OAU	-1.3863
1580	10/06/88	USA	Afghan	Shultz Address	-.2231
1581	10/06/88	USA	WSahara	Welcome Pres of Mali	1.0986
1583	10/14/88	USA	Contra	Statement	.0000
1584	10/17/88	CAN	Sudan	Ministry Statement	.4055
1585	10/18/88	USA	IndoChin	Sign Free Cambodia Bill	.0000
1586	10/25/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks to NDU	-1.0986
1587	10/25/88	USA	IndoChin	Remarks to NDU	-1.0986
1588	10/25/88	USA	Contra	Statement to NDU	.0000
1589	10/28/88	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Statement	.0000
1590	10/28/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Q&A	-1.0986
1591	10/28/88	USA	Contra	Remarks at Q&A	-.5108
1593	11/03/88	USA	Afghan	Amb to UNGA	1.7918
1594	11/03/88	USA	IndoChin	Amb to UNGA	.8473
1595	11/09/88	USA	Contra	Letter to Congress	.0000
1596	11/09/88	USA	Afghan	PS Statement	-1.0986
1598	11/18/88	IND	Afghan	Pres speech for Gorby	.0000
1600	11/21/88	IND	Afghan	PM in Parl	-1.7918
1601	11/22/88	IND	SriLanka	MEA in Parl	.2877
1603	12/07/88	USA	Contra	Remarks to AEI	.4055
1604	12/08/88	USA	Intifada	AsstSec Address	.0000
1605	12/08/88	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1606	12/16/88	USA	Afghan	Remarks at Q&A	-.2231
1609	12/27/88	USA	Afghan	Anniversary Statement	-1.0986
1610	01/05/89	IND	Libya	Statement	1.0986
1613	01/13/89	IND	IndoChin	Statement	-1.0986
1615	02/07/89	USA	Sudan	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.0000
1616	02/07/89	USA	Uganda	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.4055
1618	02/07/89	IND	Afghan	Statement	.4055
1619	02/08/89	USA	Sudan	Baker Statement & Fact Sheet	.0000
1620	02/09/89	USA	Contra	Address to Congress	1.0986
1622	02/16/89	CAN	Afghan	W/Drawal	1.0986
1623	02/16/89	USA	Contra	Written Replies	.5108
1625	02/25/89	USA	IndoChin	Remarks at News Conf	1.0986
1626	02/27/89	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	-1.5041
1627	02/27/89	USA	IndoChin	Remarks on Trip to Far East	1.3863
1629	03/01/89	USA	IndoChin	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.0000
1630	03/02/89	USA	Burma	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
1632	03/06/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	.0000
1633	03/07/89	USA	Phil	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
1634	03/08/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-.2231
1635	03/10/89	IND	Intifada	Visit of PLO	-.2231
1636	03/13/89	USA	Sudan	Statement on the War	-1.0986
1637	03/22/89	USA	Intifada	Amb Statement	.0000
1638	03/24/89	USA	Contra	Baker Statement	1.0986
1639	03/24/89	USA	Contra	Bipartisan Accord	.0000
1640	03/24/89	USA	Contra	Statement	.0000

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1641	03/24/89	USA	Contra	Statement	-.3365
1642	03/29/89	IND	IndoChin	PM honor Thai PM	.5108
1643	03/31/89	USA	Contra	Remarks at Q&A	1.0986
1644	04/03/89	USA	Intifada	Remarks post talk to Mubarak	.2877
1645	04/04/89	USA	Intifada	Toast Mubarak	.0000
1646	04/05/89	CAN	IndoChin	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1647	04/05/89	USA	Contra	PS Statement	-.2877
1648	04/06/89	IND	IndoChin	Ministry Statement	.0000
1649	04/06/89	USA	Intifada	Remarks post talk to Shamir	-1.0986
1650	04/11/89	IND	Intifada	Pres Speech	.4055
1651	04/11/89	IND	SAfrica	Pres Speech	1.0986
1652	04/14/89	USA	Contra	Baker Address	1.0986
1653	04/14/89	USA	Intifada	Baker Address	-.2231
1654	04/18/89	USA	Contra	Remarks on Bill	.1823
1656	04/21/89	USA	Contra	Letter to Congress	.0000
1657	04/21/89	USA	Contra	Letter to Congress	.0000
1658	04/24/89	USA	Contra	Remarks to AP	-1.0986
1659	04/25/89	USA	Contra	Dept Statement	.0000
1660	05/02/89	USA	Contra	Remarks to Council of Americas	.0000
1661	05/04/89	IND	Intifada	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1662	05/05/89	USA	Sudan	Dept Statement	-1.0986
1663	05/05/89	USA	Contra	WH Statement	1.3863
1664	05/12/89	USA	Contra	Texas A&M Commencement	.4055
1665	05/22/89	USA	Intifada	Baker Speech	.0000
1666	05/23/89	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-1.6094
1667	06/02/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	.0000
1668	06/06/89	USA	SAfrica	Amb Remarks	-.6931
1669	06/06/89	USA	IndoPak	Bush w/Bhutto	-1.0986
1670	06/07/89	IND	SriLanka	Pres in Zimbabwe	.0000
1671	06/07/89	IND	SAfrica	Pres in Zimbabwe	.2877
1672	06/09/89	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Statement	.0000
1673	06/09/89	USA	IndoChin	PS Statement	.2231
1674	06/15/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	.0000
1675	06/16/89	CAN	Sudan	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1676	06/16/89	IND	SAfrica	Statement	.5108
1677	06/26/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	.5108
1678	06/27/89	USA	IndoChin	Welcome Australia PM	.2231
1679	06/28/89	CAN	Contra	Ministry Statement	.0000
1680	06/30/89	USA	SAfrica	Mtg w/Sisulu	.2877
1681	07/04/89	USA	Phil	Baker Address	.9163
1682	07/06/89	USA	IndoChin	Baker Address	1.7918
1684	07/07/89	USA	IndoChin	Baker Address	1.9459
1685	07/07/89	CAN	Intifada	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1687	07/15/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
1688	07/19/89	USA	Contra	Statement	1.3863
1689	07/21/89	USA	IndoChin	Captive Nations Proclamation	-1.0986
1690	07/21/89	USA	IndoChin	Remarks Captive Nations	1.0986
1692	07/26/89	CAN	IndoChin	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1693	07/27/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-.9163
1694	07/28/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1695	07/30/89	USA	IndoChin	Baker Statement	1.9459
1696	07/30/89	CAN	IndoChin	Clark at Peace Conference	1.9459
1697	07/31/89	IND	IndoChin	EA at Peace Conf	1.9459
1698	08/02/89	USA	Afghan	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.2231
1699	08/07/89	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
1700	08/07/89	IND	IndoChin	MinSt in Parl	1.3863
1702	08/09/89	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1703	08/10/89	CAN	SAfrica	Clark ltr to Botha	.5108
1704	08/17/89	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1705	08/23/89	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1706	08/27/89	CAN	IndoChin	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1707	08/31/89	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	.2231
1709	09/05/89	IND	IndoChin	PM at NAM	.2231
1710	09/05/89	IND	Intifada	PM at NAM	1.0986
1711	09/05/89	IND	SAfrica	PM at NAM	.5108
1712	09/07/89	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Statement	.0000
1716	09/07/89	USA	SAfrica	Dept Statement	.0000
1713	09/08/89	USA	IndoChin	AsstSec Address	.5596
1714	09/13/89	USA	Burma	Dep Asst Sec to Sub	.2877
1715	09/15/89	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Statement	.0000
1717	09/28/89	CAN	Contra	Ministry Statement	.0000
1718	10/03/89	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to Sen Sub	.5108
1719	10/05/89	IND	Contra	EAM to UNGA	.2231
1720	10/05/89	IND	Intifada	EAM to UNGA	1.6094
1721	10/05/89	IND	SAfrica	EAM to UNGA	.2877
1722	10/11/89	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-.2877
1723	10/11/89	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	.0000
1724	10/12/89	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	.0000
1725	10/25/89	USA	Contra	Msg to Congress	-.4055
1726	10/28/89	USA	Contra	Remarks at NewsConf	1.0986
1727	10/30/89	CAN	Contra	Ministry Statement	1.6094
1728	11/02/89	USA	Contra	Remarks w/Duarte	.2877
1729	11/08/89	USA	Contra	PS Statement	.0000
1730	11/09/89	USA	Phil	Welcome Aquino	-.5108
1731	11/15/89	USA	Intifada	PS Statement	.0000
1732	12/12/89	CAN	SAfrica	Landry to UN Special	.5108
1733	12/12/89	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.3863
1734	12/20/89	CAN	Panama	Clark in HOC	.6931
1735	12/20/89	CAN	Panama	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1736	01/03/90	USA	Contra	PS Statement	.0000
1737	01/15/90	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Speech	.5108
1738	01/24/90	USA	Contra	Letter to Parties	.0000
1739	02/02/90	CAN	SAfrica	Clark Statement	.0000
1740	02/07/90	USA	Contra	PS Statement	.0000
1741	02/08/90	CAN	Contra	Ministry Statement	1.6094
1742	02/10/90	USA	SAfrica	PS statement	-1.0986
1743	02/10/90	USA	SAfrica	Statement	.0000
1744	02/11/90	IND	SAfrica	Press release	-.2231
1745	02/26/90	USA	Contra	Statement	1.6094
1747	04/04/90	USA	SAfrica	Remarks	.0000

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1748	05/22/90	USA	Intifada	PS Statement	.0000
1749	05/29/90	CAN	Contra	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1750	06/07/90	CAN	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1751	06/07/90	USA	SAfrica	PS Statement	.0000
1752	06/20/90	USA	Intifada	Remarks at News Conf	.0000
1753	06/25/90	USA	SAfrica	Remarks pre Mandela	.0000
1754	06/29/90	CAN	Contra	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1755	06/29/90	USA	Intifada	Remarks on Bill	.0000
1756	07/17/90	IND	SriLanka	Visit by delegation	-.8473
1757	07/28/90	CAN	Intifada	Ministry Statement	.0000
1758	08/01/90	CAN	Liberia2	Ministry Statement	.5108
1759	08/01/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.9459
1760	08/02/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	.5108
1761	08/02/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.5108
1762	08/02/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.4055
1763	08/02/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Aspen	.0000
1764	08/02/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Reporters	-.5108
1765	08/02/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks w/Thatcher	1.0986
1766	08/03/90	USA	Kuwait	Msg to Congress	-.8473
1767	08/03/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Reporters	1.6094
1768	08/04/90	CAN	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
1769	08/04/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	.0000
1770	08/05/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.0000
1771	08/05/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Reporters	.0000
1772	08/05/90	USA	Liberia2	Statement by PS	-1.6094
1773	08/06/90	USA	SAfrica	PS Statement	-1.0986
1774	08/06/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Reporters	1.0986
1775	08/08/90	USA	Kuwait	Address to the Nation	-1.0986
1776	08/08/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	1.6094
1777	08/08/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1778	08/08/90	CAN	Kuwait	Press Conf statement	-.6931
1779	08/09/90	USA	Kuwait	Ltr to Congress	-.5878
1780	08/09/90	USA	Kuwait	Ltr to Congress	1.6094
1781	08/10/90	CAN	Kuwait	Press Conf notes	.8473
1782	08/10/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.0000
1783	08/11/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	-1.0986
1784	08/12/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.6931
1785	08/15/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to DOD	-.5878
1786	08/16/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at NewsConf	1.6094
1787	08/16/90	IND	Kuwait	Visit to DC, Moscow	-.5108
1788	08/18/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	.5108
1789	08/18/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.5108
1790	08/20/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-.5108
1791	08/20/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to VFW	-.5878
1792	08/22/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at NewsConf	1.9459
1793	08/25/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.6094
1794	08/27/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	.2231
1795	08/28/90	USA	Kuwait	Bush to Congress (WCPD)	-1.0116
1834	08/28/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at WH Brf	-.7885
1796	08/29/90	USA	Kuwait	Radio Address to Troops	.0000

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1797	08/30/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at NewsConf	.0000
1798	09/04/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker to House FAC	.1178
1799	09/06/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-.5596
1800	09/06/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.4055
1801	09/07/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.2877
1802	09/08/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks in Finland	2.1972
1803	09/08/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks in Finland	.2877
1804	09/10/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker Remarks at News Conf	.6931
1805	09/10/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.0986
1806	09/10/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.6094
1807	09/11/90	USA	Kuwait	Address to Congress	-.3185
1808	09/14/90	CAN	Kuwait	Press Conf	.3365
1809	09/14/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Judges	1.7918
1810	09/14/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Reporters	.2231
1811	09/15/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker statement at Press Conf	1.6094
1812	09/16/90	USA	Kuwait	Address to Iraq	2.0794
1813	09/17/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	-.4055
1814	09/18/90	USA	Kuwait	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5596
1815	09/18/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	2.1972
1816	09/18/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.6931
1817	09/19/90	USA	Kuwait	AsstSec to House Sub	.8473
1818	09/19/90	USA	Kuwait	AsstSec to House Sub	2.1972
1819	09/19/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	1.9459
1820	09/19/90	USA	Kuwait	DepSec to House Sub	-.5108
1821	09/21/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	-.6931
1822	09/21/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at News Conf	-.5108
1823	09/24/90	CAN	Kuwait	Address in HoC	.4700
1824	09/24/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	.1823
1825	09/24/90	USA	SAfrica	Remarks w/DeClerk	.0000
1826	09/25/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker to UNSC	2.1972
1827	09/25/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to IMF	1.3863
1828	09/25/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks after mtg Ozal	1.9459
1829	09/26/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-.5596
1830	09/26/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-.1823
1831	09/27/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	2.1972
1832	09/27/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.5108
1833	09/28/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks after mtg Emir	.5596
1835	10/01/90	USA	Kuwait	Address to UNGA	1.2040
1836	10/03/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	-1.3863
1837	10/05/90	CAN	Burma	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1838	10/05/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	1.3863
1839	10/08/90	CAN	Intifada	Ministry Statement	1.0986
1840	10/09/90	USA	Kuwait	AsstSec to House Sub	.2877
1841	10/09/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.0000
1842	10/10/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-1.0986
1843	10/10/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-1.0986
1844	10/10/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.5108
1845	10/10/90	USA	Kuwait	UN Day Proc	1.6094
1846	10/11/90	USA	Kuwait	WH Briefing	.6931
1847	10/15/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-.1542

(Continued on Next Page)

Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1848	10/15/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	1.6094
1849	10/16/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.0000
1850	10/16/90	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Letters to MPs	1.6094
1851	10/17/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker to SenFRC	.0000
1852	10/18/90	USA	SAfrica	PS Statement	-1.0986
1853	10/19/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to ItalAm	-.6931
1854	10/23/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	1.2528
1855	10/23/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.8473
1856	10/23/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.3365
1857	10/25/90	USA	Sudan	ActAsstSec to Sub	.5108
1858	10/25/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.1823
1859	10/25/90	CAN	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-.4055
1860	10/26/90	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Speech	.6931
1861	10/28/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Troops	1.9459
1862	10/29/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker Speech	-.3567
1863	10/29/90	USA	Kuwait	UN Amb to UNSC	.8473
1864	10/31/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.8473
1865	11/01/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.3365
1866	11/01/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.3365
1867	11/01/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at NewsConf	1.9459
1868	11/02/90	USA	SriLanka	AsstSec to House FAC	.0000
1869	11/02/90	USA	IndoPak	AsstSec to House FAC	-1.6094
1870	11/02/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.1823
1871	11/02/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.9808
1872	11/03/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-.5108
1873	11/03/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	-.1823
1874	11/04/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker to troops	.0000
1875	11/05/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.4055
1876	11/05/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.8473
1877	11/05/90	USA	Kuwait	Campaign Speech	.6931
1878	11/08/90	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Speech	.6931
1879	11/08/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at NewsConf	.0000
1880	11/10/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker Remarks at News Conf	.5108
1881	11/10/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	1.6094
1882	11/11/90	CAN	Kuwait	Address - Military Museum	.5878
1883	11/13/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.0986
1884	11/13/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks in Italy	1.0986
1885	11/13/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to GOP	-.1542
1886	11/15/90	IND	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	-1.6094
1887	11/16/90	USA	Kuwait	Ltr to Congress	1.9459
1888	11/17/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Czech Assy	-1.0986
1889	11/20/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.0986
1890	11/21/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	1.3863
1891	11/21/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	1.3863
1892	11/22/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to MAC	-.4700
1893	11/22/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Troops	.1178
1894	11/22/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Troops	.0000
1895	11/23/90	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.0986
1896	11/23/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	1.6094
1897	11/27/90	USA	Sudan	AsstSec to SenSub	-1.0986

(Continued on Next Page)

Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1898	11/27/90	USA	Liberia2	AsstSec to SenSub	1.6094
1899	11/28/90	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Speech	1.0986
1900	11/29/90	IND	Intifada	Palestinian Solidarity Day	1.9459
1902	11/29/90	CAN	Kuwait	Address in HoC	.5878
1903	11/29/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker Remarks at News Conf	1.3863
1904	11/29/90	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Speech to UNSC	2.0794
1905	11/29/90	USA	Kuwait	Quayle Speech	-.3185
1907	11/29/90	USA	Kuwait	Statement on UNSC Res	1.7918
1908	11/30/90	USA	Kuwait	Bush at News Conf (WCPD)	.1335
1909	11/30/90	USA	Kuwait	Written Responses	1.6094
1910	12/02/90	IND	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	.0000
1911	12/04/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Uruguayan Congress	1.6094
1912	12/05/90	USA	Kuwait	Baker to Senate FRC	-.1178
1913	12/05/90	USA	Kuwait	Bush in Argentina (WCPD)	1.3863
1914	12/06/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Chilean Congress	1.6094
1915	12/09/90	CAN	Kuwait	Ministry Statement	.0000
1916	12/10/90	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Speech	.9163
1917	12/10/90	USA	Kuwait	HR Day Proc	1.9459
1919	12/14/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	1.0986
1920	12/17/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	1.6094
1922	12/18/90	USA	Kuwait	Quayle speech	-.1335
1923	12/18/90	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at NewsConf	1.3863
1924	12/20/90	USA	Intifada	UN Amb to UNSC	.6931
1925	12/24/90	USA	Kuwait	Msg to Troops	-.9163
1926	01/01/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	-.6931
1927	01/02/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	.0000
1928	01/03/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker Remarks on New Ambassador	1.6094
1929	01/03/91	USA	Kuwait	Bush Radio Address (WCPD)	1.0986
1930	01/04/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	1.3863
1931	01/04/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	.0000
1933	01/05/91	USA	Kuwait	Radio Address	-.5878
1948	01/05/91	USA	Kuwait	Ltr to Saddam	1.7918
1934	01/08/91	USA	Kuwait	Ltr to Congress	.6931
1935	01/08/91	USA	Kuwait	Msg to Allied Nations	.1823
1936	01/09/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker Remarks at NewsConf	1.6094
1937	01/09/91	USA	Kuwait	Bush Remarks at News Conf	1.3863
1938	01/09/91	USA	Kuwait	Open Letter to Students	-.1823
1939	01/09/91	USA	Kuwait	Quayle Speech in LA	-.4520
1940	01/09/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at News Conf	1.6094
1941	01/09/91	USA	Liberia2	Statement by PS	1.6094
1942	01/10/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.6094
1943	01/11/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker in Saudi	-.1542
1945	01/11/91	IND	Kuwait	Parliamentary release	1.0986
1946	01/11/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	-1.6094
1947	01/12/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker to Japan	1.0986
1949	01/12/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at News Conf	1.6094
1950	01/14/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker Remarks at Q&A	1.3863
1951	01/14/91	CAN	Kuwait	Speech by Clark to Senate	.6931
1953	01/15/91	CAN	Kuwait	Mulroney address to HoC	1.2993
1954	01/16/91	USA	Kuwait	Address to the Nation	.5596

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
1955	01/17/91	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
1956	01/18/91	USA	Kuwait	Ltr to Congress	.5108
1957	01/18/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at News Conf	.5108
1958	01/20/91	USA	Kuwait	Dept Statement	1.3863
1952	01/21/91	CAN	Kuwait	Clark speech to HoC	1.9459
1959	01/21/91	USA	Kuwait	DepSec Statement	.4055
1960	01/21/91	USA	Kuwait	Dept Statement	1.0986
1961	01/23/91	USA	Kuwait	Speech to Res Off Assn	.5596
1962	01/24/91	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Speech to Def Assn Inst	.6931
1963	01/25/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker Statement	1.6094
1964	01/26/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker Statement	1.6094
1965	01/28/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Relig Broadcasters	1.9459
1966	01/29/91	CAN	Kuwait	Clark Address to HoC	.9163
1967	01/29/91	USA	Kuwait	State of the Union	1.2528
1968	02/01/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to MCAS	1.9459
1969	02/01/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Ft Stewart	.5108
1970	02/01/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to SJAFB	1.3863
1971	02/04/91	CAN	Kuwait	Speech by Clark	2.0794
1972	02/05/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at News Conf	1.6094
1973	02/06/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker to House FAC	1.0986
1974	02/06/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Q&A	1.6094
1975	02/06/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks on signing bills	.2231
1976	02/07/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.0986
1977	02/07/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.3863
1978	02/08/91	CAN	Kuwait	Clark & Mulroney	1.6094
1979	02/08/91	CAN	Kuwait	Speech by Clark	1.9459
1980	02/08/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	-.2231
1981	02/08/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.3863
1982	02/08/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	-.2877
1983	02/09/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.7918
1984	02/11/91	USA	Kuwait	Ltr to Congress	1.7918
1985	02/13/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.0986
1986	02/14/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.3863
1987	02/15/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.3863
1988	02/15/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Am Assn for Adv Science	1.6094
1989	02/15/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Raytheon	1.6094
1990	02/15/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.3863
1991	02/16/91	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
1993	02/20/91	USA	Kuwait	Baker Remarks for Queen Denmark	1.6094
1994	02/20/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks Welcome Queen Denmark	1.3863
1995	02/20/91	CAN	Kuwait	Speech by Clark	1.0986
1996	02/20/91	USA	Kuwait	Toast Queen Denmark	-.4055
1997	02/21/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.6094
1998	02/22/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.6094
1999	02/22/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks	1.6094
2000	02/23/91	USA	Kuwait	Address to the Nation	1.6094
2001	02/23/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.3863
2002	02/23/91	USA	Kuwait	Statement	1.0986
2003	02/25/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.6094
2004	02/25/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks on Black History Month	1.9459

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2005	02/25/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.0986
2006	02/26/91	USA	Kuwait	Address to the Nation	1.6094
2007	02/26/91	USA	Kuwait	PS Statement	1.3863
2008	02/27/91	USA	Kuwait	Address to the Nation	1.7918
2009	02/28/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks to Reporters	.2877
2010	02/28/91	IND	Kuwait	Statement	1.6094
2012	03/01/91	USA	Kuwait	Remarks at Press Conf	-.4055
2013	03/01/91	CAN	Kuwait	Speech by Clark	1.9459
2014	03/02/91	CAN	Kuwait	Clark	1.0986
2015	03/02/91	USA	Kuwait	Radio Address to Troops	-.4055
2016	03/06/91	USA	Intifada	Address to Congress	1.0986
2018	04/10/91	IND	SriLanka	Statement	-1.0986
2019	04/17/91	CAN	SAfrica	Clark to Comm	.2877
2021	04/30/91	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
2022	05/14/91	USA	Sudan	ActAsstSec to SenSub	.0000
2023	05/14/91	USA	Somalia	ActAsstSec to SenSub	.0000
2024	05/16/91	CAN	SAfrica	McDougall statement	.0000
2025	05/22/91	USA	Intifada	Baker to House Sub	-1.0986
2026	05/24/91	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	.0000
2027	06/17/91	CAN	SAfrica	McDougall statement	-.4055
2028	06/26/91	USA	Yugoslav	Baker Speech	1.6094
2029	06/27/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2030	06/27/91	IND	Yugoslav	Statement by Dept	.0000
2031	06/29/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2032	07/02/91	USA	Yugoslav	PS Statement	1.6094
2033	07/03/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall support CSCE	1.3863
2034	07/16/91	USA	Liberia2	BurDir to House Sub	-1.0986
2036	07/18/91	USA	Yugoslav	Address to Greek Parliament	1.6094
2037	07/18/91	CAN	WSahara	McDougall statement	1.0986
2038	07/25/91	USA	Intifada	Remarks	-.4055
2039	07/30/91	IND	SriLanka	Statement by MinExt Aff	-1.6094
2040	07/31/91	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
2041	08/28/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2042	08/29/91	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	.5108
2043	09/05/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2044	09/06/91	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.6094
2045	09/11/91	USA	Yugoslav	Baker to CSCE	1.0986
2046	09/12/91	USA	Peru	AsstSec to House Sub	-.8473
2047	09/13/91	CAN	SAfrica	McDougall to Commonwealth	1.6094
2048	09/17/91	USA	Peru	Remarks w/ Fujimori	-.2231
2049	09/25/91	USA	Yugoslav	Baker to UNSC	.8473
2050	09/25/91	USA	Liberia2	WH Statement (WCPD)	1.6094
2051	09/26/91	USA	WSahara	Toast King Hassan	-1.0986
2052	09/26/91	USA	WSahara	Welcome King Hassan	1.0986
2053	10/02/91	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	.6931
2054	10/04/91	USA	Yugoslav	PS Statement	1.0986
2055	10/07/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall appeal	.0000
2057	10/14/91	USA	Burma	Statement by PS on ASSK's Nobel	1.0986
2059	10/17/91	USA	Yugoslav	DepAsstSec to Sen FRC	.0000
2058	10/18/91	USA	Burma	DepAsstSec to House Sub	-.2877

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2060	10/23/91	CAN	IndoChin	Sign Peace	1.6094
2061	10/25/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2063	10/30/91	USA	Intifada	Remarks at Peace Conf	.0000
2064	11/01/91	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.3863
2065	11/08/91	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	.4055
2066	11/09/91	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks	1.6094
2067	11/09/91	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at News Conf	1.0986
2068	11/12/91	USA	Burma	Remarks to Asia Society	.2231
2069	11/13/91	USA	Liberia2	Memo	.2231
2070	11/15/91	CAN	Burma	McDougall statement on ASSN	.0000
2466	11/18/91	CAN	Yugoslav	SecState in HOC	.0000
2071	11/19/91	IND	Intifada	PM msg to Arafat	-1.0986
2073	11/20/91	USA	Intifada	Official to House Sub	-1.0986
2074	11/27/91	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.6094
2075	11/29/91	IND	Intifada	Ministry Statement	1.3863
2076	12/05/91	USA	Somalia	State Dept Statement	-1.0986
2077	12/11/91	USA	Yugoslav	Statement	1.0986
2078	12/12/91	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks	1.0986
2079	12/13/91	USA	Burma	Dept Statement	1.0986
2080	01/02/92	USA	Yugoslav	Department Statement	1.0986
2081	01/06/92	USA	Intifada	Amb to UNSC	.0000
2082	01/07/92	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	.0000
2083	01/07/92	USA	SAfrica	Dept Statement	.4055
2084	01/20/92	IND	Intifada	Ministry Statement	-.9163
2085	01/28/92	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec Statement	1.6094
2087	01/28/92	IND	Burma	Ministry Statement	-1.7918
2088	02/19/92	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec Statement	1.6094
2089	02/21/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2090	03/03/92	USA	Yugoslav	PS Statement	1.0986
1746	03/12/92	USA	Peru	AsstSec to House Sub	.5596
2092	03/19/92	USA	Sudan	AsstSec to SenSub	1.0986
2093	03/19/92	USA	Somalia	AsstSec to SenSub	1.0986
2094	03/19/92	CAN	Somalia	McDougall Speech at McGill	1.6094
2095	03/19/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall speech	1.7918
2097	03/20/92	IND	SAfrica	Ministry Statement	.2877
2098	03/25/92	USA	Somalia	AsstSec to House Subs	.4055
2099	03/25/92	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec to House Subs	.5108
2100	03/31/92	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	-.2231
2101	03/31/92	USA	Burma	AsstSec to SenFRC	-.2231
2102	04/02/92	USA	Intifada	NSC official Speech	.5108
2103	04/06/92	USA	Burma	Dept Statement	.0000
2104	04/07/92	USA	Yugoslav	Recognition Statement	1.6094
2105	04/08/92	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.6094
2106	04/08/92	CAN	SAfrica	McDougall in SAfrica	.0000
2107	04/13/92	USA	Peru	Baker to OAS	1.6094
2108	04/13/92	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	.4055
2110	04/14/92	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	1.9459
2111	04/15/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	.5108
2112	04/22/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	.5108
2113	04/27/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2114	04/29/92	IND	Burma	Ministry Statement	1.0986
2115	05/04/92	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec Statement	1.6094
2117	05/06/92	USA	Yugoslav	US rep to CSCE	1.9459
2118	05/12/92	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec Statement	1.9459
2120	05/12/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2121	05/14/92	CAN	SAfrica	McDougall in SA HoC	.0000
2122	05/20/92	USA	Sudan	Dept Statement	-1.0986
2123	05/20/92	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	-.4055
2125	05/21/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	.5108
2126	05/21/92	USA	Yugoslav	Speech	1.0986
2127	05/24/92	USA	Yugoslav	Baker in Lisbon	.5108
2128	05/30/92	USA	Yugoslav	Amb to UNSC	1.9459
2129	05/30/92	USA	Yugoslav	Exec Order	.0000
2130	05/30/92	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	.0000
2132	05/31/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2133	06/02/92	USA	Intifada	AsstSec Speech	-1.0986
2134	06/04/92	IND	Yugoslav	Ministry Statement	1.0986
2135	06/05/92	USA	Yugoslav	Msg to Congress	1.0986
2137	06/10/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall address HoC	1.9459
2138	06/10/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
351	06/15/92	IND	SriLanka	Ministry Statement	-1.0986
2139	06/23/92	USA	Somalia	AsstSec to House Subs	1.3863
2140	06/23/92	USA	Peru	CT Coord Address	.2231
2141	06/24/92	USA	Intifada	AsstSec to House Subs	.5108
2143	07/08/92	USA	Yugoslav	Baker remarks at NewsConf	1.7918
2144	07/09/92	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to CSCE	.5108
2145	07/15/92	USA	SAfrica	Amb to UNSC	.0000
2148	07/23/92	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to House Sub	.5108
2149	07/24/92	CAN	Burma	McDougall (SSEA) to ASEAN	1.6094
2150	07/24/92	CAN	IndoChin	McDougall (SSEA) to ASEAN	1.6094
2151	07/27/92	USA	Somalia	Amb to UNSC	1.0986
2152	07/27/92	USA	Somalia	WH Statement (WCPD)	1.0986
2153	07/28/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2154	08/05/92	USA	Yugoslav	ActSec Statement	.0000
2156	08/06/92	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	.0000
2157	08/07/92	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at NewsConf	-.4055
2158	08/08/92	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at NewsConf	1.0986
2160	08/11/92	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec to Sen ASC	.8473
2161	08/12/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2162	08/13/92	USA	Yugoslav	Amb to UNSC	1.6094
2163	08/13/92	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec to UNHRC	1.7918
2165	08/13/92	USA	Somalia	Statement by PS	.4055
2166	08/13/92	USA	Yugoslav	Statement	.6931
2168	08/14/92	USA	Somalia	Statement by PS	-.4055
2170	08/19/92	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	.8473
2171	08/21/92	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.6094
2172	08/21/92	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	.5108
2173	08/25/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2175	08/26/92	USA	Yugoslav	Eagleburger in London	1.5041
2176	08/26/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall in London	.6931

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2177	08/27/92	USA	Yugoslav	Eagle Remarks at News Conf	.5108
2178	08/28/92	USA	Yugoslav	PS Statement	.5108
2179	08/31/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2180	09/01/92	USA	Somalia	USAID statement	-1.0986
2181	09/04/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2182	09/08/92	CAN	SAfrica	McDougall statement	.0000
2183	09/11/92	USA	Intifada	AsstSec Speech	-1.0986
2184	09/15/92	USA	Yugoslav	US Rep to CSCE	1.6094
2185	09/16/92	USA	Somalia	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
2186	09/16/92	USA	Somalia	Official to House Sub	.0000
2187	09/21/92	USA	Somalia	Address to UNGA	1.0986
2188	09/21/92	USA	Yugoslav	Address to UNGA	1.9459
2189	09/23/92	USA	SAfrica	AsstSec to SenSub	.0000
2190	09/23/92	IND	Yugoslav	Ministry Statement	1.0986
2191	10/01/92	USA	Somalia	AsstSec to SenSub	1.0986
2192	10/02/92	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.6094
2193	10/02/92	USA	Yugoslav	Statement	.5108
2194	10/07/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2195	10/09/92	USA	Yugoslav	Amb to UNSC	1.0986
2197	10/21/92	USA	Sudan	Department Statement	.5108
2198	10/23/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	.4055
2199	10/29/92	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	.0000
2200	10/31/92	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	-1.0986
2202	11/05/92	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.3863
2203	11/12/92	USA	Somalia	Dept Statement	1.0986
2204	11/16/92	CAN	SAfrica	McDougall statement	1.0986
2205	11/19/92	USA	Liberia2	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.9163
2206	12/02/92	USA	Somalia	Statement by PS	.2231
2207	12/03/92	USA	Somalia	Amb to UNSC	.5108
2208	12/03/92	USA	Somalia	Statement by PS	1.0986
2209	12/04/92	USA	Somalia	Address to the Nation	1.0986
2210	12/08/92	USA	Somalia	Statement by PS	.2231
2211	12/10/92	USA	Somalia	Letter to Congress	1.0986
2212	12/10/92	USA	Somalia	UndSec Speech	-1.0986
2213	12/15/92	USA	Intifada	Dept Statement	-.2231
2214	12/15/92	USA	Somalia	Remarks at Texas A&M	.0000
2215	12/15/92	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at Texas A&M	1.0986
2216	12/16/92	USA	Yugoslav	Sec Speech	.8473
2217	12/17/92	USA	Somalia	AsstSec to House FAC	1.6094
2218	12/17/92	IND	Somalia	Ministry Statement	1.0986
2219	12/17/92	USA	Intifada	PS Statement	-1.0986
2220	12/17/92	USA	Yugoslav	Sec Remarks at Press Conf	.5108
2221	12/18/92	USA	Intifada	Dept Statement	1.0986
2222	12/18/92	CAN	Intifada	McDougall statement	1.0986
2224	12/20/92	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks w/Major	-.4055
2226	12/22/92	USA	Yugoslav	PS Statement	1.3863
2227	12/23/92	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.6094
2229	12/24/92	CAN	Somalia	McDougall on UNSG report	1.0986
2230	12/24/92	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	.2877
2232	12/30/92	USA	Somalia	Remarks	-.2231

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2234	01/05/93	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at West Point	.0000
2235	01/05/93	USA	Somalia	Speech at West Point	1.0986
2236	01/07/93	USA	Yugoslav	Sec to CFR	-1.3863
2233	01/12/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2237	01/12/93	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.3863
2238	01/15/93	USA	Yugoslav	Exec Order	1.0986
2239	01/19/93	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.0986
2241	01/27/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.3863
2243	02/05/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2244	02/05/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf w/ Mulroney	.2231
2245	02/10/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Remarks at NewsConf	.5596
2246	02/17/93	USA	Somalia	DepAstSec to House Sub	1.6094
2247	02/22/93	USA	Yugoslav	Amb to UNSC	1.9459
2248	02/22/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2250	02/23/93	USA	Yugoslav	PS Statement	1.0986
2252	02/26/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris at NAC	1.9459
2253	03/02/93	USA	Yugoslav	PS Statement	1.0986
2254	03/03/93	USA	Sudan	US Del to UNHRC	1.0986
2255	03/03/93	USA	Burma	US Del to UNHRC	1.0986
2256	03/05/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2091	03/08/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall to HoC	.9163
2257	03/09/93	USA	Intifada	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
2258	03/09/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	.8473
2259	03/10/93	USA	Sudan	AsstSec to House Sub	.5108
2260	03/12/93	USA	Somalia	Radio Address to Armed Forces	-.2231
2262	03/12/93	USA	Somalia	UN Amb to House Sub	1.3863
2263	03/12/93	USA	Yugoslav	UN Amb to House Sub	.6931
2264	03/17/93	USA	Somalia	Remark w/ PM of Ireland	1.0986
2265	03/22/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall speech	1.6094
2266	03/25/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Statement	.5108
2267	03/26/93	USA	Intifada	Chris w/ Palestinian	-1.0986
2268	03/26/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2269	03/31/93	USA	Liberia2	AsstSec to House Sub	.9163
2270	03/31/93	USA	Somalia	AsstSec to House Sub	1.3863
2271	04/01/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2272	04/01/93	CAN	Sudan	McDougall statement	1.6094
2273	04/01/93	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Newspaper Eds	1.3863
2274	04/06/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf	-.2231
2275	04/13/93	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.0986
2276	04/15/93	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	-.4055
2277	04/20/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris to Sen FRC	1.6094
2278	04/21/93	USA	Intifada	Chris Remarks at NewsConf	.5108
2279	04/25/93	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Newspaper Assn	1.3863
2280	04/26/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.0986
2281	04/26/93	USA	Yugoslav	Msg to Congress	1.0986
2282	04/28/93	USA	Intifada	AsstSec to House Sub	.2877
2283	05/01/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Remarks at NewsConf	.6931
2284	05/01/93	USA	SriLanka	Statement	1.0986
2285	05/02/93	USA	Yugoslav	Statement	1.3863
2286	05/04/93	USA	Sudan	AsstSec to SenSub	.6931

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2287	05/05/93	USA	Somalia	Welcome Troops	.2877
2288	05/06/93	USA	Phil	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
2289	05/06/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Statement	1.3863
2290	05/06/93	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to EX-IMP Bank Conf	.8473
2291	05/06/93	USA	Yugoslav	UN Amb Statement	1.3863
2292	05/12/93	USA	Algeria	AsstSec to House Sub	.0000
2293	05/18/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris to House FAC	.5108
2294	05/19/93	USA	Burma	Statement on Burmese Human Right	1.0986
2295	05/21/93	USA	Liberia2	Chris Speech	.5108
2296	05/22/93	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	.5108
2297	05/25/93	USA	Yugoslav	Continue Emergency Notice	.0000
2298	05/25/93	USA	Yugoslav	Msg to Congress	.0000
2299	05/25/93	USA	Yugoslav	Msg to Congress	.9163
2300	05/25/93	USA	Yugoslav	UN Amb Statement	1.6094
2301	06/09/93	USA	Liberia2	AsstSec to SenSub	.9163
2302	06/10/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris to NAC	.3365
2303	06/10/93	USA	Somalia	Letter to Congress	1.0986
2304	06/12/93	USA	Somalia	Radio Address	1.6094
2306	06/17/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf	1.3863
2307	06/22/93	CAN	Yugoslav	McDougall statement	1.6094
2308	06/24/93	USA	Somalia	UN Amb Speech	.9163
2309	06/29/93	USA	Yugoslav	Amb to UNSC	1.9459
2310	07/01/93	USA	Somalia	Letter to Congress	1.6094
2311	07/06/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf	1.0986
2312	07/09/93	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	.5108
2313	07/20/93	USA	Burma	Statement on ASSK 4th Anniv	1.0986
2314	07/21/93	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec to CSCE	.4055
2315	07/27/93	USA	Intifada	AsstSec to House Sub	-.4055
2316	07/28/93	USA	Liberia2	WH Statement (WCPD)	1.6094
2317	07/29/93	USA	Somalia	UndSec to Sen FRC	1.6094
2318	08/01/93	USA	Yugoslav	Proc: HumRghts Day	1.7918
2319	08/02/93	USA	Yugoslav	WH Statement (WCPD)	1.3863
2320	08/09/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Statement	1.6094
2321	09/01/93	CAN	Yugoslav	Beatty statement	.0000
2322	09/08/93	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	1.6094
2323	09/09/93	CAN	Intifada	Beatty on recognition	1.0986
2305	09/10/93	USA	Intifada	Remarks on Declaration	.0000
2324	09/11/93	CAN	Intifada	Beatty on self-rule	1.6094
2325	09/13/93	CAN	Intifada	Beatty on peace agreement	.0000
2326	09/13/93	USA	Intifada	Remarks at Signing	.0000
2329	09/17/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks at Press Conf	1.0986
2331	09/21/93	USA	Somalia	Lake Address	1.3863
2332	09/21/93	USA	Yugoslav	Lake Address	.5108
2333	09/22/93	USA	Somalia	DepAmb to UNSC	1.3863
2334	09/25/93	USA	Somalia	Statement by PS	1.3863
2335	09/27/93	USA	Somalia	Address to UNGA	1.3863
2336	09/27/93	USA	Yugoslav	Address to UNGA	1.3863
2338	10/04/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks to AFL-CIO	1.0986
2339	10/05/93	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec to Sen FRC	.6931
2340	10/06/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks	.2231

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2341	10/07/93	USA	Somalia	Address to the Nation	.2877
2342	10/07/93	USA	Somalia	Chris et al Remarks	1.0986
2343	10/13/93	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.0986
2344	10/13/93	USA	Somalia	Message to Congress	.4055
2345	10/14/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf	.4055
2346	10/18/93	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Senate	1.6094
2347	10/20/93	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Senate	.0000
2348	10/20/93	USA	Somalia	UN Amb to Sen FRC	.5108
2349	10/23/93	USA	Somalia	UN Day Proclamation	1.3863
2350	10/25/93	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf	.2231
2351	11/04/93	USA	Somalia	Chris to Sen FRC	.4055
2353	11/04/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris to Sen FRC	-.6931
2354	11/11/93	USA	Somalia	Veterans Day Remarks	.0000
2355	11/30/93	USA	Yugoslav	Chris to CSCE	.6931
2356	12/06/93	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.7918
2357	01/06/94	USA	Somalia	AsstSec Address	.6931
2358	01/09/94	USA	Yugoslav	Speech	.2231
2359	01/10/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to NAC	.0000
2360	01/10/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	1.0986
2361	01/11/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at News Conf	.6931
2363	02/01/94	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec to Sen Sub	.4700
2364	02/02/94	USA	Chiapas	AsstSec to House Sub	-.5108
2365	02/05/94	USA	Yugoslav	Bill Statement (WCPD)	1.0986
2366	02/06/94	CAN	Yugoslav	Ouellet statement	1.0986
2367	02/06/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	1.0986
2368	02/07/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Statement	1.6094
2369	02/07/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks	1.0986
2370	02/09/94	CAN	Yugoslav	Ouellet statement	1.3863
2371	02/09/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks on AirStrike Decision	.0000
2372	02/09/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to WJC	1.6094
2373	02/10/94	USA	Burma	Ltr to ASSK	1.0986
2374	02/12/94	USA	Sudan	Statement by PS	.5108
2375	02/17/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.0986
2376	02/19/94	USA	Yugoslav	Radio Address	.0000
2377	02/20/94	USA	Yugoslav	Statement on NATO Action	1.3863
2378	02/21/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris w/ Bosnian PM	.6931
2379	02/21/94	USA	Yugoslav	Dept Statement	1.6094
2380	02/21/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at News Conf	1.6094
2381	02/23/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris to Sen FRC	.0000
2382	02/28/94	USA	Yugoslav	Welcome John Major	.0000
2383	03/01/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Statement	.6931
2384	03/01/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.6094
2385	03/01/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at News Conf	-.2231
2386	03/15/94	USA	Somalia	Remarks to Ft Drum	1.0986
2387	03/17/94	USA	Somalia	Remarks w/PM of Ireland	1.0986
2388	03/18/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at Signing of Bosnia Fed	.1823
2389	03/19/94	USA	Yugoslav	DirComm Statement	.5108
2390	03/22/94	USA	Algeria	AsstSec to House Sub	.5108
2409	03/24/94	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf	-1.0986
2391	04/07/94	USA	Yugoslav	Lake Address	-.1542

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Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2392	04/10/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	1.3863
2393	04/12/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.3863
2394	04/12/94	USA	Yugoslav	UN Amb Speech	2.1972
2395	04/13/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at Q&A	-.6931
2396	04/17/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	1.0986
2397	04/18/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	1.6094
2398	04/19/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	.6931
2399	04/19/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	.4055
2400	04/20/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at News Conf	-.1542
2401	04/22/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at News Conf	.5108
2402	04/25/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Reporters	1.0986
2403	04/26/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Remarks at NewsConf	1.0986
2404	04/30/94	USA	Yugoslav	Radio Address	.3365
2405	05/03/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks on CNN	1.0986
2406	05/09/94	USA	Liberia2	Dept Statement	1.0986
2407	05/19/94	USA	Somalia	Remarks at News Conf	1.0986
2408	05/20/94	USA	Somalia	Medal of Honor Remarks	-1.0986
2410	05/25/94	USA	Yugoslav	Continue Emergency Notice	.0000
2411	05/25/94	USA	Yugoslav	Msg to Congress	.0000
2412	05/25/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at Annapolis	.3365
2413	05/27/94	USA	Somalia	Radio Address	.0000
2414	06/04/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks w/Major	-1.0986
2415	06/07/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to Natl Assy	.5108
2416	06/07/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks w/ French PM	1.0986
2417	06/08/94	USA	Yugoslav	UN Amb Speech	.3365
2418	06/14/94	USA	Yemen3	Asst Sec to House Sub	.6931
2419	06/21/94	USA	Yugoslav	Msg to Congress	1.7918
2420	06/23/94	CAN	Yemen3	Ouellet statement	1.0986
2421	06/27/94	USA	Sudan	Remarks to Conf on Africa	1.0986
2422	06/27/94	USA	Somalia	Remarks to Conf on Africa	1.0986
2423	06/29/94	USA	Burma	DepAsstSec to House Sub	.1542
2424	07/05/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Statement	1.6094
2425	07/14/94	USA	Yugoslav	UN Amb Speech	.3365
2426	07/19/94	USA	Burma	Statement on ASSK 5th Anniv	.5108
2427	07/20/94	CAN	Burma	Chan on ASSN	.0000
2428	07/26/94	CAN	Burma	Ouellet (MinForAff) address ASEA	.2877
2430	07/30/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Remarks at Press Conf	.6931
2431	08/11/94	USA	SriLanka	Asst Sec to house Sub	.2877
2432	08/11/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	.5108
2433	08/22/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.7918
2434	09/23/94	CAN	Yugoslav	Ouellet statement	.9163
2435	09/26/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to UNGA	1.7918
2436	09/27/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Statement	1.6094
2437	09/28/94	USA	Algeria	Asst Sec to house Sub	.0000
2438	09/28/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks at NewsConf	1.0986
2440	09/30/94	USA	Liberia2	Proclamation	.0000
2439	10/20/94	USA	Sudan	Proclamation	.4055
2442	10/20/94	USA	Liberia2	UN Day Proclamation	.6931
2443	10/20/94	USA	Somalia	UN Day Proclamation	.4055
2444	10/21/94	USA	Yugoslav	Lake Address	1.3863

(Continued on Next Page)

Figure E.1 (Continued)

Case	Date	State	War	Description of Text	Worldview
2445	10/22/94	USA	Liberia2	DepSec Address	.9163
2446	10/24/94	CAN	SriLanka	Ouellet statement	1.0986
2447	10/25/94	USA	Yugoslav	Exec Order	1.7918
2448	10/25/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.9459
2449	10/25/94	USA	Yugoslav	Proclamation	1.0986
2450	10/28/94	USA	Yugoslav	UN Amb Address	.1542
2451	10/31/94	USA	Liberia2	AsstSec Remarks	1.6094
2452	11/19/94	USA	Yugoslav	Amb to UNSC	.8473
2453	11/21/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris remarks at Press Conf	1.9459
2454	11/28/94	USA	Burma	DepAsstSec Speech	-.5108
2455	11/29/94	USA	Yugoslav	AsstSec Address	.6931
2456	11/30/94	USA	Yugoslav	Lake Address	.9808
2457	12/01/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris to NATO	.8473
2458	12/01/94	USA	Yugoslav	Ltr to Congress	1.6094
2459	12/02/94	USA	Yugoslav	Chris Remarks at Press Conf	.9163
2460	12/05/94	USA	Yugoslav	Remarks to CSCE	1.3863
2461	12/31/94	USA	Yugoslav	Statement	1.0986



# APPENDIX F

## RESULTS OF RELIABILITY CHECK

Case	State	War Coded	Context Variables	Realist Indicators	Liberal Indicators	Main Point	Total Real	Lib	World view
47	IND	Hostage	5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 2 0 0 2	1	0	4	1.61
			5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 1	0 2 0 0 2	1	1	4	0.92
109	USA	Afghan	1 1 3 2	0 1 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0	1	3	0	-1.39
			1 1 3 2	0 2 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0	1	4	0	-1.61
169	IND	IndoChin	3 1 3 1	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 2	1	2	2	0.00
			3 1 3 1	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 2	1	2	2	0.00
224	USA	IndoChin	5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 1 0 0 2	1	0	3	1.39
			5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 1	0 0 1 0 2	0	1	3	0.69
283	USA	WSahara	3 2 1 6	0 1 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 1	0	3	1	-0.69
			3 2 3 6	0 2 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 2	0	4	2	-0.51
340	USA	SAtlanti	1 1 3 4	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 0	0	2	2	0.00
			1 1 2 4	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 2	0	2	4	0.51
403	USA	Afghan	3 1 3 9	2 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0	2	0	-1.10
			3 1 3 9	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0	0	2	0	-1.10
454	USA	Phil	4 1 3 2	0 0 0 0 0	0 2 0 0 0	0	0	2	1.10
			4 1 3 2	0 0 0 0 0	0 2 2 0 0	1	0	4	1.61
510	USA	Afghan	1 1 3 6	0 0 0 1 0	0 2 2 0 1	1	1	5	1.10
			2 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 2 2 1 0	1	0	5	1.79

Figure F.1: Results of Coder Reliability Test. The first line for each case indicates the author's scoring; the second line indicates the checker's scoring. Differences discussed in section 4.2 are highlighted in boldface. Appendix A defines the context variables (Continued on next page).

Figure F.1 (Continued)

Case	State	War Coded	Context Variables	Realist Indicators	Liberal Indicators	Main Point	Total Real	Lib	World view
565	IND	IranIraq	3 2 1 3 3 2 3 3	0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 2	0 0	2 2	2 3	0.00 0.29
622	USA	Contra	1 1 3 5 1 1 3 5	1 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 2 2	0 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0	1 1	9 5	4 6	-0.69 0.15
675	USA	SAfrica	3 1 3 9 3 1 3 9	0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 2	0 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0	1 1	4 4	3 6	-0.22 0.33
729	USA	IndoChin	3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3	2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2	0 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 2	1 1	2 6	5 5	0.69 -0.15
785	USA	IndoChin	9 1 1 3 9 1 1 3	0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2	0 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 2	1 1	0 3	8 6	2.20 0.56
843	USA	Contra	1 1 3 2 1 1 3 6	0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0	1 1	3 2	2 2	-0.29 0.00
893	USA	Contra	1 1 3 9 1 1 1 7	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	0 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0	1 1	10 10	3 4	-1.01 -0.79
946	USA	Contra	4 1 3 8 4 1 3 4	2 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 2 0	0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0	0 0	3 6	1 2	-0.69 -0.85
997	USA	Afghan	4 1 3 9 4 1 3 9	2 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 2	0 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 2	0 0	5 6	4 6	-0.18 0.00
1053	USA	Contra	1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1	0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2	1 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0	0 0	2 2	3 3	0.29 0.29
1103	USA	Afghan	1 1 3 9 1 1 3 9	2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0	2 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 0	0 0	6 4	4 4	-0.34 0.00
1154	IND	SriLanka	5 1 3 6 5 1 3 6	0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	1 1	3 2	0 0	-1.39 -1.10
1210	USA	Contra	4 1 3 9 4 1 3 9	1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0	0 0	1 2	0 1	-0.22 -0.41
1262	USA	Contra	1 1 3 9 1 1 3 9	2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2	0 1	8 4	4 4	-0.59 0.00
1319	USA	Contra	2 1 3 6 2 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1	0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2	1 1	2 1	4 4	0.51 0.92

(Continued on Next Page)

Figure F.1 (Continued)

Case	State	War Coded	Context Variables	Realist Indicators	Liberal Indicator s	Main Point	Total Real	Lib	World view
1372	IND	SriLanka	5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 2 0 0	1	2	4	0.51
			5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0	1	2	0	-1.10
1424	IND	Afghan	5 1 3 6	0 2 1 1 0	0 0 0 0 2	1	4	2	-0.51
			5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 2	1	0	2	1.10
1477	USA	Afghan	1 1 3 9	0 0 0 2 0	0 0 0 0 0	0	2	0	-1.10
			1 1 3 9	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 2 0	0	0	2	1.10
1535	USA	Contra	2 1 3 6	0 0 0 2 2	0 2 0 0 0	1	4	2	-0.51
			2 1 3 6	0 2 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 0	1	4	2	-0.51
1588	USA	Contra	1 1 3 8	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 0	0	2	2	0.00
			1 1 3 9	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 0	0	2	2	0.00
1651	IND	SAfrica	6 1 2 7	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 2	0	0	2	1.10
			6 1 2 7	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0	0	2	0	-1.10
1706	CAN	IndoChin	5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 2	1	0	2	1.10
			5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 2	1	0	2	1.10
1757	CAN	Intifada	5 1 3 6	0 2 0 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	1	2	2	0.00
			5 1 3 6	0 2 0 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	1	2	2	0.00
1807	USA	Kuwait	1 1 3 5	2 2 2 2 2	0 2 2 2 1	1	10	7	-0.32
			1 1 3 5	0 2 2 0 0	0 0 2 2 2	1	4	6	0.34
1857	USA	Sudan	4 1 3 2	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 2	1	2	4	0.51
			4 1 3 2	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 2	1	2	4	0.51
1909	USA	Kuwait	1 2 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 2 0 2	1	0	4	1.61
			2 2 3 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 2 0 2	1	0	4	1.61
1963	USA	Kuwait	3 1 1 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 2 0 2	1	0	4	1.61
			3 1 1 6	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 2 0 0	1	0	2	1.10
2015	USA	Kuwait	1 2 3 9	2 2 0 2 2	0 2 2 0 1	1	8	5	-0.41
			1 1 3 9	0 2 0 1 2	0 0 2 0 2	1	5	4	-0.18
2070	CAN	Burma	5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 0	1	2	2	0.00
			5 1 3 6	0 0 0 0 2	0 2 0 0 0	1	2	2	0.00
2127	USA	Yugoslav	3 2 2 4	0 0 0 2 0	0 2 0 0 2	0	2	4	0.51
			3 2 1 4	0 0 0 2 0	0 2 0 0 1	0	2	3	0.29

(Continued on Next Page)

Figure F.1 (Continued)

Case	State	War Coded	Context Variables	Realist Indicators	Liberal Indicator s	Main Point	Total Real	Lib	World view
2188	USA	Yugoslav	1 1 1 3	0 0 0 0 0	0 2 0 2 2	0	0	6	1.95
			1 1 1 3	0 0 0 0 0	0 2 0 0 2	0	0	4	1.61
2246	USA	Somalia	4 1 3 2	0 0 0 0 0	0 2 0 0 2	1	0	4	1.61
			4 1 3 2	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 2	1	2	2	0.00
2299	USA	Yugoslav	1 1 3 1	0 0 0 0 1	0 0 2 0 2	1	1	4	0.92
			1 1 3 1	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 2 0 2	1	2	4	0.51
2354	USA	Somalia	1 1 3 8	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 2	0	2	2	0.00
			1 1 3 8	0 2 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0	0	4	0	-1.61
2405	USA	Yugoslav	1 1 3 5	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 2	0	0	2	1.10
			1 1 3 5	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 2	0	0	2	1.10
2457	USA	Yugoslav	3 2 2 3	0 0 0 2 0	0 1 2 1 2	0	2	6	0.85
			3 2 3 3	0 0 0 0 2	0 0 2 0 2	0	2	4	0.51

## APPENDIX G

### REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS

The results discussed in Chapter 4 are based on a linear regression. This appendix concludes that this analysis seems to sufficiently meet the assumptions of such a regression (Gujarati, 1988: 279-80).

#### G.1 Homoskedasticity

The ordinary least squares model assumes that the variance of the residuals is constant across different values of the variables. If it is not, the estimated coefficients will be biased (Gujarati, 1988: 325-6). Using graphical methods, no heteroskedasticity was detected for any of the independent variables. A fuller analysis of this assumption would include running the Breusch-Pagan test on the residuals. This assumption of the model seems to be met.

#### G.2 Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity can lead to inefficient estimations of  $\beta$ . In other words, it may be difficult to isolate the effects of collinear variables. Their coefficients will tend to then be less significant than they "should" be (Gujarati, 1988: 288-90). So if the  $\beta$  is significant, multicollinearity has had no ill effect. The analysis which follows begins with an examination of bivariate correlations and the removal of single variables from the analysis. Because most of the independent variables are dichotomous, we cannot test for collinearity by regressing each against the others. Finally,

we examine a matrix of eigenvalues. We do not find evidence that multicollinearity is a serious problem in this regression.

Multicollinearity could only be a problem for the three variables where  $\beta$  was not significant: **PREELECT**, **POPULAR**, and **FAR\_AWAY**. **PREELECT**'s largest bivariate correlation with any variable is -.103 with **POPULAR** (i.e., leaders' popularity seems to decrease slightly when elections approach); that is not a high degree of correlation. Its VIF (Variance inflation factor) is 1.036, the lowest of any variable (see Figure G.1). Most of **PREELECT**'s variance is accounted for by eigenvectors 5 and 6; no other variable has a high proportion of its variance associated with those vectors (see Figure G.2). It seems that the low significance of upcoming elections is not attributable to collinearity problems.

Popularity has two potentially relevant bilateral correlations, -.628 with **INSURED** and -.518 with **INSBIPOL**; these reflect the grave unpopularity of Canada's Prime Minister Mulroney. The VIF for popularity, however, is only 2.085. This is also not very high.<sup>115</sup> The eigenvector matrix reveals, on the other hand, that popularity's variance is mostly accounted for by eigenvectors 11 and 12, which are the only eigenvectors with a condition index > 10. Distance and the initial participation of an ally also are associated with those two eigenvectors. If there is a problem with multicollinearity it most likely is associated with those variables.

Variable Inflation Factor of each Variable, 2-State Regression

Variable	VIF	Variable	VIF	Variable	VIF
INSURED	4.251	ALLY	5.747	RELRECES	1.236
INSBIPOL	3.507	DEMOCRAT	1.411	POPULAR	2.085
CURR_RIV	2.000	FAR_AWAY	6.150	PREELECT	1.036
LONG_RIV	1.411	ABSRECES	1.597		

Figure G.1: Variable Inflation Factor of each Variable, 2-State Regression.

<sup>115</sup>Fox (1991: 13) suggests that VIFs below 4.0 are probably not troublesome.

Table of Eigenvectors

#	Eigen value	Cond Index	Variance Proportions										
			x <sub>1</sub>	x <sub>2</sub>	x <sub>3A</sub>	x <sub>3B</sub>	x <sub>4</sub>	x <sub>5</sub>	x <sub>6</sub>	x <sub>7A</sub>	x <sub>7B</sub>	x <sub>8</sub>	x <sub>9</sub>
1	4.784	1.000	.001	.002	.005	.004	.001	.005	.001	.008	.010	.001	.003
2	1.808	1.627	.048	.061	.008	.011	.002	.011	.000	.000	.002	.001	.002
3	1.351	1.882	.000	.000	.108	.021	.016	.025	.000	.104	.000	.000	.058
4	1.121	2.066	.001	.001	.002	.223	.040	.047	.002	.005	.001	.000	.050
5	.912	2.290	.001	.001	.019	.058	.003	.083	.001	.003	.002	.000	.685
6	.816	2.423	.007	.011	.004	.031	.027	.429	.001	.000	.007	.000	.117
7	.472	3.185	.007	.000	.062	.167	.008	.062	.006	.527	.010	.003	.053
8	.315	3.896	.004	.001	.141	.022	.000	.034	.008	.222	.533	.007	.006
9	.239	4.477	.000	.058	.559	.420	.047	.117	.005	.051	.361	.000	.003
10	.142	5.799	.721	.861	.017	.039	.010	.008	.000	.02	.024	.003	.000
11	.034	11.954	.112	.004	.045	.002	.389	.035	.361	.001	.004	.480	.008
12	.009	23.689	.098	.000	.029	.002	.458	.145	.616	.059	.047	.504	.016

Figure G.2: Table of Eigenvectors.

KEY (all independent variables range between 0 and 1):

- x<sub>1</sub> = INSURED = 1 if the state's security is guaranteed by a great power
- x<sub>2</sub> = INSBIPOL = 1 if INSURED = 1 and the international system is bipolar
- x<sub>3A</sub> = CURR\_RIV = 1 if a short-term rival of the state is involved in the war
- x<sub>3B</sub> = LONG\_RIV = 1 if an enduring rival of the state is involved in the war
- x<sub>4</sub> = ALLY = 1 if an ally of the state is an initial party to the war
- x<sub>5</sub> = DEMOCRAT = 1 if any democracy is an initial party to the war
- x<sub>6</sub> = FAR\_AWAY = 1 if the war is occurring outside the state's "sphere of interest"
- x<sub>7A</sub> = ABSRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is amid a consecutive-quarter decline
- x<sub>7B</sub> = RELRECES = 1 if the state's GDP is in an annual decline relative to the G-7
- x<sub>8</sub> = POPULAR = 1 if the leader enjoys 100% support from the public
- x<sub>9</sub> = PREELECT = 1 if a national election will occur within the next three months

We are left, then, with the possible multicollinearity of **POPULAR**, **FAR\_AWAY**, and **ALLY**, which have VIFs of 2.09, 6.15, and 5.75 respectively. While the proportions of their variance associated with either eigenvector does not approach unity, if the proportions across the pair of eigenvectors is summed, we find that these are .984, .977, and .847 respectively. Before evaluating the effect of this problem, let us look at these three variables. Distance has a very high correlation (-.887) with the initial presence of an ally. This reflects the likelihood that one's allies are nearby combined with the likelihood that such an ally will get involved in a war near its own borders. Popularity, on the other hand, only correlates -.156 and .143 with distance and

allies. It correlates with the combination, however, because Canada's tendency to have a lower score on popularity is associated with Canada's lack of variation on distance (all cases are distant) and very low variation on allies (few cases involve an ally).

One way to decide if any of these variables have damaged the analysis is to re-regress the data with each variable deleted in turn. If the adjusted  $R^2$  and F drop, then omitting the variable has the more serious effect of introducing omitted variable bias. If those values increase, and the coefficients of the variables that were collinear with the omitted variable become more significant, then we can exclude that variable. Figure G.3 displays these results.

Deleting the popularity variable seems to have acceptable effects on the adjusted  $R^2$  and F, but it does not change the significance of any of the other coefficients. There is thus no reason to leave it out. When the alliance variable is omitted, distance becomes significant. The cost of doing so, however, is to slightly reduce the overall significance of the equation, and eliminate another significant variable. Since this high correlation may be, in part, an artifact of the data, we prefer to let further research support hypothesis six rather than eliminate hypothesis four. Omitting distance slightly increases the significance of ally, and reduces the significance of popularity. No other variables had major changes in their coefficients or their significance.

Results of Multicollinearity Testing

Excluded Variable	Adjusted $R^2$	F
None (Full regression)	0.180	36.144
<b>POPULAR</b>	0.181	44.509
<b>FAR_AWAY</b>	0.179	39.311
<b>ALLY</b>	0.178	38.965

Figure G.3: Multicollinearity Tests. This table shows the effects of deleting, in turn, each of the variables that might be contributing to inefficient estimation.



We noted that we are reluctant to omit variables because doing so could introduce bias for that reason. For example, at one point in this evaluation, we left out **INSBIPOL** (indicating both that the state's security is externally guaranteed and the system is bipolar). Doing so might have bolstered the significance of the very collinear popularity; instead it made distance highly significant (**FAR\_AWAY** and **INSBIPOL** correlated at only .136). Since we lack a good reason to do otherwise, we retain these variables, drawn as they are from the published literature.

### G.3 Autocorrelation

Autocorrelation occurs when the value of the dependent variable is linked to the value assigned to the dependent variable in earlier cases. Autocorrelation is a serious problem because it results in biased and inefficient coefficients. The most common sort of autocorrelation is for the value of the dependent variable to tend to be the same as it was in the case immediately preceding the current one (Gujarati, 1988: 363-8). While this dataset could have autocorrelation problems, we have not found any way to measure it.

Most tests for autocorrelation, such as the Durbin-Watson test and the runs test, make assumptions that are not valid for this dataset (Gujarati, 1988: 375-9). They assume that the cases are separated by a regular time interval. These cases are not (see Appendix E for a complete list of the cases). Sometimes several cases occur on the same date. This can occur when a single text contains problem representations of several wars, as does the 2 February 1988 testimony of Secretary of State Shultz to the House Foreign Relations Committee. That statement yielded cases 1350-3, referring to the Afghan, Contra, Indochina, and Iran-Iraq wars. Also on that date, President Reagan made a statement to the nation regarding Nicaragua, and his press secretary issued a statement on the same topic (cases 1348-9). In some cases: sometimes a week or more passes between consecutive cases, sometimes many cases occur on the same date. In this case, the dataset does not even note the order in which those statements

were made (or written out); if we cannot order the cases in time, then we cannot begin to define the possible autocorrelation. In other cases, weeks or months pass between cases. The extreme may be the six months that pass between cases 4 and 8,<sup>116</sup> but we also find a 25-day gap between cases 2026 and 2027. In this example, the cases also belong to different states and refer to different wars (Yugoslavia and South Africa). Even if these statements statistically correlated, they would not be correlated in reality.

We cannot find an equation that would relate the worldview of one text to the worldview inferred in a text that is a fixed time interval earlier than the first. If we are unable even to specify how autocorrelation would operate mathematically, we cannot test this assumption of ordinary least squares regression. We must assume that this assumption has been met.

#### G.4 Model Specification

Two types of model specification errors are possible. The more serious is omitted variable bias. Since this model has been developed by the author, there is no "standard model" from which variables could have been omitted. All potential relationships found while reviewing the literature were included, however. Figure G.2 suggests that popularity might be an extraneous variable, but excluding it does not add to our explanatory power. The model supposes that all the relationships between independent variables and the inferred worldview are linear; nothing in the literature suggests any other link.<sup>117</sup> We admit, of course, that the literature does not deeply explore the nature of the links. Grieco says states are more sensitive to relative gains (i.e., more realist) when a rival is involved. He is silent on how that sensitivity should be

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<sup>116</sup>Case 5 is an Indian text, and cases 6 and 7 were among those dropped from the initial dataset.

<sup>117</sup>In keeping with physical laws, one could perhaps suggest that the distance variable should have an inverse-square relationship with the worldview. Since **FAR\_AWAY** is only a dichotomous dummy variable, squaring it as it has been coded would serve no purpose.

operationalized. Until we have a basis for using a non-linear model, we assume that this assumption is also met.

#### G.5 Influential Cases

While not a regression assumption per se, it is often revealing to examine the effect of influential cases. It is possible for a single case to have a significant influence on the regression line; studying such a case (or several such cases) may suggest insights into the model -- perhaps even calling it into question. Two measures for influence are Cook's D and the studentized deleted residual (see Fox, 1991: 21-34). As these do not produce the same results, Figure G.4 and G.5 present the ten most influential cases according to each measure.

The two most influential cases on both lists, and five of the top eight according to Cook's D are American representations of the New People's Army rebellion in the Philippines. The Philippines is a key case for this theory. The country is an ally of the United States, but more distant than most of the allies covered in this analysis. It also changes regime from non-democratic to democratic during the war. Since these variables independently predict different responses to the war, the Philippine case may have helped sort out the relative influence of the variables.

The other cases are mostly "unusual" results: Canadian statements consistent with realism, liberal American representations of Afghanistan, and some realist American representations of wars that otherwise tended to be liberal. These results should be taken into account for future versions of this model, but they do not raise undue alarm.

Ten Most Influential Cases, Measured by Cook's D

Case	State	Date	War	Total Real	Total Lib	Ln WV RT	Cook's D
299	USA	03/30/82	Phil	7	0	-2.0794	.01576
1489	USA	06/13/88	Phil	0	6	1.9459	.01054
527	CAN	06/06/84	IranIraq	2	0	-1.0986	.00867
1836	CAN	10/03/90	Kuwait	3	0	-1.3863	.00778
1574	USA	09/26/88	Afghan	0	8	2.1972	.00756
393	USA	12/09/82	Phil	6	0	-1.9459	.00714
418	USA	03/11/83	Phil	5	0	-1.7918	.00706
435	USA	06/16/83	Phil	5	0	-1.7918	.00704
182	USA	09/22/80	Afghan	0	7	2.0794	.00700
2321	CAN	09/01/93	Yugoslav	2	2	.0000	.00633

Figure G.4: Ten Most Influential Cases, Measured by Cook's D

Ten Most Influential Cases, Measured by Studentized Deleted Residual

Case	State	Date	War	Total Real	Total Lib	Ln WV RT	Studentized
299	USA	03/30/82	Phil	7	0	-2.0794	-2.98036
1489	USA	06/13/88	Phil	0	6	1.9459	2.84057
1772	USA	08/05/90	Liberia2	4	0	-1.6094	-2.83133
1836	CAN	10/03/90	Kuwait	3	0	-1.3863	-2.77971
1574	USA	09/26/88	Afghan	0	8	2.1972	2.76473
182	USA	09/22/80	Afghan	0	7	2.0794	2.68774
826	USA	01/28/86	Yemen2	6	0	-1.9459	-2.65260
391	USA	12/01/82	Afghan	0	6	1.9459	2.64647
1028	USA	11/13/86	IranIraq	10	0	-2.3979	-2.62438
499	USA	03/22/84	IndoChin	6	0	-1.9459	-2.61952

Figure G.5: Ten Most Influential Cases, Measured by Studentized Deleted Residual

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